Pacifying Leviathan: United Nations Peace Operations and Post-Civil War State Repression

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Repression

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Abstract of Dissertation

Pacifying Leviathan: United Nations Peace Operations and Post-Civil War State Repression

Do United Nations peace operations lead to a decrease in post-civil war state repression? If so, how? While the literature is clear that UN peacekeeping decreases the likelihood of civil war recidivism, much less is known about whether the UN is able to promote liberal post-conflict human rights practices. This dissertation argues that UN peace operations, in general, produce significantly greater improvements in post-civil war state repression compared to cases where the UN does not intervene. I argue that the UN is able to accomplish its ameliorative effect on human rights practices by increasing the probability that belligerent parties will comply with peace agreement provisions, thus reducing supply- and demand-side factors of repression. On the supply-side, i.e., factors that influence the ability and/or willingness of government principals and agents to repress, peace agreement compliance typically leads to the disarmament and demobilization of government forces, the restructuring of the security sector, the monitoring of state security forces, and political power-sharing. On the demand-side, i.e., factors that influence the ability and/or willingness of opposition groups to violently dissent from the state, peace agreement compliance typically leads to the disarmament and demobilization of opposition militias, the transition of rebel groups into political parties, and the integration of opposition groups into political, military, and economic institutions.

Hypotheses derived from this theoretical argument are quantitatively tested using both the universe of post-Cold War civil wars that experienced a period of peace prior to 2005, as well as a matched subset of these conflicts in which cases are matched along important confounding variables in an attempt to mimic random assignment
to treatment and control groups. The analysis finds that cases in which peacekeeping forces are deployed experience a significantly greater improvement in human rights practices than cases in which belligerent groups are left to fend for themselves. Importantly, these estimates are robust to possible selection effects, meaning the UN did not tend to intervene in easier cases, nor are post-civil war improvements among UN cases simply regression toward the mean. Moreover, this improvement is even greater in the matched subsample, which gives a more accurate estimate of the UN’s effect in places where UN peace operations typically go. The improvement is also greater when the UN is given a multidimensional mandate. These hypotheses are further tested using causal mediation analysis, which tests whether the UN effect is mediated through the hypothesized causal mechanisms.

This quantitative analysis is supplemented with a qualitative analysis that illustrates the causal mechanisms theorized above. In these chapters I analyze two very different cases where UN peace operations were generally considered successful: ONUSAL in El Salvador and ONUMOZ in Mozambique. If the UN is indeed able to exert a causal impact in reducing state repression, it should be seen in these two cases. I therefore closely examine primary and secondary accounts of the years following the end the civil wars in El Salvador and Mozambique to determine the role the UN played in peace agreement compliance and reductions in supply- and demand-side factors of repression. I find compelling evidence that both cases experienced declines in state repression that are directly attributable to UN efforts. Quantitative synthetic control testing provides further evidence that UN involvement was at least partly responsible for the decreases in post-conflict state repression in these two cases.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Research Question

A well-established empirical finding in the international relations literature is that United Nations (UN) peacekeeping “works”. That is, countries where peacekeepers are deployed have a considerably lower probability of civil war recidivism than cases where peacekeepers are absent (Fortna 2004, 2008a; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). While this is a remarkable finding, we might ask further whether peace operations contribute to a broader societal peace than just the absence of full-scale civil war. The resumption of war or the maintenance of peace, after all, are not the only possible post-war outcomes. As Francisco Herreros has argued, “there is at least a third possibility: that civil war is followed by a wave of repression by the victors... (Herreros 2011, 177).” Given this observation, the question naturally arises: How effective are UN peace operations at promoting liberal post-conflict human rights practices? The immediate answer to this question is anything but clear. On the one hand, it may seem plausible that if UN peace operations can help maintain peace between warring parties, they may also help reduce instances of violent repression by state authorities. However, recent studies have raised doubts that this is actually
the case (Murdie and Davis 2010; Peksen 2012). Given that post-civil war states are typically places where “political institutions, economic infrastructure, and the very fabric of society have all been devastated (Fortna 2008b, 39),” and where civil-war era grievances are likely to remain (Hoglund 2008), it would not be terribly surprising to learn that the UN, while helping to prevent all-out war, is not able to produce significant improvements in human rights practices.

One thing that is certain is that some states experience much greater improvement than others. Figure 1.1 shows the five-year post-war average repression score relative to the three year pre-peace average, as measured by the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) human rights dataset (see below). Positive numbers therefore represent a post-war decrease in state repression while negative numbers represent a post-war increase. As we would expect, most states see an improvement in their human rights scores following a civil war; human rights violations and civil wars are, after all, highly correlated. However, the amount of improvement varies greatly. Furthermore, some state’s post-conflict human rights records get worse.

What explains this variation? One obvious answer is that in some states civil war resumes while in other states it does not. States where civil war reignites shortly after it ends are not likely to see much of an improvement in their human rights practices. However, even among states where war does not resume there is considerable variation. For example, despite both experiencing relatively long periods of peace following bloody civil wars, El Salvador and Peru have very different post-war human rights records. State repression in El Salvador dramatically improved following the cessation of conflict while Peru showed no improvement whatsoever.

This dissertation addresses one important piece of this puzzle by examining the impact UN peace operations have on post-war state repression. Doing so, however, requires answering at least the following questions: Do cases where UN peacekeepers intervene generally experience larger human rights improvements relative to cases
Figure 1.1
The Difference between Five-Year Post-Peace Average CIRI Score and Three-Year Pre-Peace Average CIRI Score
where the UN is absent? If so, is this association causal or merely correlational? That is, does the UN simply intervene in cases that would have seen a sharper improvement in human rights practices regardless of the presence of peacekeepers; or, does its presence cause a greater reduction in state repression? And, if the latter, what are the mechanisms by which the UN is able to effect this improvement? Lastly, are decreases in state repression simply a by-product of the UN’s ability to prevent the recurrence of civil war? In other words, if we control for the length of peace following the end of civil conflict is the effect of UN peace operations on human rights still significant?

These questions matter for numerous reasons: empirical, theoretical, and normative. Empirically, these questions are vital for assessing the success of UN peacekeeping. As Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman argue, “determining what constitutes success or failure in peace operations is a prerequisite for building knowledge about factors associated with those conditions and for making good policy choices (Diehl and Druckman 2010).” Although there is not a consensus about what the criteria for success should be, the fact that protecting human rights is becoming more and more institutionalized in UN peace operations should make us question any evaluative benchmarks that do not emphasize improvements in human rights practices. Assuming this to be the case, the general lack of studies that systematically evaluate the impact of peacekeeping on human rights should be troubling.

Theoretically, these questions get at important debates within international relations theory. Broadly, how do international actors influence the behavior of domestic actors? Specifically, what are the incentives driving state repression and how can an intergovernmental organization like the UN alter these incentives in order to decrease physical integrity violations? Another theoretical consideration concerns the causal mechanisms of civil war recidivism; in particular, the role that state repression plays in the resumption of war. Although most studies focus on the causal effect of internal
conflict in producing human rights abuses, the converse is also true; that is, state repression is a causal factor in producing internal conflict (Thoms and Ron 2007). Thus, if we are to gain a better understanding of how to prevent conflict in post-civil war environments, it is vital that we have a strong theoretical grasp of the processes that produce human rights abuses following civil war.

And normatively, answering these questions is vital to understanding how well international society is upholding its moral commitments. An unfortunate feature of civil wars, among many others, is that they are responsible for some of the worst human rights abuses in the international system. In a global statistical analysis of the cause of physical integrity violations, Poe et al. found that among other variables such as level of democracy, population size, level of economic development, and the presence of an international war, the presence of civil war had the largest effect on the likelihood that a state would violate its citizens’ physical integrity rights (Poe, Tate and Keith 1999). Given the moral obligation to mitigate the atrocities that accompany civil war, the international community should be especially interested in how the UN influences human rights practices in these ravaged countries.

1.2 Previous Research

Surprisingly little theoretical or empirical scholarly work addresses the impact of peacekeeping on post-conflict human rights practices. Most of the quantitative peacekeeping literature myopically focuses on how effective peace operations are at preventing the recurrence of civil war. Recent exceptions, however, include articles by Murdie and Davis (2010) and Peksen (2012). Murdie and Davis examine whether peacekeeping interventions improve respect for human rights in countries with a history of civil war. Their results were mixed: They found that the mere presence of peacekeepers did not improve human rights; in fact, one of their models showed that
the mere presence of peacekeepers made human rights practices worse. Other models, however, show that peacekeeping missions with a humanitarian focus or a mediation component were more successful in improving human rights practices.

Peksen, on the other hand, argues that all foreign military interventions, including those by liberal intergovernmental organizations, result in a higher likelihood that a state will violently repress its domestic opponents, regardless of whether the intervention is supportive, neutral, or hostile. The logic goes as follows: Supportive interventions bolster the political and military capabilities of a state, and because the intervention was likely triggered by some kind of domestic turmoil, states will likely use their increased capabilities to repress domestic challenges and restore political stability. Neutral interventions, due to their impartiality, signal a lack of international will to use force in order to prevent human rights atrocities, giving ruling elites the go-ahead to violently repress opponents without fear of repercussions from the international community. Finally, hostile interventions are likely to increase the strength of the political opposition, giving state authorities incentives to repress. Peksen’s empirical tests confirm his hypotheses, viz., foreign military interventions increase the probability of physical integrity violations, and this probability is unlikely to be significantly affected when the intervener is an IGO.

While these studies are a good first step in understanding the effect of peacekeepers on human rights practices, they have little to say about whether UN peace operations, or non-UN peace operations for that matter, are effective in improving post-civil war human rights. First, neither of these articles distinguishes between UN and non-UN missions. Previous empirical work has found that UN peace operations are more successful in establishing a lasting peace than non-UN missions. It may therefore be the case that UN missions are more successful than non-UN missions in improving human rights practices. Second, the dataset Davis and Murdie use does not distinguish between war years and post-war years. This is problematic because
it is likely that the impact of peace operations differs depending on whether combatants have stopped fighting and have come to some sort of peace agreement. This is exactly what Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) concluded based on their study of UN peace operations: Peace operations were not able to help wars end any faster than wars without peace operations; however, countries with UN peacekeepers were far less likely to return to war than those countries without UN peace missions. Third, both of these studies, in using a panel datasets, open up themselves to problems of post-treatment control bias. This type of bias arises when variables that may have been affected by treatment are used as control variables, biasing an estimate of the true treatment effect. Lastly, the Davis and Murdie study is theoretically underdeveloped. By focusing broadly on human rights violations committed by any actor they are unable to give a compelling account of what causes these violations. They are therefore unable to give a theoretically compelling account of how peacekeepers interact with the causes of human rights violations in order to reduce their occurrence. The Peksen article is more theoretically developed, but much of the theory is problematic. Peksen rightly begins by focusing on how foreign interventions influence the ability and willingness of governments to repress. However, he fails to address the ways in which interventions, under the right circumstances, may reduce this ability and willingness, as I argue that many UN peace operations are able to do (see below). Furthermore, this focus on ability and willingness, i.e., the response-side of repression, neglects the way that interventions may influence the threat-side of repression, e.g., violent dissent. Though he does discuss the ways in which hostile interventions may increase the domestic opposition’s strength, and thus give incentive for state repression, he does not consider how supportive or neutral interventions may reduce threat-side factors of repression.

This dissertation addresses each of these issues: 1. I test the effect of both UN and non-UN peace operations; 2. I use indicators of human rights practices that
measure human rights improvement in the years following civil war; 3. The research design used here eliminates problems associated with post-treatment control bias, and; 4. Contra Murdie and Davis, instead of focusing broadly on all human rights violations, I instead narrow my analysis to human rights violations caused by state repression. This allows for a clearer theoretical account of the causes of the particular rights violations, which also allows a clearer theoretical account of how UN peace operations are able to address these causes. Contra Peksen, I focus on both response- and threat-side factors of state repression as well as the many plausible ways in which UN peace operations can reduce these factors.

1.3 Argument

This dissertation argues that UN peace operations, in general, produce significantly greater improvements in post-civil war human rights practices compared to cases where the UN does not intervene. Drawing from liberal institutionalist theory, I argue that the UN is able to accomplish its ameliorative effect on human rights practices by increasing the probability that belligerent parties will comply with peace agreement provisions. The likelihood of compliance is increased by UN capabilities that reduce uncertainty and mitigate commitment problems, such as monitoring and verification, reducing the belligerents’ privately held information about the extent to which they are honoring their commitments, making aid disbursement dependent on compliance, and raising reputation costs. In addition, UN expertise assists in the complex undertakings that peace agreements generally require. Together, these actions lead to a decrease in response-side factors of repression (i.e., factors that influence the ability and/or willingness of government actors to repress) by bringing about the disarmament and demobilization of government forces, the restructuring of the state security sector, the monitoring of state security forces by UN civilian
police, and political power-sharing and democratic accountability. Compliance leads to reductions in threat-side factors (i.e., factors that produce dissent among opposition groups and create incentives for the state to repress) by bringing about the disarmament and demobilization of opposition militias, the transition of rebel groups into political parties, and the integration of opposition groups into political, military, and economic institutions.

1.4 Methodology

Hypotheses derived from this theoretical argument are quantitatively tested using both the universe of post-Cold War civil wars that experienced a period of peace prior to 2005, as well as a matched subset of these conflicts in which cases are matched along important confounding variables, in effect mimicking random assignment to treatment and control groups. The analysis finds that cases in which peacekeeping forces are deployed experience a significantly greater improvement in human rights practices than cases in which belligerent groups are left to fend for themselves. This improvement is even greater in the matched sample, which provides an estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The ATT is the estimate of most concern because our interest is not whether UN intervention is beneficial in all cases but whether it is beneficial for those kinds of cases where UN peace operations typically go (Fraser and Guo 2009, 47). Furthermore, the repression-reducing effect of UN peace operations is greater in cases where these missions have been given a multidimensional mandate, which makes it more likely that peacekeepers will have the capacity to reduce the response- and threat-side factors of repression discussed above.

Importantly, I find that this effect is not simply a result of the UN choosing easier cases in which to intervene. The cases in which the UN has intervened during
the post-Cold War period have significantly worse human rights records in the years prior to intervention compared to states that don’t receive peacekeepers. Yet, these cases show a significantly greater improvement in human rights practices in the years following civil war. This analysis therefore demonstrates that UN peacekeepers are sent to more difficult situations and that these countries experience a markedly greater improvement in state repression than their non-peacekept counterparts.¹ Moreover, this finding is not simply an epiphenomenal by-product of the UN’s ability to prevent the recurrence of civil war; the finding still holds when controlling for the length of peace following a civil war, providing evidence that UN peace operations have a direct, rather than merely indirect, effect on post-war state repression. Lastly, using sensitivity analysis, I find that these estimates of the UN effect are robust to the presence of unobserved confounders.

These quantitative findings are then supplemented with a qualitative analysis of state repression in two post-civil war cases. While the statistical analysis is able to tell us whether or not UN peace operations are, in fact, associated with improvements in human rights practices, it does less well at telling us how this improvement occurred, i.e., the actual causal mechanisms that reduced the violence. While causal mediation analysis (see Chapter Three) can allow us to test how much of the UN effect is mediated through particular mechanisms, we cannot fully understand exactly how the UN improves human rights practices without concrete illustrations. In order to do this, careful qualitative case studies are required. The case studies in this dissertation provide structured, focused comparisons of two cases where the UN intervened and was generally considered to be successful, but where the two cases are very different from each other. This allows me to give more generalizable illustrations of how the UN affects post-conflict state repression. The first case is El Salvador, where the UN intervened following the end of a thirteen-year long civil war that ended 1992.

¹At first glance this might seem like a “regression to the mean” phenomenon. However, not only do UN cases catch up to the levels of non-UN cases, they surpass them.
Out of all cases in the sample, it experienced the most pronounced improvement in human rights practices following the end of its civil war. The second case is Mozambique, which saw the end of a fifteen-year civil war in 1992. While Mozambique’s improvement in post-conflict human rights was not as dramatic as El Salvador’s, it was still substantial. Both of these UN missions are generally regarded as successful, with competent leadership and adequate resources for the multidimensional mandate that constituted each operation. Success has been demonstrated by many factors, foremost of which is that peace has held in both cases to the present time. If the UN is indeed able to exert a causal impact in reducing state repression, it should be seen in these two cases. I therefore closely examine primary and secondary accounts of the years following the end of the civil war to determine the role, if any, the UN played in reducing response- and threat-side factors of repression and thus improving the human rights practices of the El Salvadoran and Mozambican governments.

In rest of this section, I tackle some preliminary issues that need to be addressed before I can develop a theory of UN peacekeeping and post-conflict human rights in the next chapter. First, I define how I am using the term state repression. In order to develop a theory of how the UN influences post-conflict repression, we must first have a clear conceptual framework of what is meant by the term. Scholars have defined repression in numerous ways, some of which are radically different from one another. Second, I conceptually distinguish state repression from civil war. Doing so is vital to the aims of this dissertation: failing to do so would make the claims here redundant.² Lastly, I give a brief outline of the causal factors driving state repression. Understanding how a particular variable (e.g., the presence of the UN) can influence levels of state repression demands that we possess a solid grasp of the causal forces known to produce repression.

²The redundancy would stem from the fact that the UN’s role in preventing civil war from recurring has already been well-established.
1.5 Defining Repression

The study of repression is, at its core, the study of political order. Or, in the words of Davenport, studies of repression are an attempt at “trying to ascertain how political authorities wield coercive power amid potential and actual domestic challengers (Davenport 2007, 1).” However, the way political authorities maintain political control takes many different forms, some of which may or may not be classified as repression. Not surprising, then, finding a precise definition of state repression is notoriously difficult. Johnston and Mueller maintain that “of all the concepts in the tool kit of political process theorists, none can compare with state repression in the lack of consensus on its meaning, theoretical status, operationalization, or empirical relationships with other variables (Johnston and Mueller 2001, 353).”

The literature on state repression in the social sciences has used a host of ways to conceptualize state repression, including Galtung’s concept of structural violence; civil and political rights (free speech, democracy), and second- (cultural, social, and economic) and third-generation (environmental and peace) rights (Davenport 2007). While these concepts are certainly worthy of study on their own right, classifying them as state repression merely muddles the conceptual waters and stymies theoretical development; the causal factors leading to non-violent methods of political control (e.g., censorship) will not necessarily be the same factors that lead to violent forms of political control such as torture and murder.

Rather than attempt to define what actually counts as state repression, a more productive path may be to simply define how this dissertation uses the term. One promising way to do this has been suggested by Earl (2003), who argues that typologies of repression should incorporate three different dimensions: 1. The identity of the person(s) doing the repression; 2. The form that the actual repression takes, and;

\textsuperscript{3}This is perhaps an exaggeration, especially given the nearly law-like relationship that has been found between state repression and dissent, as will be explained below.
3. Whether or not the acts of repression are observable. In this dissertation I define state repression as follows: 1. The persons doing the repression must be government officials or sanctioned by government officials. Government officials may be any person serving in an official state capacity or granted coercive authority by the state, e.g., police, prison guard, military, etc. It is important to note, however, that this definition may include acts of repression by agents that may not have the official approval of government principals. As will be explained below, the interests of principals and agents vis-à-vis repression may not always align; 2. The form that repression takes must violate in some way the physical integrity of those being repressed by means of either torture, extrajudicial murder, political imprisonment, or disappearances, and; 3. These activities of repression must be observable. Narrowly defining state repression has practical as well as theoretical benefits. Practically, these activities are relatively easy to measure. Theoretically, since the causal mechanisms that produce the various conceptions of repression described above are likely divergent, employing a narrower definition allows for a tighter and more tractable theoretical structure. Furthermore, this narrow definition is how state repression is conventionally defined in the IR literature. Using the conventional conception allows for better theoretical development within the field as well as easier comparison among competing theories.

1.6 Repression vs. Civil War

Defining repression as actions that violate physical integrity, however, can also lead to the conflation of repression and civil war. It is therefore important to note the distinction between civil war on the one hand, and one-sided political conflict that is better defined as repression, on the other. This distinction is critical to the argument

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4Because I define repression as state repression, I use the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset to test my arguments in the following chapter, rather than the Political Terror Scale (PTS). The CIRI dataset exclusively measures acts of state repression, while the PTS dataset measures human rights abuses by any actor. This will be discussed further in Chapter Three.
of this paper. If no distinction exists between these phenomena then I would be merely restating the finding that UN peace operations increase the likelihood that peace will hold following civil wars. While the tactics of state repression, i.e., torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, and extrajudicial murder, are certainly used in civil wars, it is also the case that a government can use these tactics and yet not be considered to be at war. The difference here can certainly be fuzzy but operationally there can exist extensive state repression without civil war. This can be the case if the government isn’t actually killing anybody; for instance, by limiting their repressive acts to torture or imprisonment. This can also be the case if the government is killing large numbers of people without experiencing retaliation from a rebel group capable of inflicting serious harm on government forces. In this latter sense, repression and civil war can be distinguished by whether violence is one-sided or two-sided (Besley and Persson 2009).

Additionally, whether or not a country experiences civil war on the one hand, or repression on the other, is likely dependent on the tactics opposition groups use to obtain their revisionist goals. Cunningham and Lemke (2011) argued in a recent paper that one way to secure more resources/power/security might be to fight the government for it. But another way to pursue such goals might be to carry on demonstrations, to rise up in riots, or to target other groups in society in hopes of taking their resources or removing them from privileged positions. The former approach is likely to result in full-blown civil war while the latter is more likely to result in state repression. However, while the this distinction is meaningful and necessary, it’s also important to note the close relationship between repression and civil conflict. As Lebovic and Thompson (2006) argue, repression and civil conflict arise from the same factors.
1.7 Why Repression Occurs

In order to understand how a particular causal mechanism might influence the practice of state repression, we must first have some understanding of why state repression occurs. We can then identify how some exogenous element may play a role in altering the conditions that drive repressive behavior. Fortunately, a well-developed literature exists that theorizes the causal mechanisms that typically drive state repression. These can be broken down into response-side and threat-side factors.

1.7.1 Response-Side Factors of State Repression

I define the response-side of repression as those factors that influence both the ability and the willingness of government principals and agents to repress. This follows, at least in part, the conceptualization put forward by Poe, Tate and Keith (1999). In answer to the question of why some states choose to repress their citizens, they answer, “In most cases, we postulate, it is because their principal political leaders are willing to repress, and because they have the opportunity to act on their choice (Poe, Tate and Keith 1999, 293).” However, my definition of response-side factors goes beyond Poe et al.; a focus on government decision-makers is insufficient in conceptualizing response-side factors of repression. Because the degree of control elites have over their bureaucracies of repression, e.g., police, army, intelligence services, etc., varies over space and time, levels of repression is at least partly determined by the preferences and incentives of the agents that carry out government policies (Mitchell 2004; Bohara et al. 2008). Therefore, a more nuanced definition of the response-side factors of repression must include those factors that influence the ability and willingness of principals and agents to repress.
Principals

Principals are the decision makers that set the official repression agenda, generally in response to some perceived threat. Given a threat to the status quo, government elites have two options: repress or make concessions. Because concessions by definition mean that elites will have to give up something they would prefer to have, I assume that, when possible, elites will choose to repress rather than concede. However, elites do not always repress and frequently make concessions; that is, the level of repression is lower than one would expect given that repression maximizes elite’s share of goods better than concessions. I argue that the reason for this undersupply of repression is due to elites lacking the ability and/or the willingness to repress. A government’s ability to repress decreases when the state’s security apparatus loses strength or the government’s control over this apparatus is weakened. For instance, a repressive state needs security agencies with sufficient resources as well as security personnel who are loyal to government leaders and are willing to follow orders by committing human rights abuses. These personnel also need access to the instruments of repression such as weapons, prisons, etc.\(^5\)

However, possessing the ability to repress does not mean that, given a certain level of threat, a government will actually choose a strategy of repression; the state with perhaps the greatest ability to violently repress its people, i.e., the United States, generally does not do so. Government elites, in other words, may have the ability to repress, but not the willingness. This occurs, to simplify things greatly, when the costs of repression outweigh the benefits. The imposition of these costs can come from numerous sources, both domestic and international. Domestic sources of costs may stem from punishment in elections, at least in democracies. But even in non-democracies, excessive repression may be punished by those in a “electorate” that

\(^5\)Other elements influencing the ability to repress may include government institutions, e.g., corrupt judicial bodies willing to subject individuals to political imprisonment or at least overlook government abuses, or even domestic social norms that dictate the acceptability of particular repressive practices.
prefer not to use repression. This may be the case if widespread repression has a negative impact on the economic interests of elites within a coalition. Internationally, sources of costs are many and varied. Some examples include a reduction in foreign aid from multilateral organizations (Lebovic and Voeten 2009), a reduction in foreign investment (Blanton and Blanton 2007), and public shaming by IGOs and NGOs (Lebovic and Voeten 2006; Hafner-Burton 2008; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999).

**Agents**

Agents are those actors that actually carry out the repressive policies of principals. Because they are at least partly accountable to principals, we would expect that the actions of agents should at least partially follow the policies of principals. However, it is not necessarily the case the actions of agents and the policies of principals will always align. In some instances, agents will have preferences that deviate from those of principals. And because agents may possess asymmetric informational advantages vis-à-vis principals, government policy-makers may have a difficult time ensuring that agents are following their orders. To paraphrase Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore’s characterization of international organizations, repressive organs are constrained by government policy makers, “but the notion that they are passive mechanisms with no independent agendas of their own is not borne out by any detailed empirical study (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 705).”

Agents, therefore, may continue to repress even when the official government policy is to not repress. The economic and/or psychological interests of repressive agents may provide enough incentive to ignore official state policy. For instance, there is some evidence that repressive agencies attract those who find sadistic pleasure in harming others (Bohara et al. 2008). Others may use their repressive capacity to extort bribes from those seeking to escape violent repression. This means that, as Mitchell argues, “If behavior from other bureaucracies provides a guide, the private interests of the
agents and their ability to hide their interests and actions from the principal contribute substantially and systematically to the human toll of the bureaucracies of repression (Mitchell 2004, 6)."^6

1.7.2 Threat-Side Factors of State Repression

If the response-side of repression is about the ability and willingness to repres, then the threat-side is about the factors that provide incentives for state repression. Thus, threat-side factors of repression are those factors that produce threats to government elites, primarily in the form of dissent, particularly violent dissent. These threats create threat for repression because failing to address them could result in the ouster of government leaders from power. In the past two decades, the state repression literature has connected dissent to one of the very few “laws” within political science, what Christian Davenport refers to as the “law of coercive response (Davenport 2007).” This law states that whenever opposition groups challenge the status quo, governments respond with some sort of repressive response in order to subdue the threatening factions.

This finding has been replicated using statistical and qualitative evidence from most countries in the world across a broad span of time. Schmitz and Sikkink (2002) echo this argument when they state that the “emerging consensus holds that real or imagined threats to a regime are almost always the source of [human rights] violations.” This is striking because so few propositions in the social sciences have been able to withstand such broad empirical analysis and remain credible (Davenport

^6It may also be the case, we should note, that the preferences of principals and agents diverge in such a way as to produce less repression than policy-makers prefer. If agents find official repressive policies to be overly violent or to be directed against co-ethnics, they may refuse to carry out repressive policies.

^7Quantitative studies include Henderson (1991); Hoover and Kowalewski (1992); Poe and Tate (1994); Davenport (1995); Francisco (1996); Rasler (1996); King (1997); Franklin (1997); Carey (2006, 2010); Conrad and Moore (2010) For Qualitative examples see Bushnell et al. (1991); Churchill and Vander Wall (1990); Corradi, Fagen and Garret (1992); Rejali (1994); Della Porta (1995); O’Kane (1996); Stanley (1996); Rummel (1997); Horowitz (2002)
Like repression, dissent requires that individuals be both willing and able to engage in government-threating actions. Furthermore, depending on the level of organization of rebel groups, dissenters can be conceptually broken down into principals and agents, with possibility of non-aligning preference.\footnote{Although most studies focus on the domestic-level sources of dissent, and hence repression, other studies point to an international component. For example, Lebovic and Thompson (2006) argue that the Arab-Israeli conflict increased regional levels of repression both directly and indirectly. Additionally, Wright (2014) argues that when democratic states are involved in wars of territorial revision, they are more likely to repress domestic groups that are opposed to the conflict.}

Importantly, these findings in the state repression literature are relevant to theorizing post-conflict repression. Given that post-conflict societies have, by definition, recently emerged from a particularly severe episode of a domestic challenge, they are likely to have unique problems vis-à-vis repression. For instance, Davenport argues that authorities are more likely to respond to dissent with repression when challengers wish to displace current political leaders and/or the political-economic system (Davenport 1995). Because opposition groups in post-conflict settings have recently attempted to displace the current political leaders, it is likely case the these environments are particularly at risk for state repression.

1.8 Organization

This dissertation will proceed as follows: Chapter Two will present a causal theory of peacekeeping and human rights. I show how UN peace operations are able to
increase the probability of compliance with peace agreements and thus reduce the response- and threat-side factors that contribute to repression. Chapter Three will discuss the methodological techniques for addressing the possibility of selection bias as well as quantitatively testing the hypotheses laid out in Chapter Two. Chapters Four and Five provide case studies that outline the causal mechanisms proposed in Chapter Two. The first examines the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), which was dispatched to help mediate a peace agreement between the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), as well as verify the implementation of the peace agreement. The second case study explores the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), sent to monitor and verify the ceasefire and peace agreement between Frelimo and Renamo. Both of these case studies include synthetic control testing, a technique that attempts to compare the post-war repression trajectory of El Salvador and Mozambique against the trajectory of comparable control states synthetically created using an innovative quantitative procedure. Following the case studies I offer some general conclusions and outline policy implications and directions for future research.
Chapter 2

Theory and Hypotheses

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theory of how UN peace operations influence post-civil war levels of state repression. Although we have a reasonably strong theoretical basis for explaining how peace operations decrease the likelihood that a civil war will reignite, it is not immediately apparent how peace operations might be able to decrease human rights violations by the government in the aftermath of civil war. In fact, the actions of peace operations have on at least one occasion resulted in an increase in acts of repression.\(^1\) Perhaps the most intuitive answer is that by decreasing the likelihood of civil war, peace operations decrease state repression by preventing the types of repression that inevitably accompany war. However, causal mediation analysis from Chapter Three suggests that this type of indirect effect does not explain the correlation between UN involvement and human rights improvements. Therefore, if this correlation is to be given a causal interpretation, it is necessary to outline a theory of plausible mechanisms that explain how UN involvement results in

\(^1\)Perhaps the most conspicuous example is when the Serbian military massacred over 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in the town of Srebinica. This massacre was facilitated in part by the UN Security Council, which declared the town a safe area, resulting in the concentration of Muslim soldiers and refugees. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), made up of 400 Dutch peacekeepers, failed to prevent the genocide.
decreased state repression.

Below I elaborate a liberal institutionalist theory that explains how peace operations are able to increase the probability that belligerent parties will comply with peace agreement provisions, resulting in a reduction of the response- and threat-side factors of repression. response-side factors include both the willingness and the ability of government principals and agents to engage in acts of repression. threat-side factors concern the ability and willingness of rebel groups to threaten the stability and authority of state government institutions and officials, e.g., violent dissent, armed insurgency, etc. I argue that UN peace operations, by increasing the likelihood that belligerents will comply with peace settlement terms, are able, in many cases, to reduce both the response- and threat-side factors of repression to levels that are lower than would be the case in the counterfactual where the UN is not present. This theory constitutes one of the few fully developed causal arguments in the literature regarding the effects of peacekeepers.²

2.2 Peace Operations and Human Rights

In this section I develop a theory of how UN peace operations can exert a causal effect on post-civil war state repression. I focus exclusively on UN peace operations primarily because theorizing all peace operations would be too unwieldy. Concentrating on peace operations authorized and carried out by UN forces makes theory building more tractable since UN peace operations are likely to have systematic differences from non-UN peace operations (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2008). However, this is not to say that UN peace operations are all alike, far from it. The complexity

²Fortna (2008a) argues that most of peacekeeping literature is devoid of explicitly causal arguments, and instead relies on unsystematic and vague theorizing with few clear arguments that explain how peacekeepers can change the incentives of the peacekept to engage in conflict. The causal theory she goes on to develop explains how peacekeepers can reduce the likelihood that war will reignite. The causal argument here, on the other hand, explains how peacekeepers can reduce incidences of state repression.
of UN peace operations means, among other things, that determining exactly which causal mechanism(s) leads to an improvement in human rights practices poses a challenge. While traditional peacekeeping has typically been restricted to interposing UN personnel between belligerents and monitoring ceasefires, post-Cold War peace operations quickly began to take on additional responsibilities, including but not limited to humanitarian assistance, monitoring and running elections, human rights monitoring; assisting in the demobilization, disarming, and reintegration (DDR) of soldiers, training and monitoring police forces, security-sector reform (SSR), helping to rebuild judicial institutions, and assisting in the formations of a national military (Fortna and Howard 2008). If peace operations are in fact able to decrease instances of state repression, which of the above actions are primarily responsible for this phenomenon? I argue that by increasing the likelihood that former belligerents will comply with the terms of a war-ending peace settlement, UN peace operations decrease the government’s ability and willingness to use repression (response-side) as well as the rebel group’s ability and willingness to dissent (threat-side). I analyze these at length below.³

2.2.1 Peace Operations and Agreement Compliance

The mechanisms through which, I argue below, the response- and threat-side factors of repression are reduced—DDR, SSR, monitoring, political power sharing, rebel to party transformations —are typically agreed to in conflict-ending peace agreements. However, compliance with these agreements is anything but guaranteed. The argument here is that UN peace operations can increase the likelihood of compliance with intrastate agreements in much the same way that international institutions help increase compliance with interstate agreements.

³It’s important to note, however, that the distinction between various mechanisms in both the response- and threat-sides of repression may be more useful as analytical categories than in practice. For instance, SSR and DDR are closely related and the dynamics of both often bleed into each other.
Liberal institutionalists have long argued that international institutions can help states cooperate in the presence of anarchy (Keohane 2005; Simmons 1998). More recent work has adapted these arguments to bargaining models, showing how international institutions can help states overcome obstacles to mutually beneficial agreements by alleviating information asymmetries and commitment problems (McLaughlin and Hensel 2007). Because commitment problems and information asymmetries are often at the root of noncompliance with intrastate peace settlement terms (Walter 2009), mitigating these issues is often the key to ensuring compliance with peace agreements.

The key issue of the commitment problem is that compliance by actor A may put it at a future disadvantage with actor B if actor B does not comply with its commitments. For instance, if actor A disarms but actor B does not, actor B can then easily exploit actor A’s military weakness and insist on more favorable peace terms. Because of this, actor A is unlikely to comply unless it has satisfactory assurances that actor B will also follow through. While others have focused on third-party enforcement as the key to ensuring compliance (Walter 2001), coercive enforcement is only one way in which peace operations can increase the likelihood that belligerents will comply with their agreements. This is critical given the fact that most UN operations do not have a mandate that allows for coercive enforcement. Along with upholding agreements by force, peace operations can reduce uncertainty regarding whether the other side will comply with their promises. This prevents commitment problems from sabotaging compliance by giving both parties confidence that the other side is following through with their stated intentions. Perhaps the primary way peace operations reduce uncertainty is through providing resources for monitoring and verification. Information collected and disseminated by the UN reduces the belligerents’ privately held information about the extent to which they are honoring their commitments, making it less likely that fears of exploitation will prevent compliance. In addition, peace op-
erations can reduce the temptations either side has to exploit the other party if they do happen to gain an advantage. They do this through making aid disbursement dependent on compliance, withholding good offices in the event of noncompliance, and raising reputation costs for reneging. Each of these raise the costs of noncompliance, and thus give both parties more confidence that complying with their agreements will not lead to their exploitation. Lastly, UN organizational expertise can be a critical factor in helping parties carry out complex undertakings agreed to in peace agreements, such as elections, rebel-to-party transformations, security sector reform, and disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating large military organizations.

2.2.2 Peace Operations and Response-Side Factors

In order to conceptualize the role of peace operations in reducing response-side factors of repression, I use a simplified model of post-civil war conflict involving two main actors. On the one side are government elites, i.e., those in control, or allied with those in control, of the government during the recent civil war and those representing this group in the post-conflict government. On the other side we have an opposition group that was the main foe of the government in the recent war. Within both of these groups are agents that may or may not be fully responsive to the preferences of the principals. Peace operations can provide several functions, e.g., verification of compliance, information about capabilities and resolve, making aid dependent on compliance, etc. that increase the likelihood government principals and agents will comply with the terms of war-ending peace agreements. Compliance typically results in disarming and demobilizing security forces (DDR); security sector reform (SSR);

4While in many cases of post-civil war settlements opposition forces obtain some level of power in the post-war government, I focus on government elites when analyzing how UN peace operations influence the ability and willingness of government policy-makers to repress. The reason for this is that it allows me to concentrate on those actors that would have an incentive to repress opposition groups. When opposition groups are brought into a government, they will likely not have the willingness to repress their own people. As such, opposition groups within the government are better analyzed as a constraint that limits the ability of government elites to repress.
the UN monitoring of security forces, and power-sharing agreements. Compliance in each of these areas serves to reduce the ability and/or willingness of government elites to repress, as shown in Table 2.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principals</th>
<th>Ability</th>
<th>Willingness</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DDR, SSR, Power-Sharing</td>
<td>Monitoring, Elections</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Agents</td>
<td>DDR, Monitoring</td>
<td>DDR, SSR</td>
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**Table 2.1**

**Response-Side of Repression**

**Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration**

Perhaps the most obvious way to decrease the repressive ability of government elites is to reduce the number of military personnel at their disposal, which requires a process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). However, government elites are not likely to willingly reduce their ability to confront security threats in the absence of assurances that doing so will not result in their exploitation by opposition forces. Even if government elites agree to reduce the size of their security forces in a post-war settlement, security concerns may derail the implementation of these agreements. Both opposition and government elites have difficulties credibly committing

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5Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the concept of DDR began to rapidly penetrate and become institutionalized in international development and security discourse, as well as in UN agencies. Although several countries have implemented DDR programs on their own, e.g. Philippines, Russia, Colombia, instances of DDR have by and large been overseen by the UN’s Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (Muggah 2009). By the end of the 1990s, more than 20 UN agencies were contributing financial and technical assistance to DDR programs in dozens of countries (ibid.).
to reduce their strength, since doing so could allow their opponents to take advantage of a newly formed relative advantage. Monitoring and verification of this process by peace operations, can, in some cases, allow both sides to credibly commit to demobilizing and disarming. This is of particular importance because the same factors that convince belligerents to agree to the terms of a peace agreement can also make these agreements very difficult to implement. According to Sambanis (2008), in countries with deep hostilities (after long and bloody wars) factions are more likely to sign a treaty as they realize that they cannot win a military victory, but trust is so low and local capacities so depleted that it is in precisely such complicated “peacebuilding ecologies” that the parties need the UN’s assistance to implement a settlement. The UN can help by monitoring and verifying compliance, which gives assurances that rebel groups are also complying, thus assuaging possible commitment problems. In addition, UN operations can provide financial incentives that make noncompliance more costly and technical assistance that makes compliance less costly.\(^6\)

Furthermore, disarmed and demobilized soldiers are less likely to cooperatively participate in the peace process if they lack a clear path of reintegration into conventional society. The UN is often critical in facilitating reintegration through such means as facilitating land reform in El Salvador, and operating a trust fund for demobilized soldiers in Mozambique. Because many states involved in civil wars have a history of using their military and intelligence organizations to repress, reducing the size of these organizations should result, ceteris paribus, in a decreased ability of both principals and agents to repress. In addition, reintegration should decrease the willingness of demobilized soldiers—i.e., agents— to engage in repressive behavior.

\(^6\)Because the commitment problem is particularly relevant to the demobilizing and disarming of opposition forces, the details of how the UN can help this process is more fully elaborated in the threat-side section.
Security Sector Reform

While demobilization, disarmament, and eliminating the most repressive security agencies may decrease the size of the state repressive apparatus, this does not necessarily mean that policy-makers will refrain from using the remaining security forces to repress. Thus, along with reducing the number of repressive personnel, it is also necessary to reform the substance and character of the surviving elements of the security sector. Because the police and internal security forces of post-conflict states likely have a history of serving as repressive instruments of government elites, security-sector reform (SSR)\(^7\) is a critical aspect of decreasing the ability of government elites to choose a repressive policy as well as the willingness of agents to engage in repressive actions. SSR entails the transformation of repressive agencies into efficient and effective security institutions that serve the security interests of citizens, society and the state while respecting human rights and operating within the rule of law and under effective democratic control (Caparini 2003).

One primary means of reforming repressive agencies is the inclusion of opposition members into the security apparatus. This often means disbanding agencies with repressive histories and creating new security institutions with personnel from both government and rebel groups. Addressing the impact of post-conflict power-sharing, Timothy Sisk argues that power sharing in the security sector is the most consequential type of power-sharing vis-à-vis post-war state-society relations: “The most important appointments and offices are those in the security forces, for the military and police are often the ultimate arbiters of social relations in divided societies (Sisk 1996, 57).” Once the security sector is not composed solely of personnel loyal to

\(^7\)There are several competing ways in which SSR is conceptualized. Some especially broad versions of SSR include civil society and non-state militias as actors within the security sector. I follow Toft in using a narrower definition that focuses on those parts of the state authorized to use armed force in the service of the state. According to Toft, “depending on the particular historical and institutional exigencies in a given state, these might include military, paramilitary, and police forces (those authorized to bear arms) Toft (2009, 13).”
government elites, it becomes more difficult for them to use security forces to repress political opponents. Additionally, purging the security sector of those with a history of violent repression and including members of opposition groups will likely result in a reduced willingness of agents to have private motives to repress.

Thus, changing the composition of the security sector is a key to decreasing response-side factors of repression. However, like disarmament and demobilization, integrating opposition forces into the state military, intelligence, and police institutions is a difficult process. Although peace agreements typically include provisions whereby opposition soldiers are integrated into the state security apparatus, governments are usually loathe to assimilate former mortal enemies into the state security structure. Peacekeepers can help facilitate this transformation in several ways. First, peace operations can monitor and verify the process by which soldiers are chosen for a new post-war military. In some cases they even run this process (Fortna 2008a). Second, peace operations are sometimes able to exert pressure on those resisting SSR. This pressure obtains leverage from the UN’s ability to publicize the lack of cooperation as well as the UN’s leverage with international donors, thus making noncompliance more costly by threatening reputational damage as well as the loss of international aid.

However, even with a reformed security sector, there is no guarantee that government elites will not choose to repress perceived opponents. Furthermore, and more troubling, just because government elites adopt a non-repressive policy does not mean that significant repression will not occur; agents, acting without the sanction of principals, may choose on their own to violate human rights. Reasons for non-sanctioned repression may include economic or psychological rewards, e.g., extorting bribes or fulfilling sadistic desires. In theory, this can be prevented if the principal is able to monitor the actions of agents and deter or punish noncompliance. However, monitoring bureaucracies of repression poses several difficulties. Mitchell has argued that
because of the general public sensitivity to the use of political violence and human rights violations, and the understandable disinclination of leaders or principals to audit security agencies (fearing that what they uncover might inconveniently reflect on them), problems of information asymmetry may be particularly severe in this policy area. Not only do agents tend to exploit their information advantages, principals may exploit the advantage of ignorance. Further, if, as scholars have pointed out, the cost of auditing varies across policy areas, then it is likely to be highest with respect to violence (Mitchell 2004, 50).

One way to get around these problems is to transfer the monitoring of repressive agencies to a third party that doesn’t have the same disincentives to uncover problematic behavior; this is where the UN comes in. Thus, an important way in which the UN attempts to ensure that agents are behaving properly and abiding by the terms of a peace settlement is by monitoring the actions of security agencies. For a long time, this was primarily done through the United Nations Civilian Police Force (CIVPOL). CIVPOL, now UNPOL, serves as “the main source of accurate information on the government’s compliance with human rights through its law enforcement agencies (Hartz 1999, 27).” CIVPOL monitors are typically given, at least in principle, unfettered access to all of the activities of local law enforcement agencies (LEA).

According to Hartz, the monitor should: have access to all incoming calls and personal approaches at the local police stations; have the authority and discretion to select which specific incidents shall be monitored within the parameters of the mandate (due to manpower and resource constraints, priorities will have to be set); be present close to the Local Police Officer on the scene (including arrests/detentions, house searches etc); understand the oral and written statements and instructions that the Local Police Officer issues (normally through an interpreter); be present during interrogations and interviews; scrutinize the Local Police Officer’s actions; follow up cases and evaluate the final results; have access to all premises used by the local LEA including rooms and premises for detention and storage rooms for seized materials; as well as accessing the Law Enforcement Agency’s duty rosters, and administrative and operational documents (Ibid. 31-32).

When monitors learn of activities that they were unable to directly witness, they also have the option of retroactively reporting these activities. The reports of monitors are forwarded through the chain of command to the Head of Mission, who then has the option of recommending any actions against the government. Depending on the severity of the allegations, the UN may respond through public shaming, imposing sanctions or embargoes, etc. Along with reducing the ability of agents, this monitoring

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8In 2007 CIVPOL became UNPOL
reduces the willingness of government elites to repress by attaching potential costs to repressive actions. The costs of losing international funding, the imposition of international sanctions, or loss of reputation may in some cases outweigh the benefits of repression.

**Political Power Sharing**

Once the formerly warring parties have disarmed and demobilized, the process of integrating opposition actors into government institutions and security forces can begin, ending the formerly monopolistic reign of government leaders. Power-sharing provisions by definition increase the difficulty of using state power to the detriment of opposition groups: Repressing opposition groups becomes complicated by the presence of other power-wielding groups within the government that are opposed to repression. As Mattes and Savun argue, “If the rebels are represented at different levels of government their enemies cannot decree or implement policies without their consent. Under these conditions, the rebels’ enemies will be unable to pursue any policies, whether military, economic, cultural, or relating to autonomy and federalism, that are detrimental to the rebels (Mattes and Savun 2009, 742).” In other words, power-sharing reduces the ability of principals to repress. Importantly, the trust that enables genuine power-sharing agreements is more likely to exist in cases where peace operations are active participants and security guarantors (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). For instance, UN monitors can verify that a rebel group has completely disarmed, making their inclusion into the government less risky. Furthermore, democratic institutions, which are often a mechanism for ensuring power sharing, make government actors democratically accountable for repression. This has the effect of raising the costs of repression, and thus decreases the willingness of principals to repress. Importantly, the presence of UN peace operations is strongly associated with the development of democratic institutions and movement toward more democratic practices (Joshi
2012).

However, it’s also important to note the possibility that increased rebel political power may increase the threat level perceived by the government. In this case, it’s possible that power-sharing can lead to a backlash among hardliners, resulting in increased repression. However, UN peace operations can exert influence that limits the power of hardliners. As Fortna (2008a) argues, “By providing organizational or financial resources and information to moderates, peacekeepers may also be able to weaken hardliners in ways that make spoiling less likely.” Furthermore, peacekeepers can identify spoilers and increase their costs of defection (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). It’s also plausible, as I explain below, that the transformation of rebel groups from military to political organizations would decrease the threat level posed by opposition groups; sharing some political power may not be ideal, but it may be better than confronting a violent military organization determined to overthrow the government and take all political power. Lastly, at the very least, a tradeoff between sharing political power and raising perceived threat levels by government officials is a wash. It may raise threat levels, but it also decreases the government’s ability to do anything about that threat.

### 2.2.3 Peace Operations and Threat-Side Factors

As was explained above, the threat-side of repression relates to factors that produce threats to government elites. These threats create incentives for repression because failing to address them could result in government leaders being ousted from power. As was also explained, the relationship between dissent and repression is so strong that they seem to have a nearly law-like relationship: where you find repression, you also find dissent. Therefore, in identifying the factors that produce incentives for repression in post-conflict settings, it is important to think carefully about the likely

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9This statement refers more to principals than to agents. As was discussed above, violent repression by agents may not be as a result of government policy, but rather due to private interests.
sources of dissent.

This is critical because post-war cases will likely differ from cases that are not immediately recovering from armed conflict. For one thing, states in the immediate aftermath of civil war are likely to face the problem of a large, heavily armed opposition that has just engaged in bloody conflict with the government. If violent anti-government activity is to take place, this will likely be the source. In addition, dissatisfaction with the outcome of the war or with the terms of the peace agreement may lead to dissent, violent and otherwise. This is especially likely to be true with wars that ended with a negotiated settlement.\textsuperscript{10} If the previous war didn’t end in the defeat of the militarily organized opposition, then rebels will still possess the capacity to engage in threatening anti-government activity and their continued existence is likely to pose a serious threat to government leaders. This should be particularly true in cases in which the UN intervenes given that these cases are likely to have relatively more powerful rebel groups than other cases (Fortna 2008a).

Because government leaders are likely to want to weaken these relatively powerful opposition groups, but also avoid returning to civil war, repression may be a possible alternative that accomplishes both preferences, viz., it may be the case that covert acts of repression will not as conspicuously violate a peace agreement as overt military acts. Thus, it’s possible to have a situation in which war has not resumed but where a government is violently repressing opponents. So while human rights are likely to improve in the aftermath of a civil war by virtue of the fact that the atrocities that often accompany civil war will likely decline, post-civil war environments still offer many incentives for state repression. A key, then to reducing repression, is to reduce the incentives for repression; in other words, to reduce the real or perceived threat to government leaders from opposition groups. These threats come primarily through anti-government activity of various types, e.g., riots, protests, terrorism,

\footnote{The post-Cold War period has seen a dramatic increase in the number of civil wars ending in negotiated settlement, rather than victory by one side or stalemate.}
strikes, etc. While all forms of dissent may motivate state repression, violent dissent, in particular, is likely to result in human rights violations by state authorities. It follows, then, that if peace operations are able to reduce the instances of dissent, instances of repression should correspondingly decline. I argue that the UN is able to accomplish this by helping belligerents comply with the terms they agreed to at the peace settlement, which likely requires that the rebel groups demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate, transform from military organizations into political parties, and obtain representation within government institutions to pursue their interests through peaceful, democratic means. As Table 2.2 shows, these processes reduce the ability and/or willingness of rebel groups—both principals and agents—to defect from a peace treaty and violently dissent, reducing threat-side factors of repression.

**Table 2.2**

**Threat-Side of Repression**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ability</th>
<th>Willingness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principals</strong></td>
<td><strong>Willingness</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR, Rebel-To-Party</td>
<td>Rebel-To-Party, Power-Sharing, SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agents</strong></td>
<td><strong>Willingness</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>DDR, Power-Sharing, SSR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Demobilizing, Disarming, and Reintegrating Rebel Groups**

The process of DDR for rebel groups is similar to the account given above. However, there is a critical difference: While government DDR typically leaves a func-
tioning military behind (or creates a new one), rebel group DDR typically results in the complete elimination of rebel military capabilities. This creates acute issues of commitment that must be overcome before rebel groups will voluntarily disarm themselves and lose their main source of leverage. Indeed, the post-conflict literature is unanimous in asserting that disarming and demobilizing belligerents is extraordinarily difficult. It’s not a stretch to say that this constitutes the primary problem in post-civil war environments. Because rebel groups must completely demilitarize, they are left extremely vulnerable to exploitation from government forces.

In this situation the presence of peace operations can be crucial to assuaging fears that the government will not comply with their end of the peace agreement. First, peace operations serve as a neutral source of information. Fortna notes that “both sides have strong incentives to hedge their bets by maintaining armed forces. Knowing this, each side will require credible information that the other soldiers are turning in their weapons and disbanding (Fortna 2008a, 94).” Providing this kind of information in the absence of a neutral arbiter would be extremely difficult since both sides have incentives to withhold any kind of data that would make them seem vulnerable or in any way give their rivals an advantage. “Leaders,” Fortna argues, “may not trust each other not to exploit, for aggressive purposes, information gleaned by watching the disarmament process (Ibid.).” An unbiased third-party can provide each side assurances that each party is maintaining their side of an agreement and that they need not fear an attack by an uncooperative enemy. In cases where the government maintains control over some military capabilities, peace operations can provide information regarding the government’s compliance with security sector reform components of peace agreements, which reduces the ability of government leaders to use state security forces to exploit disarmed rebel groups.

Second, peace operations can give assurances to rebel groups that noncompliance by the government will not be tolerated. If government leaders don’t comply, the UN
can draw on various sources of leverage (e.g., influencing funding decisions from major donors, withholding good offices, reputational damage, etc.) that put pressure on government leaders to adhere to peace settlement terms. These various mechanisms can give rebels groups the confidence they need to voluntarily rid themselves of all military capabilities. Doing so greatly diminishes the ability of rebel principals to engage in violent dissent.

Following DDR, reintegrating rebel soldiers into civilian life is critical to disarming rebel agents and giving them a stake in the success of the peace process, thus reducing their ability and willingness to dissent. Jaremy McMullin points to some of the problems that result when rebels are not reintegrated:

Large numbers of combatants on the various sides of a conflict are demobilized after a peace agreement. In the absence of proper care for those soldiers after their demobilization—programmes to help them survive, find employment and adjust to life as civilians—they become disgruntled with peace and use their weapons and skills to re-ignite conflict. Renewed violence initially takes the form of public disruption and rioting, and then escalates into a return to all-out civil war (McMullin 2004, 625)

Although reintegration schemes are rarely entirely successful, interventions by peace operations have been shown in several cases to increase their effectiveness Howard (2008). One particularly effective reintegration scheme seems to be integrating former rebel soldiers into state military institutions. This component of security sector reform can play a critical role in reducing threat-side factors of repression. First, rebel integration into the state military apparatus helps create a self-enforcing agreement. In other words, knowing that the ability of the state to renege on a peace agreement has been decreased can assuage fears and lessen incentives to dissent. Furthermore, rebel-military integration can offer economic incentives to maintain peace: Providing former rebel soldiers stable employment decreases their willingness to defect from post-war agreements (Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008).\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\)Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) find that rebel-military integration is usually not effective at
Rebel-to-Party Transformation

I begin this section with the simple, if not simplistic, assumption that domestic conflict resolution is primarily characterized by either politics or violence (Kovacs 2008). The defining characteristic of transformed rebel groups is the renunciation of the latter and the adoption of the former. Doing so is critical to peaceful coexistence in the post-conflict political environment. Jeroen de Zeeuw argues that one of the primary causal factors in successful civil war settlements is the “ability of former rebel movements to transform themselves into ‘normal’ political organizations (de Zeeuw 2008, 1).” This transformation from a militia to a political party “provides channels for both interest articulation and political process engagement for former rebels, thus contributing to a sustainable peace, stability, and democracy (Ishiyama and Batta 2011).” Importantly, this process can play a significant role in reducing the incentives for repression; this metamorphosis necessarily includes pacific changes to organization, goals, and tactics of the heretofore rebel groups. These complementary changes are expressed by Zeeuw (2008) when he argues that the transformation of a rebel group into a political party “compels former rebel leaders to change their military struggles into political ones and to reorganize their war-focused military organizations into dialogue-based political entities (de Zeeuw 2008, 1).”

The transformation of rebel groups into peaceful political parties in the aftermath of a civil war, however, is far from given. As Zeeuw (2008) observes, “For some rebel movements, the postwar period has meant a clear departure from the use of military tactics in favor of political strategies. Other rebel movements have combined the use of political and military tactics or have used the postwar period to restructure themselves and set up political fronts for what are still essentially military organizations.” It is important to note that this process is not always smooth; some former rebels have struggled to make the transition to politics. However, they find some evidence that it works better when UN peacekeeping missions are involved.

I use a minimalist definition of political party as any political group that competes in elections using non-violent means. As Zeeuw argues, “...it is important not to put the bar too high, too soon, for former rebel movements in emerging postwar democracies (de Zeeuw 2008, 5).”
izations (de Zeeuw 2008, 3).” For groups that do end up transforming into peaceful political parties, several key changes are necessary including the demilitarization of organizational structures and the development of political party organization, and adopting the strategies and goals of a political party.

Developing a party organization entails representing constituent interests, mobilizing voters, fielding candidates, and organizing campaigns. Because these are radically different activities than those performed by the rebel group during the previous civil war, their accomplishment is dependent upon constituting new organizational structures suited to them. Necessary complements to these organizational structures are radical changes to a rebel organization’s goals and tactics. Where goals were once military in nature, they must now become political. And whereas tactics were once geared toward violence and coercion, they must now rely on nonviolence and persuasion. Mitchell notes the importance of tactical change to levels of repression incentives: “The tactics of the opposition and whether or not they are willing to resort to violence are a component of threat and influence the ease with which governments, particularly democratic governments, turn to violence in return (Mitchell 2004, 33).”

However, like DDR, converting a military organization into a peaceful political party can be extraordinarily difficult, particularly without outside help. It is no surprise, then, that scholars have identified the international context of rebel-to-party transformations as playing a sometimes crucial role in their success. International actors, and in particular, UN peace operations, have assisted rebel group transformations in a number of ways. As discussed above, peace operations often provide a critical role in supporting DDR processes; DDR is critical for demilitarizing and pacifying rebel groups. This is a critical factor in persuading opposition groups to comply with their commitment to transform to non-violent political party. Beyond DDR, peace operations can support rebel-to-party transformations in a number of ways. First, they can provide provide logistical support. Some of this support is
as mundane as providing office space, a necessary resource for political parties but something in which rebel groups are typically lacking. Second, they can offer direct financial assistance that enables rebel transformation. Finally, peace operations "have given political support and exercised political pressure on former rebel leaders to enter peace negotiations and remain committed to the peace and political transformation process (de Zeeuw 2008, 23).” These resources have proven in several instances to enable compliance with commitments to organizational transformation that would otherwise likely have failed.

**Power-Sharing**

Above I discussed how power-sharing decreases the ability of government leaders to repress. In this section, I elaborate on this logic and discuss how it leads to a reduced willingness on the part of rebel groups to dissent. Rebel-to-party transformations are insufficient in and of themselves to domesticate and pacify rebels; these newly formed parties must be allowed to actually participate in the domestic political machinery. Importantly, then, power-sharing can serve the dual purpose of incentivizing a transformation into a political party as well as allowing opposition groups to legitimately obtain their fair share of state resources, both of which serve to pacify an opposition’s goals and tactics, thus reducing levels of threatening dissent.

Allowing opposition groups to obtain state resources via political processes is vital to reducing violent conflict. Civil war and other forms of domestic conflict are, at least partly, a dispute between those in power and those out of power over how to divide state resources, e.g., political power, military power, economic resources, etc. It would seem to follow, then, that the more fairly these resources are distributed the less incentives opposition groups will have to challenge the status quo. Unsurprisingly, then, power-sharing provisions have been shown to be highly effective in preventing the recurrence of civil war. By including opposition groups into the government
decision-making structure, potential dissidents are assured that post-civil war state structures will not be used to repress them (Mattes and Savun 2009).

This idea has been supported by recent scholarship that has pointed to a significant relationship between levels of political inclusion, power-sharing, and dissent. Armstrong (2009), for instance, found that higher levels of inclusion predicted lower levels of violent dissent. Others have found that institutional exclusion is a primary cause of civil war. Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010), focusing on ethnic conflict, found that ethnic groups are significantly more likely to clash with the government if they are excluded from state power. Reynal-Querol (2005) found that states with higher levels of political inclusion had lower probabilities of experiencing civil war. Furthermore, these results were robust when separately analyzing autocracies, partial democracies, and full democracies. Inclusion therefore, is a better predictor of civil conflict than level of democracy, which has been shown to have a complex relationship to domestic conflict, with high and low levels decreasing the chances of civil war while medium levels increase its likelihood.

Alongside these impressive empirical findings is a strong theoretical foundation explaining the connection of institutional inclusion and civil conflict. The main argument underlying the hypothesis that political inclusion reduces the probability of domestic conflict has to do with the pacifying influence of political institutions (Lijphart 1980). Summarizing arguments that have existed in comparative politics since at least the early 1970s, Tim Wegenast notes that when possible dissidents are coopted into a state’s institutional framework, they tend to “opt for legal, parliamentarian means rather than resorting to violence in order to articulate their interests and pursue their political goals. In this sense, political parties serve as a forum in which threats can be expressed without appearing as acts of betrayal or insurgency (Wegenast 2010, 7).” Or to put if more baldly, “legalized opposition becomes domesticated opposition (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1283).” Lijpart, in a later work,
argues that when certain groups are continually denied access to power they “will feel excluded and discriminated against and may lose their allegiance to the regime (Lijphart 1999, 33).”

These long-standing arguments have become refined and formalized in recent years. Reynal-Querol (2005) argues that when deciding whether or not to challenge the status quo, domestic actors must decide whether expected benefits exceed costs. The expected gain from rebellion is partly a function of status quo policies. If these policies significantly deviate from the preferences of potential rebels, as they are likely to do when opposition groups are excluded from decision-making processes, then their expected utility from rebelling will be relatively higher than if status quo policies were closer to their preferences. Cederman, Wimmer, and Min theorize that politics in ethnically heterogeneous states are largely constituted by a struggle among ethnic groups to obtain the levers of state power. “It follows”, they argue, “that groups that lose out in this struggle for state power are more fertile breeding grounds for organizations that challenge the government Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010, 95).” These processes are essential to the question at hand because post-war politics are largely constituted by questions of who will control the state. It’s likely that war began because one or more groups were unhappy with their share of power and/or resources. Successfully integrating various groups by fairly distributing power and decision-making is thus vital to reducing dissent and the concomitant repression.

This is born out in an analysis by Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) who argue that institutional reform that divides and/or shares institutional power is an integral component of maintaining peace. I extend their argument to say that not only is this process vital to preventing the recurrence of war, but also that it is vital in reducing all forms of dissent by opposition groups, and thus repression by government actors, in a post-civil war environment. The primary concern of belligerents following civil war is the question of who is going to govern, i.e., who is going to have control of
the state machinery. Opposition groups must have confidence that they will be fairly represented in the post-war government in order to give them confidence that the government will not be used to exploit or repress them. Post-war power sharing arrangements constitute a necessary condition in providing this confidence.

One way this confidence is given is through the development of democratic institutions provide rebel groups the possibility of obtaining political power. As Joshi (2012, 5) has argued, “If former rivals are convinced that they can claim access to political power through institutional means, they will find democratic institutions to be a promising alternative to violence.” Joshi goes on to find compelling evidence that the presence of UN peace operations is strongly associated with the development of democratic institutions and movement toward more democratic practices.

However, as Walter (2001) has noted, the presence of democratic institutions may not always be enough; the mere opportunity of accessing political power may be insufficient in convincing excluded groups that government institutions will not be used to exploit them in the years following civil conflict. Knowing this, rebels may believe it to be rational to continue fighting rather than put their faith in elections. Rebels may therefore seek for institutional reforms that ensure they will have a seat at the governing table. This type of reform can take the shape of “a specific quota of power, a guaranteed distribution of key ministries, or shared control over executive positions, all of which would ensure the competing factions a significant say in how the postwar state is run (Walter 2001, 30).”

Hartzell and Hoddie give three reasons why power-sharing arrangements are so critical. First, power-sharing institutional reform addresses the concern of opposition groups about who will control the state power and how that power will be used. It’s likely that one of the primary reasons an opposition group fought the recent war was because state power was being used in a way that harmed and/or excluded them. If opposition leaders can be assured that state power will not be used against them
they will have fewer incentives to challenge the status quo. Peace operations can help prevent this from happening by controlling or at least monitoring the process by which soldiers are chosen for a new post-war military. Second, the willingness of government leaders to relinquish sole control over the state signals to opposition groups that they are sincere about building a lasting peace. This is because “neither the design nor the implementation of power-sharing and power-dividing institutions is a cost-free process...” and the fact that the government is willing to bear these costs “has the potential to serve as a costly indicator of their commitment to an enduring peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 4).”

Lastly, post-war government institutions “define the means by which social conflict is to be managed in the postwar state. If a stable peace is to be secured, groups must have a means, other than relying on the use of force, for resolving their disagreement (Ibid., 4).” Unless these institutions provide a means whereby the grievance of opposition groups can be fairly processed then these groups will be more likely to use channels of conflict resolution that fall outside the rule of law. In sum, post-war institutional reform increases the likelihood that conflicts of interest will be addressed nonviolently within law-abiding state institutions; or, in other words, power-sharing helps to ensure that the goals and tactics of opposition groups remain nonviolent and democratic.

However, this type of institutional reform does not take place easily. Without a third-party mediator that is able to reduce commitment problems the chances of reforms being implemented is significantly reduced. As argued above, these commitment problems are a primary impediment to agreement compliance. However, in their quantitative analysis, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) find that the presence of peacekeepers increases by 47 percent the likelihood that power-sharing and power-dividing institutions will be part of the post-war settlement. Furthermore, one of the chief mechanisms through which power-sharing occurs, i.e., elections, is much more
likely to be successful with the political and logistic support of UN peace operations. As the cases of El Salvador, Mozambique, and many others show, the logistical capabilities of peace operations are invaluable in registering voters, training election staff, publicizing elections, and monitoring voting. Furthermore, peace operations can help overcome political obstacles that threaten to derail elections. For instance, UN involvement in Mozambique’s 1993 elections was critical in facilitating agreement when conflict over election rules nearly brought election plans to a halt. Furthermore, when Mozambique’s main opposition group, Renamo, threatened to boycott the election, intense UN pressure and assurances were a vital component in compelling Renamo to comply with its promises.

2.3 Hypotheses

In this section I outline a series of hypotheses derived from the theory outlined above. If this theory provides a useful explanatory template, then there should be empirical evidence for each of these hypotheses, which will be tested in the next chapter. I begin with more general hypotheses that test the association between the presence of the UN and improvement in human rights practices, and then move on to more specific hypotheses that test the causal mechanisms of how the UN is able to produce sharper declines in post-conflict state repression relative to non-UN cases.

The main hypothesis of this dissertation is that cases where the UN intervenes experience a larger improvement in post-civil war human rights practices compared to places where the UN does not intervene.
H1: Cases where the UN intervenes should experience a greater improvement in human rights practices than cases where the UN is absent.

If it were simply the case that the UN prevents war, and the lack of war leads to better human rights practices, then the complexity of the theory presented here would be unnecessary. But my theory presumes that there is more going on than just the absence of recurrence of war, and that countries that remain at peace can have very different records when it comes to post-conflict human right practices depending on levels of response- of and threat-side factors of repression.

H2: The Effect of the UN on Human Rights Improvement is not Significantly Mediated Through its Impact on the Duration of Peace Following the End of a Civil War.

UN missions, however, are not all created equal. They can range from missions composed of a small number of unarmed observers to missions composed of tens of thousands of armed troops and civilian monitors, administrators, and police. The latter are typically referred to as multidimensional missions. Multidimensional missions generally attempt to help implement comprehensive peace settlements. As such, they are more ambitious and endeavor to facilitate more of the repression-reducing mechanisms described above than non-multidimensional missions. They also have more capabilities with which to reduce uncertainty about compliance as well as the leverage necessary to make noncompliance costly.
**H3:** UN peace operations with multidimensional mandates should produce a greater improvement in post-civil war human rights practices than missions with more modest mandates.

If variation exists among UN peace operations, there exists even more variation between UN and non-UN missions. In general, UN missions are better staffed and have access to more resources than missions conducted by non-UN IGOs. They should therefore be better able to reduce uncertainty regarding compliance along with making noncompliance more costly, leading to a greater reduction of response- and threat-side factors of repression. It should therefore be the case that UN missions are able to produce a more significant decline in state repression than non-UN missions.

**H4:** UN peace operations should produce a greater reduction in post-civil war state repression than peace operations led by non-UN entities.

If it’s the case that the primary way the UN reduces repression is by increasing the likelihood that belligerents will comply with agreements and implement the repression-reducing mechanisms outlined above, then it should be true that cases in which the UN intervenes have more of these mechanisms compared to non-UN cases.

**H5:** Cases where the UN intervenes should have more instances of mechanisms that reduce the response- and threat-side factors of repression, e.g., DDR, SSR, power-sharing, elections, rebel-to-party transformations, monitoring security forces, than cases where the UN is absent. This association should be more pronounced in multidimensional missions.

If the UN’s effect on repression largely takes place through its effect on repression-reducing mechanisms then the presence of more of these mechanisms should be associated with a more pronounced decrease in state repression than where there are
fewer of these mechanisms, regardless of whether the UN is present or not.

H6: Cases with more of the mechanisms outlined in this chapter should experience a greater decrease in post-conflict repression. Furthermore, the effect of UN peace operations should be substantially mediated through these mechanisms.
Chapter 3

Data and Analysis

3.1 Introduction

What explains why some states experience a decrease in state repression following civil war, while other states experience no change, or even an increase? Figure 3.1 shows the difference in pre-peace and post-peace state repression scores\(^1\) in all civil wars that have ended in the post-Cold War period. Because higher scores indicate lower levels of state repression, positive numbers represent improvements in human rights practices following civil wars, and negative numbers the converse.

Which factors best explain this variation? Figure 3.2 displays the bivariate relationship between post-conflict human rights improvement and several plausible candidates. As these graphs show, few straightforward relationships exist. The clearest relationship, though, appears to be between the presence of UN missions, particularly multidimensional missions, and higher levels of post-conflict improvement.

However, several questions must be addressed before a plausible causal interpretation can be given to this relationship: Does this relationship remain when controlling for other variables? Is this relationship primarily a result of the types of cases in which the UN typically intervenes? Is this relationship simply an indirect effect of the UN’s ability to prevent civil war relapse? Can a UN effect be shown to flow through plausible causal mechanisms? Is this relationship robust to the presence of unobserved

\(^1\)These scores come from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (explained below).
Figure 3.1
The Difference between Five-Year Post-Peace Average CIRI Score and Three-Year Pre-Peace Average CIRI Score
confounding variables? This chapter quantitatively addresses each of these questions using a variety of statistical methods. In doing so I attempt to establish the plausibility of a causal relationship between UN peace operations and decreases in post-conflict state repression as explained in Chapter Two, and graphically represented in Figure 3.3.²

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, I evaluate whether the UN is intervening in cases where improvements in human rights would be more likely (i.e., the problem of selection bias). Second, I provide a justification for using a matched subsample, and graphically demonstrate the improvement in covariate balance after matching. Third, I test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter Two.

3.2 UN Intervention and Selection Bias

To attribute causation to the UN, at least three criteria must be met: (1) UN intervention must temporally precede measurements of repression; (2) The presence of UN peace operations and improvement in repression measures must be empirically correlated; (3) This empirical correlation cannot be shown to be the result of a third variable that causes both UN intervention and improvement in repression scores. It is the third criterion, a form of selection bias³, which I evaluate in this section. As in all observational studies, the potential for selection bias distorting estimates of causal effects is of serious concern here. However, I argue that any selection bias in this study is more likely to underestimate, rather than overestimate, the impact of UN peace operations in improving post-civil war human rights.⁴ Furthermore, some of

²In this directed acyclic graph (DAG), each node represents a random variable and the arrows run from causal variables to outcome variables.
³Technically, this may better be referred to as omitted variable bias, i.e., the corr(UN, Z) ≠ 0 and the effect of Z on the outcome is non-zero. However, I use the more general term of selection bias to emphasize the point that the selection of cases by the UN in which to intervene may bias the estimates of a UN effect.
⁴This is because of two factors: 1. The correlation between UN intervention and omitted variable(s) that affect the likelihood of intervention is positive; 2. The effect of these variable(s) on
**Figure 3.2**

**Scatterplots with Loess-smoothed lines showing the relationship between each variable and improvement in post-war human rights practices**

- State Military Personnel (Log)
- Population (Log)
- Mountainous Territory
- Level of Democracy (Polity2)
- GDP (Log)
- Ethnic Fractionalization
- War Deaths (Log)
- War Duration (Log)
- Peace Agreement
- Non-UN Peace Operation
- UN Peace Operation
- Multidimensional UN Peace Operation
Figure 3.3
The Theory of UN Peace Operations and Human Rights

UN Peace Operation → Compliance with Terms of Peace Agreement

Reduction in Supply Side Factors of Repression

Improved Human Rights Practices

Reduction in Demand Side Factors of Repression
the issues of selection bias are attenuated by using a matched subsample to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated.\(^5\)

Selection bias arises when unobserved variables that influence the likelihood of receiving treatment also influence the outcome of interest. In this case, selection bias would entail that unobserved factors that determine whether a country will be the recipient of a UN peace operation also influence a country’s post-civil war human rights practices.\(^6\)

\(^5\)Matching on observables does not do anything to attenuate issues that arise due to selection on unobservables; however, it is useful in reducing model dependence when full overlap of observable covariates does not exist between the treatment and control cases.

\(^6\)Sambanis (2008) gives a convincing argument that, given the institutional logic of the UN, UN peace operations should be considered exogenous:

The UN’s complex decision-making process suggests that there is no simple utility-maximizing logic underlying the UN’s decision to send peacekeepers to different countries. Bargaining inside the UN is too complex to respond in a straight-forward manner to a particular logic of intervention. The interests of the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the General Assembly are rarely aligned in such a way as to produce a unifying logic for the deployment of blue helmets. This explains why there is so much variation in the fit between the underlying conflict conditions and the mandate and resources given to UN peacekeeping missions (see our earlier discussion). In some cases (e.g. El Salvador, Namibia), the fit is good and the UN
Thus, it’s crucial that we determine whether those countries where peace operations are deployed systematically differ from non-intervention cases in such a way as to make the outcome of interest, i.e., improvement of human rights practices, more or less likely. There are several ways in which this could happen. First, suppose that peace operations are typically deployed in countries where both parties of a civil war have consented to a peace operation, implying that both desire peace and are willing to work together. If this is the case then any improvement in human rights practices may be a result of having cooperative parties rather than a result of UN efforts. Second, presume that the UN tends to intervene in cases where domestic opposition is relatively weak. As has already been noted, the state repression literature is nearly unanimous in asserting the law-like relationship between dissent and repression. It therefore follows that countries with a relatively weak opposition may have experienced high levels of repression during a civil war but still have have relatively lower levels of repression once the fighting has ceased. Improvement between civil war levels of repression and post-civil war levels of repression may then correlate with the presence of peace operations but not be caused by them. Finally, if the UN tends to intervene in cases with relatively lower levels of repression during civil war, then it may be that these are easier cases and that improvement in human rights practices responds in a unified way to the challenges it faces. In other cases (Rwanda), the UN mission barely hides the major powers’ indifference. There is also a large amount of agency slack in the field and review of several cases of peacebuilding suggests that the same mandate can be interpreted either as a ceiling or as a floor by different force commanders or by the same commander under different conditions in the same country. Leadership decisions in the field are not easily anticipated and can lead to adaptations of the mandate over time in ways that does not reflect directly the preferences of the initial guidelines of the Security Council. The actual impact of UN operations has as much to do with how the mandate is implemented as it does with what mandate is given in the first place and the agency slack available to field commanders is the source of the independent institutional impact of UN peacekeeping (15).

Because CIRI data scores are not continuous, but rather discrete levels, two cases may differ in orders of magnitude of human rights violations but still receive the same score provided they have both crossed a certain threshold, e.g., 50 or more violations of a particular type of repression such as torture. Therefore, this threshold may be easily crossed in civil war even in cases with relatively weak rebel groups. However, once a war ends it would be more difficult for the relatively weak rebel group to instigate high levels of repression.
following civil war may be a function of these easy cases rather than the presence of
the UN. However, it could also be the case that countries with worse levels of repres-
sion have more room for improvement and thus a greater post-civil war improvement
in repression may paradoxically be more of a reflection of poorer human rights prac-
tices during the war. In other words, these bad cases may just be regressing to the
mean.

The first and second possible sources of bias can be addressed by examining the
relationship between receiving a UN peace operation and the relative strength of the
government. Fortna’s (2008) analysis of where peacekeepers go shows that having
a strong opposition makes consent-based peace operations much more likely. This
makes intuitive sense as militarily strong governments that control the state will have
little reason to desire the constraining presence of UN peacekeepers. Furthermore,
because the government still controls the state apparatus, rebels are likely to be more
fearful of the government than vice-versa and are likely to have a stronger desire
for a third-party guarantor of peace. These considerations lead to the conclusion
that giving consent to peace operations is a function of the relative strength between
the government and opposition rather than how cooperative they are. Consent of the
parties therefore signifies cases in which we would expect to see a stronger opposition,
which we have no reason to believe would increase the probability that state repression
will decrease.

What about levels of state repression during the civil war? The first and third
plots in Figure 3.4 show violin plots\(^8\) of the three-year pre-peace CIRI\(^9\) average for
both UN and non-UN cases. Cases in which the UN did not intervene had significantly
higher scores on the CIRI index than cases in which the UN did intervene, meaning

\(^8\)Violin plots combine box plots and density plots, showing the minimum, 25th percentile, median,
75th percentile, and maximum values, as well as where the cases cluster.

\(^9\)As will be explained in more detail below, the CIRI scale measures yearly human rights practices.
The scale ranges from 0-8, with 0 being given to the worst offenders and 8 given to those states with
the best human rights practices.
the UN has tended to intervene in cases with significantly worse human rights records in the years prior to intervention. A difference in means test shows that the difference between these two groups is statistically significant (p-value=0.009). Another way to visualize this relationship is by graphing the probability of the UN intervening in a particular case as a function of that case’s pre-peace human rights record. The bottom right graph in Figure 3.5 shows the probability of UN intervention on the Y-axis and a country’s three-year average pre-peace CIRI score on the X-axis. As is clear, the likelihood of the UN intervening sharply drops as a country’s civil war-era human rights record improves. The other graphs in Figure 3.5 also show the probability of UN intervention as a function of variables likely associated with the level of difficulty in a given case, including levels of violent dissent, deaths caused by the war, and duration of the war. Higher levels of each of these variables are associated with an increased probability of UN intervention, meaning that the UN is intervening in more, rather than less, difficult cases.

Because the UN is in fact intervening in more difficult cases vis-à-vis repression, statistical models are more likely to underestimate rather than overestimate the ameliorative effect of UN peace operations on post-war repression.\(^\text{10}\) However, this also

\(^{10}\)This is not to say that the models will necessarily underestimate the effect of the UN, only that because the cases where the UN goes seem to be more difficult, and it’s unlikely that all factors of difficulty can be controlled for, it’s more likely that the models will underestimate, rather than overestimate, the UN effect. Furthermore, another reason that statistical models may underestimate the effect of UN peace operations has to do with the violation of the stable unit treatment value assumption (Fraser and Guo 2009). The classic violation of this assumption come from agricultural research, where it may be the case in some experiments that natural weather phenomena, e.g., rainfall, carry the treatment, e.g., fertilizer, from a treated tract of land to an untreated tract of land. A similar dynamic may occur with some UN peace operations. It may be the case the stabilizing effect of UN intervention may have effects beyond the borders of the state where the intervention is taking place and may be an impact on a control case. If this happens, then the control case is getting credit for outcomes that should rightfully be credited to the intervention. One possible instance of the violation of this assumption may be in the Central African Republic (CAR). The CAR, in which a civil war ended in 2003, borders the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which received a multidimensional UN peace operation in 2002. It’s therefore possible that some stabilizing effect of this mission spread to the CAR, in which case the UN may have produced a positive result without getting any credit. And since UN cases are being compared to non-UN cases, any improvement experienced by the CAR and produced by the UN would decrease the statistical estimates of the effect to the UN on post-conflict repression.
leads to the aforementioned possibility that if cases in which the UN intervenes have significantly worse pre-peace human rights records then they also have more room for improvement in the post-war period. If we see a big post-war improvement in this situation it may simply be the case that these countries are regressing toward the post-war repression mean. This charge could be refuted if the UN cases not only caught up to the human rights scores of the control cases but also surpassed them. As plots two and four in Figure 3.4 show, this is indeed what has happened, as the median for UN cases is about a full point higher than the median for non-UN cases.\footnote{The difference in means, however, is only about half a point, and is not statistically significant.} Furthermore, the mean of the UN cases has jumped a statistically significant (p-value=0.0002) amount of nearly 2 points, an improvement of nearly 100 percent. The non-UN cases, however, only improve by a statistically insignificant (p-value=0.33)
two tenths of a point. These factors taken together give compelling evidence that selection bias does not give an advantage to cases in which the UN intervenes. In other words, an a priori prediction of which cases would be the most likely to experience high levels of improvement would likely not choose the UN cases. The multiple regression and matching techniques below will attempt to determine whether the impressive improvement in the UN cases holds up once we control for alternative variables.

3.3 Matching

In addition to these theoretical and empirical answers to possible sources of selection bias, recent methodological innovations have provided statistical methods that can
reduce other potential sources of bias. Matching techniques allow researchers to create samples in which treatment and control cases are balanced among important observed covariates. Assuming there are no significant unobserved covariates, matching mimics the kind of covariate balance that exists in randomized experiments. Under this assumption, we can say that, conditional on a group of covariates Z, X is randomly assigned, where X is UN intervention.

While matching and multiple regression have much in common, there’s an important difference that allows matching to provide a less biased estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated\textsuperscript{12} in cases where there exists a lack of overlap in variables among control and treatment cases. For instance, the UN has never intervened in very large or very powerful states. Therefore, analysts only have information for control cases among these variables. Inferring a counterfactual result is thus problematic and forces a greater reliance on modeling assumptions, making estimates model dependent (Ho et al. 2007). As Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill note, “arguably, we could not make any causal inferences about the effect of the treatment on these [cases] because we would have no empirical evidence regarding the counterfactual state. Lack of overlap and balance forces stronger reliance on our modeling than if covariate distributions were the same across treatment groups (Gelman and Hill 2007, 184).” This can cause researchers to give biased estimates of the true average treatment effect, and is not a trivial problem. King and Zeng (2007) demonstrated in the case of the relationship between UN interventions and peace that minor modifications to a model, such as adding a theoretically plausible interaction variable resulted in very different counterfactual predictions between competing models when variables without overlap were included.

\textsuperscript{12}Guo and Fraser cite Heckman as arguing that “in a variety of policy contexts, it is the ATT that is of substantive interest. The essence of this argument is that in deciding whether a policy is beneficial, our interest is not whether on average the program is beneficial for all individuals but whether it is beneficial for those individuals who are assigned or who would assign themselves to the treatment (Fraser and Guo 2009, 47).”
A promising fix to this problem of model dependence is to restrict analysis to cases with similar covariate profiles, i.e., using a matched sample. This strategy was recently undertaken in an article by Gilligan and Sergenti (2008). These authors created a matched subset of the universe of post-Cold War civil war cases that were matched along a number of theoretically important covariates, creating a more balanced sample. Using this matched subset allowed them to create a much less model dependent estimate of the effect of UN intervention on the likelihood of renewed civil war. They found a strong association between the presence of UN peace operations and a reduced probability of the outbreak of war and they maintain that estimates that do not use matching techniques significantly underestimate this effect.

Following Gilligan and Sergenti, I also create a matched sample. The matching was performed by a genetic search algorithm using the MatchIt software in the R statistical computing environment (Ho et al. 2011).\(^\text{13}\) Matching was performed without replacement\(^\text{14}\) and used the following variables:

\textit{Battle Deaths from War (log)}: Battle deaths from the last war are elated with the duration of peace and positively correlated with the probability of UN intervention (Fortna 2004, Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Because civil war and state repression are highly correlated, omitting this variable would likely give the appearance that UN interventions are associated with an increase in state repression, or, at least, a smaller improvement than cases where the UN does not intervene. Data comes from the Battle Deaths dataset version 3.0 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005).

\textit{Duration of Last War (Log)}: Because the duration of the previous war is positively correlated with both the length of peace and the likelihood of UN intervention, omitting this variable would likely give undue credit to the UN in improving post-war human rights. Data for this variable come from the Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2012 (Themnér and Wallensteen 2012).

\textit{Military Personnel (Log)} The size of a country’s military likely influences both the

\(^{13}\)Genetic matching uses an evolutionary search algorithm to maximize the balance of observed covariates in control and treatment groups (Sekhon 2009).

\(^{14}\)Matching without replacement maximizes accuracy while matching with replacement maximizes balance. Because matching with replacement significantly decreases the amount of information in the sample, and because matching without replacement still significantly increases balance, I choose the latter.
probability that the UN will intervene (Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) and Gilligan and Stedman (2003) find that large militaries are negatively correlated with UN intervention) as well as levels of post-war repression (larger militaries can increase the ability of government leaders to repress). Data comes from the National Material Capabilities Dataset (v3.02) (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1988).

Population(Log): The state repression literature has consistently found that larger populations result in more state repression (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994). Furthermore, Collier and Hoefler (2004) have found that larger populations are more prone to civil war. An additional confounding factor of population size is that the UN tends not to intervene in countries with very large populations (Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). Data for this variable is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators.

Democracy: The relationship between democracy and state repression has been extensively studied (see, for example, (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). Although the exact relationship is debated, it is quite clear that democracies repress less than non-democracies. Democracy scores are measured in the year prior the civil war. The data is taken from the Polity2 dataset.

GDP(Log): GDP levels have consistently been shown to be negatively correlated with state repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). GDP measures are taken in the year prior to the civil war. The data is taken from World Bank Development indicators.

Regional Controls: Several researchers have found that the probability of UN intervention varies by region (Fortna 2004, 2008a; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005). Furthermore, Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) found that duration of peace varies by region.

These particular variables were chosen as they are the standard variables used in the repression literature due to both theoretical and empirical reasons. Furthermore, these are the same variables used in Murdie and Davis (2010) and Peksen (2012), thus allowing me to make a more direct comparison to their conclusions.\textsuperscript{15} Lastly, although the inclusion of additional variables may allow for more unbiased estimates of the effect of the UN on post-conflict repression, additional variables will also reduce the balance between control and treatment groups because with each additional vari-

\textsuperscript{15}The exception to both of these reasons is the military personnel variable. However, I still choose to include it because of theoretical reasons (the size of the military should influence the ability of government leaders to repress) as well as empirical reasons (the UN tends not to intervene in countries with very large militaries and military size is negatively correlated with improvements in post-war human rights practices).
able, it becomes more difficult to find a suitable match. And since creating sample balance is the primary goal of matching, one must be careful about including more matching variables than are necessary. Ideally, a balance between unbiasedness and sample balance should be struck, which I have attempted to do here by only using the necessary variables.

**Figure 3.6**

**Kernel Density Plots of Model Covariates Before and After Matching**

The improvement in balance created by matching is graphically represented in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. Figure 3.6 shows the density plots of the variables used in the matching algorithm before and after matching. With the slight exception of the GDP variable, each of the variables show a marked improvement after matching, meaning the distribution of each variable in control and treatment cases became more similar.
A simpler representation is shown in Figure 3.7, which gives density plots of propensity score distributions for control and treatment groups before and after matching. This graph shows that the distribution of control and treatment case propensity scores is much more similar in the matched than in the unmatched sample. The upshot is that the models using the matched sample are comparing cases with similar probabilities of receiving a UN intervention, and where there is more covariate overlap, making estimates less model dependent.

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16 A propensity score is the probability of receiving treatment (UN intervention) based on a logistic regression using the same covariates used in the matching algorithm.
3.4 Research Design

In this section I formally test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter Two using two different samples: (1) The first is a sample of all countries that experienced peace periods\(^\text{17}\) following a civil war during the years 1988-2005.\(^\text{18}\) Data for the end of civil wars comes from the Armed Conflict Dataset v.4 (Thennér and Wallensteen 2012) and includes 96 cases and 58 countries.\(^\text{19}\) This includes 19 treatment cases and 77 control cases.\(^\text{20}\) (2) The second sample is a matched subsample, which contains 38

\(^{17}\)Because my theory of post-conflict repression assumes that all major armed conflicts have ceased (at least temporarily), I use country-level data, which means that I do not include cases where one conflict ends but one or more are still ongoing. Gilligan and Sergenti use the following logic to justify this practice:

[Using country-level data] does lead to some complications, however. We are using a country-level, not a war-level, measure of peace. We do not examine the length of peace after the end of a particular war; instead we examine the length of peace for an entire country. One complication is that some countries may experience several conflicts concurrently. These conflicts are often difficult to disentangle and are almost certainly not independent observations, which is why we have adopted the country-level approach for our dependent variable. However, it does come at a cost. The clearest example of this cost is for Indonesia. During the 1990s, the Armed Conflict Dataset identifies at least two intermittent conflicts, one in East Timor and another in Aceh. Whereas the conflict in East Timor ended in 1998, the one in Aceh started in 1999. Thus, our measure is unable to pick up the post-conflict period of peace in East Timor before it became an independent country in May 2002, because by our country-level measure Indonesia remained in a state of conflict due to the conflict in Aceh. We cannot therefore evaluate the role of the UN Peacekeeping mission in prolonging peace in East Timor. Fortunately, these cases are rare. The UN mission to East Timor is the only UN mission excluded due to this issue (Gilligan and Sergenti 2008).

\(^{18}\)I limit my analysis to the post-Cold War period because UN peace operations underwent quantitative, normative, and qualitative transformations following the Cold War. Quantitatively, the number of peace operations increased dramatically. The UN sent out more peace operations between 1988 and 1993 than it had in the 40 previous years of its existence. Normatively, a consensus began to develop which held that peace operations should promote post-Wesphalian ideals concerned with internal state practices. Qualitatively, UN peace operations became characterized by much broader and more complex mandates than had been the case during the Cold War. These mandates included such activities as delivering humanitarian aid, institution building, democracy and human rights promotion, among others. Given these transformations, it’s likely that post-Cold War operations work very differently than those during the Cold War (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010).

\(^{19}\)Much of this data was taken from Gilligan and Sergenti (2008). This dataset updates their data set by several years as well as makes some corrections based on the revised Armed Conflict Dataset v.4. Also, several cases were omitted due to the lack of CIRI data including Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. Additionally, the models that difference the post and pre-peace averages only have 93 cases due to missing data in the CIRI dataset from Burundi, Iran, and Afghanistan.

\(^{20}\)The models from this sample estimate the average treatment effect (ATE). The ATE can be formally defined by the equation
cases (19 treatment, 19 control) and 28 countries. The list of countries can be found in the appendix.

### 3.5 Statistical Method

Although this study uses limited dependent variables, the estimates of the following models are primarily derived with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The use of OLS estimators for limited dependent variables has seen a recent resurgence. Though there are potential pitfalls in using OLS in these situations, the benefits of easy interpretation and generally reliable output outweigh the costs (Angrist and Pischke 2008). Furthermore, even though the main variable I use only ranges from 0-8, the

$$ATE = E(Y_1 | W_1) - E(Y_0 | W_0)$$

In this equation, $W_i = 1$ indicates receipt of treatment, $W_i = 0$ indicates nonreceipt, $Y_i = 1$ indicates the outcome variable after having received treatment, and $Y_i = 0$ indicates the outcome variable of units not receiving treatment. $E(Y_1 | W_1)$ is therefore the mean outcome of those in the treatment group and $E(Y_0 | W_0)$ is the mean outcome of those in the control group.

The models from this sample estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The ATT can be formally defined as

$$ATT = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | W_1)$$

$E(Y_0 | W_1)$ may seem contradictory, but it simply refers to the expected value of the outcome variable for cases that have characteristics that make them likely to receive treatment, but in fact didn’t. Therefore, in calculating the ATT the mean difference between treated and control groups is only taken between cases that meet the criteria that make them eligible to receive treatment.

21 The sample sizes used here are fairly small. One possible method to increase the size is to convert the data into a panel dataset. This would allow for multiple observations per UN intervention. However, there are several reasons why this would be unwise. First, time-series cross sectional analyses often have severe issues with post-treatment bias. For instance, using panel data would require that control variables such as GDP per capita and level of democracy be used in the years following treatment. However, it may be the case than an increase in GDP per capita and/or level of democracy is the result of the treatment. Therefore, models including these variables may attribute an improvement in human rights practices to GDP per capita and/or democracy when in actually these variables are merely mediating the causal effect of UN intervention. This will result in an underestimate of the causal effect of the treatment. Therefore, using panel data would be detrimental to the estimation of an unbiased treatment effect. A second problem is that while panel data allows a researcher to include more observations per treatment, the added information is not equivalent to the number of added cases. This is because the observations within a panel are not independent of each other. Rather, the errors tend to be serially correlated, i.e., the errors in country $i$ at time $t+1$ are correlated with the errors in country $i$ at time $t$ (Beck and Katz 1995). Therefore, while panel data does add more information which in some cases allows more valid inferences, the added information is typically much less than if the cases were independent of one another.
way I construct the measurement of this variable yields enough possible results that it behaves like a continuous variable. Because some countries appear multiple times in the samples, independence of observations cannot be assumed, which means conventional standard errors may be compromised. In order to error on the conservative side when making inferences I use robust standard errors, clustered on country.\textsuperscript{23}

3.6 Hypothesis Tests

\textbf{H1: Cases where the UN intervenes should experience a greater improvement in human rights practices than cases where the UN is absent, holding other factors constant.}

\textit{Dependent Variables}

Most of the dependent variables in the models below use measures of physical integrity rights that are taken from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. These measures are an aggregated index of measures of extrajudicial killing, torture, disappearances, and political imprisonment, each having a disaggregated score of 0-2, for a range of 0-8. I use the CIRI indicators rather than the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Wood and Gibney 2010) because this dissertation is mainly interested in state repression. CIRI scores focus solely on repression by or sanctioned by government forces. PTS indicators, on the other hand, include all human rights abuse including those inflicted by non-state or non-state-sanctioned actors. For instance, while the PTS dataset includes data for country years in which a government did not technically exist, i.e., Somalia in 1997, the CIRI dataset only has data for country-years with a recognizable government (Cingranelli and Richards 2010).\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{23}Gary King and Margaret Roberts (2012) have recently written a paper critical of the profligate use of robust standard errors by political scientists. However, divergence between conventional and robust standard errors in the models here is small and does not indicate the presence of the problem these authors are concerned with, i.e., model misspecification.

\textsuperscript{24}Wood and Gibney (2010) dispute the CIRI claim that the PTS data measures human rights conditions generally, rather than state repression specifically. However, Cingranelli and Richards
The models used to test hypothesis one use two groups of dependent variables. The first group is the difference between the average CIRI score in the three years prior to ceasefire and the average CIRI score three, four, and five years following the ceasefire.\textsuperscript{25} The equation for the difference between the three year pre-peace average and the five-year post-peace average, for instance, is:

\[
[(x_{t+1}) + (x_{t+2}) + (x_{t+3}) + (x_{t+4}) + (x_{t+5})]/5 - [(x_{t-3}) + (x_{t-2}) + (x_{t-1})]/3\]

where \(t\) is the year in which a civil war ended.\textsuperscript{27} Scores thus range from -8 to 8.

The second group of dependent variables measures the difference between the human rights score in each of five years following the ceasefire and the three-year pre-peace average:

\[
(x_{t+i}) - [(x_{t-3}) + (x_{t-2}) + (x_{t-1})]/3
\]

The possible range of each dependent variable is therefore -8 to 8.

\textsuperscript{25}Although some studies, e.g., Fortna (2008b) use measures from only one year prior to the cessation of fighting, I use the three-year average in order to mitigate the influence of anomalies and capture the general climate of state repression in the years prior to peace.

\textsuperscript{26}I use three years prior to peace in order to get a general picture of the repression environment in a country prior to peace. Less than three years may give an unrepresentative picture, and more than three years would likely add too much noise. I generally use five years following peace in order to get as much information as possible while also maximizing the number of cases in the dataset. However, although these choices are somewhat arbitrary, model estimates are robust to using different numbers of years of both pre- and post-peace.

\textsuperscript{27}For conflicts that ended in November or December of a particular year I code as having ended the following year since these conflicts might otherwise be at a disadvantaged when measuring post-war repression compared to conflicts that ended earlier in the year. In other words, it is likely to take time for response- and threat-side reducing mechanisms to take effect. Therefore, comparing year \(t+1\) in a case that ended on December 15 to a case that ended on January first would likely privilege that case that has had a full year, as opposed to fifteen days, to stabilize.

(2010) remain skeptical of this claim for two reasons. First, PTS documentation “has explicitly stated that it measures conditions. Gibney and Dalton have stated explicitly that coders who collect information used to construct the PTS are told to ‘try to measure government terror, but ultimately be sensitive to all forms of terror.’ Coders are explicitly instructed not to ignore terror from non-governmental actors. The aim of the PTS is ‘to reflect the human rights violations that exist in a country more generally.’” The second reason is that the PTS, as mentioned above, “produces scores for all countries of the world for every year—even for those countries and years in which no national government existed (Cingranelli and Richards 2010, 406).”
Independent Variable

The independent variable of interest in this hypothesis is the presence of a UN peace operation in the aftermath of a civil war. All cases in which a UN peace operation was present when a civil war ended or where the UN sent an operation in response to the end of conflict will be coded as 1. All other cases are coded as 0.

Control Variables

Although matching greatly improves covariate balance and reduces the need for the extensive use of control variables in OLS models, it is still valuable to use the same variables used for matching in the regression model in order to control for any remaining imbalance. Because the samples I am working with are relatively small, great care must be taken when choosing which control variables to include. A delicate balance must be struck between too few variables, which would likely result in omitted variable bias, and too many variables, which makes inferences in small samples much more difficult.\textsuperscript{28} I attempt to strike this balance by using only those variables that have been well-established as necessary controls in the state repression literature or that have clear theoretical and empirical reasons for inclusion based on the particulars of this study.\textsuperscript{29} These are the same variables used for matching (see above).\textsuperscript{30}

Results

Table 3.1 gives estimates of the effect of the UN on post-war changes in human rights practices. The 5-year column shows the difference between the 5-year post-peace and the 3-year pre-peace average CIRI score. The 4-year column shows the difference be-

\textsuperscript{28}Clarke (2005) makes the argument that including more variables does not necessarily reduce bias, and can, in some cases, actually increase bias, depending on the colinearity of additional variables and omitted variables.

\textsuperscript{29}See above for an explanation of the military personnel variable.

\textsuperscript{30}The only additions are variables that square the value of the military personnel and democracy variables. These are used in order to account for the curvilinear relationship of these variables to the outcome variable.
tween the 4-year post-peace and the 3-year pre-peace average CIRI score, and so on. What we see is not only statistically significant but also substantively large associations between UN peace operations and higher magnitudes of post-war improvements in human rights practices. The fourth column in the table, for instance, shows that the 5-year pre/post difference in the matched sample is 1.58 points higher in cases where the UN intervened compared to cases where the UN did not, a substantively very large effect. To get an idea of the size of this association, consider that the average value of the dependent variable in this model for control cases is 0.17. Adding the UN coefficient of 1.55 points to this figure would be 1.75, which is 10.29 times, or 1029 percent larger, than 0.17. The estimates in the matched sample are slightly larger than in the full sample, giving evidence that models using samples that include cases where the UN would not be likely to intervene underestimate the impact the UN typically has. All coefficients other than the three-year estimate in the matched sample reach conventional levels of statistical significance. These models thus give convincing evidence that even when taking other factors into account the presence of UN peace operations is associated with very large improvements in post-war human rights practices.\footnote{Because I am only interested in the treatment effect of the UN, rather than in modeling post-war repression, I do not analyze the coefficients of the control variables.}

The next results, in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, show the estimates for the difference in the three-year average pre-peace human rights score and each of the five years following the year of ceasefire.\footnote{The reason for the variation in the number of observations year to year is that some countries are missing CIRI data in certain years.} As with the previous models, these results show a substantial association between the presence of the UN and large human rights improvements.\footnote{The appendix includes regression tables that estimate the effects of multidimensional missions as well as all UN missions on each of the disaggregated CIRI measures. The estimates of the effect of all UN missions show that the largest UN effects are associated with decreases in extrajudicial murder and political imprisonment. However, the multidimensional mission estimates, which is the independent variable of primary interest, does not show any statistically significant differences between the various CIRI measures.} Once again, the estimates of the UN impact in the matched sample are slightly larger
than in the full sample, though they are less statistically significant, likely due to the smaller sample size. In both samples, the coefficients in years two through 5 are significantly higher than year one, implying that at least one year is required before the full effects of UN intervention become apparent. No other pattern, such as a gradual decline, or continual improvement relative to control cases emerges from the data. All in all, the data strongly confirms hypothesis one.

**H2: The effect of the UN on human rights improvement should not be mediated through its impact on the duration of peace following the end of a civil war.**

Along with demonstrating that the presence of the UN is associated with larger improvement in post-war human rights practices than in control cases, a further means of testing the veracity of the theory presented in Chapter Two is to show that the effect of the UN is not simply a byproduct of its ability to prevent the recurrence of civil war, as graphically represented in Figure 3.8. If it were simply the case that the UN prevents war, and the lack of war leads to better human rights practices, then the complexity of the theory represented in Figure 3.3 would be unnecessary. But my theory presumes that there is more going on than just the prevention of war, and that countries that remain at peace can have very different track records when it comes to human right practices depending on levels of response- and threat-side factors of repression. In order to show that the association between the UN and larger improvements in human rights practices is not simply an indirect effect, this section attempts to determine the amount of improvement that is mediated through the length of peace following a civil war.

In order to do this I use a recently developed method called causal mediation analysis (Imai et al. 2011). Traditional methods of causal mediation analysis typically use structural equation models, which rely on untestable assumptions, and even under those assumptions are often inappropriate. However, recent methodological innova-
### Table 3.1

The effect of UN peace operations on the five, four, and three year average post-war CIRI score relative to the average CIRI score in the three years prior to peace

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.79)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
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</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Table 3.2
The Effect of UN Peace Operations on Post-War CIRI Scores in Each of the Five Years Following the End of a Civil War Relative to the Three-Year Pre-Peace Average (Full Sample).

<table>
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<td>1.52*</td>
<td>1.38*</td>
<td>1.54**</td>
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<td>(0.68)</td>
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<td>(0.52)</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
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<td>-0.14***</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.02*</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.91)</td>
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<td>(1.04)</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
### Table 3.3

The Effect of UN Peace Operations on Post-War CIRI Scores in Each of the Five Years Following the End of a Civil War Relative to the Three-Year Pre-Peace Average (Matched Sample).

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<th>t+3</th>
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<th>t+5</th>
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<td>1.73+</td>
<td>1.50+</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.82)</td>
<td>(0.90)</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War Deaths (Log)</strong></td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War Duration (Log)</strong></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.21</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
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<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>(0.40)</td>
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<td>(0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.03*</td>
<td>-0.05*</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.03+</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.47</td>
<td>0.51</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
<td>(2.03)</td>
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<td>(2.52)</td>
<td>(2.01)</td>
<td>(2.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>6.65***</td>
<td>6.14**</td>
<td>2.90+</td>
<td>2.79+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.13)</td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
<td>(2.11)</td>
<td>(1.58)</td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>3.14*</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.73)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td>(1.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7.10</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>11.61**</td>
<td>8.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.27)</td>
<td>(5.75)</td>
<td>(6.07)</td>
<td>(3.67)</td>
<td>(5.08)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R^2</strong></td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
tions overcome these limitations by building on the potential outcomes framework, which, according to Imai et. al. “is essential because it provides a formal language for understanding the counterfactual comparisons required to study causal mechanisms(ibid. 767).” Essentially, this approach argues that “the identification of causal mechanisms can be formulated as a decomposition of a total causal effect into direct and indirect effects (ibid).”

Formally, indirect effects, or the average causal mediated effect (ACME), can be defined as

\[ \delta_i(t) \equiv Y_i(t, M_i(1)) - Y_i(t, M_i(0)) \].

Indirect effects are thus the change in the outcome variable that corresponds to a change in the mediator that is observed to take place under the control and treatment condition (Hicks and Tingley 2011). Therefore if \( M_i(1) = M_i(0) \), then the mediator is unaffected by the treatment, which would make the causal mediation effect equal to zero (ibid).

To test whether the UN effect is mediated through the post-war duration of peace I use the mediation package in R, developed by Imai et al. (2010). This package uses three steps to generate the quantities of interest. In step one, models for the observed outcome and mediator variables are fitted. The second step simulates model
parameters from their sampling distribution. Step three consists of repeating the following three steps for each draw of model parameters: 1. Simulate the potential values of the mediator; 2. Simulate the potential outcomes given the simulated values of the mediator; 3. Compute quantities of interest, which include the average causal mediation effect, average direct effect, and average total effect (Hicks and Tingley 2011).

Using UN intervention as the treatment variable and post-war duration of peace as the mediator variable yields estimates displayed graphically in Figure 3.9. As this figure shows, the UN impact mediated through post-war duration of peace is virtually zero.\(^{34}\) This gives overwhelming evidence that the association between the presence of UN peace operations and relatively larger improvements in human rights practices is not simply due to the fact that the UN is able to prevent war from recurring. The rest of this chapter is devoted to determining the plausibility of the casual mechanisms proposed in Chapter Two.

**H3: UN peace operations with a multidimensional mandate should produce a greater improvement in post-civil war human rights practices than missions with more modest mandates.**

The fact that the effect of UN peace operations on post-war human rights practices is not simply a byproduct of its ability to prevent war recurrence leaves open the possibility that the UN is having its impact by reducing the response- and threatsides of repression. If this is true then it should be the case that multidimensional peace operations are more effective than non-multidimensional missions in reducing post-war state repression. The reason for this is that multidimensional missions by definition have a much broader mandate than non-multidimensional missions. These mandates typically include such things as demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating former combatants, monitoring human rights practices, facilitating security sector activities, and

\(^{34}\)The actual figure is 0.028, or about 0.8 percent of the total effect of the UN.
reform, monitoring elections, and generally assisting in rebuilding social, political, and economic institutions. As Chapter Two argued, each of these play an important role in reducing response- and threat-side factors of repression. Along with broader mandates, multidimensional missions typically have more sources of leverage with which to push for compliance.

I test the effect of multidimensional missions using the same dependent variables used in Table 3.1. The model includes dummy variables for both multidimensional UN missions and non-multidimensional missions. The latter category includes observer
TABLE 3.4
THE EFFECT OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS BY TYPE ON THE FIVE, FOUR, AND THREE YEAR AVERAGE POST-WAR CIRI SCORE RELATIVE TO THE AVERAGE CIRI SCORE IN THE THREE YEARS PRIOR TO PEACE

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Matched Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>4-Year</td>
</tr>
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<td>UN-Multi</td>
<td>2.23**</td>
<td>2.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.77)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(0.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Deaths (Log)</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
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<td>(3.04)</td>
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</table>

Observations 93 93 93 38 38 38

$^2$ R2 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.67 0.68 0.70

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
missions, traditional peacekeeping missions, as well as peace-enforcement missions, as coded by Fortna (2008a). I run the model on both the full sample of cases and the matched sample. The control variables are the same used in the previous section.

As Table 3.4 clearly shows, the presence of a UN mission with a multidimensional mandate is associated with a much greater improvement in post-conflict human rights practices than non-multidimensional missions. For instance, column four shows that multidimensional missions are associated with a highly statistically significant improvement of 2.47 points in the five-year/three-year pre-post difference while non-multidimensional missions are only associated with a non-statistically significant 0.87 points. The three-year/three-year pre-post difference in column 6 shows an even larger disparity, with multidimensional missions having a coefficient of 2.85 and non-multidimensional missions a much smaller 0.55.

**H4: UN peace operations should produce a greater reduction in post-civil war state repression than peace operations led by non-UN entities.**

Because UN missions typically have more resources and broader mandates, they should be more likely than non-UN missions to effect a reduction in response- and threat-side factors of repression. The dependent variables in the model testing this hypothesis are the same as the previous section. The model contains dummy variables for UN peace operations and non-UN peace operations. The control variables are also the same as the previous section.

Table 3.5 shows that cases where the UN intervenes experience a much greater improvement in post-conflict human rights compared to cases where non-UN organizations intervene. The data shows that countries receiving a non-UN peace operation can be expected to see much less of an improvement in post-war human rights compared to UN interventions. This gap is even larger in the matched sample. The models

---

35 A model that uses multidimensional UN missions as a dummy showed an even greater disparity when compared to non-UN missions.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Full Sample</th>
<th></th>
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<th>Matched Sample</th>
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<td>5-Year</td>
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<td>3-Year</td>
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<td>1.39*</td>
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<td>-1.10*</td>
<td>-1.05*</td>
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<td>(0.34)</td>
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<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
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<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>-0.03**</td>
<td>-0.04**</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.47</td>
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<td>1.36</td>
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<td>5.44***</td>
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<td>(1.45)</td>
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<td>0.61</td>
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</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
here show that UN cases have statistically significant coefficients ranging from 1.38 to 1.79 while non-UN cases have statistically insignificant coefficients ranging from 0.51 to 1.36. Though the relatively small number of non-UN peace operations in the data should prevent us from reading too much into this comparison, these findings are at least consistent with the hypothesis that UN peace operations associated with a greater improvement in post-conflict repression compared to non-UN operations.

The relationship between various mission types and different levels of post-war improvements in human rights practices is graphically summarized in 3.10. Starting at the top and moving down, these graphs show the effect of different kinds of peace operations on the probability of having at least some improvement, improving by at least one point (i.e., the 5-year post-war CIRI average is at least one point more than the three-year pre-peace average), and improving by at least two points. Because these are marginal effects they represent the effect of a peace operation holding other variables at their means (in this case the variables are the same control variables used in the previous models). These graphs were created with logit models using a factor independent variable (i.e., 0=control, 1=non-UN peace operation, 2=non-multidimensional UN mission, and 3=Multidimensional UN mission) As the graphs show, having a UN mission, in particular a multidimensional mission, significantly increases the probability that countries will experience significant improvements compared to the other cases.
FIGURE 3.10
MARGINAL EFFECT OF VARIOUS MISSION TYPES ON VARIOUS LEVELS OF POST-WAR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENT
H5a: Cases where the UN intervenes should have more mechanisms that reduce the response- and threat-side of repression, e.g., DDR, SSR, power-sharing, elections, rebel-to-party transformations, monitoring security forces, than cases where the UN is absent. The association should be larger among multidimensional missions.

H5b: Cases with a higher Mechanism Index value should experience a greater decrease in post-conflict repression.

If the effect of UN interventions on post-war state repression is mediated through the causal mechanisms proposed in Chapter Two, as graphically represented in Figure 3.3, then cases where the UN intervenes should have more of these mechanisms than control cases. The models in this section test this by adding a new variable: an index of theorized repression-reducing mechanisms, hereafter referred to as *Mechanism Index*. The index uses data from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen 2006) and is composed of the following variables:

*Integration in Army*: This variable is coded as 1 if a new national army is created or if rebels are integrated into the existing army and 0 if otherwise. This variable serves as an indicator of security-sector reform.

*DDR*: This variable is coded as 1 if the peace agreement provides for the demobilization of warring military forces, 0 if otherwise.

*Political Party*: Coded 1 if the agreement allows for the rebel group to transform into a political party, 0 if otherwise.

*Elections*: Coded as 1 if agreement included provisions for elections or stipulations for electoral reform, 0 if otherwise.

*Shagov*: Coded 1 if peace agreement provides for extensive power-sharing in newly formed government, 0 if otherwise.

*Intgov*: Coded as 1 if agreement calls for the integration of rebels into the government or civil service. This variable serves as an additional indicator of power-sharing.
Monitoring: Coded 1 if agreement included civilian monitoring of security sector or human rights monitoring, 0 if otherwise.

Cases can therefore receive a score ranging from 0-7. It's important to note that these data come from the composition of peace agreements, but do not say whether they were actually implemented. Therefore, at best these variables serve as proxies for implemented processes. However, I argue that these variables are plausible proxies for several reasons: (1) Ceteris paribus, cases that have peace agreement provisions for certain post-war reforms will be more likely to institute those reforms than cases that do not have these provisions. This is supported by a growing body of evidence that highlights the importance of the content of peace agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Mattes and Savun 2009, 2010); (2) Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) show that the presence of a third party increases the likelihood that the provisions of a peace settlement will be implemented; and (3) Case study evidence points to the fact that the multidimensional missions included in the dataset used here were largely successful in helping to implement peace agreement provisions (Howard 2008).

To test hypothesis 5 I use two related models. The first tests the effect of UN peace operations on the number of repression-reducing mechanisms. The second tests the effect of these mechanisms on post-civil war improvements in human rights. However, because the error terms and the parameters of the two models are likely correlated, I estimate a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model that accounts for these relationships (Zellner 1962). In other words, it may be the case that there is mutual interdependence between the number of repression-reducing mechanisms and human rights practices, e.g., countries where the parties agree to more types of post-war peace provisions may be more likely to respect human rights. It is therefore necessary to account for the endogenous process between the number of repression-reducing mechanisms and state repression (Peksen 2012). The first equation of the simultaneous

---

36 When error terms are highly correlated, SUR models produce more efficient estimators than individual regression models (Tien 2004).
model estimates the covariates of the improvement in post-war state repression, while the second equation estimates the determinants of repression-reducing mechanisms.

In the first of the simultaneous models I use Mechanism Index as a dependent variable in order to test whether the presence of multidimensional UN peace operations are associated with higher levels of the mechanisms theorized to reduce the response- and threat-sides of repression. The primary independent variables are dummy variables indicating the presence of a multidimensional UN mission and the presence of a non-multidimensional UN mission. The control variables are the same as in the previous models except I replace the democracy squared variable with a variable that is the square of the number of war deaths.\(^{37}\) These models are used with both the full and matched samples.

Table 3.6 shows that these models support the hypothesis that multidimensional UN missions are associated with more repression-reducing mechanisms. In the full sample, the presence of one of these peace operations is associated with a Mechanism Index score 2.65 points higher than non-UN cases. This association is highly statistically significant. In the matched sample, the coefficient is lower, but still an impressive 2.10. As hypothesized, the association is much larger among multidimensional UN missions than non-multidimensional missions.\(^{38}\)

The second of the simultaneous models tests the hypothesis that repression-reducing mechanisms actually reduce repression. The dependent variable in this model is the difference between the 5-year post-peace CIRI average and the 3-year pre-peace average.\(^{39}\) The independent variable of interest is the Mechanism Index

\(^{37}\)The reason for this is the curvilinear relationship between the log of war deaths and the Mechanisms Index variable, and the lack of this relationship between democracy level and Mechanism Index.

\(^{38}\)One important caveat is in order, however. Though these models do show an association between UN operations and higher index values, they cannot tell us whether the UN is causing this association. It’s also possible that the higher index values are the cause, and UN intervention is the effect. Or, both may be caused by a third variable. However, the use of a SUR model that simultaneously models both of these variables helps give some credence to a causal interpretation.

\(^{39}\)Using the 4-year or 3-year post-peace average as a robustness check does not substantially alter the model estimates.
TABLE 3.6
SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION MODEL THAT MODELS MECHANISM INDEX AND POST-WAR STATE REPRESSION IMPROVEMENT

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<th>Mechanisms Index</th>
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<th>Matched Sample</th>
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<td>5-Year</td>
<td>5-Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanism Index</td>
<td>Mechanism Index</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.67*** 2.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.13) (0.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.06 -0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.42) (0.32)</td>
<td>(0.58) (0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.01 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03) (0.02)</td>
<td>(0.04) (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.05 0.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.17) (0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.09 1.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.12 2.38</td>
<td>12.82 0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.94) (2.08)</td>
<td>(4.90) (4.65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 93 93 38 38
R^2 0.36 0.47 0.62 0.55

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
variable. Like the previous section I use data from the full sample as well and the matched sample.

As Table 3.6 shows, a larger value of the Mechanism Index variable is associated with a greater improvement in post-conflict human rights practices. An increase in the Index by 1 results, holding other factors constant, in a 0.51 increase in the five-year post-war CIRI average relative to the three year pre-peace average. In the matched sample, this coefficient increases to 0.67. Both of these estimates are highly statistically significant. Based on the matched sample estimate, this means that a case with an index score of seven can be expected to have post-war improvement of 4.69 points higher than a case with an index score of zero. These models therefore clearly support the hypothesis that a larger value of the index variable is associated with a greater decrease in post-war repression.

**H6: The effect of UN peace operations should be substantially mediated though the Mechanism Index variable.**

To test how much of the UN effect on post-conflict state repression is causally mediated through the Mechanism Index variable I use the same statistical procedure used to test Hypothesis Two. For the mediator model, where the Mechanism Index is the dependent variable, I use the same model used in the second equation of Table 3.6. The outcome model is the same used to produce Table 3.1, except that the mediator variable, Mechanism Index, is added. Figure 9 graphically displays the results. About 0.5 (0.49 to be exact) of the total effect of 1.41 is causally mediated though the Mechanism Index variable, or 34 percent.\(^{40}\) This is a significant, though not overwhelming value. Most of the UN effect appears to be mediated though other mechanisms. However, given the imprecise proxies the index variable is composed of, this model probably serves as a fairly rough approximation. Suffice it to say, at the very least the data is consistent with a argument that a very large proportion of the

\(^{40}\)A table containing all of the exact estimates and standard errors can be found in the appendix.
UN effect is causally mediated through the repression-reducing mechanisms outlined in Chapter Two.

**Figure 3.11**
AVERAGE CAUSAL MEDIATION EFFECT (ACME) OF REPRESSION REDUCING MECHANISMS ON POST-CONFLICT HUMAN RIGHTS
3.7 Sensitivity Analysis

In this final section, I conduct an important robustness test of the relationship between multidimensional UN peace operations and improvements in post-civil war human rights practices. The crucial assumption of matching estimators is that the assignment to treatment is unconfounded, also known as the strong ignorability assumption (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Formally, this assumption states that $(Y_0, Y_1) \perp T \mid X$, meaning that conditional on the observed covariates $X$, treatment assignment is independent of the potential outcomes of both $Y_0$ and $Y_1$. Therefore, an important diagnostic tool in assessing the plausibility of matching estimators is determining their robustness to failures of the unconfoundedness assumption (Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini 2008). In other words, we are assuming that there isn’t an unobserved confounder that can account for the different outcomes of the treatment (UN) and control (No UN) cases. Sensitivity analysis “allows us to assess how reasonable this assumption may be (Keele 2010).”

This type of sensitivity analysis is conventionally conducted using Rosenbaum bounds (Rosenbaum 2002). Rosenbaum assumes treatment assignment is influenced by a certain probability and then “calculates bounds on the significance level if those differences were maximally correlated with the outcome (Blackwell 2014).” First, suppose that two units, $j$ and $k$, have the same observed covariates but may have different probabilities of receiving treatment $\pi$. In other words, $x_j = x_k$, but $\pi_j \neq \pi_k$. Respectively, the odds that $j$ and $k$ receive the treatment are $\pi_j/(1 - \pi_j)$ and $\pi_k/(1 - \pi_k)$. Therefore, the odds ratio is

$$\frac{\pi_j/(1 - \pi_j)}{\pi_k/(1 - \pi_k)}.$$  

(3.1)

The bounds on this odds ratio is given by
\[
\frac{1}{\Gamma} \leq \frac{\pi_j/(1 - \pi_j)}{\pi_k/(1 - \pi_k)} \leq \Gamma.
\] (3.2)

These equations show that if \( \Gamma \) is 1, then whenever \( x_j = x_k, \pi_j = \pi_k \), meaning the estimators would be free of hidden bias. However, if \( \Gamma \) is 2, the odds of being in the treatment group could differ by as much as a factor of 2. In this case, one unit could be twice as likely to be included in the treatment group (Fraser and Guo 2009). Rosenbaum explains,

In other words, \( \Gamma \) is a measure of the degree of departure from a study that is free of hidden bias. A sensitivity analysis will consider several possible values of \( \Gamma \) and show how the inferences might change. A study is sensitive if values of \( \Gamma \) close to 1 could lead to inferences that are very different from those obtained assuming the study is free of hidden bias. A study is insensitive if extreme values of \( \Gamma \) are required to alter the inference (Rosenbaum 2002).

Because I am primarily interested in the effect of multidimensional UN peace operations on post-civil war state repression, I restrict the sensitivity analysis to the model that tests this relationship. I use the Rbounds package in R developed by Keele (2010). Table 3.7 shows the effect that an unobserved covariate of various magnitudes would have on the confidence level of the model estimate. The upper bound column, which are the parameters we are interested in,\(^{41}\) shows that even if an unobserved variable made receiving a UN peace operation 70 percent more likely for the treatment cases, then the UN effect would still hold at the .05 confidence level. In addition, it would take an unobserved variable that made treatment 300 percent more likely for the treatment cases before the estimate would lose significance at the .10 level. This is a fairly large number, meaning that the model can be considered largely insensitive to unobserved confounders.

\(^{41}\)This is because we want to determine the type of unobserved confounder it would take to invalidate the model estimate, rather than strengthen it.
Table 3.8 shows the effect of possible unobserved confounders on the beta estimate, rather than on the p-value. This table tells a similar story to Table 9. We would need a confounder that made the treatment cases 320 percent more likely to receive treatment than control cases before the beta estimate dips below zero. This is quite a large number, and should give us confidence that our beta estimate is insensitive to unobserved confounders.

**Table 3.7**

**Sensitivity Analysis Using Rosenbaum Bounds (Confidence Interval)**

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<tr>
<th>Gamma</th>
<th>Lower Bounds</th>
<th>Upper Bounds</th>
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<td>0.0139</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0105</td>
<td>0.0179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.0079</td>
<td>0.0222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.0060</td>
<td>0.0268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.0046</td>
<td>0.0314</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>0.0361</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0409</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.0021</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
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### Table 3.8
Sensitivity Analysis Using Rosenbaum Bounds (Beta Estimate)

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</tr>
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<td>2.1667</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1.9</td>
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<td>3.1667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.2667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.0667</td>
<td>3.3667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.9667</td>
<td>3.4667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.8667</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-0.0333</td>
<td>4.4667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.8 Conclusion

The preceding statistical analysis demonstrates that states with a UN presence experience significantly lower levels of state repression in the years following civil war. The magnitude of this improvement is even greater in cases with multidimensional mandates. Furthermore, for the most part, this analysis supports the plausibility of the theoretical arguments in Chapter Two about how the UN is able to produce these results. Cases with more complex UN missions appear to have more mechanisms that reduce the response- and threat-sides of repression, and the presence of these mechanisms is associated with a steeper decrease in post-war state repression than would otherwise be the case. Moreover, these findings cannot be attributed to selection bias, or be written off as a by-product of the UN’s ability to lower the probability of civil war recurrence. The data support the argument that UN peace operations have a direct, causal effect on improving post-conflict human rights practices. Finally, beta estimates—and their p-values—of the multidimensional peace operation effect are robust to the presence of unobserved confounders.
Chapter 4

El Salvador and ONUSAL

4.1 Introduction

Chapter Two presented a theory of how peace operations can contribute to reductions in post-conflict state repression. I argued that peace operations can reduce response-side factors of repression by helping disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) government troops, supporting security-sector reform (SSR), monitoring security forces, and facilitating political power-sharing and elections. Additionally, peace operations can reduce threat-side factors of repression (i.e. dissent) by helping opposition forces disarm, demobilize and reintegrate, assisting in rebel-to-party transformations, and facilitating the integration of opposition groups into political, military, and economic institutions. Together, these mechanisms reduce the ability and willingness of state authorities to repress as well as the ability and willingness of the opposition to engage in threatening dissent. The overarching theoretical explanation for this phenomenon involves the role that the UN can play in helping actors comply with repression-reducing peace agreement terms. The UN does this primarily through monitoring and verifying that parties are fulfilling the terms of agreements, which serves to mitigate compliance-reducing commitment problems (McLaughlin and Hensel 2007). In
addition, IOs can use various sources of leverage—such as providing information that affects international aid and connecting the use of their good offices to compliance—that give incentives for actors to follow through with their commitments.

Although the quantitative evidence in Chapter Three provides convincing evidence that UN peace operations are associated with larger improvements in post-war human rights practices compared to cases where the UN is absent, as well as some limited evidence that the causal mechanisms outlined above are responsible for that improvement, this quantitative evidence must be augmented with qualitative case studies in order to more fully support the theoretical arguments proposed in Chapter Two. Compared to quantitative data, qualitative evidence can provide more persuasive accounts of causal mechanisms operating in actual historical and contemporary processes. To this end, the following chapters present a series of structured-focused comparisons (George and Bennett 2005) that trace the UN role in several thematic areas and illustrate UN peace operations acting through the causal mechanisms proposed in Chapter Two.

The first of these case studies, and the subject of this chapter, evaluates the role The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) played in El Salvador’s dramatic decrease in state repression following a highly repressive decade of civil war. As Figure 4.1 shows, El Salvador’s post-civil war human rights record, as measure by CIRI,\(^1\) improved sharply compared to the years during the war, and has subsequently remained relatively high. Does the UN deserve credit for this impressive improvement? In some important ways, this should be a difficult case in which to show a UN effect. Several circumstantial factors boded well for the peace process. First, the denouement of the Cold War deprived both sides of supportive patrons.\(^2\) Second,

\(^1\)As was explained in Chapter Three, CIRI’s physical integrity measure is an aggregated measurement of four types of state repression: torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances. Higher scores indicate lower amounts of state repression.

\(^2\)The Soviet decision to halt arms shipment to Nicaragua’s Sandinista government had the effect, in the words of FMLN leader Salvador Samayoa, “knocked the revolutionary perspective off balance (Karl 1992).”
both the Salvadoran government and the FMLN, not to mention Salvadoran society as a whole, appeared to be exhausted from the long and bloody war and to have a genuine desire for peace. Third, newly elected political leaders in both El Salvador and the United States appeared more willing than their predecessors to pursue peace: In El Salvador, a relatively moderate president, Alfredo Cristiani, was elected; in the U.S. the more pragmatic George H. W. Bush replaced the more ideological Ronald Reagan (Karl 1992). If the null hypothesis is true (i.e., if the observed correlation between the UN presence and improved human rights is spurious), then the historical record should show the parties able to overcome differences, maintain peace, and respect human rights largely without the help of direct UN efforts. However, I argue below that the opposite is the case. Despite consenting and relatively cooperative parties, UN efforts proved necessary to help the parties reconcile and, related, to influence the factors necessary to improve Salvadoran respect for human rights.

**Figure 4.1**

**Human Rights in El Salvador Before and After Peace Settlement**
I proceed to support this arguments as follows. The first section explains the background of the civil war as well as the history of severe state repression during the conflict. The following sections proceed thematically, tracing the UN role in security sector reform and disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating, monitoring security forces, and the related processes of rebel-to-party transformation, elections, and political power-sharing. In the process, I attempt to demonstrate precisely how the efforts of the United Nations were able to increase compliance with peace accords and reduce both response- and threat-side factors of state repression. Finally, the last section uses synthetic control methods in order to provide a hypothetical counterfactual of the trajectory El Salvador’s human rights practices would have taken without a UN presence.

4.2 Background

On January 16, 1992, representatives from the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) signed the Chapultepec Peace Accords in Mexico City, ending more than a decade of civil war marked by numerous and severe violations of human rights.3 All told, over 75,000 people were killed and over one million people became refugees. The proximate cause of the civil was the brutal assassination of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero, carried out while Romero was conducting mass in the spring of 1980. However, the ultimate causes are complex and can be traced back to the 1930s and the inception of military authoritarianism, as well as the deepening gap between the rich and poor, a gap that increased dramatically throughout the 20th century (Howard 2008; Montgomery 1995; Stanley 1996; Wood 2003). With a population of around five million in 1980, the majority

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3A post-war truth commission received over 22,000 complaints of serious violence that occurred during the civil war. 60 percent of these complaints were about extrajudicial executions, 25 percent concerned forced disappearances, and 20 percent were about torture (Johnstone 1995). Furthermore, the commission estimated that 95 percent of these acts were committed by groups and individuals affiliated with the Salvadoran government, most against civilians (Howard 2008)
of land and wealth in El Salvador was said to be controlled by a coffee-producing oligarchy composed of just fourteen families (Bourgois 2001). Not surprisingly, this oligarchy maintained close ties with the military and other security agencies; the military maintained order and stability for the elite in exchange for state resources and relative autonomy (Call 2002). According to Howard (2008), “over the years since the 1930s, while not necessarily unified, the army, security forces, paramilitary forces, and police had come to dominate political life, committing grave human rights violations including torture and massacres (89).”

In the 1970s, economic disparities were brought into sharper relief by structural changes in the El Salvadoran economy. Although macroeconomic indicators performed fairly well during this decade (McCintosh 1998), other factors related to an expansion of export agriculture produced an economic decline for many rural Salvadorans. This expansion “diminished the amount of land available for domestic use agriculture, increased land rents for all agricultural tenants, enlarged the pool of people depending directly on wages that were declining in real terms, and flattened the net output of grain per person (Baloyra 1998, 17).

While moderates hoped that reform could be accomplished through gradual democratic processes, this hope was undercut by massive electoral frauds in 1972 and 1977 (Baloyra 1998). Following these elections violence began to escalate between leftist groups and rightist paramilitary organizations. In the months following the assassination of Archbishop Romero, five leftist groups—with varying degrees of militarism—unified into the FMLN and began a full-scale insurrection. The initial FMLN offensive failed, largely due to U.S. support of the Salvadoran government, and the FMLN was driven into the mountains and countryside from which it began

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4These groups, most of which formed as splinter groups of the Communist Party (Grenier 2004), include the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Martí (FPL), Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), the Resistencia Nacional (RN), the Partido Comunista Salvadoreño (PCS) and the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRC). In addition to their own resources, the FMLN received support from other regional and international Marxist states, including Cuba, the fledgling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union.”
a protracted guerrilla campaign.

As the war progressed the violent repression that had been a pattern in El Salvador for decades intensified. Led by Roberto D’Aubuisson—who was sometimes called “Blowtorch Bob” due to his affinity for using blowtorchers during interrogations—the extreme right began creating “death squads” to terrorize opponents and civilians friendly to the FMLN (Johnstone 1995). This pattern of civilian killing continued throughout war; however, it was particularly severe during the first few years. Over half of the total 75,000 civil war deaths occurred during the first four years of the conflict “when death squads targeted a broad range of civilians presumed to be active in ‘subversive’ popular organizations and the armed forced executed thousands and conducted ground sweeps targeting civilians as well as combatants (Call 2002, 548).

By the end of the decade, however, several factors—both international and domestic—combined to bring about an opening for peace. Internationally, the FMLN lost much of its support and ideological underpinning due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the electoral defeat of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Furthermore, the waning of the Cold War and the end of the Reagan administration made the United States a less ideological supporter of the Salvadoran government and less likely to condone human rights atrocities committed in the prosecution of the war (Brody 1995). In addition, a wave of democratization in Latin America in the 1980s provided regional support for democratic governance in El Salvador (Hampson 1996). Domestically, Alfredo Cristiani beat out the more extremist Roberto D’Aubuisson to become elected president. The moderate Cristiani sought to transition ARENA (the dominant right-wing political party) away from a paramilitary ideology toward a more free-market identity (Levine 1997). And perhaps most importantly, both the FMLN and the government came to realize that, while they could both inflict significant damage on each other, neither had the capability to decisively win the war.
4.3 UN Involvement

However, the aforementioned factors alone were not sufficient to bring about a stable peace. Although both parties had given up on the idea of total victory, there still existed a wide chasm between the FMLN and Salvadoran government on many substantive issues that would need to be resolved in order for peace to become a serious possibility. Both parties realized that a neutral third party arbiter would be necessary in order successfully bridge their differences (Hampson 1996). To that end, both the Salvadoran government and the FMLN wrote the UN to request the assistance of then Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar in future negotiations. They also indicated their willingness for mediation by Cuellar’s Personal Representative, Alvaro de Soto (Howard 2008).

On April 4, 1990, catalyzed by the leadership of the Secretary-General, as well as the aforementioned softening of the U.S. position toward the FMLN, the two-sides signed the first of what would be seven agreements (Levine 1997). Immediately following this inaugural agreement Secretary-General de Cuellar obtained the formal support for the peace process of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the USA. However, negotiations immediately stalled over the status of the El Salvador military. The FMLN, which "viewed the military through the prism of sixty years of army domination of the country’s politics, ten years of civil war, and innumerable human rights abuses," wanted to completely abolish the military, as Costa Rica had done in the 1960s. Not surprisingly, this was a non-starter for the Cristiani government (Levine 1997, 33). Furthermore, the irreconcilable disagreement was not limited to military reform. According to Howard, "while the warring sides were expressing more moderate views rhetorically, they remained far apart on every substantive issue to be discussed in the peace talks (Howard 2008, 93).

In what turned out to be an inspired move, de Cuellar’s special representative, Alvaro de Soto, put on the table the issue of human rights and, after only a day of
intense negotiations, the San José Agreement was signed. Although neither party expected to make human rights monitoring the first substantive agreement of the negotiations, both had reasons for acceding to the language put forward by de Soto. For the FMLN, a desire for third-party monitoring of human rights was unsurprising. As one FMLN leader noted, issues surrounding human rights "impregnates all reforms" (Johnstone 1995, 18). However, the Cristiani government’s reason for supporting human rights monitoring, in which they would be the primary target, was less clear. It appears that a combination of U.S. pressure, a desire to show good faith and put pressure on the FMLN to make concessions, and a desire to improve their international image motivated the Salvadoran government to sign the agreement.

Despite concerns about the safety of monitors and their ability to effectively monitor while fighting was still ongoing, at the request of both parties the UN decided to deploy monitors prior to a cease-fire, an unprecedented move at that point in UN history. Building on the foundation of the San José Agreement, a series of further agreements culminated in the signing of the Chapultepec Accords, bringing to an end over a decade of brutal civil war.

The human rights record of post-Chapultepec El Salvador showed significant improvement relative to the pre-Chapultepec years. Charles T. Call notes that

With the end of the war, political violence declined markedly. The UN reported a significant improvement in human rights between 1991 and 1995, including the complete cessation of disappearances. While torture of detainees was commonplace, indeed routine, during and before the war, in the first nine months of 1993 there were only nine cases of torture reported to ONUSAL. The Human Rights Institute of the University of Central America (IDHUCA) reported only 12 killings attributed to police or military forces in 1995, in contrast to an annual average of thousands during the war. These dozen alleged killings were many times fewer than the 488 deaths attributed to common criminals during the same period (Call 2003, 846).

I now turn to analyzing the UN’s role in this dramatic reduction of state repression.
4.4 Security Sector Reform and DDR

As I argued in Chapter Two, SSR and DDR are crucial aspects of reducing both response- and threat-sides of repression. On the response-side, SSR typically entails reducing the size of the military, eliminating leaders and organizations with repressive histories, the liberal transformation of remaining security institutions, and integrating rebel soldiers into the national military and police. DDR results in the demobilizing of certain military units from a state of armed readiness and reintegrating ex-soldiers into society. Together, these processes reduce the resources government leaders have at their disposal with which to repress. On the threat-side, DDR entails completely eliminating the military capacities of rebel organizations and reintegrating rebel soldiers into society, reducing the threat to government leaders posed by opposition groups. Furthermore, SSR reduces the threat state military forces pose to opposition groups, reducing the likelihood of violent dissent. DDR and SSR are related processes, and the dynamics of one often bleed into the other. For instance, integrating former rebel soldiers into the national military as part of SSR becomes indistinguishable from the reintegration aspect of DDR. Because of this close interrelationship I will analyze these two processes together. As I show below, the presence and efforts of ONUSAL in the years following the Chapultepec Accords were critical to helping the Salvadoran government and the FMLN comply with their agreements aimed at DDR and SSR.

Throughout the peace negotiations, the primary demand of the Salvadoran government was the disarming and demobilization of the FMLN. Although DDR, if successful, results in the partial demobilization of the national army, the primary onus falls on rebel forces, who must completely eliminate all military capabilities, including dismantling control and command structures as well as giving up all military weaponry. Understandably, the FMLN was extremely reluctant to accede to this demand; their military capabilities, after all, were their principal bargaining
chip. Thus, the primary obstacle for FMLN demobilization, and for DDR in general, was the commitment problem (Walter 2009). Demobilizing and disarming render former rebels extremely vulnerable should government leaders renege on their commitments. Because rebel groups know this, they are understandably very reluctant to fulfill promises to abolish their military forces without some kind of guarantee that government leaders will abide by the terms of peace agreements. Therefore, a necessary condition for demilitarizing the FMLN was some sort of guarantee that the Salvadoran government would keep its commitment to reform the national military and allow the FMLN to enter Salvadoran political life, even after the FMLN had lost its capabilities to punish them for not doing so. There was thus somewhat of a catch-22 here: The FMLN demanded to be allowed involvement in Salvadoran politics, but the Salvadoran government would not agree to this unless it disarmed. However, once it disarmed the FMLN had no way of enforcing the Salvadoran concession to allow their political participation (Montgomery 1995). As will be explained below, it appears that the UN was able to resolve this catch-22 by guaranteeing the implementation of the peace accords to the FMLN’s satisfaction.

Overseeing DDR was primarily the responsibility of ONUSAL’s military division, which was charged with the following:

- Monitoring the cease-fire: supervising the separation of forces and troop quartering; counting troops and weapons; weapons collection at specified sites and investigations of any violations of this provision (i.e. weapons outside of collection locations); exercising control over troop movement (if any troops were to leave bases or barracks, they had to have ONUSAL approval and were often accompanied by ONUSAL troops); verification of all supplies moving in and out of bases; concentration of all FMLN arms, munitions, mines, and other military equipment; destruction of all FMLN weapons; minefield clearance; and finally, the Chief Military Observer of ONUSAL was to be the Chairman of a "Joint Working Group," made up of one representative from each of the parties, which was to "facilitate application" of the agreement (Howard 2008, 114)

- Not surprisingly, given the stakes involved, this process was marked by delays and obfuscations on both sides. Shortly after the process began, implementation of
the peace accords hit a roadblock due to the lack of peace accord compliance by both parties. The Cristiani government failed to properly abolish the Treasury Police and the National Guard, instead "converting" them into Military Police and Frontier Guards, respectively (The United Nations and El Salvador). The FMLN, on the other hand, “delayed the reintegration of the first 20 percent of its ex-combatants, saying, among other things, that the Government had failed to implement measures that would facilitate the reintegration process, notably those relating to land and to political activity by the FMLN (The United Nations and El Salvador, 26).” Having received appeals for assistance from the Cristiani government as well as the FMLN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali dispatched Under Secretary-General Mack Goulding to exert pressure and get the process moving. In a subsequent report, “Goulding’s criticism of the Salvadoran government’s lack of compliance worked to embarrass the government internationally, and increased donor pressure on the Cristiani administration to comply with its commitments (Howard 2008, 116).” This highlights one of the UN’s key sources of leverage: “While the UN did not directly hold the purse-strings on international donations, it was in a position to certify or decertify the good faith and democratic vocation of the Salvadoran protagonists, and thereby to influence the prospects for major international funding (Stanley and Holiday 1997, 23).” Furthermore, the UN did unilaterally control some resources such as mission personnel and conflict mediation abilities that the mission could use to give incentives for compliance (ibid.).

Following the release of Goulding’s report, both parties agreed to a “recalendarization” of the peace accords, in which new timetables were agreed to. Shortly thereafter the FMLN demobilized the first 20 percent of its military forces and the Cristiani government agreed to a key FMLN demand: formally recognizing it as a political party following complete demobilization and weapons destruction. Although the two sides would have two more similar deadlocks, each was resolved with UN support and
subsequent recalendarizations (Howard 2008).

One year after the process had begun the Salvadoran military decreased in size from 63,000 to 31,000 personnel. Furthermore, by December of 1992 the FMLN had demobilized all of its 12,000 troops and claimed that it had destroyed all of its weapons, a claim that was certified by ONUSAL. However, following an explosion of an FMLN arms cache in Managua, Nicaragua, in May of 1993 it became clear that this was not the case. President Cristiani reacted to this discovery by threatening to dissolve the FMLN as a political party and also requested that “ONUSAL certification of complete disarmament on the part of the FMLN be left in abeyance until FMLN had handed over all its war-related materiel for destruction (S/26005 1993).”

A UN report authored by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali called the discovery of the Managua weapons cache as well as others within El Salvador “the most serious violation to date of the commitments assumed under the Peace Accords (S/26005).”

The FMLN responded to discovery of their deception with good faith measures to demonstrate their commitment to peace including destroying the Managua weapons cache and turning over weapons from over 100 other sites over to ONUSAL for destruction (Wrobel and Oliverra 1997). Critically, as Howard notes, "the FMLN agreed to this measure because it had guarantees from the UN that the Cristiani government would not be allowed to disband the FMLN, or otherwise flagrantly exclude the party from the postwar political process (Howard 2008, 118).

While the partial demobilization of the national military and the elimination of the FMLN’s military force had their share of political difficulties, the reform of the Salvadoran military was perhaps more fraught with political challenges because it “struck at the very heart of one of the primary centers of military and political power: the Salvadoran military elite (Howard 2008, 107).” Indeed, “purging the military was the most sensitive aspect of the entire peace process, precisely because some feared it would provoke a serious backlash in the military if not handled carefully (Johnstone
Despite its difficulty, reforming the security sector was a crucial facet of reducing the response-side of repression in post-civil war El Salvador, and likely would not have been possible, or at least achieved with so few difficulties, without UN assistance.

The primary military reform demanded by the FMLN during negotiations was the dismissal of the tandora class that graduated from the Salvadoran military academy in 1966. The Cristiani government refused to this demand, however, and instead offered to conduct a “self-purge.” Finally, after months of difficult negotiations, the two parties agreed to a UN-proposed compromise. This compromise established an ad hoc commission made up of three Salvadoran civilians known for their independent judgement and “unimpeachable democratic credentials responsible for recommending which officers should be ousted from the armed forces.” The chief criteria of evaluation included an officer’s “record of observance of the legal order, with particular emphasis on respect for human rights, both in personal conduct and in the rigour with which he has ordered the redress and punishment of unlawful acts, excesses or human rights violations committed under his command, especially if there have been serious or systematic omissions in the latter respect (A/46/864-S/23501 1992).”

After reviewing the 232 most senior officers, the commission recommended purging the entire senior military establishment. According to interviews conducted by Johnstone, this recommendation went beyond what most expected and raised fears that the Salvadoran military elite would resist the report’s recommendations (Johnstone 1995). Cristiani, hoping to avoid a military backlash, requested that some of the officers named in the report be allowed to remain in their positions until normal retirement. Boutros-Ghali refused this request and demanded full implementation, though he, and several of the FMLN factions were more flexible about the speed of implementation, allowing the Salvadoran government to proceed at a politically acceptable pace. “Thus,” Johnstone argued, “the UN deftly handled the situation
by insisting on compliance with the recommendations, but not in a way that would have destroyed President Cristiani’s ability to keep the military in check (Johnstone 1995, 33).” The UN was thus a necessary ingredient in removing some of the most repressive elements of the Salvadoran government and also provided a signal that human rights abusers could be held accountable.

Along with purging the military of its worst human rights violators, Call notes that several other significant and successful reforms were effected:

All in all, remarkable progress was achieved in military reform. For the first time in history, a Latin American military submitted its officer corps to external review and vetting... its budget was reduced, and new levels of accountability and civilian input reached. As of 2002, the army was roughly the same size as the National Civilian Police, and its missions and doctrine reflected significant emphasis on classic external defense functions and respect for human rights and civilian control (Call 2003, 836).^5

Along with reform of the military, an ostensibly external security force, the Chapultepec Accords also called for significant institutional reform of internal security forces. However, this is somewhat of a misnomer, since a separation between external and internal security agencies did not exist in pre-Chapultepec El Salvador, which was a large source of the human rights problems El Salvador experienced, and, consequently, a main target of post-conflict reform. In contrast to the military-dominated nature of the status-quo, the internal security reforms “embraced a civilian notion of policing, specifying a police doctrine oriented toward protecting citizen rights rather than state interests and creating mechanisms of command and oversight wholly outside the military structure (Call 2003, 837).” The primary component of this transformation was the demilitarization of the internal security forces, represented chiefly by the creation of a new police agency that would be the sole national-level law enforcement agency, called the National Civilian Police (PNC) (Call 2003). Furthermore, the Accords “greatly reduced the constitutional powers of the armed forces, called for

^5However, because some military officers retired with full honors, and only when they were ready, the process did not send as strong a signal as it might have (Johnstone 1995).
the complete elimination of the existing public security forces, and provided a very specific institutional and legal framework for the new police force and a timetable for its development and deployment (Stanley 1995, 33)." Thus, the PNC would be markedly different from previous Salvadoran law enforcement agencies in that it would be entirely distinct and independent from the national military. The ultimate goal of these reforms was to revamp the historically repressive police and internal security forces into a “single modern force, based on the principles of professional, apolitical, community- and rights-based policing (Howard 2008, 111).”

The UN assisted this transformation in a number of ways. ONUSAL’s “CIVPOL” division was directed to assist in the creation of a new police training academy as well as the selection of academy recruits. Furthermore, the UN, along with other elements of the international community provided “unprecedented levels of technical assistance, training, on-the-job supervision, and material assistance to the new police force (Stanley 1995, 33).”

However, security reform proved to be a difficult and drawn-out process. The Salvadoran government resisted and reneged on agreements and had to be continuously prodded by the UN as well as other international actors, such as Spain and the United States. For instance, a Special Investigations Unit and the old Anti-Narcotics Unit, each with the presence of repressive agents, were initially indiscriminately transferred into the PNC. However, following intense UN pressure, each of the transferred members were individually evaluated, allowing some to join the PNC while causing others to resign en masse (Call 2003). In another example of government recalcitrance on the issue of police reform, the Cristiani administration refused to provide proper funding and facilities needed in order to get the police academy off the ground. Once again, however, with UN assistance along with bilateral aid from the United States

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6The new police force was to made up of 20 percent former FMLN, 20 percent former National Police, and 60 percent new recruits (A/46/864-S/23501 1992).

7These forces included the National Police, the National Guard, and the Treasury Police.
and Spain the academy was eventually able to train a sufficient number of recruits (Howard 2008).

Overall, the reform of Salvadoran security forces was successful. By December of 1993 a national survey showed that 71 percent of Salvadorans approved of the PNC, while only two percent rated it as “bad” or “very bad (Call 2003)”. In addition, the integrative and liberalizing nature of the reforms made security reform “one of the most important venues for national reconciliation (Stanley and Call 1997, 116).” Montgomery notes that

one of the most dramatic changes in El Salvador is the disappearance of state-sponsored terrorism. Occasional reports of human rights violations by police officers always center on those involved; there has never been even the suggestion that the institution condones this behavior. On the contrary, agents are usually arrested and prosecuted for such violations. When they are not, one can count on the National Counsel for Human Rights to denounce the lapse (Montgomery 1997, 66).

Together, institutional and personnel reforms of the military and internal security agencies reduced both the ability and the willingness of the Salvadoran military to repress and help explain the significant improvement in El Salvador’s post-conflict human rights practices. The elimination of internal security agencies previously used as instruments of state repression removed a primary tool government leaders might use to repress. Furthermore, the purging of the most repressive agents within the Salvadoran military reduced the ability of government principals to repress, as well as the aggregate repressive willingness of agents within the security sector. The ability and willingness to repress was further reduced by integrating different factions within each police district: “The decision to mix ex-guerrillas, ex-National Police officers, and civilian commanders inside each territorial delegation helped prevent the force from reproducing partisan divisions while providing sufficient security guarantees to the FMLN and its supporters (Call 2003, 838).”
4.5 Human Rights Monitoring

I argued in Chapter 2 that third party monitoring can be an effective way in which to reduce response-side factors of state repression. For various reasons, such as the threat of losing international aid or reputational damage, the presence of international monitors raises the cost of violating human rights. Therefore, all things being equal, third party monitoring reduces the willingness of principals to repress. Furthermore, because international monitors do not have the same disincentives as principals to uncover and report repressive behavior, they are more likely to effectively reduce incentives that agents have to violate human rights. This section evaluates the role that UN monitoring played in reducing human rights violations in post-war El Salvador.

As I explained above, progress in ceasefire negotiations began with an agreement about human rights monitoring. Shortly after, in an unprecedented move, the UN deployed human rights monitors prior to the formal end of hostilities, starting out as a human rights- rather than a ceasefire-monitoring mission. Officially, ONUSAL was charged to “monitor nationwide...respect for and the guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms (A/45/1055-S/23037 1991).” This was to be done by actively monitoring the human rights situation; investigating specific cases of alleged human rights violations; making recommendations; and, lastly, reporting to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. The powers conferred on the Mission are very broad and include the possibility of visiting any place or establishment freely and without prior notice; receiving communications from any Salvadoran individual, group, or entity and interviewing freely any individual or group; conducting direct investigations; and using the media to the extent useful for the fulfillment of its mandate (A/45/1055-S/23037).

The presence of UN monitors seemed to have an immediate ameliorative impact on the Salvadoran political climate:

First, the level of human rights abuses decreased, primarily because the UN’s presence and authority to visit any place freely and without prior notice’ had a dissuasive effect. Second, the level of violence decreased and was concentrated away from urban
centers, primarily because the parties did not want to risk UN casualties and incur the wrath of the international community. Furthermore, the presence of police and military advisers within the human rights mission had a ‘calming effect.’ These advisers provided security for the human rights observers and established links with the Salvadoran military and police, links that were used to minimize the impact of the conflict on civilians and that helped reassure the population that uniformed personnel could contribute to the peace process. Finally, the willingness of both sides to accept international human rights monitoring demonstrated that they had given up on seeking a military victory. In that sense, it was an important confidence-building measure (Johnstone 1995, 20).

Beyond this initial ameliorative effect, the human rights division of ONUSAL continued to contribute to reductions in state repression throughout the mission’s tenure. While the initial investigating and reporting of human rights abuses was somewhat ad hoc, by late October of 1992 the process became systematized. According to Howard, this process went as followed:

The office would first collect complaints of alleged human rights abuses; second, it would investigate the complaints using the ample powers of inquiry granted by the mandated; and third report on the findings while making recommendations to the parties for ways in which behavior and institutions should be changed. One year later, these reports began to include analyses of past trends and predictions about future potential difficulties, thus making it easier for UN headquarters to exert pressure on the parties while presenting them with facts from the past, and suggestions for future reform (Howard 2008, 106).

Following these initial improvements, however, in mid-1993, El Salvador experienced “an upsurge of selective violence against citizens who were openly engaged in politics,” as well as an “increase in arbitrary executions and activities of illegal armed groups, including the so-called death squads (A/49/59-S/1994/47 1994).” The UN response to the backslide helps give some insight into the mechanisms through which human rights monitoring affected human rights practices. The chief mechanism seems to have been public pressure. As Ian Johnstone notes: “Public pressure was stepped up in mid-1993 when ONUSAL began publicizing the parties’ records in implementing the recommendations of both the truth commission and the human rights division (Johnstone 1995, 27).” This public pressure, according to Howard, also became more
innovative, using “radio, television ads, posters, and even a puzzle for children, the pieces of which comprised the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Howard 2008, 106).”

In addition to the human rights monitoring conducted by the human rights division, CIVPOL was tasked with monitoring the newly formed National Civilian Police. According to (Stanley and Loosle 1998, 139), “The main role of the CIVPOL division was to prevent the [National Police] from acting in an openly politicized and abusive manner during the peace process and to assist in maintaining public safety in former conflict zones. It carried out these functions successfully.”

Together, the monitoring and reporting of the various ONUSAL divisions appeared to have a significant effect on human rights practices. As early as February of 1992, the Human Rights Division reported a “significant decline in such problems as...harm done to the civilian population in the course of the armed conflict and, in general, violations of international humanitarian law by both parties(S/23580).” Because the decline in human rights violations began immediately after ONUSAL entered the country, but prior to the end of the civil war, it appears that the decline cannot be explained as an epiphenomenon of the end of civil war. A more plausible explanation is that UN monitors had a direct causal role in reducing state repression.

4.6 Power Sharing and Rebel-to-Party Transformation

While changing the size and composition of security forces and monitoring their activity should have a significant effect on repressive behavior, lasting change will likely only be effected when the interests of the repressed are represented in the political system, i.e., when opposition groups have genuine access to the levers of political

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8 The overlapping mandates of the human rights division and CIVPOL initially created some conflict between the two divisions. Both, after all, were charged with investigating human rights abuses but were housed in separate buildings and separate reporting mechanisms. This conflict was eventually resolved when the two divisions were integrated in 1994 (Howard 2008).
power. Being democratically accountable for repression raises the costs of repressing, and thus decreases the willingness of principals to repress. Further, dispersing political power among opposition leaders by definition removes the monopoly control of power that government leaders may have previously had, thus decreasing their ability to repress. All of this also serves to reduce incentives of rebel groups to use violence and revolution as a means of obtaining their political objectives.

Unsurprising then, the primary goal of the FMLN in the peace negotiations was to “create structural and legal conditions for incorporating the FMLN and its supporters into the nation’s political process (O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999, 102).” Initially, the primary obstacle to political liberalization was the militarization of the FMLN. As Gerardo Munck notes, “the transformation of a guerrilla commander into a politician, and a guerrilla force into a political party, is not simple (Munck 1993, 87). This turned out to be the case for the FMLN. As was noted above, after ONUSAL certified that the FMLN had been completely disarmed, and the subsequent discovery of numerous hidden weapons caches, President Cristiani threatened to decertify them as a political party. Boutros-Ghali, however, pushed back against Cristiani’s threat, arguing that ‘the transformation of FMLN into a political party and the full reintegration of its members within a framework of full legality, into the civil, political and institutional life of the country, are at the very core of the Peace Accords. Indeed, this process constitutes the ultimate goal of the entire process as envisaged in the Geneva Agreement of 4 April 1990 (S/26005).’ Because, as I’ve already argued, the UN was critical to providing the FMLN the trust to finally fully disarm, the UN also deserves significant credit for the subsequent political liberalization and the incorporation of the FMLN into Salvadoran political life.

Another way in which the UN helped solidify power-sharing and rebel-to-party transformation was through its critical role in ensuring free and fair elections in 1994. The success of these particular elections was crucial for at least two reasons: First,
they were the first elections held after the peace process and were an important litmus test for the success of the peace process. As Johnstone notes,

In reflecting on the long-term impact of the Salvadoran peace process, the significance of converting the FMLN from a military force to a legitimate political party should not be underestimated. It meant that the insurgent movement would operate within rather than outside the constitutional framework and, after a decade of bitter civil war, could legally challenge the government in an election campaign on relatively equal footing (Johnstone 1995, 50).

Second, these elections, as happens once every fifteen years in El Salvador, would simultaneously elect both the Presidency and the Legislative Assembly.\(^9\) The outcome of these elections would thus play a major role in the post-war distribution of power.

Although elections monitoring was not a primary component of the ONUSAL mandate, the UN came to play a large role in ensuring the success of the 1994 elections. In May 1993 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali declared his “intention to enlarge the United Nations Observer Mission to include an electoral component for the purpose of observing and verifying the Salvadoran general elections(S/25812/Add.1).” This request was subsequently approved by the Security Council and an election division that later reached a peak of 900 personnel was established (S/RES/832 1993).

ONUSAL’s responsibility during the initial phase was to assist in voter registration. According to a study conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/ONUSAL, “27 percent of Salvadorans of voting age—some 700,000 people—do not have an electoral card (S/26606 1992).” This study attributed the high numbers of unregistered citizens to El Salvador’s complex registration process that would be a challenge in any country, but posed even greater problems in El Salvador where a significant number of citizens are semi-literate.\(^{10}\) Low numbers of

\(^9\) In El Salvador the President is elected every five years and the assembly is elected every three years. In addition to the Presidential and Legislative elections, 262 mayoralties and 20 Deputies to the Central American Parliament were up for grabs.

\(^{10}\) From the report: “The starting-point in this [registration] process is presentation of a request for registration by the voter, who must return a month later to collect his electoral card. If the information on the request tallies with that on the birth certificate stored in the registry files, the card will be ready. However, responsibility for sending the birth certificates to the registry lies with
voters posed obvious legitimacy issues for the election, not least because a significant number of unregistered citizens lived in former combat zones (ibid.).

ONUSAL performed several functions that substantially increased the number of registered voters and greatly reduced the likelihood of illegitimate elections. Perhaps most importantly, ONUSAL set up various ways, such as day-long registration drives, for voters to circumvent the normally onerous and bureaucratic registration process. On top of this they used every means at their disposal to pressure the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to do its job\(^{11}\) (i.e., register voters and ensure successful elections) and even went so far as personally visiting municipalities to find individual birth certificates (Montgomery 1995; Howard 2008). By the time the elections arrived over 2.3 million voters, or about 85 percent of the eligible population, had been verified as registered (The United Nations and El Salvador).

Along with facilitating voter registration, ONUSAL was also tasked with monitoring electoral activities prior to and during the elections. At the beginning, the monitors appeared to have their work cut out for them, as the outset of the electoral campaign was marked by some troubling activities, in particular the “murders of at least 15 persons of some political importance (ibid., 50).”\(^{12}\) However, following this rash of killings the campaign season “unfolded more smoothly in 1994 as the frequency of killings and other violence diminished and the Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups began to discharge its mandate (ibid.).”\(^{13}\)

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\(^{11}\) According to Montgomery (1995), this entailed flattery, cajoling, and bullying.

\(^{12}\) Although these killings echoed El Salvador’s troubled past, their impact was mitigated by the fact that they were perpetrated by fringe elements, rather than by any of the main players (ibid.)

\(^{13}\) Secretary Boutros-Ghali gives the following account of his response to the killings: “On 3 November 1993, I expressed my shock at the killings, called for a vigorous inquiry and urged the parties to accelerate implementation of the peace accords. I also stated that the killings confirmed the need for immediate implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth regarding the investigation of illegal groups. The Security Council supported my ideas two days later in a statement calling for an end to the violence. I then dispatched Under-Secretary-General Goulding to El Salvador for consultations, which were held from 8 to 15 November. These led to the formation, in December, of a Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed...
Election day itself went relatively smoothly, other than some logistical problems and a relatively small number of rejected voters. Voter turnout was smaller than expected, though still about 33 percent more than had voted in the previous election (Howard 2008). In the end, the ARENA party won the presidency and a plurality in the Assembly, though the FMLN won a respectable 21 seats of the 84 available, and would see further gains in future elections. While the elections were not entirely problem free, they were deemed “acceptable” by the UN. Most importantly, perhaps, they contributed to the institutionalization and consolidation of democracy in El Salvador and helped in the transformation of the FMLN from a revolutionary military force into a respectable political party.

This transformation influenced several mechanisms that produce state repression, contributing to El Salvador’s post-conflict human rights improvement. On the response-side, the inclusion of the FMLN into the political system decreased the ability of state leaders to use repression as a means of political control. On the threat-side, FMLN’s political inclusion, along with possible gains in the future, decreased incentives to use violent dissent as a means of obtaining political goals. Clearly, the UN’s efforts deserve significant credit for these accomplishments. At the very least, ONUSAL helped the elections proceed more smoothly than otherwise would have been the case. But more likely, “ONUSAL’s electoral division saved the elections from certain disaster (Montgomery 1998, 126).” As Stanley and Holiday (1997) have argued, “The entire peace process depended on the election being broadly free and fair, and accepted as such by the parties involved and by the population in general (36).” It’s unlikely this could have been accomplished without UN assistance.

Groups, a course of action supported by the Security Council. The Joint Group was composed of two independent representatives of the Government of El Salvador nominated by the President of the Republic, Dr. Jose Leandro Echeverria and Dr Jeronimo Castillo; the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights, Dr. Carlos Mauricio Molina Fonseca; and the Director of ONUSAL’s Human Rights Division, Dr. Diego Garcia-Sayan (The United Nations and El Salvador).
4.7 Synthetic Control Testing

While the foregoing discussion gives compelling evidence that the UN played a significant role in improving El Salvador’s post-conflict human rights practices, the case would be much stronger if we had a control case to compare. Under ideal conditions, we could determine the effect of the UN on El Salvador’s post-conflict human rights practices by comparing it to an identical case, but one where the UN was absent. Obviously, this is not possible; however, recent methodological advances do allow us to compare the trajectory of human rights in El Salvador to the trajectory of human rights practices in a synthetic case that has similar pre-treatment (i.e., pre-peace) characteristics to El Salvador but where the UN did not intervene. This practice was first suggested in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), and was refined in Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010). The motivating idea behind synthetic control methods is that it is often not possible to find a control case that suitably matches the pre-treatment characteristics of the treatment case of interest. However, a weighted combination of two or more control cases may sufficiently resemble the treatment case so as to warrant inference of a treatment effect based on comparing the treatment case and the weighted combination of control cases. Abadie and Gardeazabal, for example, use a weighted combination of two Spanish regions in order to approximate the economic growth the Basque region would have experienced had it not fallen victim to terrorist attacks.

To construct a synthetic El Salvador, I used the R Synth package (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller 2011) to create a synthetic country that approximates several Salvadoran pretreatment variables, including: number of people killed in the civil war, how long the war lasted, the number of military personnel, level of democracy, population, and GDP.\footnote{See chapter three for justification for using these variables.} Because using countries that significantly differ from El Salvador may bias the results (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller 2010), I restrict the donor
pool of possible countries to the ten control cases with the propensity scores closest to El Salvador’s.\textsuperscript{15} Table 4.1 shows countries from the donor pool that were used and the weights they were given. In this case, synthetic El Salvador was created using a weighted combination of Chad and Peru. Table 4.2 shows the covariate balance between El Salvador and its synthetic counterpart.

\textbf{Table 4.1}

\textbf{Donor Pool Used to Create Synthetic El Salvador}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weights</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{15}Propensity scores were created using a logit model with the same variables listed above.
Figure 4.2 shows the trajectory of El Salvador’s CIRI measure of physical integrity rights beginning five years prior to the war’s end and ending five years after the peace agreement. Prior to peace, El Salvador had a much worse human rights record. However, in the post-war years El Salvador’s CIRI score far surpasses its synthetic counterpart. Figure 4.3 presents the same basic information, with the line representing the gap in CIRI score between El Salvador and synthetic El Salvador during each of the five years before and after peace. Figures 4.4 through 4.11 present these same graphs for disaggregated CIRI measures, including torture, extrajudicial murder, political imprisonment, and disappearances. It appears that the improvements experienced by El Salvador compared to its synthetic counterpart are primarily coming from the areas of torture, political imprisonment, and extrajudicial killing. However, while the post-war records in disappearances are not significantly different, El Salvador’s pre-peace record in this area was worse, meaning that El Salvador experienced a greater relative improvement.

Because the synthetic El Salvador and actual El Salvador likely have some residual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Treated</th>
<th>Synthetic</th>
<th>Sample Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Deaths (log)</td>
<td>10.915</td>
<td>8.380</td>
<td>8.555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Duration (log)</td>
<td>148.000</td>
<td>128.746</td>
<td>83.500</td>
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<td>Military Personnel (log)</td>
<td>50.800</td>
<td>69.124</td>
<td>53.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>6.200</td>
<td>-2.625</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>8.533</td>
<td>9.269</td>
<td>8.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>7.343</td>
<td>6.117</td>
<td>6.659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Integrity (CIRI)</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>2.050</td>
<td>2.850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
confounding differences that might explain deviance in human rights trajectories, strong inferences based on this data alone is probably unwarranted. However, at the very least, the results presented here are consistent with the argument that the UN had a causal role in improving El Salvador’s post-war human rights practices.

**Figure 4.2**

**Human Rights Trajectory of El Salvador Before and After Peace Compared to a Synthetic El Salvador**

![Graph showing the Human Rights Trajectory of El Salvador before and after peace, compared to a synthetic El Salvador.](image-url)
Figure 4.3
Gap in Physical Integrity scores between El Salvador and Synthetic El Salvador

Pre-Peace  Post-Peace

Gap in Physical Integrity Rights
Figure 4.4
Torture Trajectory of El Salvador Before and After Peace Compared to a Synthetic El Salvador

![Graph showing torture trajectory for El Salvador and a synthetic version before and after peace.](image)
Figure 4.5
Gap in Torture Scores between El Salvador and Synthetic El Salvador
Figure 4.6
Extrajudicial Murder in El Salvador Before and After Peace
Compared to a Synthetic El Salvador

Extrajudicial Killing (CIRI)

Pre-Peace          Post-Peace

El Salvador
Synthetic El Salvador
Figure 4.7
Gap in Extrajudicial Murder Scores between El Salvador and Synthetic El Salvador

Pre-Peace                      Post-Peace

Gap in Extrajudicial Killing
Figure 4.8
Political Imprisonment in El Salvador Before and After Peace Compared to a Synthetic El Salvador

![Graph showing political imprisonment in El Salvador before and after peace, compared to a synthetic El Salvador.](image)
Figure 4.9
Gap in Political Imprisonment Scores between El Salvador and Synthetic El Salvador
Figure 4.10
Disappearances in El Salvador Before and After Peace Compared to a Synthetic El Salvador
Figure 4.11
Gap in Disappearance Scores between El Salvador and Synthetic El Salvador

![Graph showing gap in disappearance scores between Pre-Peace and Post-Peace periods.](image-url)
4.8 Conclusion

El Salvador was lucky in that both belligerent parties had a genuine desire for peace. However, it appears that that desire alone would not have been sufficient to resolve the thorny issues involved in the post-war peace process, many of which directly affected the mechanisms that produce state repression. The consensus among scholars seems to be that the UN played a necessary role in assisting the parties in coming to agreements as well as complying with those agreements. Stanley and Holiday argue that "because of their [the Salvadoran government and the FMLN] deep distrust of one another, and because that distrust extended to the military rank and file and political constituents of both sides, they were simply unable to end the conflict without the involvement of an impartial outsider to provide some assurance that the terms agreed to would actually be implemented (Stanley and Holiday 1997, 23). Tammy Sue Montgomery echoes this argument: "Both the agreements, as well as their implementation, could not have happened without the good will of the parties involved, together with the crucial role played by the United Nations (Montgomery 1995, 146)."

Lastly, David Holiday maintains. "Arena deserves credit for following through with the implementation of the 1992 peace accords, although most scholars would argue that it was UN oversight-and even US pressure-that assured government compliance on key issues (Holiday 2005, 78)." Furthermore, UN efforts appeared to directly help reduce levels of state repression, largely through the mechanisms theorized in Chapter Two. The UN helped both sides disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into society; facilitated security sector reform, monitored the activities of security personnel, assisted in rebel-to-party transformation and power-sharing, and mitigated the effects of isolated non-compliance. As Stanley (1996) notes, "Taken all together, the agreements...greatly reduced the state’s freedom to use coercion." To that I would add the agreements, and by extension the UN, also reduced the state’s willingness to use coercion, as well as the freedom and willingness of state opponents to violently
dissent.
Chapter 5

Mozambique and ONUMOZ

5.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the role played by The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in improving human rights practices following a 15-year-long civil war, a conflict that had some noteworthy features distinguishing it from El Salvador, and that posed significant challenges for the UN. Whereas El Salvador’s war was homegrown, the war in Mozambique was instigated, and then continued, by third-party states: first Rhodesia, and then, following the collapse of the Ian Smith regime, South Africa. Whereas El Salvador’s war pitted a rightist regime against leftist insurgents, the conflict in Mozambique reversed this, with the leftist Frelimo regime attempting to stave off insurgents from the rightist Renamo.\footnote{Rightist is a generous label. Renamo had difficulty articulating a coherent ideology.} Additionally, whereas most human rights atrocities in El Salvador were committed by the state, Renamo was responsible for the bulk of human rights abuses in Mozambique.\footnote{The Frelimo regime, it should be noted, was also responsible for human rights abuses during the war. Were that not the case, there would be little reason in analyzing improvements in human rights practices. Some of Frelimo’s repressive tactics will be outlined below.} Three additional differences between Mozambique and El Salvador include: 1. Mozambique provoked little interest from the United States, or any other major power for that mat-

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ter; 2. Perhaps the most obvious difference: Mozambique is located in Sub-Saharan Africa with a very different set of political, economic, and cultural institutions than El Salvador; and 3. Perhaps the most substantial difference: El Salvador was a case in which both parties were cooperative and consenting from the beginning. In the Mozambique case, however, consent was less forthcoming, and had to be created by the UN mission. Outlining these differences is important for one primary reason: If the ability of UN peacekeepers to improve post-war human rights can be generalized, it must be shown that the organization has exerted this ability in different places with different conditions. El Salvador and Mozambique are, indeed, very different places, who fought very different wars, and had very different peace processes.

But, despite these differences, Mozambique and El Salvador had one very important similarity: in both places, lasting peace and reduced repression were hardly guaranteed. Observers at the time of the ceasefire were not at all convinced that peace would last in Mozambique. Alden and Simpson (1993) argued that

Despite the signing of a peace accord between the Government and the rebels in October 1992, and an undertaking by the U.N. to supervise the cease-fire as well as the multi-party elections to be held in October 1993, the situation remains finely balanced. The tortuous nature of the negotiations process itself points to the existence of a great deal of mistrust between the protagonists which will not disappear overnight, and which will always threaten to re-surface during the transition. (110).

I argue below that that were it not for the presence of a multidimensional peace operation, this mistrust would likely have prevented the relatively smooth transition to peace that occurred. This UN presence overcame the commitment problem that otherwise would have likely derailed the peace process: demobilization left each side vulnerable in the event that the other party didn’t follow through with their commitments. Furthermore, this problem was even more severe for Renamo. Because Frelimo would still maintain control of the national police, Renamo could not be sure the Frelimo would follow through with its commitments after Renamo had demobilized and
surrendered its primary source of leverage over Frelimo. By helping these parties overcome the commitment problem and implement the terms of the peace agreement, I intend to show that, like in El Salvador, the United Nations peace operation was instrumental in decreasing the levels of post-war state repression in Mozambique, as shown in Figure 5.1, compared to what they would have been in the counterfactual where the UN did not intervene.

This chapter will proceed as follows. The first section gives some general background on the long and bloody war between Frelimo and Renamo. The second section outlines the role the UN played in implementing the peace process and improving human rights practices. The final section conducts synthetic control testing that uses the same statistical method employed in the previous chapter to compare the trajectory of human rights scores in Mozambique compared to a synthetic Mozambique that is constructed from similar cases.

Background

The civil war in Mozambique, like many other civil wars in Africa, had its roots in the decolonization that took place in the latter half of the 20th century. However, Mozambican independence came much later than most African states—like other Portuguese colonies, Mozambique remained under colonial control well into the 1970s. It wasn’t until 1975 that Mozambique obtained its sovereignty, primarily as a result of The Mozambican War of Independence, waged by the Mozambican Liberation Front, or FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique). While Portuguese colonization was hardly beneficent, the hasty exit of Portuguese colonizers created formidable governance problems. By 1974, the Portuguese population in Mozambique had rise to 200,000, primarily due to the Portuguese policy of encouraging immigration to Portuguese colonies. As a result, the Mozambican economy became almost entirely dependent on the skilled and semi-skilled Portuguese labor force. This dependence
quickly revealed itself upon independence, when “the mass exodus of expatriate settlers... (about 90 percent departed within 18 months) left Mozambique with a virtual vacuum in terms of the availability of skilled labor.” Some reports estimate that only 33 college graduates remained after the Portuguese departure (Kyle 1999). In addition, a similar vacuum was created in the civil service, leaving state management to inexperienced and uneducated revolutionaries.

To complicate things even more, the new Frelimo regime, led by Samora Machel, quickly undertook antagonistic policies toward neighboring Rhodesia. First, as part of international sanctions against the Smith regime, the newly independent Mozambique closed its borders with Rhodesia. Second, Mozambique allowed Zimbabwean guerrillas to use rear bases in Mozambican territory. As one commentator put it,
“these moves probably had more disastrous consequences on [Mozambique] than on [Rhodesia]. In response Rhodesia entered into war with Mozambique. From 1976 till the end of the Zimbabwean independence war in 1979, Rhodesian air-raids and commando attacks on vital installations in Mozambique became the major feature of the strained relations between the two countries (Chingono 1996, 29).”

The primary, and most destructive component of the Rhodesia-led war, was the creation of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) in 1977 by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization. Renamo, as the MNR came to be known after 1981, “was designed to serve as a destabilizing force within Mozambique that would sabotage communities, as well as government economic and military installations, in an effort to punish Machel’s government and to undermine Zimbabwe’s National Liberation Army guerrillas who were using Mozambique as a staging area for attacks on Rhodesian forces (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 126).”

After the downfall of the Smith regime in 1980, South Africa took control of Renamo, and intensified the war effort against Mozambique. Whereas the Rhodesians had mostly used Renamo clandestinely, the South African regime in Pretoria “assumed a much more public profile. It pursued a double pronged strategy combining political and military initiatives to boost [Renamo]. Through this support Renamo graduated from being a mere ’Matsanga outfit’ or bunch of bandits into being a formidable force to reckon with (Chingono 1996, 31).”

From its beginning, and through its transition to South African patronage, Renamo’s primary means of gaining support was coercion, and its primary weapon used against Frelimo was indiscriminate destruction. By late 1977, Vine argues, Renamo’s role had become defined. It was to “sabotage, to disrupt the population and to disrupt the economy of Mozambique...In concrete terms this represented the burning

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3South Africa’s motivation for supporting Renamo was political and ideological in nature. Its primary problems with Mozambique included: 1. Frelimo’s active support for the African National Congress (ANC); 2. Mozambique’s close ties with communist powers; and 3. Frelimo’s revolutionary fervor’ and vocal condemnation of the Pretorian regime (Chingono 1996).
of villages, the plundering of agricultural co-operatives, shops and clinics, attacks on railroad lines and road traffic, the raiding of re-education camps and the disruption of commerce generally (Vines 1991, 16)." After gaining South African backing, Renamo become even more destructive. Between 1980 and 1987, Renamo attacks destroyed or rendered inoperable roughly 1,800, schools, 720 health units, 900 shops, and 1,300 buses and trucks (ibid.). Renamo terrorism was such that even right-wing Western regimes, which could usually be counted on to support insurgencies directed against left-leaning regimes, thought that Renamo's tactics were too egregious to support. Margaret Thatcher, for instance, described Renamo as one of the "most brutal terrorist movements that there is (Vines 1991, 1)."

Although Renamo was responsible for the bulk of atrocities committed during the war, Frelimo was hardly an innocent bystander. Cabrita (2000) argues that "the pattern of internal dissent, persecution and physical elimination of members and opponents that characterized the liberation movement during the years of [Frelimo] exile continued after independence, except now in far larger proportions as Frelimo became the ruling party (xv)." As Pitcher (2006) notes, Frelimo's repressive behavior intensified in response to Renamo attacks:

After 1983, as civil conflict mounted, the ruling party became more authoritarian. While it continued to cultivate its worker-peasant base in particular provinces, it resorted to harsh tactics elsewhere. In the countryside, for example, the motives for relocating people became more tied to control of rural populations rather than improvement of their lives, and the means of resettling rural peoples became more coercive. The government heavily guarded productive agricultural areas and valuable assets such as the railways, and restricted movement around the country owing to security concerns. The language and the means of socialist rule became militarized, and policy choices were often repressive in their consequences (93).

A Country Report on Human Rights Practices by the United States Department of State gives the details of one particularly heinous incident:
In response to the insurgent attacks, the Government has instituted increasingly repressive measures to control the population. On two occasions in January 1983, in the southern provinces of Maputo and Gaza, a total of seven Mozambicans accused of being resistance guerrillas were tried without due process before large, hostile crowds, found guilty, and summarily executed. The Government described these as military tribunals, which have the authority to mete out the death penalty, although the trials were directed by senior government officials who did not normally bear judicial responsibility. There have been unofficial but credible reports that other such public trials have also taken place in the central provinces of Inhambane and Zambezia (USDOS 1984, 251).

While state repression gradually improved over the course of the 1980s, by 1989 repressive tactics by state authorities were still common. A 1989 State Department report notes that “human rights were tightly circumscribed in 1989. Major human rights concerns were harsh prison conditions; the use of arbitrary, incommunicado detention, especially by SNASP [The National People’s Security Service]; the denial of fair trials; restrictions on freedoms of press, assembly, and association, and the right of citizens to change their government; and serious limitations on worker rights (USDOS 1990, 251).”

Peace Process

By the late 1980s it became clear that neither side would be able to obtain a total victory. Although Renamo could likely have gone on fighting longer, two factors undercut its support and provided incentives to negotiate with Frelimo. The first was the threat of famine, perceived by many to be caused not only by a drought, but also by Renamo’s destruction of the infrastructure necessary to combat the famine. Second, Mozambique’s new president, Joaquim Chissano, began a a series of actions aimed at peace through gaining Western support and undercutting part of Renamo’s raison d’être. These actions primarily consisted of Western-style economic and political liberalization—including the adoption of a multi-party constitution, the official renunciation of Marxism-Leninism at the Fifth Party Congress, and the adoption of
an IMF/World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment program—and the courting of Western and Western-aligned powers, including the United States, Great Britain, and even South Africa, which publicly endorsed Chissano’s peace efforts. Furthermore, the high levels of destruction made for a very war-weary population. As the 1990s began, 4.3 million Mozambicans were displaced (out of a population of 14 million), up to 1 million people were dead, 250,000 children were orphaned, the infant mortality rate was the highest in the world, economic losses topped $15 billion, and the country’s economic and social infrastructure were decimated, all as a direct or indirect result of the war (Tollenære 2006; Howard 2008).

In response to these developments Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of Renamo, declared that he was ready to negotiate an end to the war. The first indirect contacts began in August of 1989. Unlike El Salvador, the United Nations was not a leading figure in these peace talks. That role was played by an Italian Catholic organization called Sant’Egidio, which had long ties to Mozambique and was closely linked to the Vatican. The first cease-fire was signed in 1991, which quickly fell apart after Renamo, suspicious of Frelimo actions and intentions, returned to full-scale fighting (McCormick 1993). Despite this setback, by 1992, with the support of the U.S., France, and Britain, talks progressed to the point where Chissano and Dhlakama were meeting face-to-face. Finally, after years of negotiations and 12 rounds of formal talks Frelimo and Renamo finally signed The General Agreement of Peace on October 4, 1992. The primary components of the agreement included specific provisions for a cease-fire, the complete demobilization of Renamo and Frelimo troops and the creation of a new national army with equal numbers of Renamo and Frelimo soldiers, the withdrawal of foreign forces, the monitoring of humanitarian corridors, and the holding of elections after the demobilization had been completed. The implementation of these terms was to be overseen by the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, which was to be chaired by the United Nations.
However, securing a strong UN presence did not come easily. As I explained in Chapter 3, rebels and governments tend to have different views about peacekeepers: rebels prefer to have them while governments prefer not to, or at least governments prefer smaller, less intrusive operations. This is why the presence of peacekeeping is positively correlated with the strength of rebel groups. Mozambique was a perfect illustration of this dynamic:

The initiative for peacekeeping came from the belligerents themselves, specifically from the rebels. From the very beginning of the negotiations, Renamo pushed for an international presence, while the Frelimo government resisted. The first mention of UN peacekeeping during the peace talks came in a proposal from the Renamo negotiator, Raul Domingos, in August 1990. Frelimo negotiator Armando Guebuza (now Mozambique’s president) insisted that the government would accept no such infringement on Mozambican sovereignty (Fortna 2008a, 64).

Renamo went as far as to propose a UN transitional authority that would temporarily take over administration of the country. This was out of the question for Frelimo, but, according to a U.S. observer during the peace talks, the proposal “reflected the depth of Renamo’s skepticism that the Frelimo government...could be trusted to conduct fair, multiparty elections (Hume 1994, 59).”

Thus, rather than signaling cooperative and trustful parties, the agreement to allow a peacekeeping mission in Mozambique was more reflective deep mistrust. Renamo was convinced that Frelimo could not be trusted to fulfill its commitments without a large and powerful UN peacekeeping mission to hold them to their promises. Furthermore, as I will explain in more detail below, consent was not simply an exogenous factor the preceded the UN presence, but was rather an endogenous factor that had to be manufactured.

While Renamo did not gets its wish for a UN operation with transitional authority, the parties did eventually agree to a sizable multidimensional peacekeeping operation “endowed with formal authority and leverage over the parties (Howard 2008,
This formal authority and leverage primarily came from the UN’s position as chair—with veto power—of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, which was responsible for implementing the entire peace agreement. By mid-1993 the UN force came to number 6,000 military personnel and 350 UN military observers tasked with humanitarian, military, political, and electoral mandates, each of which were interrelated:

Without sufficient humanitarian aid, and especially food supplies, the security situation in the country may deteriorate and the demobilization process might stall. Without adequate military protection, the humanitarian-process might stall. Without adequate military protection, the humanitarian aid would not reach its destination. Without sufficient progress in the political area, the confidence required for the disarmament and rehabilitation process would not exist. The electoral process, in turn, requires prompt demobilization and formation of the new armed forces, without which the conditions would not exist for successful elections (S/24892 1992).

The next section deals with perhaps the most critical of these tasks: demobilizing the belligerents and reforming the Mozambican security sector.

## 5.2 Security Sector Reform and DDR

Fully disarming and demobilizing soldiers that had been fighting each other for the past 15 years was a necessary condition for sustained peace. The import of this task was especially prominent in the minds of UN officials given UNAVEM’s recent experience in Angola, where UN peacekeepers had failed to fully demobilize and disarm soldiers prior to elections. The result was the return of full-scale civil war when these elections became contested. In contrast, however, ONUMOZ was quite successful. One scholar had this to say about the process:

The demobilization and reintegration programme (DRP) implemented in Mozambique was the most comprehensive ever attempted at the time, aiming to ease the combatant-to-civilian transition of about 100,000 fighters. The UN Secretariat and international aid agencies continue to judge
Mozambique's as one of the most successful war-to-peace transitions. So do many of those who write about such transitions (McMullin 2004, 627).

The procedure for DDR came from a template laid out by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, which had been assisting Frelimo with unilateral demobilization at Chissano’s request since 1990. The Swiss plan would concentrate soldiers in demobilization sites for no longer than two months, where they would be disarmed and registered in a database. Following demobilization, four main components were designed to help demobilized soldiers reintegrate into society. First, soldiers were offered transportation to anywhere in Mozambique and given civilian clothing, vegetable seeds and tool kits, and a three-month supply of food. Second, the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) would provide up to 24 months of payments in order to meet the veterans’ immediate needs while they adjusted to civilian life. The government was to pay the first 6 months of this subsidy, and the international community the rest. Third, the Information and Referral Service (IRS) was to help soldiers with training and employment opportunities. Lastly, an occupational training program offered courses in carpentry, electricity, business management, and other skills (Schafer 2007).

As in El Salvador, though, the primary obstacle to full demobilization was the commitment problem. From Renamo’s perspective, its military capability was the only thing that gave it any negotiating leverage with Frelimo. Once this capacity was gone, little would stand in the way of Frelimo forces militarily decimating Renamo. And although Frelimo gave assurances that this would not be the case, they could not credibly commit to follow through with these assurances without some kind of third-party guarantor. This guarantee to hold Frelimo to its commitments was the main reason Renamo was so intent on a large and powerful peacekeeping force. Dhlakama, in explaining his demand for an third party guarantor, asked, “When we have laid down our weapons, who will guarantee that Frelimo will not step back from
its commitments (Hume 1994; Fortna 2008a, 79)? Consequently, Renamo refused to begin demobilization until large numbers of UN troops arrived (Sygne 1997, 28). One Renamo leader interviewed by Fortna (2008a), João Almirante, was emphatic that Renamo would not have agreed to peace and the subsequent demobilization without UN guarantees:

Q: If the government had refused the UN force, would you have agreed to peace?
A: No! It [peacekeeping] is a warranty.
Q: Of what exactly?
A: Of security, specifically.

This confidence Renamo placed in the UN raises the question of how, exactly, a consent-based peace operation like ONUMOZ would be able to guarantee that Frelimo would abide by its commitments. After all, the Mozambican military was much larger and more powerful than the UN mission. The answer, then, had less to do with military deterrent, and more to do with financial incentives. Because Aldo Ajello, the Special Representative of the Secretary General in charge of ONUMOZ, had a significant level of influence of international donors, he also had a significant level of influence over the Mozambican government. As one anonymous USAID official said, “Mozambique is completely dependent on donors, so if you had the donors in line, you had Mozambique in line (Fortna 2008a, 128).”

However, the mere fact that Ajello had significant leverage over Frelimo was not by itself sufficient to motivate Renamo demobilization. In December of 1992, for instance, Dhlakama threatened to withdraw from some of the commissions responsible for implementing the agreement, citing a lack of the promised financial support from Frelimo and the international community. During the Rome negotiations, Frelimo had promised that it would provide Renamo $10-12 million to assist them in demobilization and transforming into a political party. Not surprisingly, though, Frelimo
was sluggish in fulfilling this promise. In order to keep the peace process momentum going, Ajello and ONUMOZ established a new funding mechanism in the form of a $17.5 million trust fund, primarily funded by Italy, and to be controlled by Ajello. Renamo would receive monthly installments from this fund only after Ajello had confirmed that Renamo was fulfilling the terms of the peace agreement (Tollenaere 2006; Howard 2008). Once the money from this fund starting coming, Renamo started demobilizing.

In addition, ONUMOZ served an important impartial observer role during the demobilization phase that served to placate fears that the other side was cheating. One ONUMOZ staff member interviewed by Fortna (2008a) described the role as follows:

You need military observers to sit down with local commanders, to explain the stages of disarmament, etc. the calendar, the various steps, what they have to get their men to do. They can’t just tell that to each other. The rebels aren’t going to believe what the government tells them. So you need someone neutral for transparency...You have to assume zero trust between the belligerents. So you need someone neutral. You can’t expect them to communicate with each other, even to have communication systems that are compatible. You need to give a radio to each side, say, “Okay, we talk on this channel. If you have a problem, you call the UN. We’ll try to resolve it. If not, we’ll send it to the next level up [for deliberations] etc.” For guys coming out of the bush, communication is crucial; they need to know what’s going on. The trouble starts when they are left in the dark (145-146).

One potential ceasefire violation was averted because the UN was able to convince Renamo that rumors of a impending attack by Frelimo hardliners were unfounded. After UN intercession, Renamo leader Joao Almirante noted that “we concluded [these] were only rumors; otherwise our soldiers would have left the cantonment centers. But because we had trust in the UN...that rumor didn’t guide them [Renamo soldiers]. Otherwise we would have attacked, and Frelimo would have responded... (Fortna 2008a, 129)”
Along with providing financial incentives and serving as a neutral source of information, ONUMOZ also at times had to resort to threats in order to motivate compliance with demobilization. In late 1993, when Ajello began to tire of Renamo intransigence, he explained to Dhlakama that at the moment the UN was guaranteeing Renamo’s security, but that if Renamo didn’t become more cooperative in the demobilization process, then the UN would withdraw and all international support would thenceforth go to the government. After this pointed threat Dhlakama finally dropped all resistance to demobilization (Howard 2008).

With the political leaders on board, it also was critical to induce cooperation from rank and file soldiers. To this end, the Reintegration Support Scheme coordinated with international donors to provide another trust fund that would provide 18 months of salary, in addition to 6 months provided by the government, that would support the soldiers while they reintegrated into society. In addition to the trust fund, the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) was tasked with providing jobs for military officers in an attempt to allow them the same standard of living they were used to and give them a stake in the peace process.

According to one Frelimo general, “support for demobilization meant that everyone wanted to go home. The allowance for two years was a big deal (Fortna 2008a, 132).” All in all, the generous severance pay meant that “demobilization was the preferred choice, even among the elite troops that both parties probably intended to keep back as a military contingency (Synge 1997, 91).” In fact, this program may have worked too well. In the end 97 percent of soldiers chose demobilization; too many to be able to adequately staff the new national military (Barnes 1998).

The latter point brings us to security sector reform. SSR in post-war Mozambique entailed the creation of a new national military composed of both Renamo and Frelimo soldiers, the removal of foreign troops from the country, the dismantling of non-governmental armed groups, and restructuring police forces and “delinking” them
from Frelimo party structures (Synge 1997).

Including Renamo in the national military was crucial for reducing both response- and threat-sides of repression. On the response-side, the inclusion of Renamo officers and soldiers gave Frelimo less of an ability to use state power for repressive purposes. On the threat-side, the inclusion of Renamo personnel gave these individuals a stake in the peace process and removed key incentives for violent dissent against the state. The UN was critical in this area in at least two ways. First, the UN provided training that helped underqualified Renamo generals transition into the national military. One high-level Frelimo general noted the following:

The UN helped with the training here...These Renamo “generals” were accepted, and some of them are still there [in the army]. The idea was to forget about this, not worry about prior qualifications, but retrain...[Now] there is no chance of Renamo regrouping for war, because the Renamo generals have been accommodated. They were let into the new army without qualifications. Some were even illiterate, but now some of them are getting an education (Fortna 2008a, 132).

Second, the UN assisted the parties in overcoming their mistrust of each other so they could integrate into a single military entity. Initially, the commission tasked with training and integrating the new army had little UN involvement. However, from the beginning the commission was “immobilized by the parties’ fear of each other’s intentions.” According to Frelimo Brigadaire General Macaringue

It took two to three months for most of the commissions to begin operating, [but] the one for the new army was still not operating. It was not meant to be chaired by the UN, and it got hung up on who would be chair, and how to manage a cochairmanship [between Renamo and Frelimo], how things should be done, the procedures for selecting troops into the new army, etc. So the UN was obliged to take the lead in chairing the sessions, and then the two parties began to feel more confident in each other (Fortna 2008a, 146).

However, despite these positive developments, the new Mozambican army was hampered by the success of the reintegration program. As was mentioned above, the
incentive for demobilization compromised new military’s ability to recruit volunteers. During the negotiations, it was hoped that 15,000 new recruits from each side would join the national army. But only 12,000 total chose this option, and only 4,000 of these came from Renamo (Ajello 1999). Yet, despite the lack of numbers, SSR in Mozambique accomplished the important task of ending the Frelimo monopoly in the state security sector, which reduced the ability of Frelimo leaders to repress and the willingness of Renamo to violently rebel against the state.

5.3 Rebel-to-Party Transformation

The demobilization of Renamo was just the first step in a more radical transformation that would need to occur in order to fully integrate Renamo into Mozambique’s political institutions. This transformation entailed the conversion of Renamo from a violent rebel group to a nonviolent political party, a crucial aspect of reducing both response- and threat-side factors of repression. On the response-side, the inclusion of Renamo into the state meant that Frelimo would no longer be able to unilaterally make state policy, which reduced its ability to repress. On the threat-side, inclusion of Renamo into the state meant that Renamo would have some say into how state resources should be distributed, in effect reducing the willingness of Renamo members to violently dissent against the state. Furthermore, the transformation of military control and command structures into political structures reduced the ability of Renamo to violently dissent even if they had incentives to do so.

However, the fact that this transformation occurred is quite extraordinary. At the time of the peace agreement, Renamo was best known for its “grotesque campaign of terror against Mozambican civilians, for its status as an army of captives, ... for its apparent lack of a political program... [and] as a puppet of the South African apartheid regime, bent only on mindless destruction and violence (Manning 2002,
Yet, by 1994 this same organization was able to competently compete in the 1994 elections. While Renamo certainly exercised agency in deciding to renounce war, its transformation into viable political party would likely have not been possible without UN persuasion, cajoling, and organizational assistance.

Skillful persuasion by Ajello seemed to have a had a significant effect on Dhlakama on at least one occasion. In an effort to overcome Renamo intransigence, Ajello traveled to the bush to meet with Dhlakama. Ajello explained to Dhlakama that the future of Renamo very much depended on Renamo transforming into the type of organization that could attract young people by means other than coercion. Furthermore, he explained that Renamo was well situated to attract bright young individuals because Frelimo was already well-staffed and new positions were hard to come by. Renamo, on the other hand, would have numerous openings for ambitious and well-educated individuals. However, Ajello noted that “no bright young people will join Renamo if it is perceived as an organization of bandits. If you do not change this image, you will fail to attract this young generation and you will have no political future (Ajello 1999, 672).” This persuasive carrot was reinforced by a more coercive stick when Ajello told Dhlakama that failure to transform would cost him all the international support and goodwill that he currently enjoyed.

Ajello’s visit seemed to have a profound effect on Dhlakama. Dhlakama’s new mantra became “wisdom, not muscle,” in reference to Ajello’s comment that everyone knew about Renamo muscle, but now it was time to prove that the group also had wisdom. From that point on, Renamo refrained from obstructing the peace process using military means and seemed to accept its new role as a fledgling political party apprenticing under the tutelage of the international community (Ajello 1999; Howard 2008).

The UN’s role in facilitating Renamo’s rebel-to-party transformation also entailed helping Renamo with some very mundane, yet critical, aspects of modern political
parties. The UN provided fax machines, office equipment, administrative assistance, and even helped with the clothing necessary to be taken seriously as a viable political party. One NGO staffer noted that “Eric Lubin, Ajello’s assistant in charge of Renamo, held Dhlakama’s hand through the peace process. When Dhlakama said, ‘We need suits [for the negotiations],’ Lubin got them suits (Fortna 2008a, 165).”

A UN staffer, Augustinho Zacarias noted further that ONUMOZ provided a critical mentoring role to the ‘politically unsophisticated’ Renamo. While Renamo already believed it had enough political savvy to be a substantive political player in Mozambique, Renamo leaders also conceded that the UN was critical in helping Renamo function as a legitimate political party:

After the [peace agreement], Renamo left the bush and the fields and went to the city. There the UN helped to organize, not to transform, Renamo. We didn’t know how to manage a political force. Renamo needed offices, computers—all that was also important—but helping to organize the management of a political party, administrative[capacity], was most important. I want to underline that during the war, we knew how to manage military logistics—the guns go here and there, etc., but how to administrate politically, how to set up an office, etc., was different. Political logistics were new to us (Fortna 2008a, 166).

At one point, UN logistical support became a crucial factor in saving what appeared to be a failing peace agreement. Shortly after the peace agreement was signed, Renamo members of the Control and Supervisory Commission (CSC) and the Ceasefire Commission failed to show up in Maputo, claiming they lacked transportation and accommodations. This absence was an acute source of worry for Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, who noted in his monthly report that Renamo’s absence was disrupting the peace process since both sides were reporting major ceasefire violations, but these violations could not be investigated while Renamo was not participating in the Ceasefire Commission. As Boutros-Ghali lamented, “This logistic problem, seeming marginal, turned out to be a major impediment to the early establishment of the monitoring and verification machinery (S/24892 1992).” Renamo officials finally ar-
rived in Maputo after Ajello called a meeting to address Renamo’s concerns. For a time, Renamo accepted Frelimo’s offer of additional housing, transportation, and means of communication. However, when Frelimo was slow to deliver on some of these promises, Dhlakama pulled out all of his officials from Maputo, saying they would only return when the government provided adequate working conditions. This impasse was finally broken when Ajello created the UN trust fund, allowing Renamo officials to move into the Hotel Cardoso as a temporary solution (Manning 2002).

As the previous paragraphs imply, while persuasion and organizational support were necessary factors in facilitating Renamo’s transition, perhaps the most critical factor was money. Vicente Ululu, then secretary-general of Renamo argued, “We don’t need training because Renamo during the war was a politico-military movement, so we have experienced personnel. We need money to create conditions to be able to function (Manning 2002, 106).” These "conditions" included buying off redundant personnel and attracting those with the required skills necessary to transform to a political party.

The aforementioned trust fund, which amounted to $17 million, became the source of the Renamo-transforming capital. In fact, one of explicit purposes of the trust fund was to provide materials and services necessary for Renamo’s conversion to a political party. Article 7(b) of the General Peace Agreement noted that the fund was to “assist in obtaining facilities and means so that Renamo may secure the accommodation and transport and communications facilities it needs to carry out its political activities (S/24635 1992)...”

But along with materially benefiting Renamo, this trust fund provided critical leverage for the UN to cajole Renamo toward a pacific transformation. As was noted earlier, Renamo was required to demonstrate that it was fulfilling the terms of the

4While Renamo probably had legitimate grievances regarding accommodations, another reason for Renamo’s logistical complaints was likely to gain more time in order to fill positions on the various peace commissions (Manning 2002).
peace agreement, including transforming from a military to a political organization, before Ajello would remit the funds to Dhlakama. The latter's obstructionism for the most part ceased once Ajello had the trust fund at his disposal. Furthermore, considering that ONUMOZ as an operation was costing the UN around $1 million a day, the $17 million needed secure Renamo cooperation seemed like a bargain.

### 5.4 Elections and Power-Sharing

The capstone of Mozambique’s military demobilization and Renamo’s rebel-to-party transformation was the multi-party elections held in October of 1994. As Carrie Manning has argued, “Mozambique’s transitional elections in 1994 set important precedents and patterns for relations between the parties, as well as for how parties positioned themselves vis-à-vis the new political system (Manning 2002, 167)." These precedents included Renamo pressing for its share of national resources through peaceful electoral means, rather than violence, as well as Frelimo accepting limits to its power through the inclusion of a minority party into the government. However, like the other processes discussed in this chapter, the success of the elections was far from guaranteed. For one thing, many observers feared Renamo would return to violent conflict when it became clear that it still had stockpiles of arms hidden away. Furthermore, Dhlakama’s commitment to leading a minority party in a multi-party government was unclear (Howard 2008). Given these uncertainties, and the events that followed, it seems probable that the successful elections, and the subsequent decrease in response- and threat-side factors of state repression, likely would not have occurred without the assistance of ONUMOZ. I focus on two ways in which ONUMOZ contributed to a successful election: political aspects and technical aspects.
Technical

The technical elements of the Mozambican elections, which included voter registration, education, logistics, and counting and verifying results, were primarily funded and overseen by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), working in concert with the National Elections Commission (CNE), which was responsible for enforcing and interpreting electoral rules, and was made up entirely of Mozambicans (Synge 1997).

The first technical problem faced by the UNDP was registering millions of voters in a country with no electoral infrastructure, including such basic things as vehicles, buildings, and furniture. A task this large was not possible with the UNDP staff alone, which, by 1994 totaled 154 international and 88 local staff members. Thus, the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE), the technical arm of the CNE, recruited 8,000 registration agents. These 8,000 agents were divided up into 1,600 five-person brigades, which traveled through the country registering voters. All told, these registration brigades were able to register 6,363,311 voters, or 81 percent of the estimated 7.9 million eligible voters. During this process, the UNDP was playing a central management role behind the scenes, perhaps most importantly by providing logistics for the STAE. For instance, the UNDP provided a a fleet of 26 helicopters that conveyed the registration brigades throughout the country. This was particularly vital for the success of voter registration in the early stages of the process, when the STAE only had access to 20 cars (ibid.).

In addition to registering voters, it was also necessary to educate voters given Mozambique’s lack of any democratic traditions or institutions. To accomplish this, the STAE, again with UNDP support, recruited 1,600 education agents. These agents primarily traveled in the countryside and used such tactics as popular theater and simulated voting in order to convince rural Mozambicans that their vote would make
a difference.\textsuperscript{5} For the election itself, 7,417 polling stations were created and staffed by 52,000 polling agents. In addition, the UN brought in 1200 UN election observers, who joined 1100 observers from other countries and organizations.

**Political**

While the technical support provided by the UN, Mozambicans, and other international agencies was necessary for successful elections, they were not in themselves sufficient to ensure that Frelimo and Renamo would peacefully participate in the elections, or that the parties would abide by the results of the elections if they lost. Perhaps the most significant way in which the UN contributed to peaceful participation and acceptance of results was through its role in facilitating complete demobilization. The primary event on the minds of election observers in Mozambique was the recently failed elections in Angola, where full demobilization had not occurred, and where war had broken out when Unita, a rebel group analogous to Renamo, disputed the election results. Like Renamo, Unita was terrified of disarming without sufficient guarantees of its safety, and so it never completed a full demobilization. Similarly, Dhlakama was insistent that full demobilization in Mozambique did not need to be completed before elections took place, likely so he could have something to fall back on should Renamo do poorly in the elections or Frelimo commit fraud. However, the UN had learned the lessons of Angola, meaning Dhlakama’s request for less than full demobilization before the elections was a non-starter. Because Renamo had been fully demobilized by the time the elections were held, Dhlakama had less of an ability to renege on the peace agreement.

However, this does not mean that everything went smoothly. Several crises occurred that could have derailed the entire process. Right out of the gate, for instance,

\textsuperscript{5}According to Synge, “one of the greatest fears among many Mozambicans, that ‘sorcerers’ would know how people would vote, was tackled by simple demonstrations showing that each ballot paper would be mixed up with hundreds of others and could not therefore be recognized by anyone during the counting (Synge 1997, 129).
political disagreements nearly prevented the elections from happening at all. One early obstacle was getting the parties to agree on the composition of electoral law. The Multi-Party Conference, which was forum in which the laws governing elections were to be agreed upon, collapsed when Renamo and 12 smaller parties claimed the government had not allowed sufficient time to study the document. These discussions were further complicated by issues involving the composition of various national and regional electoral commissions, as well as the status of expatriate voters. According to one analyst, “It took the personal intervention of the [UN] Secretary-General in October 1993 and a subsequent intercession by [Ajello] in December to finally restart discussions and establish an agreement formula for representation on the electoral commission (Alden 2001, 62)."

A more serious political problem concerned the question of whether Renamo would accept the results of the election in the face of defeat. In order to decrease the incentives Renamo might have to defect from the peace agreement should it lose the elections, several Western governments began to pressure Frelimo to accept a national unity government, similar to the successful power-sharing agreement in neighboring South Africa. George Moose, the American Under Secretary of State for Africa Affairs, argued that “where there’s no tradition of a ‘loyal opposition’, it’s crucial to ensure the losers have a continuing stake in the democratic process, or else they will lose faith and start a new form of tyranny (AWEPA 1993, 4)." However, even in the face of strong international pressure, including from Nelson Mandela, Frelimo declared that a unity government was a non-starter (Alden 2001).

Frelimo’s refusal to offer a power-sharing agreement, and Renamo’s fears of Frelimo electoral fraud, led to perhaps the most serious crisis of the election. On the eve of the election Dhlakama, after hearing rumors of planned Frelimo fraud, declared that Renamo would boycott the elections. However, after intense pressure from the Security Council, the Secretary-General, Robert Mugabe, U.S. diplomats, and others,
along with assurances that all Renamo complaints would be investigated before the election results were made official, Dhlakama agreed to call off the boycott. According to Manning (2002), the guarantees provide by the UN were the critical factor in persuading Dhlakama to rejoin the elections:

Renamo reentered the elections because it had received guarantees from the international community. It was not satisfied with the CNE’s response to its complaints, despite the fact that Renamo had seven representatives on the commission. Dhlakama said he was satisfied once he heard ON-UMOZ chief Aldo Ajello say that if there was fraud, the UN would not declare the elections free and fair (154).

These technical and political efforts by the UN appeared to have contributed to a relatively successful election. In the end, Chissano was elected president with 53 percent of the popular vote. Dhlakama garnered 33 percent. In the National Assembly elections Frelimo won 44.33 percent of the seats and Renamo claimed a surprising 37.78 percent. More important than the final tally was the fact that Renamo accepted the results and didn’t subsequently renege on the peace agreement. The 1994 elections, though not perfect, were vital to the process of institutionalizing the peaceful pursuit of political interests in Mozambique. Through incorporating Renamo into the Mozambique National Assembly, the former rebels now had fewer incentives to pursue their goals through violent means. Furthermore, the incorporation of Renamo into the national decision-making apparatus decreased the ability of Frelimo to unilaterally use state power and violate human rights in pursuit of its interests.

5.5 Monitoring

While human rights monitoring was at the core of the peace agreement in El Salvador, monitoring non-military security forces received much less attention in Mozambique. The General Peace Agreement, for instance, said nothing about CIVPOL or human rights monitoring. While Renamo would have preferred a large police monitoring con-
tingent, it was not a high priority during the negotiations. Furthermore, FRELIMO vehemently opposed the presence of police monitors. However, Chissano eventually agreed to a UN police monitoring force when he and Dhlakama reached an impasse regarding the duties and makeup of National Police Affairs Commission. This force, however, didn’t receive its mandate or operational plan until February 1994, 16 months after the peace agreement had been signed, and roughly a year after ONUMOZ had been deployed.

Despite its late start, ONUMOZ’s CIVPOL was given an ambitious mandate, over 1,000 police personnel, and a sizable budget of $40 million. CIVPOL’s responsibilities included, among other duties, monitoring the activities of all Mozambican security agencies and verifying that their actions were in accord with the peace agreement, monitoring respect for human rights and civil liberties, and monitoring, in concert with other ONUMOZ entities, the electoral campaign in order to verify that political rights were respected (S/1994/89/Add.1 1994).

However, there was a gap separating this ambitious mandate and CIVPOL’s actual abilities. As such, its impact on the human rights situation was a mixed bag. On the one hand, as Howard (2008) points out, CIVPOL was responsible for several positive outcomes, including opening up Renamo-controlled areas so government police could enter and contributing to the calm atmosphere of the election process by monitoring electoral campaigns and political rallies. Furthermore, the impact of CIVPOL personnel seemed to increase the further they traveled from urban centers:

In general, CIVPOL was most effective at policing human rights at posts far from headquarters, where local policemen were less aware of CIVPOL’s lack of authority for redress and were fearful of having their misdeeds reported to their superiors. CIVPOL was also more effective in situations where its officers had developed good personal relations with the local police forces... The relationship between CIVPOL officers and the Mozambique police was complex. It incorporated elements of monitoring, mentoring, joint patrolling, passive observation, and some training (Woods 1998).
Yet, despite some successes, CIVPOL did not have the training, leverage, or unity necessary to have the same type of human rights impact as CIVPOL in El Salvador. According to Woods (1998),

There was little initial training for CIVPOL officers beyond an “induction program” to explain the mission. Officially, qualifications for participation were command of English and the ability to drive U.N. vehicles. However, even these basic requirements were often not met: in mid-1994, the U.N. Police Commissioner in Maputo reported that 255 CIVPOL officers (about 36 percent of the total contingent at the time) could not drive or did not speak English, or both.

In addition, CIVPOL’s personnel came from 29 countries, which created cultural and language difficulties, as well as disagreement about policing strategies and tactics. Because of these factors

the force proved powerless to transform either systematic weaknesses in the Mozambican police or the country’s human rights record. Equally, it could do little to improve the feeble performance of the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL), which took no action on the complaints that CIVPOL regularly referred to it. COMPOL’s activities were apparently of little concern to the parties or to ONUMOZ, diverted as they were by the other priorities in the last months of the peace process (Synge 1997, 121).

Because the Mozambican police were the primary source of human rights violations following the war, and because CIVPOL did not have the capabilities to adequately monitor them, and sanction them in cases of human rights violations, it’s likely that CIVPOL’s relative lack of effectiveness was a primary reason why human rights practices in Mozambique did not improve as dramatically as they did in El Salvador.

5.6 Synthetic Control Testing

As in the previous chapter, I include a section that uses synthetic controls to test the trajectory of Mozambique’s human rights practices against a synthetic country
with similar pre-treatment covariates. Table 5.1 shows countries from the donor pool that were used and the weights they were given. In this case, synthetic Mozambique was created using a weighted combination of Chad, Peru, and Azerbaijan. Table 5.2 shows the covariate balance between Mozambique and its synthetic counterpart.

**Table 5.1**

**Donor Pool Used to Create Synthetic Mozambique**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weights</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5.2 shows the trajectory of Mozambique’s CIRI measure of physical integrity rights beginning five years prior to the war’s end and ending five years after the peace agreement. Prior to peace, Mozambique and synthetic Mozambique had similar human rights record. However, in the post-war years Mozambique’s CIRI score surpasses its synthetic counterpart. Figure 5.3 presents the same basic information, with the line representing the gap in CIRI score between Mozambique and synthetic Mozambique during each of the five years before and after peace. Figures 5.4 through 5.11 present these same graphs for disaggregated CIRI measures, including torture, extrajudicial murder, political imprisonment, and disappearances. It appears that the improvements experienced by Mozambique compared to its synthetic counterpart are primarily coming from the areas of torture and extrajudicial killing.

Like in the El Salvador, because the synthetic Mozambique and actual Mozambique likely have some residual confounding differences that might explain deviance in human rights trajectories, strong inferences based on this data alone is probably unwarranted. However, at the very least, the results presented here are consistent with

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Treated</th>
<th>Synthetic</th>
<th>Sample Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Deaths (log)</td>
<td>11.864</td>
<td>9.396</td>
<td>8.555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Duration (log)</td>
<td>190.000</td>
<td>120.820</td>
<td>83.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel (log)</td>
<td>65.000</td>
<td>71.762</td>
<td>53.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>-6.800</td>
<td>-1.292</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>7.130</td>
<td>9.340</td>
<td>8.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>5.251</td>
<td>6.787</td>
<td>6.659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Integrity (CIRI)</td>
<td>2.800</td>
<td>2.793</td>
<td>2.850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the argument that the UN had a causal role in improving Mozambique’s post-war human rights practices.

**Figure 5.2**

Human Rights Trajectory of Mozambique Before and After Peace Compared to Synthetic Mozambique

![Graph showing the trajectory of Physical Integrity Rights (CIRI) for Mozambique and Synthetic Mozambique before and after peace.](image-url)
Figure 5.3
Gap in Physical Integrity scores between Mozambique and Synthetic Mozambique
Figure 5.4
Torture Trajectory of Mozambique Before and After Peace Compared to a Synthetic Mozambique
Figure 5.5
Gap in Torture Scores between Mozambique and Synthetic Mozambique
Figure 5.6
Extrajudicial Murder in Mozambique Before and After Peace Compared to a Synthetic Mozambique
Figure 5.7
Gap in Extrajudicial Murder Scores between Mozambique and Synthetic Mozambique
Figure 5.8
Political Imprisonment in Mozambique Before and After Peace Compared to a Synthetic Mozambique
Figure 5.9
Gap in Political Imprisonment Scores between Mozambique and Synthetic Mozambique

Pre-Peace                      Post-Peace
Gap in Political Imprisonment
Figure 5.10
Disappearances in Mozambique before and after Peace compared to a Synthetic Mozambique
FIGURE 5.11
GAP IN DISAPPEARANCE SCORES BETWEEN MOZAMBIQUE AND SYNTHETIC MOZAMBIQUE
5.7 Conclusion

Although many problems still remained in the aftermath of the long and bloody Mozambican civil war, the country experienced genuine improvements in governmental human rights practices. In 1993, the U.S. State Department reported that there were no known cases of government-perpetrated extrajudicial killing, disappearances, torture, or political imprisonment (USDOS 1994). In 1994 the State Department noted that “the overall human rights situation in Mozambique continued to improve...(USDOS 1995)” And the 1995 Report, while acknowledging some remaining misconduct, declared that “continuing the postwar trend of recent years, the status of political and civil liberties in Mozambique improved again (USDOS 1996).”

Furthermore, it’s unlikely this improvement would have occurred without the assistance of the United Nations. The commitment problem was simply too big of a concern for Renamo. Fortna’s (2008a) interviews with Frelimo and Renamo leaders, as well as UN and other international officials, shows that there is widespread belief among those intimately involved in the process that a UN presence was a necessary condition for developing trust and cooperation between the former belligerents. As she notes, giving the upshot of her interviews: “There was consensus that the UN’s presence made it easier for both sides to trust each other. In a general way, this helped ameliorate the concerns each side had about the other’s intentions (Fortna 2008a, 144). Without this trust, the commitment problem would have almost certainly prevented either side from fulfilling the terms of the General Peace Agreement. And it was the implementation of the peace agreement that reduced response- and threat-side factors of state repression, leading to a significant improvement in human rights practices in the post-civil war years.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

6.1 Summary of Findings

This dissertation asks two empirical questions: Does UN peacekeeping reduce state repression following civil wars? If so, how do UN peace operations accomplish this? In this section I summarize the answers to these questions. The following section highlights findings about the conditions when the UN is most likely to have a positive effect. I conclude with suggestions for future research and outline some policy implications of this dissertation.

UN Associated With Greater Decrease in Post-Civil War Repression Relative to Control Cases

It has long been known that cases where the UN intervenes are much less likely to return to war. However, much less is known about the quality of the ensuing peace that the UN helps create. After all, it’s possible for a civil war to end, but for high levels of state repression to remain. The UN, it appears, not only helps to prevent the outbreak of full-scale hostilities, but also facilitates more pacific relations between governments and citizens. Data from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project shows that cases where a civil war ends and the United Nations intervenes
experience significantly larger decreases in state repression compared to cases where the United Nations does not intervene. These kinds of large improvements were illustrated in the Mozambique and El Salvador case studies. However, these countries are not alone. Other cases with similarly large improvements include Liberia, Croatia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and others.

This Association is Larger Among Multidimensional Operations

Not all UN peace operations are created equal, and thus we should not expect all UN operations to produce the same results. Chapter Two hypothesized that UN missions with multidimensional mandates should produce sharper decreases in post-civil war state repression than less ambitious operations. This hypothesis was strongly confirmed in Chapter Three. Cases with multidimensional missions saw significantly greater decreases in post-war state repression compared to cases receiving non-multidimensional UN peace operations, non-UN peace operations, or no peace operation.

In addition, Chapter Two hypothesized the mechanisms that produce the decrease in state repression: 1. Reducing response-side factors of repression by reducing the ability and willingness of government principals and agents to repress. 2. Reducing threat-side factors of repression by reducing the ability and willingness of rebel principals and agents to violently dissent against the state. The UN contributes to this reduction by increasing the likelihood that belligerents will follow through with the terms of a peace agreement, which typically include response-side reducing mechanisms (e.g., military demobilization, security sector reform, third-party monitoring, and power-sharing/elections) and threat-side reducing mechanisms (e.g., military de-mobilization, rebel-to-party transformation, and power-sharing/elections).

Regression analysis in Chapter Two demonstrated that cases with a UN mission are more likely to have these types of mechanisms in the peace treaties that end the civil war. Furthermore, cases with higher levels of these mechanisms experience
higher levels of improvement in their post-conflict human rights practices. Lastly, causal mediation analysis shows that a significant portion of the total UN effect is mediated through the theorized repression-reducing mechanisms.

This Association Does Not Appear to be a Result of Selection Bias

One possible criticism to the conclusions put forward in this dissertation is that the association between larger improvements in post-conflict human rights practices is a result of the kinds of places where the UN tends to intervene. However, Chapter Two provides compelling evidence that the UN is in fact intervening in more difficult cases vis-à-vis state repression. Cases where the UN intervenes have far worse human rights practices in the years prior to the end of civil war. Furthermore, UN cases have higher levels of pre-peace violent dissent, more total war deaths, and longer total months of war. Yet, despite these factors, countries in which the UN intervenes experience larger human rights improvements in both relative and absolute terms. This finding is in line with other studies that have found that the UN tends to intervene in more difficult cases (e.g., (Fortna 2008a; Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

In addition, the El Salvador and Mozambique case studies show that the UN was instrumental in ensuring a lasting peace and a decrease in state repression. In other words, it’s highly unlikely that the domestic actors in these cases could have produced a stable peace and significant reductions in state repression on their own. This does not necessarily prove that these cases were not more likely to improve than others; however, it does provide compelling evidence that the UN was a causal factor that at least partly explains the decrease in post-war state repression, i.e., the cases themselves are not fully responsible for the observed improvement.
This Association Not an Indirect Effect of UN’s Effect on Civil War Recidivism

Because UN intervention is associated with a decreased risk of civil war recurrence, and because civil wars are associated with higher levels of state repression, a logical conclusion is that the UN effect on state repression is simply an indirect effect of the UN’s ability to prevent civil war. If this was the case, then the theory outlined in Chapter Two would be unnecessary and incorrect. However, causal mediation analysis shows that only a tiny and statistically insignificant amount of the UN effect is mediated by the length of peace after a civil war ends.

6.2 Conditions Under Which the UN Peace Operations Work

This dissertation has analyzed UN peace operations as independent variables and attempted to determine the effect they have on the dependent variable of post-civil war state repression. In this section I briefly change tack and analyze UN peace operations as dependent variables. Drawing on the case studies in Chapters Four and Five, as well as other UN missions, I attempt to outline some conclusions about what differentiates successful from unsuccessful missions.

Adequate Size and Mandate

The cases that experienced the most improvement were those where the UN mission had a robust mandate and sufficient number of personnel. Those with weak mandates and insufficient human resources, on the other hand, such as Angola and Rwanda, have did not perform as well. Consider Angola. Angola and Mozambique were similar in many different ways.\footnote{Both were Portuguese colonies, both adopted Marxist policies after decolonization, both were victims of South African destabilization policies in the 1970s and 1980s, and both were objects of international efforts to bring peace in the 1990s (Synge 1997).} However, the mandate for ONUMOZ in Mozambique was
much stronger than the mandate for UNAVEM in Angola. UNAVEM was restricted
to monitoring and verifying the terms of the peace agreement, but could not intervene
in order to ensure that the terms were implemented. Furthermore, personnel numbers
were relatively small, with only 350 military observers, 125 police observers, and 100
individuals in the electoral division, the latter receiving a brief influx of 400 monitors
for the elections (Synge 1997; Vines 1993).

With this weak mandate, and small number of personnel, UNAVEM confronted a
herculean task. Unita and the MPLA, Angola’s ruling party, were deeply suspicious of
each other. According to one analyst, “high levels of mistrust characterized relations
between Unita and the MPLA during both the negotiation and implementation phases
of the Bicesse Accords (Hampson 1996, 120).” However, the same characterization
applied to Renamo and Frelimo in Mozambique. Yet, a robust mandate including
provisions for demobilization and reintegration, along with skillful leadership (see
below), allowed ONUMOZ to help alleviate distrust to an extent that the parties
were able to cooperate with each other. In Angola, however, the results were much
different. McMullin (2004) notes the following:

Tragically, this devastation is not merely hypothetical: the above model
has its roots in experience. In Angola the lack of alternative employment
for troops from the government’s Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola (MPLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA), and indeed of any significant reintegration efforts from the sec-
ond UN Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) deployed in 1991,
left each side still mobilized and well-armed at elections on 29-30 Septem-
ber 1992. Once UNITA denounced the election results, the slide back
into civil war was rapid and bloody, exacting a devastating human and
economic toll (McMullin 2004, 625).

Moreover, as Figure 6.1 shows, human rights practices remained poor, and even
worsened, following the Bicesse Accords in 1991.
Competent Leadership

One of the things ONUMOZ and ONUSAL had in common was competent leadership, ONUSAL under Alvaro de Soto and ONUMOZ under Aldo Ajello. Without these men at the helm, or similarly competent leaders, it is unlikely that these missions would have been as successful as they turned out to be. As was shown in Chapter Four, Ajello was able to adeptly overcome several obstacles to the peace agreement implementation and skillfully applied pressure that helped coax Renamo into demobilizing and transforming into a political party.

Likewise, in El Salvador, de Soto was instrumental in getting the parties to sign the peace agreement and in defusing several tense situations that threatened to reignite hostilities between the El Salvadoran government and the FMLN. Furthermore, other UN leaders contributed to the successful peace agreement implementation, such as
when Under-Secretary-General Mack Goulding was dispatched to El Salvador by Secretary-General Ghali to exert pressure and oversee a recalendarization of the peace accords.

Both Ajello and de Soto, it seems, interpreted the mandates they were given very broadly. For instance, the mandate in El Salvador lacked the robustness of other cases: on paper the UN only had authority to verify peace agreement implementation in “non-binding terms.” However, as Johnstone (1995) notes, “The UN pushed that mandate to the limit...[even though] at the time of the negotiations it was not expected to play an activist role beyond verification (19).” Howard (2008) argues that de Soto was the “center of the authority and legitimacy that the Salvadoran parties granted the UN.” In an interview with Howard, de Soto said that “we were able to exert pressure through shame, cajoling, and persuasion. We got very far using these tactics. Especially when you compare the mandate of this mission with the more robust mandate of other missions (103).” Similarly, although he had a more robust mandate, Ajello did not shy away from pushing the limits of UN authority. In contrast, UN officials in Angola took a much narrower interpretation of their mandate, neglecting to ever really use the leverage tactics used by Ajello and de Soto.

A further illustration of how inept leadership can be a hindrance in UN missions comes from the UN debacle in Somalia. Initially, leadership of UNOSOM I was given to Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, a senior Algerian diplomat. Sahnoun proved to be adept at negotiating with the various clans and sub-clans, and developed an amiable relationship with the most powerful Somali warlord, general Mohamed Farah Aideed, with whom he worked the entire summer of 1992, along with Ali Mahdi, the leader of a rival clan, to gain consent to have 500 UN peacekeepers deployed in order to protect humanitarian aid convoys. However, in the course of his duties Sahnoun became openly critical of the UN Secretariat and several UN relief agencies. As a result tensions between Sahnoun and Boutros-Ghali “escalated and eventually erupted
(Howard 2008, 25).” Boutros-Ghali undermined Sahnoun’s authority by convincing the Security Council to approve another 3,000 troops without first discussing the matter with Sahnoun or the warring factions. This move led to the resignation of Sahnoun and infuriated Aideed, who from that point on stopped cooperating with the UN. Lalande argues that Sahnoun had a “special relationship with Aideed ...[and] the dismissal of Mr. Sahnoun...seems to be the turning point of the UNOSOM mission, and perhaps the entire UN operation in Somalia (Lalande 1995, 74).”

Leadership among rebel groups appeared to play an important roles as well. In both El Salvador and Mozambique, rebel groups were relatively cohesive and led by individuals who could make credible promises on behalf of the groups. However, it should be noted that rebel leadership can be an endogenous factor influenced by UN leadership. For instance, Dhlakama’s leadership over Renamo was greatly enhanced by the trust fund monies given to him by Ajello.

**International Support**

Both of the peace operations examined in this study benefited from the support of international donors and states that gave the UN sources of leverage they may not have otherwise had. For example, in Mozambique international donors gave Ajello a good deal of leverage by making aid conditional on Ajello’s confirmation of cooperation. In addition, the trust fund that Ajello used to motivate Renamo cooperation was provided by international donors. In El Salvador, after a decade of impeding the peace process, the United States played a particularly important role. In 1991, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell made the first direct contact with the FMLN by a U.S. leader, giving the FMLN important credibility and legitimacy in the peace process. Furthermore, after the peace accords were signed the U.S. threatened the Salvadoran government with a loss of aid if it didn’t comply with the terms of the peace agreement (Howard 2008). While I argue the the UN
was the most important international factor in improving human rights practices in El Salvador and Mozambique, UN effectiveness was greatly enhanced by the support of other international actors.

6.3 Directions for Future Research

This dissertation represents the first effort to systematically understand the effect of UN peace operations on post-civil war state repression. However, there is still much left to be explored. First, future efforts may benefit from more fine-grained data. The CIRI data used, while valuable, is a relatively rough measure of state repression. For example, cases with zero instances of torture and one instance of torture would receive a different CIRI score, while cases with one instance of torture and 49 instances of torture would receive the same score. In addition, beyond a certain point of human rights violations, governments guilty of drastically different levels of human rights abuse may receive the same score. One possible remedy for this is the use of more nuanced data, such as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) One-Sided Violence Dataset, which gives estimates of exact totals of civilian deaths caused by governments and other formally organized armed groups. However, this kind of data is still fairly limited: because neither El Salvador or Mozambique was responsible for civilian deaths in time period the dataset measures, there is no information about state repression in these cases. Ideally, better datasets with more fine-grained measures of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances will become available and will allow for a more nuanced picture of the relationship between UN peace operations and state repression to emerge.

In addition, it would be useful to create more nuanced measures of UN peace operations. Current research primarily relies on describing peace operations by their mandate. However, other factors clearly matter in the execution of peacekeeping mis-
sions, e.g., quality of leadership, international support, numbers and composition of personnel, etc. As the number of peace operations grows, these kind of measurements will allow researchers to examine how variations in peace operations affect changes in state repression.

6.4 Policy Implications

Several conclusions relevant for policy makers arise in this dissertation. First, echoing the findings of other studies, it appears that consent-based Chapter VI missions can be highly effective. In fact, while other studies find that these consent-based operations are just as effective as Chapter VII peace enforcement operations, the findings here point to the conclusion that, at least in the area of human rights practices, Chapter VI missions are more effective. This should be good news given that consent-based missions are more politically tenable. Second, as I have mentioned above, effective leadership is a vital characteristic of effective missions. Unfortunately, in a highly bureaucratic and political organization like the United Nations, competent leadership is not always guaranteed. But it seems clear from the case studies that the UN missions in El Salvador and Mozambique were on several occasions saved from catastrophe by effective leaders. Given this fact the Security Council and Secretariat should place a very high priority on placing highly competent leaders, with proven track records of mediating between hostile adversaries, in charge of peace operations. Lastly, I have demonstrated that reducing state repression is largely a function of reducing response- and threat-side factors of repression, and reducing these factors is a complex and multi-faceted process best achieved with multidimensional mandates. Therefore, whenever possible UN peace operations should incorporate these multidimensional factors that help facilitate the demobilization of armed groups, security sector reform, respect for the rule of law by security agencies, rebel-to-party
transformations, and elections and power-sharing.
Appendix A

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<th>Treatment (Peace Year)</th>
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UN Effect Mediated Through Duration of Peace

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### Table A.3
UN Effect Mediated Through Repression Reducing Mechanisms

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### Table A.4

The Effect of UN Peace Operations on Post-War CIRI Scores in Each of CIRI Sub-categories

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**Observations** 94  95  96  93  

**$R^2$** 0.34  0.23  0.28  0.26

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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