Hughes’ War: The Allied High Command through the Eyes of General Everett S. Hughes

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Dedication
To my dear parents, Martin and Marie Lovelace, who gave me everything.
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DDEL: Dwight David Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.


MHI: Military History Institute, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Pennsylvania.
Major General Everett S. Hughes had an important, controversial, and almost forgotten role in World War II. His position at the epicenter of the Allied high command gave him an unprecedented view of the war against Germany. Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton Jr., Omar N. Bradley, Mark Clark, and all the other top U.S. commanders came to Hughes to solve their problems. In an unobtrusive, but very real way, the American war effort in Europe and the Mediterranean revolved around Hughes. He arrived in England in the summer of 1942 to work as the Chief Ordnance Officer for the Service of Supply (SOS). Hughes was quickly made Chief of Staff for the SOS and then Deputy Chief of Staff for the European Theater of Operations (ETO). In early 1943 Hughes was transferred to North Africa to become the Deputy Theater Commander, bringing him directly under his old friend General Eisenhower. When Eisenhower returned to England in 1944 to begin planning the invasion of France he sent for Hughes who became his chief trouble shooter, a post he held for the duration of the war. By the time he retired as the Chief of Ordnance in 1949, Hughes had spent more than forty-five years in the service of the United States.

Hughes however, was a controversial figure both during and after the war. In Europe, he came into conflict with numerous officers, most notably and repeatedly Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff Walter Bedell “Beetle” Smith. These disagreements usually involved problems with the Allied command structure and supply issues, which today have been all but forgotten. Nevertheless, Hughes has grown even more contentious in history, though for very different reasons. In 1981 David Irving published, *The War Between the Generals: Inside the Allied High Command*, which for the first time since
the war, brought Hughes out of obscurity.\textsuperscript{1} Irving had discovered Hughes diary in the Library of Congress and used it to support his thesis of massive incompetence, hatred, and infidelity throughout the Allied leadership. Perhaps the most shocking revelation was that Hughes’ diary seemed to support the allegation that Eisenhower was having an affair with his driver Kay Summersby. Irving’s claims were reinforced ten years later by James Bacque’s book, \textit{Other Losses}, which linked Hughes to Bacque’s claim that Eisenhower had knowingly caused the death of thousands of German POWs at the end of the war.\textsuperscript{2} Rather than investigate Irving’s use of Hughes’ diary, most historians settled for attacking Hughes reliability as a source. Historian Carlo D’Este, has stigmatized Hughes as “a notorious and unreliable gossip,” while David MacIsaac characterized the general as World War II’s “deep throat.”\textsuperscript{3} More recently, historian D.K.R. Crosswell has written that such statements do Hughes a disservice and his diary and papers “provide the best insights into the structural problems besetting American headquarters and commands as well as the foibles of the men who headed and staffed them.”\textsuperscript{4} Though disagreeing with some of Crosswell’s conclusions, this paper generally supports his appraisal of Hughes.

Despite all of this, very little of what Hughes actually did during the war is known. A few of the U.S. Army’s Official Histories of World War II mention him,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} David Irving, \textit{The War Between the Generals} (London: Allen Lane, 1981), 87.
\item \textsuperscript{4} D.K.R. Crosswell, \textit{Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith} (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 1047.
\end{itemize}
though never in great detail.\(^5\) Hughes also appeared, briefly, in a few firsthand accounts of the war.\(^6\) This is also true for most secondary works. For example, in his popular, though comprehensive, study of the North African Campaign, *An Army at Dawn*, Rick Atkinson mentioned Hughes only four times in passing despite the fact that the General was the Deputy Theater Commander. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army’s Official History of the campaign is no better and mentions Hughes only once.\(^7\) More recently historian D.K.R. Crosswell gave a good description of Hughes’ role in Europe and North Africa in his biography of General Walter Bedell Smith. Yet, as with other biographies, Crosswell was focusing on his subject, Smith, and not Hughes. Many of these sources also contain numerous mistakes. One glaring example of this is the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps online

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biography of Hughes, which, among other things, gives the wrong year of his death. In fact, one of the most challenging things about researching this paper was the difficulty in finding basic information about the General’s life and career. It took three months for example, to find the name of Hughes’ wife, Kate, partly because the General often referred to her by the feline moniker of “Kittens.” There were also more pressing questions such as what was Hughes’ role in Eisenhower’s headquarters? Was he really a gossip or a reliable source? What do we truly know about the man and his opinions? Finally, does knowing these things change our view of what Hughes scribbled in his diary? For the first time, these and other questions begin to be answered.

These queries were made all the more difficult to investigate because of the nature of the sources. In 1958, a year after the general died, Kate Hughes donated nine boxes of correspondence, papers, and diaries to the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Yet Hughes handwriting was extremely bad, making his diary almost unreadable, while most of the official papers seemed fairly generic. The collection also did not include Hughes’ private letters to his wife. In the early 1980s Irving paid $5,000 to have the years of 1943 to 1945 of Hughes’ diary transcribed. The transcript is available on microfilm and it is from this copy that most historians have quoted the diary. A comparison of the original with the transcript reveals that most of the transcript is

10 For an example of Hughes handwriting see appendix.
fairly accurate, though future researchers would do well to check important passages against the original diary.

In 1995, the Library of Congress received four more boxes containing correspondence between the General and his wife, which radically change how the diary is viewed. Though the letters were written under censorship, which prevented total candor, much of what appeared only as short notations in his diary found its way into Hughes’ letters. This has given the diary a great deal more context than before. More importantly the letters also shed some light on how the diary was viewed by Hughes. As he explained to his wife “I am keeping a diary of sorts. I can’t fill in secrets but just enough notes to remind me, I hope, as to what is happening during these interesting days.” As can be seen from this passage Hughes did not mean for the diary to be a full account of his activities or opinions, but only notes to jog his memory. Thus the diary must be seen in the context of the general’s other private and official writings. Aside from Crosswell, who used these additional documents extensively in his book, Beetle, this paper is the first to utilize these new sources.

The conclusion of this research is that Hughes made a valuable contribution to the Allied war effort, both in his ability to solve numerous problems and his influence with Eisenhower. After a brief prologue on Hughes’ background, the first chapter shows the difficult supply problems facing the Allies during the invasion of North Africa in 1942. By careful assessment of supply needs Hughes helped make the invasion possible.

Chapter two shows the General’s role as Eisenhower’s Deputy Theater Commander after

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12 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, September 24, 1942, folder 8 Sept-Oct 1942, box II 1, Everett Strait Hughes Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Hereafter abbreviated to ESHP.
being transferred to North Africa in early 1943. It was in this position that Hughes was able to help the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) to play a larger role in the Theater. His influence with Eisenhower also helped get George Patton into the war and saved Patton’s career twice when Eisenhower was ready to send his brilliant but troublesome General home. The third chapter looks at the relationship between Eisenhower and Kay Summersby and what Hughes’ diary really reveals to posterity about their relationship. Chapters four and five follow Hughes in the planning for D-Day and the problems the Allies encountered in France. As Eisenhower’s “eyes and ears” across the ETO Hughes fixed numerous problems at the front and in the rear. Hughes was certainly not an unbiased observer, but his diary and letters gives a unique glimpse into the Allied command and many of the figures who propagated it. The Allies would have won the war without Hughes, yet examining his overlooked role during the war helps explain why the U.S. Army fought the way it did. This essay, for the first time, makes Hughes’ contribution to the victory clear, and shows that his influence in Eisenhower’s headquarters needs to be taken seriously by those trying to understand the decisions of the American leadership in Europe during World War II.
Prologue
Reflections Prior to War
April 9, 1940, Washington D.C.

Two Colonels of the United States Army sat eating lunch and talking disgustedly about their future prospects. The gold “exploding bomb” insignia on their lapels denoted that they belonged to the Ordnance Department. Dud, an unfortunate name for an artilleryman, but that was what his friends called him, sat across from Colonel Everett S. Hughes, the Executive Assistant for the Chief of Field Services. Hughes was tall, 6 foot 3, with piercing blue eyes, and dark slicked back hair which at fifty-five still remained fully intact. Though his height and stern no-nonsense demeanor intimidated many of his colleagues, Hughes also possessed a sardonic sense of humor and was generally kind. Likewise, with his taste for alcohol—and more importantly, ability to locate it—Hughes certainly knew how to have a good time. He was intelligent, thirteenth in his class at West Point, and over a long army career had gained a reputation as something of an innovator, unfortunately not a valued quality in the pre-war U.S. Army.

The lunch conversation centered on retirement. Congress, those geniuses who had spent the last twenty years cutting the defense budget, were now debating a bill that would make officers’ retirement mandatory at age sixty. Added to this, the new Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, was attempting to remove “deadwood” from the army. Thirty-seven years service and still being a colonel counted as deadwood.

Nevertheless, Hughes did not want to retire. There was a war in Europe and another in Asia which might, with luck, amount to something interesting. Though he was not acquainted with Marshall, a definite career disadvantage, Hughes had friends across the Army, many of whom he had known for decades. That, combined with a career of
pressing against prevailing wisdom to foster innovations, made Hughes think twice about retirement.\textsuperscript{13}

Hughes was born on October 1, 1885, in the territory of Dakota. In 1889 his hometown of Ipswich became part of the state of South Dakota and the United States.\textsuperscript{14} However, when Everett was still a boy the family moved to Minnesota.\textsuperscript{15} Everett’s father, William F. Hughes, was a probate judge which likely facilitated his son’s entry into West Point. As historian Martin Blumenson has observed, “In those days it took virtually a lawyer, as well as a dedicated father, to follow the maze of paper and red tape into the Military Academy.”\textsuperscript{16}

The judge’s son entered the academy in 1903. Yet during his first year Hughes was plagued by a number of health problems so severe that he was forced to return home. “I can get a sick leave until Aug 28, 1904,” Hughes informed his parents, “and come back in time for school again. Of course it will turn me back a year but I don’t care the least about that.”\textsuperscript{17} Thus, instead of graduating in 1907 he was now part of the class of 1908. This put him one year ahead of another cadet to gain fame in World War II, George S. Patton Jr. At first Hughes pitied Patton because of his poor academic standing, but then grew to despise him because of his arrogant military bearing.\textsuperscript{18} The two would be

\textsuperscript{13} Untitled document, folder, diary notes 1942-1956, box 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{14} Irving, \textit{The War Between the Generals}, 87.
\textsuperscript{16} Undated unnamed newspaper article found in diary, box 1, ESHP; Martin Blumenson, \textit{The Patton Papers}, vol. 1, paperback ed. (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1974), 11.
\textsuperscript{17} Everett S. Hughes to his parents, February 26, 1904, letter, box 3, folder 1904, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{18} Everett S. Hughes to Mrs. Hughes, June 12, 1905, letter, folder June 1905, box 3, ESHP; “Patton,” diary notes 1942-1956, box 2, ESHP.
reconciled only after graduation. Unlike Patton, Hughes did not struggle academically and graduated thirteenth in his class.\textsuperscript{19}

The next few years were busy ones for the young officer. After graduating, Hughes joined the 3d Field Artillery and spent the next few years being shuffled around America’s far flung military frontier.\textsuperscript{20} In 1910 Hughes married Kate Murphy of San Antonio. Two years after their marriage the couple set sail for Manila and a tour in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{21} Hughes returned to the U.S. in time to take part in General John Pershing’s Punitive Expedition to Mexico in the unsuccessful attempt to hunt down the murderous outlaw Francisco “Pancho” Villa. Hughes commanded Pershing’s artillery and during the campaign constructed the first mobile repair truck in the U.S. Army. When the U.S. entered World War I in 1917 Hughes was put in charge of buying artillery for the army. In 1918 he was sent to France, but arrived too late to see much service. Ten years after graduating from West Point however, Hughes was a Colonel.\textsuperscript{22}

Though he was quickly reduced to major after the war, Hughes service in the interwar years was notable for two reasons. The first was Kate and Everett’s friendship with a younger army couple named Dwight and Mamie Eisenhower. Hughes had first met Eisenhower while he was serving as an instructor at the General Service School at Leavenworth in 1926. The friendship would continue after both men graduated from the War College in 1928 and grow even closer when the two couples were stationed in

\textsuperscript{19} Special Orders, No. 213; “First Class Arranged According to General Merit,” November 1, 1907, box 7, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{21} “Kate Hughes, D.C. Resident Since ’30s, Member of DAR,” \textit{Washington Post}, October 29, 1980.
\textsuperscript{22} “Gen. Hughes, 71, Dies.”
Washington D.C. in 1929. Hughes was greatly impressed by the younger officer. Eisenhower’s son, John S.D. Eisenhower, recalled boyhood memories of “Uncle Everett” telling him privately “Your father is a man to watch.” John agreed, “but in the light of the Old Man’s disciplinary policies, I probably interpreted the statement a little differently from the way it was intended.” The social Eisenhowers also introduced Hughes to many of the future leaders of World War II. Some, like George Patton, Hughes had known since West Point. Others, such as Harry Butcher and his wife Ruth, were new. “Butch,” as he was often called, was then running WJSW, a local Washington radio station, but would later join the navy and act as Eisenhower’s’ naval aide during the war. There were also Ham Haislip and Leonard “Gee” Gerow, both future four-star generals. Hughes would work closely with all these men during World War II.

The second notable activity of Hughes’ inter-war service was his advocacy for women in the military. During his time on the General Staff in Washington, Hughes wrote a long memorandum dated September 28, 1928, arguing that women had always been involved in warfare to some degree and that their involvement was only growing. The memorandum shied away from the question of what role women would play in future wars since “the solution depends upon the situation and the situation is as yet

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24 Eisenhower, Strictly Personal, 7.
unknown.”26 If, however, women knew nothing of the military before the war, they would be ill-prepared to make and give informed opinions and fit into the army. He noted that,

Until women during time of peace have had an opportunity to discuss war plans and planning, nothing that is really worth while [sic] can be accomplished. We cannot overlook the fact that women will participate in the next war, and will exercise directive powers. If their leaders are ignorant of war and of armies, the women they lead will be ignorant.27

Hughes concluded that the War Department should invite potential leaders to work with the Army on the utilization of women in the next war.

In practical terms Hughes memorandum had little effect on the formation of the WAACs of World War II. As the Army’s official history of the Women’s Army Corps notes, “Major Hughes’ prophetic efforts were embalmed with indorsements, [sic] laid out for observation for a period, and then buried so deep in the files that they were recovered only after the WAAC was six months old and War Department planners had already made most of the mistakes he predicted.”28 Yet Hughes was justly proud of his visionary, well argued, and fair report. In an army whose quartermaster would shortly publish a handbook that spent approximately one hundred pages discussing horse drawn wagons, Hughes’ innovation and foresight are startling.29

After leaving the general staff in 1932, Everett and Kate spent the remainder of the 1930s at a number of posts on the upper east coast. From 1932 to 1935 Hughes was stationed at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. His efforts to improve the base led

26 Everett S. Hughes, Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, September 21, 1928, Subject: Participation of Women in War, box 1, folder 1928, ESHP.
27 Everett S. Hughes, Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, September 21, 1928, Subject: Participation of Women in War, box 1, folder 1928, ESHP.
28 Treadwell, The Women’s Army Corps, 14.
him to petition President Franklin D. Roosevelt directly for Public Works Program money to improve the post.\(^{30}\) In 1935 Hughes was transferred to Picatinny Arsenal in Dover New Jersey.\(^{31}\) In 1936 Hughes was promoted to full colonel. On May 15, 1939, he was reassigned to the Chief of Ordnance office in Washington D.C.\(^{32}\)

It had been a good, if undistinguished, career yet Hughes was not ready to retire despite the dire prospects. With wars in Europe and Asia it was better to stay in the Army instead of trying to find a job in a country still racked by the Great Depression. Years later, Hughes reflected back on the lunch with Dud and realized that if he had retired then he would never have been a general, played a vital part in the next war, or become the Chief of Ordnance.\(^{33}\)

\(^{30}\) Everett S. Hughes, to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 5, 1933, letter, box 5, folder 1930s, ESHP.
\(^{31}\) Special Order No. 149, Aberdeen Proving Ground, June 26, 1935, box 8, ESHP.
\(^{32}\) Special Orders No. 51, Washington D.C. 3 March, 1939, box 8, ESHP.
\(^{33}\) Untitled document, folder, diary notes 1942-1956, box 2, ESHP.
Chapter I
The English Torch

Even before the United States had entered World War II Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill had agreed that the defeat of Nazi Germany must come before Japan.\(^{34}\) Not only was Germany the stronger enemy, but the strongest ally, the Soviet Union, appeared on the brink of collapse. The Americans wanted to launch a cross-channel invasion of France in 1942 to which the British were opposed, for, among other reasons, the lack of men and material.\(^{35}\) Yet both Allies knew that no operation could take place without a large buildup of U.S. forces in Great Britain. Under Operation Bolero, the United States began shipping substantial personnel and significant equipment to England in early 1942.\(^{36}\) On January 8, the U.S. Army officially established a headquarters in the United Kingdom in prelude to a buildup for an invasion of France.\(^{37}\) The officer in charge of the U.S. Army’s Service of Supply (SOS) in England, Major General John C.H. Lee, requested Colonel Everett Hughes as his Chief Ordnance Officer.\(^{38}\) On June 4, Hughes arrived by air at Bristol, England, and then traveled by train to London.\(^{39}\) A few days after Hughes’ arrival, U.S. forces in Britain were officially reorganized with senior officers placed in charge of various supply sections such as Quartermaster, Inspector General, and Transportation etc. Hughes was appointed the Chief Ordnance Officer, directly under

\(^{38}\) General John C.H. Lee’s unpublished memoirs, Page 82, box 1, John C.H. Lee papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Pennsylvania. Here after MHI.
\(^{39}\) Diary, June 4, 1942, box 1, ESHP. The U.S. Army’s official history incorrectly states that Hughes arrived on June 8, 1942. Mayo, *The Ordnance Department*, 94.
General Lee. In the coming months Hughes would be critical in solving the numerous supply and organizational problems surrounding the Allied buildup in England, and the invasion of North Africa.

The role of the Service of Supply in World War II was not limited to simply making sure equipment reached the front. Supplies, of course, were the main duties, but the SOS also was responsible for most activities at the rear. The SOS in Europe in August, 1942, controlled the medical service, chaplains, the engineer service, base sections, and many other duties not directly linked with supplies.

Hughes’ appointment to the SOS in England was part of a larger War Department attempt to clear up a confusing command structure that existed between the SOS and the United States Army Forces in British Isles (USAFBI), which technically controlled the U.S. Army in the European Theater. Earlier in May, General Lee directed that the SOS had the responsibility for all of the administrative matters in the Theater. USAFBI headquarters vigorously disagreed, and the subsequent bureaucratic battle left the lines of authority and communication blurred. In June, the War Department renamed the USAFBI to European Theater of Operations United States Army (ETOUSA), and gave its commander broader responsibilities. It did not, however, directly address Lee’s authority which remained in dispute. This created a confusing command situation, as Hughes remembered, where the “[s]ubordinate staff officers of the Theater staff undertook the review of specific problems. In effect one section of the Theater staff

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controlled the corresponding sections of the SOS staff.” At the same time however, the “Chiefs of Services were assigned to and reported to the C.G. [Commanding General], SOS.” When Eisenhower took over ETOUSA, usually abbreviated to ETO, he reviewed the situation but made few changes to the divided command structure except to allow Lee to communicate directly with the War Department, and move SOS headquarters from London to Cheltenham.45

The confusing command structure was compounded by the fact that the SOS in England had little say in what supplies they received from the United States. Pre-war Army regulations dictated that the momentum of supplies must come from the rear of the army in the field. This meant that the SOS in the U.S. shipped what they believed the troops in the respective theater needed. The doctrine of supplies from the rear was “misunderstood or misconstrued [sic] throughout the war,” Hughes claimed later, “with only one exception about which I know.” That exception occurred in June 1942, when Hughes and the other section heads were awakened by Lee’s G4 (logistics) officer who informed them that 200,000 tons of additional shipping had been found in the U.S., and that each officer was to order what his section needed. Hughes, not looking forward to spending all night on highly technical work, argued convincingly that the War Department should simply ship the material already requested faster. “In all other cases, Hughes reflected, “the SOS shipped what it thought the Theater Commander should have” not what the Theater Commander requested.47

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44 Untitled document, folder, diary notes 1942-1956, box 2, ESHP.
46 “Supply from the Rear,” folder, diary notes 1942-1956, box 2, ESHP.
47 “Supply from the Rear,” folder diary notes 1942-1956, box 2, ESHP.
Around this time Hughes’ old friend Dwight Eisenhower was appointed the new Theater Commander, and near the end of June the two officers met for dinner. Writing Mamie, Eisenhower noted that Everett looked “fine” and that it was “a relief to have a quiet eve alone with such a good friend.” Eisenhower had arrived in England a few days before, and was busily engaged building an allied headquarters in Britain. One staff appointment Eisenhower insisted on reclaiming was his British driver, Kay Summersby. Summersby, who had worked as a Worth fashion model in Paris before the war, had joined the British Motor Transport Corps, like many London debutantes, during the 1940 Blitz. Since newly arrived American officers did not know their way around blacked-out and bombed London they were assigned female drivers. On his first visit to England earlier in the year Eisenhower and General Mark Clark were waiting at Grosvenor Square, apparently without a ride. Suddenly, a tall, dark haired woman in uniform dashed over. “I’m your driver, sir” said Kay, who had sneaked away for a sandwich. It was the auspicious beginning of a fateful and controversial relationship. When Eisenhower returned to establish a permanent headquarters in London he asked Kay to continue as his driver. As Hughes and Eisenhower chatted over their first dinner in England together it is unlikely that Kay was a topic of conversation. Summersby, however, would cause Hughes to land himself squarely into one of the longest running controversies of World War II.

50 Morgan, Past Forgetting, 18.
On July 8, Hughes returned to the United States and met with Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, commander of the War Department’s SOS, and other supply officers to try and improve the supply situation. Hughes argued that requests for supplies should come from the Theater and not from Washington. “The trouble was,” Hughes argued, “that equipment came to the Port [sic] from all over the US without much regard being paid to priorities and space. It had to be shipped and … [w]e had to take it whether we wanted it or not.” The Washington SOS agreed, Hughes remembered, that “we overseas should know more than persons in [the] US about what we need but would not agree that we did know.”

Returning to Cheltenham, where the Service of Supply headquarters had been moved, Hughes was appointed General John C.H. Lee’s Chief of Staff. After the destruction and busyness of wartime London, Hughes found the small, undamaged British city a welcome relief. “The food is better here than it was in London,” he wrote Kate, “Much much better.” As the new Chief of Staff for the SOS, Hughes tried to improve the confused command structure. He attempted, unsuccessfully, to establish a priority system to control what supplies were shipped to the ETO. When Hughes discovered that the chief of the SOS Control Division, a holdover position from the pre-war Army, was acting as a Chief of Staff and checking his orders he abolished the office. Likewise, when he found that the Administrative Services office controlled his communication with the Adjutant General and the Judge Advocate General, Hughes

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51 “Supply from the Rear,” folder diary notes 1942-1956, boxl 2, ESHP.
52 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, August 2, 1942, letter, boxii 1, ESHP.
53 “Supply from the Rear,” folder, diary notes 1942-1956, boxl 2, ESHP.
rerouted the lines of communication. Despite this, the Colonel was continually frustrated by his failure to relieve the supply problems, and doubted that he “would have succeeded if I had remained with Lee forever.”

Working as John C.H. Lee’s Chief of Staff was probably an unpleasant experience for Hughes. Lee noted after the war “One of my difficulties in the United Kingdom during 1942 and ’43 was filling the important post of Chief of Staff,” and in those two years six different officers held the position. Lee had a somewhat odd personality that led many officers, and historians, to agree with Hughes that the General was “a queer duck.” This may have had something to do with Lee’s deep religious beliefs, which caused Eisenhower to compare him to Oliver Cromwell, while others joked that J.C.H. stood for “Jesus Christ Himself.” Then, there were Lee’s unhidden opinions of racial equality, which many officers, including Hughes, found disconcerting. When Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis Sr., the first African-American General in the U.S. Army, joined Hughes and Lee on an inspection trip, Hughes wrote bewilderedly to Kate, “I wish you…could have heard JC [H. Lee] with his Kansas “Suhs” discussing the future of the black race with the colored apostle. Between them they had the colored soldier and the white soldier buddies before we had arrived.” Finally, Lee possessed what historian Stephen Ambrose described, as “something akin to a supply sergeant’s

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54 “Organization,” folder, diary notes 1942-1956, box l 2, ESHP.
55 “Supply from the Rear,” folder, diary notes 1942-1956, box l 2, ESHP.
56 General John C.H. Lee’s unpublished memoirs, page 92, box 1, John C.H. Lee papers, MHI.
57 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, September 10, 1942, letter, box ll 1, ESHP.
59 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, September 28, 1942, letter, box ll 1, ESHP.
attitude” and distributed equipment as if it was based on his personal generosity.\textsuperscript{60} He also had a taste for luxury for himself and his staff, which reached scandalous proportions before the war’s end. Hughes, however, was not Lee’s Chief of Staff for long and on August 11, General Al Gruenther, Eisenhower’s own Chief of Staff, offered him a chance to work on planning for operation Torch.\textsuperscript{61}

All through the summer of 1942 the American and British high commands had engaged in what Eisenhower’s naval aid, Captain Harry C. Butcher, described as a “transatlantic essay writing contest” over whether the Allies would launch a cross-channel invasion of France, code named Sledgehammer, or invade French North Africa, code named Gymnast.\textsuperscript{62} By the end of July it was clear that Churchill, future Nobel Laureate for literature, had won the essay contest and convinced Roosevelt to invade North Africa. Though the U.S. staff was bitterly opposed to Gymnast, Roosevelt finally conceded that it was the only way to get Americans fighting Germans in 1942. On July 24, the operation was re-christened Torch.\textsuperscript{63} It was also decided that Torch would be divided into three task forces which would land at Algiers, Casablanca, and Oran. D-Day was planned for sometime in October, and Eisenhower was appointed the Allied Commander-in-Chief of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ).\textsuperscript{64}

Eisenhower now had a massive amount of planning to accomplish and not much time to do it. Nor, as his Chief of Staff observed, did Eisenhower yet have “a very strong

\textsuperscript{60}Ambrose, \textit{The Supreme Commander}, 346.
\textsuperscript{61}Diary, August 11, 1942, box 1, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{62}Butcher, \textit{My Three Years with Eisenhower}, 83.
\textsuperscript{64}Butcher, \textit{My Three Years with Eisenhower}, 53.
team” for his planning staff. It was decided that during the North African Campaign General Lee would remain in the ETO in charge of the SOS for an eventual invasion of France. Thus Eisenhower’s AFHQ Headquarters would work out the supply problems related to Torch, further complicating the command situation for the SOS. When AFHQ began to plunder the SOS for the “best officers,” Lee rushed to London to complain. The SOS Chief was not the only officer hurt. Major General Robert Littlejohn, Lee’s Chief Quartermaster, wrote later that he sent ninety-six officers, including some of the best he had, to the Torch planning staff. However, in a meeting at Eisenhower’s headquarters on August 8, between Eisenhower, Lee, Hughes, and two other officers from the SOS, Eisenhower told Lee emphatically that “all must share” and that he wanted Hughes or Littlejohn, for the Torch planning. General Mark Clark, Eisenhower’s deputy for the North Africa Campaign, chose to move Hughes to operations planning staff for Torch.

Hearing that his old friend George Patton was in London, Hughes stopped by his office before the August 8 meeting. Patton was seated at a desk with his head in his hands. The General tossed a document across the room and mumbled “Read it.” It was the order sending Patton back to the states to prepare the Western Task Force. “[T]hey call this thing Torch,” Patton murmured, “and have handed me the burning end.” The Western Task Force was to sail from the United States and land at Casablanca on the west coast of Africa, or, as Patton told anyone who would listen, die trying. Patton was pessimistic about the operation’s success, but nevertheless told Hughes he would “be the

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65 Crosswell, Beetle, 279.
67 Robert Littlejohn to Everett S. Hughes, January 1, 1944, letter, box 6, folder 20, Robert M. Littlejohn Papers, MHI.
68 “Personal,” folder, diary notes 1942-1956, box 2; Diary, August 13, 1942, box 1, ESHP.
first man ashore” then after a pause, added “no I won’t either—if there is an SOB in my office than he’ll go ashore ahead of me!” Eisenhower had requested Patton’s services for Torch, and Patton had immediately picked a fight with the U.S. Navy over operational planning. Eisenhower, who was also old friends with Patton, understood that the Western Task Force’s leader was both an actor and a competent military leader. Eisenhower was willing to put-up with the former to utilize the latter. 69 “If this war does nothing else,” Hughes informed Kate, “it will fry out a lot of Geo. Patton stories.” 70

Hughes was ordered back to London to become the deputy Chief of Staff for Major General Humphrey Gale, then the senior British logistician at AFHQ. 71 However, the position for the time being was only temporary and he still remained the nominal Chief of Staff for the SOS making his position frustratingly unclear. Writing to Kate a few weeks after his transfer, Hughes complained

I am [Chief of Staff] of the SOS but nobody knows it or gives a damn. I am the guy everyone goes too when things go wrong. I am the man who is supposed to have the answers to all the questions especially those to which there is no answer. I am supposed to take over the job of [Chief of Staff] of the Theater but that is held in abeyance. 72

Nevertheless, both Gale and Hughes had Eisenhower’s complete confidence. Writing to George C. Marshall, Eisenhower noted,

Major General Gale, the British officer given me to head the Administrative Staff, is the best man in this line in all of England. By the same standards, I regard Colonel Hughes as the best man in the American Army. I have no fears that these two, with their assistants, will do a grand job. Incidentally, their job is an

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69 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 82.
70 “Patton,” folder, diary notes 1942-1956, boxI 2; Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, December 11, 1942, letter, boxII 1, folder December 1942, ESHP.
71 Crosswell, Beetle, 301.
72 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, September 10, 1942, letter, folder 8 September October, boxII 1, ESHP.
enormous one, even though theoretically each national force is responsible for its own logistics.\textsuperscript{73}

Despite his transfer to AFHQ Hughes was hardly separated from the SOS, who he would continue to work with closely throughout the invasion of North Africa.

In the wake of so many books highlighting Anglo-American disagreements during World War II, it is a scarce remembered fact that most U.S. officers had a favorable first impression of the British. Patton, a notable exception, observed in his diary in August, 1942, “It is very noticeable that most of the American officers here are pro-British, even Ike….I am not, repeat not, Pro-British.”\textsuperscript{74} Soon after arriving in England Hughes quickly came to admire the British. On June 15 he wrote his wife, that the “British are being really helpful,” while later after talking with a British station agent, who “spoke perfect English,” Hughes informed Kate in admiration “We have a lot in the way of good manners to learn from these people.”\textsuperscript{75} Writing again in exasperation of General Lee’s love of luxury Hughes noted “When we are living with the British we should live as the British do. They cannot afford swank, and neither can we.”\textsuperscript{76}

The planning for Torch was an extremely stressful experience particularly during the months of August and September. Hughes reported to his new planning job with Gale at 8:15 on August 17, and found “nothing to work with and a lot to do.”\textsuperscript{77} A few days


\textsuperscript{74} Diary, August 11, 1942, Box 2, George S. Patton Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Here after abbreviated to GSPP.

\textsuperscript{75} Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, June 15, 1942, letter, folder June 7-August, boxII 1; Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, September 28, 1942, letter, folder 8 September October, boxII 1, ESHP.

\textsuperscript{76} Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, October 20, 1942, letter, folder 8 September October, boxII 1, ESHP.

\textsuperscript{77} Diary, August 17, 1942, boxI 1, ESHP.
later Clark informed Hughes that Eisenhower was concerned that he was unhappy. Hughes felt inclined to inform the Commanding General that he “was working for him and doing a good job and no more unhappy than he and Clark.”78 “[D]on’t think I am down hearted,” Hughes wrote Kate in the beginning of September, “I still have a job to do and am doing it to the best of my ability. It’s just war, and I know it.”79 Nevertheless, the strain was incredible. In a late August meeting Gale and the leading British supply officers told Clark bluntly that the Torch plan “as now set up,” could not be supplied logistically. Angry Clark broke-up the meeting saying “that the operation was definitely on and that ways and means to make it successful would have to be found.” Clark wrote later that “I suppose that all planners encounter the same period of confusion and pessimism in such an enterprise…but it is difficult to exaggerate the depression we sometimes felt during that critical month of September.”80

Supply shipments from the states continued to hamper planning for Torch. On August 30 Eisenhower cabled Marshall that the equipment for the U.S. 1st Division was still in the states and could not reach England in time to be distributed and re-loaded for Torch. The Allies, already short on craft to supply a two ocean war, were losing shipping at an alarming rate to German U-Boats.82 Clark would claim later that the 1st Divisions equipment had been sent out from New York three times and each time had been lost or

78 Diary, August 21, 1942, box1 1, ESHP. Hughes made a post-war transcription of this diary entry with slightly different wording. See “Personal,” folder diary notes 1942-1956, box1 2; Diary, August 13, 1942, box1 1, ESHP.
79 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, September 6, 1942, letter, folder 8 September October, box11 1, ESHP.
80 Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 77.
81 Clark, Calculated Risk, 55.
diverted. After briefly debating whether to dress a British division in American uniforms, Churchill’s idea, it was decided to postpone Torch until early November.

The equipment shortage of the 1st Division, Hughes believed, was a direct result of the poorly designed supply system. Instead of the SOS in Washington asking what was needed in England officers at the War Department sent what they thought the theater should have. Trying to rectify the problem, Hughes visited the SOS Headquarters in Cheltenham, and met with each of the section heads individually “one after another as a doctor does a series of patients” asking each what their branch needed. The officers stated what they wanted, and Hughes combined each request into a tightly worded and spaced cable eleven pages long. The cable, given the number 1949, requested everything from 400 life preservers, to carrier pigeons, with feed. Hughes also requested that forty-five days of combat supplies should be shipped to England. The list was dispatched from Eisenhower’s headquarters on September 8.

The Service of Supplies in Washington D.C. reacted with indignation to Hughes’ cable. On September 12 Lee received a letter from Brigadier General LeRoy Lutes, Chief of Operations of the SOS in the War Department. Lute, who oversaw supply shipments to England, wanted to know why so much supplies had apparently disappeared in Britain. The Chief of Operations regretted that there was not enough supplies to fill the request and “urgently recommended that your staff swarm, on the British ports and depots and

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83 Clark, *Calculated Risk*, 54.
85 “Supplies from the Rear,” folder diary notes 1942-1956, box 2; Diary, August 13, 1942, box 1, ESHP.
86 Ref. No. 1949, “Class II, Class IV and Class V Supplies,” September 8, 1942, box 6, ESHP.
find out where these people have put our supplies and equipment.” As for Hughes’ cable itself, Lutes did not “know who is responsible for sending this radiogram, but I recommend that you have your Chief of Staff investigate the matter with a view to having radiograms of this type carefully edited and coordinated between your Staff and the Theater Staff before they are forwarded here.”

Lee responded with a conciliatory message explaining that the SOS in England was short of personnel which led to losing supplies. Lee did not mention that it was his Chief of Staff, Hughes was still technically in that post, that had written the cable. Nevertheless, the message paid dividends of thirteen ship loads of supplies arriving before Torch was launched. This was enough supplies to equip the 1st Division and launch Torch. The incident left Hughes even more convinced of the need for the SOS in England to decide what supplies were needed rather than the War Department.

Contrary to Lute’s assertions Hughes had already inventoried supply stocks in Britain before sending cable number 1949. In a flurry of memos on September 4, he had listed the shortages of supplies in all the branch sections. One of the many shortages was a lack of rations, with only enough B Rations for 15,000 men, less than an U.S. division, for ninety-five days, only enough C Rations for seven and a half days, and no K Rations at all. Hughes also pointed out that none of the food was packed for assault troops.

By September 12 the 1st Division’s supplies had still not left the states and Clark was losing patience. The supplies had to arrive by September 26 in time to be distributed

88 LeRoy Lutes to John C.H. Lee, September 12, 1942, letter, box 6, ESHP.
89 John C.H. Lee to LeRoy Lutes, September 21, 1942, letter, box 6, ESHP.
90 “Supplies from the Rear,” folder diary notes 1942-1956, box 2; Diary, August 13, 1942, box 1, ESHP.
91 Memorandum, 4 September, 1942, box 1, ESHP.
and reloaded for the October 8 deadline. Clark met with Hughes and forcefully ordered that he “must make it vividly clear to Washington that if the weapons are not here by September 26, the assault teams will have to attack with insufficient arms and ammunition. Something must be done and done fast or those men will be going in virtually with their bare hands.”

Two days later on September 14 Hughes sent a memorandum to Clark stating that after weeks of studying the problem from all angles “I am of the opinion that the operation contemplated cannot be carried forward with a sufficiently high degree of supply and maintenance efficiency within the limiting dates set.” Hughes saw September 12 as being the critical day, since he could not foresee how equipment that left the U.S. after that date could arrive in time to help Torch. It was also unclear what supplies was being shipped or what equipment was even needed. Hughes doubted whether missing supplies could be made up from stock already in England. “To say that organizations will go with what they have,” Hughes argued, “is not enough unless we know what they will have.” Furthermore, there was a shortage of SOS personnel in Britain to administer the supplies, and it would take too long to train Englishmen in U.S. Army nomenclature. The Colonel reminded Clark that this was “the first major American effort. The date on which it starts should be less important than its success. Its success depends largely on adequate maintenance and supply.” Hughes recommended that the invasion of North Africa be postponed till December 15, 1942.

92 Clark, Calculated Risk, 55.
93 Memorandum, “Estimate of the Supply and Administrative Aspects of proposed operations,” 14, September, 1942, box 5, folder 1942, ESHP.
That same day Gale wrote a memorandum stating that “an impasse will shortly be reached” in regard to supplies unless the SOS in Washington could answer Hughes 1949 cable, and the full effort of the ETO SOS be exerted for Torch planning. Gale also demanded to know how far Lee could meet the need for food, ammunition, vehicles, and general stores for the Centre Task Force. To meet the deadline for Torch these supplies must be ready by October 5. Gale further noted that a decision must be made on when the shipping would be set aside for the complete use of the Centre Task Force. Gale concluded that “Until the SOS reports its condition no final decision can be made.”

However, Hughes report was quickly overruled by Lee. “While as Col. Hughes indicated it is difficult fo[r] the SOS to meet the date now set for the Operation,” Lee informed Clark, “I believe they can be met with fair efficiency.”

If the General Assumptions of the operation plan prove reasonably sound, the campaign should succeed although the logistical arrangements be far from perfect. If on the other hand, the Assumptions prove mutually false, the invasion logistic efficiency to be gained by a momentous as six weeks delay, could not guaranty success.

I have counseled my Deputy SOS Commander and all our Supply Chiefs that we must support the Operation as now set.

On his copy of Lee’s letter to Clark, Hughes scribbled angrily, “He supported Sledgehammer in the same offhand manner. I am up against Clark who doesn’t want any bad news and Lee who says he can support any operation.” Adding insult to injury Lee wrote Hughes stating, “From now on lets [sic] give our full best thought to foreseeing and overcoming the perhaps more minor obstacles, thus to raise our percentage of

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94 H. M. Gale, “Ability of SOS to meet initial supply demands,” Memorandum, 14 September, 1942, Boxl 6, ESHP.
95 John C.H. Lee to Mark Clark, September 18, 1942, letter, boxl 5, ESHP.
96 John C.H. Lee to Mark Clark, September 18, 1942, letter, boxl 5, ESHP.
performance. We must play the game as written down in the present book of rules which can’t be changed, as I see it and as I accept it.”

“I wrote a memo to Clark advising delay,” Hughes scribbled in his diary that evening. “He showed it to Lee. Lee always an optimist wrote memo which I shall preserve.”

On September 22, however, Hughes received the much more welcomed news that he had been promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Though Somervell had hinted at a promotion when Hughes had visited Washington in July, he had since given up hope of becoming a general. “Have decided that I’ll never be a [brigadier general], Hughes wrote in his diary on September 2, “because of that poor report Wesson placed on me at the A.P.G. [Aberdeen Proving Ground]…. Oh well!”

Hughes was one of the oldest officers in the ETO, and he did not know General Marshall who famously elevated officers who had personally impressed him. Thus the promotion was a well deserved recognition of his work over the past few months.

The new Brigadier needed good news since the supply problems involving the invasion of North Africa was only growing worst. “All we need, Hughes noted in his diary on September 28, “are 10 magicians. But if we got them they would be untrained.”

More troubling was that the confused and divided command structure for the SOS was still causing problems, and these problems were about to be transferred into North Africa if something was not done. Yet Hughes was no longer alone in advocating

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97 John C.H. Lee to Everett S. Hughes, September 18, 1942, letter, box 5, ESHP.
98 Diary, September 18, 1942, box 1, ESHP.
99 Diary, September 2, 1942, box 1, ESHP.
100 Diary, September 28, 1942, box 1, ESHP.
reform since Eisenhower’s new Chief of Staff was determined to fix the supply and command problems.

Eisenhower had managed to obtain Major General Walter Bedell Smith, nicknamed “Beetle,” as his Chief of Staff. Aloof, cold, with a perpetual sour expression aggravated by a stomach ulcer, Smith was far from an easy person to work beside. On one memorable occasion during a conference Smith’s secretary, Ruth Briggs, walked into the room. Looking up, Smith shouted “Get the hell out of here.” As Briggs hurriedly departed she heard Smith say, “You’ll have to excuse her, gentlemen. She’s an idiot.”

Yet despite his abrasiveness, or perhaps because of it, Smith would be indispensable to Eisenhower throughout the war. The “Prussian,” as Eisenhower called Beetle, was able to keep the Allied headquarters running smoothly, and perform many of Eisenhower’s more distasteful duties. Hughes would work closely, though not always cordially, with Smith.

One of Smith and Hughes’ first challenges was redesigning the supply system that would operate in North Africa. How would supplies be requested and shipped for two allied armies based in the Mediterranean? Eisenhower had delayed making any decision, and chosen a temporary solution of leaving supply problems to Gale’s administrative office in AFHQ. Yet this did not solve how SOS shipments would be organized after the invasion.

At 10:30 on the morning of October 13 Smith assembled most of the leading supply officers in his office. Hughes began the meeting by presenting his ideas for organizing how AFHQ planners and the Service of Supply for the ETO could operate

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101 Ambrose, The Supreme Commander, 82.
102 Crosswell, Beetle, 319-320.
more efficiently. He argued that the SOS ETO should be the organization responsible for supplies but mostly in an advisory capacity. Attempting to avoid repeating the supply problems of divided command, and receiving unasked for supplies from the U.S., Hughes argued that the SOS in England should supervise supply needs while leaving operational duties to the personnel on the ground. Among other things, Hughes stated that the SOS in the ETO should establish priorities, send requisitions to the U.S. for equipment, maintain records, and assign shipping.

Most of those present disagreed with Hughes’ plan. The general consensus was that the base of supplies for Torch should be in the U.S. instead of England. General George W. Griner, who supported Hughes’ ideas in principle, pointed out that the ETO Theater staff and the Torch planners did not communicate well enough with each other to work together while, General Thomas Larkin suggested that supply requests should be sent to the SOS headquarters in London who would decide where the supplies was shipped. After more discussion it was agreed that the ETO headquarters would keep in closer contact with the AFHQ.103 On October 19, Larkin sent Hughes a memorandum stating that the SOS in the ETO would supply the Central Task Force for a time until the supplies for all three task forces could come from the United States. He suggested that supplies must be shipped first to England so it could then be moved to Africa.104 This however, did not solve the main problem, which was not communication but divided command. Likewise, the problem of who would decide what was sent to the theater remained in the United States instead of those most familiar with AFHQ’s needs. In the

103 “Minutes of Meeting Held at 10:30 A.M. 13 October in Office of the Chief of Staff,” box I 6, ESHP.
104 T.B. Larkin to G-4, Allied Force, Memorandum, 19 October, 1942, box I 6, ESHP.
battles across the Mediterranean during the coming years these failures would continue to plague the Allied supply structure.

The next day, October 14, was Eisenhower’s birthday. Hughes joined Generals Leonard Gerow, Smith, and Eisenhower for lunch. Hughes, who was not feeling well for the first time since arriving in England, presented Eisenhower with an ordnance wristwatch. Eisenhower, who claimed never to have worn a watch before, agreed to wear it for his friend’s sake. The Commanding General then said that Hughes’ assignment was not working out as he had hoped since he wanted to take him to North Africa. Hughes was also disappointed on not going to the Mediterranean. “I appear to be completely severed from [North Africa],” he noted glumly in his diary, “But am trying to keep track of the supply lines to the U.S. It’s complicated as hell and I appear to be the only one interested.”

Despite the strain of the past months, Hughes observed that Eisenhower looked fine, confiding to his diary that Eisenhower “knows what he is up against physically and what men he has.”

A few days later Hughes was officially appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for the ETO.

On November 6 Eisenhower and his staff secretly left England for Gibraltar where he would command Operation Torch. Eisenhower asked Hughes to try to devise some way of letting Mamie know where he had relocated. Hughes gave the message to General

105 Diary, October 16, 1942, boxI 1, ESHP.
106 Diary, October 14, 1942, boxI 1, ESHP; Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, October 15, 1942, letter, folder 8 September October, boxII 1, ESHP.
107 Announcement of Assignment, 17 October, 1942, boxI 8, ESHP.
Littlejohn who was about to fly home for meetings at the War Department.\textsuperscript{108} Two days later the Allies began landing troops at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers, and after heavy fighting convinced the French to stop resisting.

It was not long before Hughes heard from Smith that Eisenhower wanted him to come to Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{109} Soon afterward Smith and Hughes were ordered to Washington for a brief visit and then to Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{110} On December 5 Hughes stopped keeping his diary so it could be left with Kate. Therefore little is known about how the trip went. What is known, however, is that with Eisenhower’s help he was successfully transferred to the new headquarters in Algiers.

Hughes’ contribution to the planning for Torch and his work in England was mixed. He had successfully helped straighten out the Service of Supply in the ETO and been an affective Chief of Staff to General Lee. Hughes had also made the invasion possible by sending the 1949 cable, which got enough badly needed supplies to England in time for the invasion of North Africa. He had done much to assist both Clark and Eisenhower to understand the supply problems that they faced. Yet Hughes had also been overly pessimistic about the success of the invasion, though he had not been the only one since much of the Allied leadership believed Torch could not succeed. Hughes likewise failed, though not through lack of trying, to fix the larger supply issues. What front received what supplies was determined throughout the war by Washington instead of the theater that needed the supplies. These difficulties would continue to plague the Allies.

\textsuperscript{108} Everett S. Hughes to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 10 November, 1942, Box 58, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principal File, Eisenhower President Library, Kansas, Here after DDEL.

\textsuperscript{109} Diary, November 13, 1942, box 1, ESHP.

\textsuperscript{110} Crosswell, Beetle, 353; Diary, November 30, and December 5, 1942, box 1, ESHP.
throughout World War II. Finally, a confused command structure that divided responsibility between the Allied Headquarters and the U.S. Theater Headquarters, was carried into North Africa, which would be a major problem in the coming year.
Chapter II
The Mediterranean

“Bedell says I am to be Deputy Theater Commander,” Hughes wrote in his diary shortly after arriving in North Africa, “What does that mean[?]” Nobody seemed sure, and the year Hughes spent in the Mediterranean would largely be focused on defining, then defending, his role as Eisenhower’s Deputy for the North Africa Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA). Hughes’ new job also included commanding the U.S. Communications Zone, which handled everything behind the front from supplies to military police. NATOUSA was a separate American force working alongside, but distinct from, Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ). In effect, Eisenhower commanded two headquarters, with AFHQ in charge of directing the Allied armies in battle and controlled by his Chief of Staff, Walter Bedell Smith. Meanwhile, NATOUSA looked after American supply needs and was controlled by the Deputy Theater Commander, who was now Hughes. This setup was as confusing as it sounds and caused no shortage of controversy in the coming year. In the meantime, the Allies would clear North Africa and Sicily of Axis troops and then invade Italy. During these operations Hughes would play a significant role, not only in supply matters, but also influencing many of Eisenhower decisions.

When Eisenhower asked him to come to North Africa as his Deputy, Hughes at first requested to remain at his old job in England. Eisenhower insisted, saying he needed his best man to help him in Algiers. Nevertheless, Hughes was not altogether unhappy to follow Eisenhower to North Africa. He had returned to England during the month of

111 Diary, February 3, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
112 Notes by Hughes, box 2, folder Diary notes 1942-1956, ESHP.
January, but felt away from the center of action since most of the supply operations in the ETO were in support of the Mediterranean Theater. “We are giving until it hurts to AFHQ” Hughes wrote in London, “We won’t have a thing to do in a few weeks. We suspect that Geo. Marshall will appear in U.K. before long with a staff and we will all be out on our ears.”

Hughes also wondered how long Eisenhower would be in command, writing in his diary, “I can’t help from thinking about myself my future and the future of Ike. I think Ike is doomed. Too many conflicting forces at play.” On his return from the U.S. after Christmas, Hughes had visited Patton and conveyed his thoughts about Eisenhower’s future. Patton recorded in his diary that Hughes “fears that the senior partner [Eisenhower] is on his way out due to the knife work of the other [Mark Clark], concerning whom he has the same idea as I have.”

It was partly because of Eisenhower’s precarious position that Hughes had been made the Deputy Theater Commander. As one of Eisenhower’s closest friends, Hughes had influence that went beyond his official duties. “I’ve ordered Everett Hughes down here for duty,” Eisenhower wrote Mamie the day before Hughes’ arrived in North Africa, “Just got to feeling I had to have him closer than he now is.” Having an old friend in the theater allowed Eisenhower to rely on Hughes for special chores that might prove awkward for other officers. Having a deputy to handle the Theater Headquarters also relieved Eisenhower of the more mundane staff work. “Everett has just arrived,”

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113 Diary, January 23, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
114 Diary, January 24, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
115 Diary, January 8, 1943, box 2, GSPP.
Eisenhower wrote Mamie on February 3, “and I’ve handed him a job that has, I think, rather taken away his breath. He will get on top of it though, and will relieve me of a tremendous amount of work.” Eisenhower added, “It’s a joy to have him around.”

General Smith, who retained his job as Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, was less thrilled to have Hughes in such a powerful position. Smith had suggested that Hughes be made the American chief administrative officer (CAO) and run Theater matters along with supply arrangements. Hughes would be directly under Smith who claimed this arrangement would negate the creation of two headquarters. Eisenhower, however, vetoed Smith’s plan for his own, making Hughes directly responsible to him and not Smith. He wrote Marshall on February 8 laying out a three department plan encompassing supply, static defense installations, and routine administration matters connected with the War Department. All three departments would answer to Hughes.

The next day Eisenhower further spelled out Hughes’ duties in an order, stating he was to establish, operate and command a U.S. Communications Zone for NATO USA. You will assume all possible U.S. administrative and supply duties now being performed at AFHQ, in order to relieve AFHQ to the maximum of supply and administrative matters pertaining to U.S. forces. You will also be responsible for the detailed developments of supply plans for American forces in future operations.

118 Crosswell, Beetle, 380-381.
120 “Instructions,” February 9, 1943, boxl 8, ESHP.
Eisenhower, who was engaged in a hopeless battle to keep the AFHQ in Algiers small, instructed Hughes to choose his staff from his headquarters and to work closely with the British command.121

Hughes spent the first few weeks in Algiers establishing his headquarters and trying to understand the complexities of his new job. “Beedle says he is going to fix me up with a billet,” Hughes noted in his diary on February 13, “entertainment, food, household, etc. etc.”122 “I do not want a mansion,” he told Kate, but “a place that will house me and perhaps an aide with a spare bedroom.”123 Nevertheless, palaces were the vogue for Allied generals in North Africa, and the Deputy Theater Commander soon found himself ensconced in a beautiful villa with a lovely garden on top of a hill overlooking Algiers’ harbor. “Always wanted to see an air raid from there” was how General John Lucas described it.124 “I have never worked so hard in my life,” Hughes wrote Kate shortly after moving into his villa, “I have had a job to do and on top of that I have had to move to a new office and try to establish my self [sic] in a new billet….I have been sitting in on innumerable conferences for the purpose of gaining a background as to what is going on and why.”125

Already, Hughes had begun recruiting his headquarters staff. For his Chief of Staff he chose Louis Ford, who immediately began doing “yeoman service and is as

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121 Dwight D. Eisenhower to George C. Marshall, February 8, 1943, in Dear General, 101; Instructions,” February 9, 1943, box 8, ESHP. AFHQ would soon have six thousand personal working in Algiers.

122 Diary, February 13, 1943, box 2, ESHP.

123 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, February 14, 1943, letter, folder 12 February 1943, boxII 2, ESHP.

124 Diary July 23, 1943, box 14, folder 1, John P. Lucas Papers, MHL.

125 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 8, 1943, letter, folder 13 March 1943, boxII 1, ESHP.
swamped as I am."\textsuperscript{126} After being in North Africa a few weeks Hughes cabled London and asked two attractive British women, who he had met there the previous year, to come to Algiers as his secretaries. Knowing the importance Eisenhower put on American-British relations Hughes believed having English accents around his headquarters would be a useful asset. The first, Mrs. Marie “Toppy” Black, was an experienced secretary while the other, Mrs. Elizabeth Prismall, had experience managing personnel. Prismall, to whom Hughes was to grow very close, also took over the decoration and organization of his villa.\textsuperscript{127}

Immediately Hughes launched three projects he hoped would improve the supply situation in North Africa. The first was to take an inventory of all materials in the Theater. With Allied forces from two nations scattered all over Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia this was not an easy task. Yet the inventory allowed shortages of supplies to be corrected and surpluses identified. As a result it soon became clear that the quartermasters were excepting large stocks of rations and ammunition far in excess of Allied requirements.

Secondly, Hughes attempted to ship supply dumps east of Oran to relieve congestion in Morocco. The ports on the Atlantic coast offered the shortest journey from the United States to Africa for Allied convoys. However, Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers were connected to the Tunisian battlefields by only a single railway, which Hughes quickly observed could not handle the demands of both the American and British supplies and troop shipments. He suggested that supply dumps be established by Algiers

\textsuperscript{126} Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 8, 1943, letter, folder 13 March 1943, box II 1, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{127} Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 8, 1943, letter, folder 13 March 1943, box II 1, ESHP.
and thus closer to the front. Though this conclusion was self evident to anyone who looked at a map, Hughes encountered considerable resistance to trying to rectify the situation. Hughes claimed that the opposition, to what he believed was common sense, came from officers ignoring basic shipping documentation.

Thirdly, the Deputy Theater Commander advocated abandoning the month’s reserve of supplies that was stationed in England for emergencies in the Mediterranean. Fortunately, the SOS in Washington had already realized the foolishness of having a supply reserve separated from the front by hundreds of miles. By the time Hughes officially took over as Eisenhower’s deputy supplies were mostly coming from the U.S. and not from Britain.\textsuperscript{128}

However, it was Hughes influence with Eisenhower that made a substantial contribution to the battle of Tunisia. In late February, 1943, German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel swung two experienced German divisions against the U.S. II Corps at Kasserine Pass and inflicted a stinging defeat on green and poorly led American soldiers. The U.S. troops were forced to retreat in disorder, saved from a complete disaster only by Rommel’s inability to exploit his victory.\textsuperscript{129} “II Corps blew up a bridge in 5 pieces,” Hughes noted sardonically in his diary during the battle, “When we blow them up they stay blown up.”\textsuperscript{130} American inexperience was on full display, and this heightened tensions with the British who now barely concealed their condescension for their Ally.

\textsuperscript{128} Everett S. Hughes to LeRoy Lutes, April 12, 1943, letter, boxl 6, ESHP
\textsuperscript{129} Keegan, \textit{The Second World War}, 342.
\textsuperscript{130} Diary, February 17, 1943, boxl 2, ESHP.
Noting the change, Hughes wrote that “BBC Says American forces this and that. It used to be First Army.”

It was clear that a change in command of II Corps was needed and Hughes suggested to Eisenhower that their mutual friend George Patton be placed in command. Eisenhower agreed and placed Patton in command. In a whirl of orders, discipline, and profanity, Patton reorganized the shattered II Corps and led it to victory at the Battle of El Guettar a few weeks after assuming command. “Apparently my suggestion to Ike that Geo. Patton take over II Corps … has borne fruit,” Hughes proudly wrote on March 6, “at least Geo is in command.” Hughes’ influence with Eisenhower had given Patton the chance to shine, with the added benefit of restoring the Army’s morale and gaining an American victory at El Guettar. Patton would have become famous during the war without Hughes, since he would have commanded an Army in Sicily. Yet, Patton’s fighting spirit and discipline were badly needed in II Corps when Hughes suggested him for the command. Patton, and by implication Hughes, was responsible for rebuilding II Corps which would be the nucleus of the U.S. Army in Europe in the coming years.

It was his influence with Eisenhower however, that made Hughes so odious to Beetle Smith. Indeed, failure to place Hughes under his command was a defeat that did not sit well with Eisenhower’s irritable Chief of Staff. Though he tried keeping his frustration to a minimum, Hughes was also getting fed up with Smith. When Hughes saw

131 Diary, February 17, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
132 Diary, March 6, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
134 Diary, March 6, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
135 Crosswell, Beetle, 383-384.
a letter from Smith asking if his official photo could be altered to include another star—“I have been promoted since the picture was taken”—and readjust the position of his mouth, Hughes wrote disgustedly at the bottom “He [Smith] had already had all the wrinkles removed.” He added “Vanity Vanity sayifth [sic] the Preacher all is Vanity.”

On March 8, Hughes was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal by Eisenhower. Smith, Gale, and Hughes’ two secretaries were present for the ceremony along with the British Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham. The medal was in recognition of Hughes’ role as Chief of Staff for the SOS in the ETO and cited, among other things, his “marked organizing ability, [in] effecting coordination with British staffs.”

Despite his past effective “coordination” with the British, Hughes was now beginning to have second thoughts about the United States’ closest ally. On his January 8 visit to Patton, always a good Anglophobe, Hughes grumbled that the “British are incompetent.” This change of opinion was caused in part by his irritation with Eisenhower. “Ike still hipped on Allied action,” Hughes noted in his diary, “which means as I see it do everything for the British [and] do it their way.” Under the influence of his pre-war mentor Fox Conner, Eisenhower had long pondered the problems of fighting alongside allies and believed his role was to eliminate as much friction between the Americans and British as possible. He viewed himself first as an ally, than an

136 Walter B. Smith to Bertnam Park Studio, January 7, 1943, letter, box II 1, ESHP.
137 Diary, March 8, 1943, box II 2, ESHP.
138 “General Order, Distinguished-Service medal,” February 25, 1943, box I 8, ESHP.
139 Diary, January 8, 1943, box II 2, GSPP.
140 Diary, April 15, 1943, box I 2, ESHP.
141 D’Este, Eisenhower, 169.
American commander, and believed that “continuous loyalty to the concept of unity and to allied commanders is basic to victory.”\(^{142}\)

When not quietly complaining about the British, Hughes was fending off attacks on his position from other Americans. The post of Deputy Theater Commander was not in any command chart—a fact that did not make Hughes, or his job, very comfortable. Added to this was a mess of confusing organizations, both American and British, with unclear lines of authority. Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), which was controlled by Eisenhower through Smith, was in charge of coordinating supplies for the British, French, and U.S. forces in combat. AFHQ also made policy decisions for the U.S. Fifth Army and II Corps. North African Theater of Operations U.S. Army (NATOUSA), controlled by Hughes, was a separate headquarters and directed the SOS and lines of communication in the Theater, but only for U.S. forces.\(^{143}\) How two organizations, whose responsibilities were entangled to such a degree, were supposed to coordinate was left unspecified. A few days after arriving Hughes tried to draw an organizational chart of the command structure and failed. When he mentioned it to Eisenhower he was informed that the organization “is too complicated to be placed on paper.”\(^{144}\) Eisenhower did not bother to explain how an organization “too complicated to be placed on paper” could be expected to function.

Hughes was now equal with both his former British boss, General Humfrey Gale who was the Chief Administrative Officer for AFHQ, as well as Smith. The British First Army was fighting alongside the U.S. II Corps and during January AFHQ took over

\(^{142}\) Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 158.
\(^{143}\) Crosswell, *Beetle*, 385.
\(^{144}\) Diary, February 10, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
responsibility for their supply lines. Thus there were two supply systems—one American one British—moving over poor roads and many miles to the front.145 “Smith, Gale and I on same level,” Hughes noted in his diary, “All agreed. Can we continue to agree [?] I’ll try.”146 Yet he began to feel frustration with Gale and this undoubtedly contributed to his growing Anglophobia. “Saw Gale after trying four days” he noted testily in his diary.147 Nevertheless, the two officers cooperated well enough for the U.S. Army’s official history of the campaign to note that supply “problems were met as they arose by steady co-operation between Generals Hughes and Gale.”148

Promotion to the rank of Major General, on March 27, improved Hughes’ mood somewhat. “For about twenty four hours now I have been a Major General in the Army of the United States” he wrote happily to his wife. “During that period I have increased the allotment to you by two hundred dollars per month, have plastered stars over all available garments, and have come to the conclusion that the one fly in the ointment is that I can’t have a good fight or argument with any one any more [sic].”149 Given the divided allied command, this last prediction would prove amazingly short sighted.

One of the agencies with command responsibilities left undefined was the North African Economic Board. The Board had taken over the administration of North Africa from the military Civil Affairs staff and was working to eventually turn the responsibility for governing North Africa over to the French. As with so many organizations in North Africa the NAEB came into conflict with NATOUSA. On February 25, Hughes attended

145 Howe, Northwestern Africa, 496.
146 Diary, February 11, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
147 Diary, March 4, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
148 Howe, Northwestern Africa, 496.
149 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 28, 1943, letter, box 1, folder 13, ESHP.
an NAEB meeting which he described as “out of control and not dealing with Base Section Commanders.” After fixing this problem, Hughes managed to straighten out the NAEB responsibilities and persuaded them to “agree to work with us. No friction.***

As time passed, however, Hughes began to have repeated confrontations with Smith. The two officers were of roughly equal seniority and the overlap of AFHQ and NATOUSA was so close that they were bound to clash over jurisdictions. On March 11, Hughes met with Gale who became irritated when the American demanded to know whose job it was to oversee the NAEB.151 The next day Hughes asked Smith the same question and received an equally annoyed and noncommittal response. Later that day Smith agreed with Hughes’ recommendation to relieve two officers, then phoned the Deputy Theater Commander and told him that AFHQ staff belonged to him and Hughes was “not to make any more changes.”152 Two weeks later Hughes discovered that the State Department representative at AFHQ and Chief of Civil Military Relations, Robert Murphy, had been going to Smith with questions that should have been asked of Hughes. “Beetle Smith still doesn’t know enough to lay off my job” Hughes wrote angrily. Worse, Hughes noted disgustedly, “Bedell gives all the answers. I finally had to tell Murphy to come to me.”153 The next day, a bewildered Hughes had to endure a harangue by

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150 Diary, February 25, 1943, box 2, ESHP. The transcript prepared by David Irving has a slightly different translation of Hughes’ diary. See Papers relating to the Allied High Command, 1943-1945 from the Private Research Collection of David Irving, Reel 5.
151 Diary, March 11, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
152 Diary, March 12, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
153 Diary, March 28, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
Eisenhower who “gave me hell because people were interfering with my job. I can’t figure it out.”

On April 23, Eisenhower appointed General Clarence Ralph Huebner to clear up the confusing command structure between AFHQ and NATOUSA. Unluckily for Hughes, Smith saw this as an opportunity to increase his own authority and recruited Huebner along with Brigadier General Ben Davis and Colonel Harold Roberts to advocate redesigning the command structure to the Chief of Staff’s benefit. All three officers wrote recommendations supporting Smith. The next day Huebner presented an “ultimatum” prepared by both British and American officers to Hughes advocating changing the command structure in favor of Smith. In a memorandum to Huebner dated April 25, Hughes stated he failed to see how the existing command arrangement was unworkable. “Admittedly,” Hughes wrote, “there are imperfections in the present system as there will be in any system involving men and personalities.” He continued that “The proposed change does not appear to relieve the C-in-C [Eisenhower] of numerous details as I understand he desires done, so as to leave him free to accomplish his major tasks.” Hughes concluded that Eisenhower’s “wishes are reasonable and possible of accomplishment, provided all concerned make the comparatively minor concessions essential to successful operations and the winning of the war.”

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154 Diary, March 29, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
155 Diary, April 23, 1943, box 2, ESHP; Crosswell, Beetle, 436.
156 Everett S. Hughes to C. R. Huebner, Memorandum, April 25, 1943, box 5, folder Jan-Aug, 1943, ESHP.
memorandum Huebner informed Hughes that he was inclined to agree with him, yet he still did not understand how the two separate commands could work.  

At twelve o’clock the following day, Hughes and Huebner were present at a conference called by Smith with both American and British supply officers in attendance. Smith began the meeting by turning to Huebner and asking “How is your fight with Everett coming along?” All, including—to Hughes annoyance—the British, laughed. The Deputy Theater Commander’s views remained unchanged. He reiterated his opinion that, 

In view of the fact that the setup under discussion is purely an American organization and in view [sic] of the fact that to date the Chief of Staff has not given me any clear idea as to what is wrong with the present organization, and in view of the fact that the proposed solutions have been prepared by the British, and in view of my conclusion that there is nothing radically wrong, I proposed that there be no major change at this time. The secret of successful operation of any organization is a clear understanding on the part of all concerned as to what their responsibilities are. As far as 90% of the work is concerned, those responsibilities are now clear. I see no necessity for changing the setup in order to accommodate the other 10%, most of which can be handled by anybody or is handled by nobody, would not win or lose the war.

Smith’s humor had departed by the time he entered Hughes’ office later that day. Smith angrily told Hughes that the Deputy Theater Commander had been “brought down here to be promoted and a job made for me. Now that I have been promoted I can afford to accept the AFHQ organization.”

Smith had forgotten, however, that Hughes had also been brought to North Africa because of his special influence with Eisenhower. Before the meeting in Smith’s office
that morning, Hughes had informed Eisenhower about Smith’s actions. The Commanding General flew into a rage and “wanted to send for the recalcitrant members of his staff at once but was persuaded not to.” After his second confrontation with Smith, Hughes informed Eisenhower who tore into his Chief of Staff. In a letter to Kate that evening Hughes triumphantly described what happened next.

About three I received a telephonic invitation to appear in … [Smith’s] office. I went with my chin up prepared to battle to the death. Instead I found two of the meekest Major Generals it has ever been my good fortune to find. We had a love feast and I got without asking for it everything that I had been standing out for.

Many years before General Douglas McArthur had smilingly told Eisenhower after a violent disagreement, “Ike, it’s worthwhile to argue with you sometimes just to see that Dutch temper of yours.”

However, it was not in Smith’s nature to admit defeat in bureaucratic battles and a week later he renewed his attack. After three of his officers were promoted on May 5, Hughes wrote in his diary,

One more step taken today toward getting NATOUSA staff organized. Bedell Smith fighting every step of the way. He gets mad and then as he said today “I like to throw my weight around and then quiet down.” But that is not all. He doesn’t enjoy any more than I would having my job cut into.

Early in June, Smith returned to attacking Hughes position with a new plan for reorganizing the command structure. Smith’s latest scheme would leave NATOUSA intact, and give the Deputy Theater Commander the same responsibilities for troops as Gale had for the British service men. Hughes, however, would be reassigned as Chief

162 Memorandum, April 26, 1943, boxI 6, ESHP.
163 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, April 26, 1943, letter, boxII 1, folder 14, ESHP.
165 Diary, May 5, 1943, boxI 2, ESHP.
Administrative Officer (CAO) and be directly under Smith instead of Eisenhower.\textsuperscript{166} This new attack also failed and by the end of June Hughes wrote in his diary, “Have done nothing about being CAO (A) [American]. Beetle giving up.”\textsuperscript{167}

Smith however, had not given up. The command structure in North Africa was so complicated that it was bound to cause confusion, particularly to newly arrived officers. Instead of relying on prewar plans, the Theater organization was based on the personalities of the commanders and the different nationalities of the Allies. On June 25 during a meeting with Eisenhower, Hughes, and Smith, “the question of organization was raised for the umpteenth time by Bedell Smith, who maintained the stand that he has always taken,” Hughes wrote angrily to a friend, “that the organization is not a type organization and not according to the book.” Eisenhower agreed, but countered that the Theater was a “very special situation” and since it worked the organization should not be changed simply because newly arrived officers found it confusing. The Commanding General concluded the meeting by stating that “the present situation would continue until there was some real reason for modifying the organization.”\textsuperscript{168} “Ike puts stop on Beetle” Hughes gleefully wrote in his diary that evening.\textsuperscript{169}

At 1:16 PM, on May 13 Sir Harold Alexander, commander of the 15\textsuperscript{th} Army Group under Eisenhower, informed Winston Churchill that “the Tunisian campaign is over. All enemy resistance has ceased. We are masters of North African shores.”\textsuperscript{170} It was

\textsuperscript{166} Third Draft Logistical Organization of AFHQ, boxi 5, folder Jan-Aug 1943, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{167} Diary, June 19, 1943, boxi 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{168} Everett S. Hughes to Virgil L. Peterson, June 25, 1943, letter boxi 5, Folder Jan-Aug 1943, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{169} Diary, June 25, 1943, boxi 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{170} Atkinson, \textit{An Army at Dawn}, 529.
now time for the Allies to look forward to the next operation, which would capture Sicily and land in Italy.

Meanwhile, with the demise of the Afrikakorps, the Allies captured approximately 240,000 German and Italian prisoners.\(^{171}\) NATOUSA was responsible for feeding at least half of the POWs with the British taking the other half. Since the Geneva Convention dictated that POWs must be fed to the equivalent of their captors armed forces, this presented a new strain on American supply lines.\(^{172}\) Because sufficient supplies of food were not always available, Hughes began trying to find a way around the requirement. “You need not publish the fact,” Hughes wrote the SOS at the War Department, “but we are hard at work in devising menus for German and Italian prisoners of war which will enable us to utilize excess components of rations in a manner which will not work a hardship on the American soldier. We wish to avoid any possibility of retaliation but at the same time, we believe that it is unnecessary to feed prisoners the best of everything.”\(^{173}\) On July 2, Hughes wrote again to Washington that “I am happy to state that I have single-handedly put across the idea that rations for POW will not be anything except the absolute minimum and that POW will not be fed the luxuries supplied to U.S. Troops.”\(^{174}\) However, tactfully getting other commanders to comply was not easy, and Hughes wrote later, that “it was extremely difficult to get the men in charge of the POW cages to reduce the ration.” ‘My orders were,’ Hughes continued, ‘that we

\(^{171}\) Eisenhower, *Crusade In Europe*, 156.


\(^{173}\) Everett S. Hughes to LeRoy Lutes, May 21, 1943, letter, box 6, ESHP.

\(^{174}\) Everett S. Hughes to LeRoy Lutes, July 2, 1943, letter, box 6, ESHP.
would comply with the Geneva Conventions in spirit but no[t] literally and that POWs were to be given a good ration but not the full “B” ration.”

Throughout the spring and early summer of 1943 Hughes was busy working on the supply preparations for Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily by Patton’s Seventh Army and General Bernard Law Montgomery’s Eighth Army. The British made the job easier and prevented waste by sending NATOUSA copies of all their supply requests made to the United States. Others were not so cooperative. The 1st U.S. Division, which had gained a reputation for asserting its independence in a number of disturbing ways, had taken to discarding official channels and demanding supplies directly from whatever they thought it could be obtained. “Please help!” Hughes angrily wrote the II Corps Commander, Omar Bradley, “All of us here are trying to be helpful and are doing what we can. However, we are all doing it the hard way.”

On the morning of July 6, Hughes said goodbye to Patton who was billeted on the U.S.S. Monrovia with General John Lucas, another Eisenhower deputy, for the voyage to Sicily. At ten minutes past eight the Monrovia was ordered to “Let go all lines” and began slowly moving past British battleships out of Algiers harbor. “It is a moving sight,” Patton wrote in his diary after enduring an endless photo shoot with the invasion fleet commander Admiral Hewitt, “but over all [sic] is the feeling that only God and the Navy can do anything until we hit the shore.” Watching from the dock as the invasion fleet slipped into the Mediterranean, Hughes was struck by the thought that “If we can’t do it

175 Chapter IX, box I 2, folder diary notes 1942-1956, ESHP.
176 Stores and Equipment for “Husky,” box I 6, ESHP.
177 Everett S. Hughes to Omar Bradley, June 12, 1943, letter, box I 5, folder Jan-Aug 1943, ESHP.
178 Diary, July 6, 1943, box 2, GSPP.
nobody can.”\footnote{Diary, July 6, 1943, box 2, ESHP.} He then returned to his headquarters to work, drink, and wait, like the rest of Eisenhower’s officers, for news of the invasion.

On July 10 reports began reaching Algiers that Husky was “going according to plan.”\footnote{Diary, July 10, 1943, box 2, ESHP.} The U.S. Seventh Army had landed on the west side of Sicily and was making speedy progress northward toward the Sicilian capital of Palermo. However, the British Eighth Army, designated to make the main drive up the east coast to cut off the Axis from Italy, hit difficult German resistance and terrain. Patton’s “emissary wants some cigars and decorations for Geo.,” wrote Hughes a few days later, “who can’t be badly off. With the liquor I sent him he should be well off.”\footnote{Diary, July 15, 1943, box 2, ESHP.} In a July 23 letter Patton made “the urgent request” of Hughes to “visit me, as the pressure in the boiler has reached a stage beyond which the gauges fail to register.”\footnote{George S. Patton Jr. to Everett S. Hughes, July 23, 1943, box 32, folder 16, GSPP.} Yet Hughes ignored the invitation. “Tom Larkin back from Sicily—more interested in combat than supply,” Hughes noted a few days later, “That’s one reason I haven’t gone.”\footnote{Diary, July 25, 1943, box 2, ESHP.}

However, reports were also reaching Algiers of renewed tension between the Americans and the British in Sicily. The British, remembering the American defeat at Kasserine Pass, assigned Patton’s Seventh Army to guard Montgomery’s western flank. On July 22, Hughes observed that

Lucas came to N.A. from Sicily to tell Ike that Geo. P. objected to being told to defend the rear of the 8th Army …. Geo. and Wedemeyer saw Alexander [commanding both the American and British Armies] and apparently W. told A.
that American people would not stand for. So order changed and P. sent to Palermo and then Messina.\textsuperscript{184}

Palermo fell to Patton the day Hughes recorded this diary entry. The British were also trying to reach Messina but were still slowed by tough German resistance.

The Deputy Theater Commander was still battling Smith over the command structure. The Chief of Staff had relinquished the authority to police North Africa to NATOUSA, but then refused to give Hughes Military Police (MP) or the power to impound AFHQ cars. Furious, Hughes went to Eisenhower and reminded him that he had told him not to “let Beadle needle you.” Eisenhower responded that he had told Smith the same thing. However, Hughes would be given the MPs.\textsuperscript{185} Unsurprisingly, this decision enraged Smith who angrily told Hughes that when the Allies got to Italy he was going to establish an Allied Force Headquarters without a theater command. “Maybe” Hughes shrugged.\textsuperscript{186}

The Battle for Sicily was coming to an end when Lieutenant Colonel Perrin H. Long of the Medical Corps came to North Africa with a report for the Theater Surgeon General which was quickly passed on to Eisenhower.\textsuperscript{187} Hughes had befriended Long a few months before and made a point of seeing him whenever he was in the Theater. At dinner on August 16, the Colonel explained to Hughes that his report was on General Patton slapping two shell shocked soldiers in a field hospital. Hughes wrote his wife,

In one case the man in answered to P’s question “What’s the matter with you,” answered “I don’t know General I guess I can’t take it.” So Geo slapped his face, god dammed him and raised hell generally. The Medico and I agreed that Geo

\textsuperscript{184} Diary, July 23, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{185} Diary, July 23, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{186} Diary, August 1, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
should not have jumped on a sick man, but I could not get Long to agree that because the man was in the hospital he was sick. However Long did agree that if Geo took Messina it didn’t make much difference how he did it. 188

The next day, August 17, Patton entered Messina hours ahead of the British in one of the most stunning advances any U.S. army had ever conducted. 189 “[R]egardless of method,” Henry Butcher told a very angry Eisenhower, “Patton had done a swell job.” 190

Victory, however, did not make the slapping incident disappear, especially since it was not only medical officers that were now sending reports to Eisenhower. “Ike says that correspondents have some stories about Geo. they are dying to tell” Hughes wrote on August 20. 191 However, Eisenhower, knowing of Patton’s value to the war effort, and not sure if he could retain him in command if the story broke in the press, asked the reporters not to publish it. All the reporters in the Theater complied with the Commanding General’s wishes. 192 Eisenhower wrote Patton a harsh letter of reprimand and ordered him to apologize to the soldiers he had slapped, yet took no further official action. 193

Ten days after the capture of Sicily, Hughes boarded a plane to visit Patton. He reached the Seventh Army’s palatial headquarters—“which is about the same size as the main Palace at Versailles”—at 1:20 P.M. to find the Seventh Army Commander away. Patton soon returned, and after a detailed discussion of the Sicily Campaign, the talk turned to the slapping incident. Patton was now showing little repentance and was

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188 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, August 17, 1943, letter, box II 2, folder Aug, ESHP.
190 Butcher Diary, August 17, 1943, box 167, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principal File, DDEL.
191 Diary, August 20, 1943, box I 2, ESHP.
192 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 181-182.
193 Dwight D. Eisenhower to George S. Patton Jr., August 17, 1944, letter, box 91, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principal File, DDEL.
claiming, among other things, that he had saved the two soldiers’ “immortal souls.”
Hughes offered to help Patton write a reply to Eisenhower’s letter and advised repentance would be more constructive than justification. The final letter was a model of contrition.\(^{194}\) “I am at a loss to find words with which to express my chagrin and grief at having given you, a man to whom I owe everything and for whom I would gladly lay down my life, cause to be displeased with me,” Patton wrote in a line so obsequious that Eisenhower underlined it.\(^{195}\) He could not resist adding that “After each [slapping] incident I stated to officers with me that I felt I had probably saved an immortal soul.”\(^{196}\) Despite this, Hughes had undoubtedly helped Patton tone his letter down. Eisenhower had already made the decision to retain Patton in command, but his letter of repentance undoubtedly cemented the decision.

The slapping incident was not the only problem for Patton to come out of Sicily. Early in the invasion two mass shootings of approximately seventy-six German and Italian prisoners took place near Biscari Airfield. During the court-martial of the Captain and Sergeant who murdered the POWs both men claimed that in a fiery speech Patton delivered before the invasion he had implied that no prisoners should be taken.\(^{197}\) There were also allegations that the Seventh Army had misused POWs by having them unload...

\(^{194}\) Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, September 1, 1943, letter, box II 2, folder 2, ESHP; Diary notes, box I 2, folder Diary notes 1942-1956, ESHP; Diary, August 29, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
\(^{195}\) George S. Patton Jr, to Dwight D. Eisenhower, August 29, 1944, letter, box 91, folder Patton, George S, (4), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principal File, DDEL.
\(^{196}\) George S. Patton Jr, to Dwight D. Eisenhower, August 29, 1944, letter, box 91, folder Patton, George S, (4), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principal File, DDEL.
ships in a combat zone, controlling them with artillery whips, and making them clear minefields.\textsuperscript{198}

Since the American Provost Marshal General in the Mediterranean reported directly to the Deputy Theater Commander, Hughes oversaw the investigation. Eisenhower ordered Hughes to send an Inspector General to Sicily to investigate the Patton incidents and discover what the ordinary soldiers thought of their commander. Hughes settled on Colonel H.S. “Bertie” Clarkson as Inspector General and sent Patton a letter asking him to explain the abuse of prisoners.\textsuperscript{199} Hughes’ letter, however, was sent privately since it would lessen the chance it would be leaked to the press.\textsuperscript{200} Replying at once Patton gave a full report of his knowledge of the incidents and closed by stating that the “Seventh Army will do everything within its power to carry out the rules of land warfare and the desires of the Commander-In-Chief”\textsuperscript{201}

Eisenhower had been informed by war correspondent Quentin Reynolds that 50,000 American soldiers in Sicily would shoot Patton if given the chance. Dismissing the claim as “the normal grousing of the soldiers” Eisenhower nevertheless decided to check the report.\textsuperscript{202} Clarkson’s mission was not only to determine what happened during the slapping incidents but also its affect on the morale of the Seventh Army soldiers. In the middle of September Clarkson returned from Sicily, and told Hughes he thought Patton was through and recommended his relief from command. Hughes quickly disagreed and after some arguing eventually persuaded Clarkson to agree that, though

\textsuperscript{198} Everett S. Hughes to George S. Patton, September 7, 1943, letter, box 32, folder 16, GSPP.
\textsuperscript{199} Diary notes, box 2, folder diary notes 1942-1956, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{200} Everett S. Hughes to George S. Patton, September 7, 1943, letter, box 32, folder 16, GSPP.
\textsuperscript{201} George S. Patton Jr., to Everett S. Hughes, September 10, 1943, letter, box 32, folder 16, GSPP.
\textsuperscript{202} Butcher, \textit{My Three Years with Eisenhower}, 393 and 396.
Patton was a bum, he was still an excellent army commander. The final report concluded that the incident hurt Patton’s reputation, “affected his standing as a high commander and as an officer and a gentleman” in the eyes of his soldiers. Clarkson concluded, however, “There is also such evidence to indicate that these acts and others have not seriously affected Lieutenant General Patton’s standing as a tactical leader who successfully concluded in record time a very complicated military maneuver, and whom they would again be willing to follow into battle.” Hughes also objected to a report on the incident being sent to Alexander’s Fifteenth Army Group since this was purely an American affair. Though Patton would be sidelined for the next few months, he would get to command an army again in Europe. This was, at least in part, due to Hughes persuasion in getting Clarkson to revise his report’s conclusions.

Meanwhile, as the drama surrounding the Battle for Sicily and the slapping incident was still unfolding, Hughes and Eisenhower were having trouble of a very different nature. Since the 1920s Hughes had been a proponent of women serving in the military. World War II had seen the creation of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) later changed in 1943 to the Women’s Army Corps (WAC). Having authored a major study of women in the service Hughes naturally took a special interest in the progress of the WACs. When he met Colonel Oveta Culp Hobby, the director of the

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203 Diary notes, box 2, folder diary notes 1942-1956, ESHP.
204 “Treatment of Certain Mentally Ill Hospital Patients by Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr.” 18 September, 1943, box 91, folder Patton, George S, (3), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principal File, DDEL. The Clarkson’s report was dated 18 September, 1943, Hughes claimed that him talked with him on the 19 of September. The diary page is missing and we have only Hughes’ notes on the subject. Eisenhower did not read the report until September 22, so it is likely that Hughes mistyped the date or that Clarkson changed his conclusion.
205 Diary, September 12, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
WACs, Hughes asked what happened to his study. Hobby had the study found but
discovered that the War Department had already made most of the mistakes Hughes had
predicted.206

North Africa gave Hughes a ringside seat for observing the, at times rocky, start
of the WAACs deployment. In March he had told Captain Marquis, commander of the
WAACs in North Africa, that there were many capable women in the theater who should
be placed in positions of responsibility, even if that meant they jumped over higher
ranking officers, and offered his service in any way possible.207 Nevertheless, most of the
WAACs in North Africa were disenchanted with the army. This was partly due to the fact
that the WAACs had been deployed to the Theater without a director and thus lacked an
officer on the staff level. The problem was drastically elevated in the early summer when
it was learned that most of the WAACs wished to return home rather than transfer to the
new WACs.208

The problem was somewhat relieved when WAC Major Westray Boyce replaced
Marquis as director of the WACs in the Mediterranean. Eisenhower, with Hughes’ help
redesigned Boyce’s position to be Theater WAC Executive Officer. This, as the official
U.S. Army History of the Women’s Army Corps notes, gave Major Boyce “greater power
than any ever held at any other place or time by any other WAC staff director.”209 Hughes
let it be known that every recommendation of Major Boyce would be approved.210 Under
her leadership the WACs’ performance and morale greatly improved. Hughes wrote

206 Treadwell, The Women’s Army Corps, 14n.
207 Everett S. Hughes to Oveta Culp Hobby, March 30, 1943, letter, box 5, folder Jan-Aug 1943, ESHP.
208 Treadwell, The Women’s Army Corps, 362-363.
209 Treadwell, The Women’s Army Corps, 364.
210 Diary, August 11, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
Colonel Hobby on New Year’s Day 1944, that “the supervision of the Wacs have
improved materially since the arrival of Westray Boyce.”

Nevertheless, this progress did not happen overnight, nor could it prevent a large
number of WAACs from leaving the service. In an effort to inspire the WAACs to stay,
on August 16 Eisenhower spoke to a large gathering of women in the Theater. Hughes
described the evening in his diary.

Ike addresses me in gruff non friendly way to say that he is going to cuss out
WAACS … Sticks out his chin and dares them to leave. Growls and says “Good
night.” Then tells WAACs captain to tell [the] girls that they can go home if they
can find a good excuse. Before he spoke 25 girls had said they were going to
quit.

“41 WAACs decide to leave” Hughes recorded in his diary the next day, Speech didn’t
go so well.

It should be noted here that Hughes, and his diary, have been used to badly
impugn Eisenhower’s character in regard to the women serving in the WACs. In his
controversial book, The War Between the Generals, David Irving wrote that Eisenhower
“displayed only distaste for what he regarded as the promiscuous Women’s Army Corps.
Indeed, so exercised did Eisenhower become that he cussed out the WACs in a speech in
August 1943, accusing them of unsoldierly comportment admonishing them either to
mend their ways or to quit.” Irving also believed Eisenhower to be the source of a very
crude and sexual description of the WACs which he claimed to find in Hughes diary.

Irving did not grace his book with citations, but Hughes attributes the quote to a “Teddy”

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211 Everett S. Hughes to Olveta Culp Hobby, January 1, 1944, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
212 Diary, August 16, 1943, box I 2, ESHP.
213 Diary, August 17, 1943, box I 2, ESHP.
214 Irving, The War Between the Generals, 88; Diary, February 7, 1945, box I 2, ESHP.
not Eisenhower. Likewise, Hughes’ diary does not quote Eisenhower as describing the WACs as promiscuous or criticizing their “unsoldierly comportment.” In a letter to Kate, Hughes claimed that the ‘only person who has given me 100% support [on WAC participation in the theater] is General “Ike”. As a matter of fact, he has given me 150% support.’" It appears that Irving simply made up the passage to suit his thesis of mismanagement in Eisenhower’s headquarters.

Hughes also had to deal with accusations of being critical toward the WACs during the war. On October 27 he heard from the states that Colonel Hobby had been informed by General Cook, who had visited the North African Theater, that Hughes disliked the WACs and had called them “whores.” Hughes was outraged, ranting to his diary “Gen. Cook told Hobby I didn’t like WACs. He slept with Marquis and proves I am at odds with WACs. What a mess.” He wrote Kate that “There is just as much justice in alleging that I do not like the WAC’s as there is in alleging that I do not like the U.S. Army because some of its members steal, contract VD, fail to salute and to do a lot of other things.” Hughes listed a few incidents where it had been necessary to discipline WACs but claimed these were minor criticisms. He concluded, “to accuse the author of ‘Participation of Women in War’ against WAC’s is absurd [sic]. I have been pushing the project over the objections of many officers in this Theater.”

Replying, Kate informed her husband that she had spoken to Colonel Hobby and her assistant William R. “Helen” Gruber who said they never believed the story. Kate

215 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, October 27, 1943, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
216 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, October 27, 1943, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
217 Diary, October 28, 1943, box II 2, ESHP.
218 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, October 27, 1943, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
also said, however, “that these statements came back, and continued to come back all to
the affect that you were the only man over there who was down on the Wacs [sic], and
the only way to straighten out the situation was to get another man in your place.” Kate
noted that Helen had complained that they had not gotten any good reports about the
WACs performance overseas and suggested to her husband that he write such a report.219

Before Hughes could write Hobby however, Major Boyce did. In a letter to Helen
Gruber she praised Hughes’ efforts in helping the WACs, and stated that the charges
against Hughes had come from “a completely mad mind.”220 When Hughes finally did
write Hobby, he noted that “You are fully aware, I know, of the charges and counter-
charges which have been bandied back and forth across the Atlantic. By this time you are
undoubtedly familiar with the motives of all concerned.”221 By this point, however, the
incident had been mostly forgotten.

In late November Patton’s indiscretions once again consumed Hughes’ attention.
On November 23 the stateside radio commentator Drew Pearson broke the story of the
slapping incident. The problem was compounded when Smith informed reporters that
Patton had received no official reprimand; Eisenhower’s reprimands were officially
unofficial.222 Patton, who had spent the past three months moping around Sicily and
bemoaning his future prospects in winy letters to Hughes, was suddenly thrown back into
the light of public attention. Hughes once again began trying to save his old friend’s
career. “The last few days have been nerve racking as far as our Headquarters are

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219 Kate Hughes to Everett S. Hughes, November 16, 1943, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
220 Westray Battle Boyce to W.R. Gruber, November 11, 1943, letter, box I 5, ESHP.
221 Everett S. Hughes to Olveta Culp Hobby, January 1, 1944, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
concerned,” Hughes wrote to Kate after the media eruption, “Again, in my opinion, Drew Pearson has done his country a dis-service [sic].”

When Hughes heard that General Smith was writing a cable about the slapping incident to the War Department, Hughes managed to rewrite the message so it did not “tear Geo. down so much.” Hughes was also on the lookout to prevent Patton from tearing himself down. Patton passed on to Hughes a letter that he wished to send to the Secretary of War, his old friend, Henry Stimson. Patton told him to hold the letter if he did not think it should be sent. Believing that Patton still did not have the right attitude Hughes suggested he not send it. Patton concurred. Not for the first or last time, Hughes had intervened to save Patton’s career.

As 1943 drew to a close it became clear that the Mediterranean Theater would soon be rearranged to make way for the invasion of France. Conventional wisdom held that Eisenhower would be transferred to the United States as Chief of Staff for the Army, and George C. Marshall would go to England to command D-Day. At the meeting of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at Teheran in late November 1943, the Soviet leader demanded to know who would command the cross-channel invasion of France, code named Operation Overlord. The western allies tried to avoid the question. Stalin, however, kept pressing the issue.

Few were more interested in Eisenhower’s future than Everett Hughes. Not only was the Commanding General his personal friend but much of Hughes’ job in North Africa rested on that friendship. Smith was still threatening his position whenever he

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223 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, November 25, 1943, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
224 Diary, November 26, 1943, box 1 2, ESHP.
225 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, November 30, 1943, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
could, though his attacks had slackened off considerably when it became clear that the Mediterranean was about to become a secondary theater. On October 8, Eisenhower confided to Hughes that he did not want to become Army Chief of Staff. However, he believed Marshall would command Overlord. Eisenhower wanted to make Hughes Theater Commander for the Mediterranean and offered to leave his car and his driver, Kay Summersby, for Hughes’s use. From then on Hughes kept a running chronicle of rumors of Eisenhower’s future in his diary. October 13, “No news about Ike’s job.” November 9, “I guess Ike is going home.” November 10, “Sat next to Kay at Ikes [sic] invitation. Guess Ike is about to turn over.” December 6, “Does Ike stay or go[?]”

That was also the question on Roosevelt’s mind the night of December 6. Earlier when Roosevelt had asked the Chief of Staff what he wanted, Marshall had declined to give an opinion. “I don’t think I could sleep at night with you out of the country” the President mused. Driving with Churchill earlier that day Roosevelt had casually informed the surprised Prime Minster that he intended to nominate Eisenhower as Supreme Commander for Overlord. The President asked Marshall to come to his room and write a letter to Stalin. Roosevelt began to dictate, “The appointment of General Eisenhower to command of Overlord operation has been decided upon.”

Before heading to England to begin planning for Overlord Eisenhower visited the U.S. He had promised to take Hughes along. To Hughes bitter disappointment,

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227 Diary notes, boxl 2, folder Diary notes 1942-1956, ESHP.
228 Diary, October 13, November 9, November 10, December 6, 1943, boxl 2, ESHP.
230 Diary, December 14, 1943, boxl 2, ESHP.
however, plans changed and Eisenhower returned to Washington D.C. without him.\textsuperscript{231} Eisenhower’s sudden departure also destroyed the influence Hughes’ position rested on in the complicated power structure in North Africa. “God how I hate to see him go,” Hughes wrote to Kate on Eisenhower’s departure, “He has given me full support and authority. What more could I ask? Nothing!”\textsuperscript{232} With Eisenhower gone, and Smith’s sudden loss of interest in the Mediterranean, Hughes was now in temporary command of the Theater until a new commander could be appointed.\textsuperscript{233}

It soon became clear however, that Hughes would not be the new Theater Commander, though there were rumors of other jobs. As Smith boarded his plane to Britain he assured Hughes that he would be asked to fill some post. Hughes was skeptical, “Maybe Ike won’t agree even if Beadle told the truth.”\textsuperscript{234} Nevertheless, Hughes received word from Patton—who had just been moved to Britain to take command of the Third U.S. Army—that he had not been forgotten about by “Divine Destiny” Patton’s code word for Eisenhower.\textsuperscript{235} On February 2, 1944, exactly one year after arriving in North Africa, Hughes was relieved as Deputy Theater Commander. Hughes visited Clark’s Fifteenth Army after hearing a rumor that he would be made governor of Rome.\textsuperscript{236} Rome, however, had not been captured yet, nor would it fall for another five months, meaning Hughes was out of a job. “If I could only stop thinking about myself”

\textsuperscript{231} Diary, December 30, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{232} Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes January 7, 1944, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{233} Walter B. Smith, to Everett S. Hughes and et al, December 30, 1943, cable #21243, EP, 1640.
\textsuperscript{234} Diary, January 18, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{235} Diary, January 31, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{236} Diary, February 2, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
Hughes wrote sadly in his diary in the middle of January something that became increasingly difficult under the new Theater Commander, General Jacob Devers.²³⁷  

Devers, like so many other World War II generals, was a protégé of George C. Marshall who backed his career. Yet throughout the war he had a habit of annoying his brother officers which included Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton, for reasons Hughes would soon discover.²³⁸ The relationship started out badly when Devers repeatedly told Hughes that Patton was through as an army commander. “I guess the reason is that D[evers] doesn’t want to take a chance on backing P[atton] who may win the war but do it in a manner not acceptable to D[evers’] press” Hughes angrily wrote in his diary.²³⁹ Devers also began making changes to the Theater chain of command which brought yet more organizational confusion to the Mediterranean. In fairness to the new Theater Commander he was in a difficult position since the command structure was confusing, especially to officers—like Devers—who were newly arrived. This was compounded by Devers being the Deputy to the British Commander, General Henry “Jumbo” Wilson.²⁴⁰ Finally, to Eisenhower and Hughes’ exasperation Devers began replacing the WACs with men so efficiently that all of the WACs in Hughes’ old headquarters were soon relieved.²⁴¹ Devers also changed the command structure so that the WAC Director in North Africa could no longer consult directly with his deputy chief of staff.²⁴² This

²³⁷ Diary, January 16, 1944, boxI 2, ESHP.  
²³⁹ Diary, January 9, 1944, boxI 2, ESHP.  
²⁴⁰ Taaffe, Marshall and His Generals, 107.  
²⁴¹ Oveta Culp Hobby to Everett S. Hughes, February 9, 1943, letter, boxII 2, ESHP.  
²⁴² Treadwell, The Women’s Army Corps, 364.
destroyed the improvements made in WAC relationships that Hughes had worked so hard to implement.

Fortunately for Hughes, Eisenhower was interested in transferring him to Britain. He had been impressed with his service in North Africa which is clear from a letter Eisenhower sent to Kate, stating

Everett has…a most wearing and responsible job. He has been a great tower of strength to me – as of course I knew he would be. The kind of work he is doing doesn’t produce headlines but if he doesn’t do it right, there would be plenty of them.243

After arriving in England Eisenhower wrote Devers that “I feel that HUGHES have performed a most remarkable job in the Mediterranean and while I do not have a similar position for him here at this moment I request that if you ever consider making him surplus that you let me know. I would then survey the situation to see whether there was not some place where his unusual talents could be profitably utilized.”244 Devers, undoubtedly to Eisenhower’s further annoyance, made no reply to the Supreme Commanders message. Eisenhower wrote Devers again asking what Hughes wanted to do. Hughes told Devers that he was not interested in being the military govern of Rome and would welcome the chance to go to England.245 Devers informed Eisenhower of Hughes reply. Months later Hughes would ask Eisenhower why he had left him in North Africa with Devers. The Supreme Commander replied that “It never occurred to me that Jake Devers wouldn’t want you to continue as Deputy. The SOB.” Hughes concluded

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243 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Kate Hughes, December 26, 1943, letter, box 58, folder 3, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principal File, DDEL.
244 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Jacob Devers, cable, January 19, 1944, boxII 2, ESHP.
245 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Jacob Devers, February 7, 1944, cable, boxII 2, ESHP.
that “Ike is right about most things but he miffed that one.”

At 11:30 P.M. on Sunday February 20, 1944, Hughes boarded a C-34 cargo plane bound for England.

Hughes’ service as Deputy Theater Commander had been important to the Allied victories in North Africa and Sicily. As Eisenhower wrote him shortly after his arrival in England “For over a year you have been engaged in administering and supplying combat troops in an active theater. You have had to meet a host of problems, including manpower and other shortages.”

The job had not been easy, largely because of the complicated command structure and the continuing battles with Smith. Not only had Hughes made the Theater work, he had also helped the WACs gain a more prominent role in the campaign. His personal influence likewise placed Patton in the command of II Corps and helped save his career after the slapping incidents. Patton services were retained for the coming battles across France and into Germany where he would more than repay Eisenhower and Hughes’ confidence in him. On the whole, the Deputy Theater Commander had used his influence with Eisenhower to excellent advantage.

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246 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, August 14, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP
247 Diary, February 20, 1944, boxI 2, ESHP.
Chapter III
Love and War in 1943

Most historical controversies have their genesis at the time the event occurred. Therefore, it is not surprising that the rumors surrounding the relationship between Eisenhower and his driver Kay Summersby, a former fashion model, would continue into history. Kay, however, was more than a driver and soon became Eisenhower’s confidant, joining the small circle of aides making up his “official family.” The Supreme Commander was often seen with Kay, whom he brought to North Africa in 1942 and back to England in 1944, creating gossip about their relationship. Patton, for example, who never commented on whether he believed Eisenhower was cheating on Mamie, however, noted in early 1944 “Ike asked me to dinner … Ike very nasty and show-offish—he always is when Kay is present.” After the war, some historians would use such remarks to paint a picture of an affair and create a historical controversy, which is still hotly contested today. Everett Hughes, always a keen observer of events, took an interest in the relationship. Indeed, what little attention Hughes has received from historians has mostly been linked to his notes made about Eisenhower and Kay. Unfortunately, historians have had no context for the seemingly incriminating statements Hughes scribbled in his diary. They have also missed the fact that his opinion fluctuated overtime, reflecting a level of uncertainty he had about the affair.

After the war Summersby moved to the United States, but heard very little from Eisenhower. When he left Europe in November, 1945, the Supreme Commander severed

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250 Two of the most recent biographies of Eisenhower have taken the opposite view of his relationship with Kay. Carlo D’Este argued against any affair, while Jean Edward Smith argues the opposite. D’Este, Eisenhower, 387-389; Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace (New York: Random House, 2012), 315.
the relationship with a letter. “I am terribly distressed,” wrote Eisenhower, “first because it has become impossible longer to keep you as a member of my personal official family, and secondly because I cannot come back to give you a detailed account of the reasons.”

When word of Eisenhower’s sudden departure reached Europe, Hughes found Kay in the office of Eisenhower’s aide, Colonel Ernest R. “Tex” Lee “looking downcast. Tex says there is no solution evident in her case.” Eisenhower would be working in the Pentagon and since Kay was not yet a naturalized U.S. citizen she would not be allowed to accompany him.

In 1948 Kay began writing a book about her time in Eisenhower’s Headquarters. Originally the book was to be titled, Eisenhower’s Girl Friday: That’s what they called me. When asked for his opinion of the name Eisenhower responded that he had never heard of the expression and it “struck me unfavorably, and I still believe that some other title would be more accurate and more descriptive. I do not understand…why my name has to appear in the title.”

The book was finally published under the title, Eisenhower Was My Boss, and contained no reference to an inappropriate relationship. When Eisenhower’s own book, Crusade In Europe, was published in 1949 he mentioned Kay only once. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s however, rumors would occasionally appear about an affair, but in general, they gained little credibility.

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251 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Kay Summersby, November, 22, 1945, letter, box 112, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principal File, DDEL.
252 Diary, November 23, 1945, box 2, ESHP.
254 Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe, 133.
In 1973, however, Merle Miller published, *Plain Speaking an Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman*. Miller quoted Truman saying that Eisenhower had written George Marshall after the war stating he intended to divorce Mamie and marry Kay. “Marshall” according to Truman, “said that if he [Ike] even mentioned a thing like that, he’d see to it that the rest of his life was a living hell.” Truman continued, “one of the last things I did as President, I got those letters from his file in the Pentagon, and destroyed them.”

There is, however, considerable evidence that Miller made the quotation up. Historian Francis H. Heller reviewed Miller’s transcript and could not find a single reference to Kay and very few related to Eisenhower. Since, *Plain Speaking*, was published after Truman’s death there was no way to verify Miller’s account. Harry H. Vaughn, a close aide to Truman, recalled that the President had seen a letter on Eisenhower from Marshall, but had returned it to the Pentagon. Later Vaughn searched the Defense Department files for two days but could not find the letter.

Nevertheless, Miller’s book renewed interest in the “affair,” and inspired Kay to change her story. In 1976 she published, *Past Forgetting: My Love Affair with Dwight D. Eisenhower*, claiming that the two had an affair during the war. “[C]an’t you tell I’m crazy about you?” Kay quotes Eisenhower as telling her in North Africa right before kissing her.

259 Morgan, *Past Forgetting*, 150.
Rather than ending the debate Kay’s book only heightened the controversy, partly because Kay was also dead by the time it was published. Kay was dying of cancer when she began the manuscript and employed a ghostwriter who completed an unknown quantity of the book after Kay’s death.\(^{260}\) Exaggerating Kay’s story by a ghostwriter eager to increase sales may account for the unevenness of the book. *Past Forgetting* has few incidents of Eisenhower’s stated affection for Kay, who admitted that ‘He was never able to come right out and say, “I love you” after the first time.’\(^{261}\) At other points in the book Kay seemed unsure if she and the General were even having an affair, and claimed it was never consummated.\(^{262}\)

Other members of Eisenhower’s “official family” found a number of inconsistencies with Kay’s story. Butcher, who had an affair himself during the war, stated flatly “I was with the Boss almost everywhere during World War II….He worked incessantly, was always protected, always watched. There was no time or opportunity for an affair.”\(^{263}\) Eisenhower’s orderly throughout World War II, Sergeant Mickey McKeogh, was even more emphatic. “I put the Boss to bed every night,” McKeogh told reporter Virgil Pinkley, “and there was no one else in the bed. In the mornings when I would wake him up, there was no one else in the bed.”\(^{264}\) Despite these statements, some historians continued to cast around for more proof of an affair.

In 1981 David Irving claimed to find new evidence of the Eisenhower-Kay relationship in Everett Hughes’ diary. Irving had discovered Hughes’ diary in the Library

\(^{261}\) Morgan, *Past Forgetting*, 189.
\(^{262}\) Morgan, *Past Forgetting*, 196.
of Congress and paid to have a transcript deciphered from the generals horrible handwriting. Hughes had made numerous comments about Kay, and Irving used them as more evidence of an affair. Irving made the diary transcript available on microfilm. Yet instead of checking the transcript against the original diary historians attempting to defend Eisenhower, usually resort to criticizing Hughes’ motives. Historian Carlo D’Este noted in his biography of Eisenhower, Hughes “kept a near-illegible diary filled with juicy tidbits of gossip and observations about his boss…What Eisenhower never knew was that most of what he unburdened himself of usually ended up in Hughes’s diary, in what were often unflattering comments.” Yet, a closer examination of Hughes’ writings reveals a much different picture then that trumpeted by Irving and demeaned by D’Este.

Another fact, overlooked by historians, is that Hughes never intended for his diary to be a definitive record on any subject. The entries were always brief and almost illegible both to save time and prevent disaster if the diary were to fall into enemy hands. As has been previously noted Hughes did not mean for the journal to be a full account of his activities or opinions, but only notes to jog his memory. It would be impossible to write anything definite about the General using only his diary, yet this is exactly what historians have done. Balancing the journal with Hughes’s other writings produces a very different picture of his opinions.

Hughes first reference to Kay came in a diary entry for December 30, 1942. After a party where Hughes admitted he had too much to drink he

265 Dodopoulos, “David Irving Answers Nine Questions for a Major Greek Newspaper.”
266 Irving, The War Between the Generals, 46.
267 D’Este, Eisenhower, 389.
Sat around with Ike after the party broke up. Discussed Kay[.] I don’t know whether Ike is alibing [sic] or not. Says he likes her. Wants to hold her hand. Doesn’t sleep with her. He doth protests too much especially in view of the gal’s reputation in London.268

A few weeks later on February 12, Hughes recorded another incident involving Kay who was driving Eisenhower to the front.

Elspeth Duncan comes to my room and crys [sic] over Kay and Ike. She foresees a scandal. Claims she is [a] stooge for Kay. Wants to quit. I tell her to stick around. Maybe Kay will help Ike win the war.269

However, Hughes conclusion of an affair at this time does not fit with the evidence provided by Summersby herself. Past Forgetting does not claim that the two became involved romantically until much later in the Mediterranean Campaign.270 Before this, Kay was engaged to be married to an American Colonel Richard Arnold. Whatever his own feelings Eisenhower, according to Butcher, encouraged the two to marry and even lent them his villa so they could spend a rare leave alone together.271 On March 22, 1943, Arnold asked permission to marry Kay at the conclusion of the Tunisian Campaign. Both Patton, his commanding officer, and Eisenhower granted the request.272

Likewise, as historian Jean Edward Smith has noted, “If Eisenhower was infatuated with Summersby, he retained his love for Mamie.”273 Smith goes on to quote a letter from Eisenhower to Mamie written the same day he confided his interest in Kay to Hughes. Eisenhower began by saying that “Sometimes I get to missing you so that I

268 “Notes on a much discussed subject,” boxI 2, folder diary notes 1942-1956, ESHP.
269 Diary, February 12, 1943, boxI 2, ESHP.
270 Morgan, Past Forgetting, 145. Kay gives no date but it is clear that the incident happened sometime after the New Year.
271 Pinkley, Eisenhower Declassified, 362.
273 Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace, 253.
simply don’t know what to do. As pressure mounts and strain increase everyone begins to show weaknesses in his makeup. It is up to the Commander to conceal his.” Tellingly he went on, “When the strain is long continued the commander gets to feeling more and more alone and lonesome, and his mind instinctively turns to something or someone that could help. This, of course, is not well explained—but I mean only to tell you that constantly I think of you as someone who could provide a counter balance for me.” Eisenhower added, “No one else in this world could ever fill your place with me—and that is the reason I need you. Maybe a simpler explanation is merely that I LOVE you!!”\textsuperscript{274}

Despite his views after the war, Kay’s pending marriage was a source of bewilderment to Butcher. Hughes was also surprised. Dining alone at Hughes’ Villa on May 6, 1943, Butcher and Hughes “talked principally about Kay whose coming marriage on June 22 has us stumped.”\textsuperscript{275} However, on June 11 Hughes learned that Colonel Arnold had been killed at the front. Butcher, Eisenhower, and Hughes were at lunch when Kay called and asked to be consoled by Eisenhower.\textsuperscript{276} Years later Kay would write she never really knew Arnold “Ours had been a wartime romance….now when I tried to mourn him, I discovered that I did not really know the man I was grieving for.”\textsuperscript{277} Yet Hughes recorded that Kay appeared heartbroken over her fiancé’s death for months afterward. “Planned party for tomorrow with Ike and Kay,” he wrote on July 3, “But Kay still

\textsuperscript{274} Dwight D. Eisenhower to Mamie Eisenhower, February 2, 1943, in \textit{Letters to Mamie}, 74-75.
\textsuperscript{275} Diary, May 6, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{276} Diary, June 11, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{277} Morgan, \textit{Past Forgetting}, 134.
broken up or down or something.” It is clear from this passage that Kay was deeply shaken by Arnold’s death and her reaction caught Hughes by surprise, and perhaps caused him to rethink the relationship. In any case, after Arnold’s death Hughes’ references to any improper relationship between Eisenhower and his driver disappear from his diary, at least until 1944.

So far the evidence seems to indicate that Hughes believed Eisenhower was having an affair with Kay, except for two factors. First, Kay is hardly mentioned in Hughes’ diary and apart from the three examples shown above, the majority of the references are totally innocent. Hughes mostly mentions Kay’s name among dinner guests or bridge games with Eisenhower. Secondly, Hughes told his wife Kate in a March 8, 1943, letter not to “believe all you hear about Ike…Things are not always what they appear on the surface and are never what they appear to be after being told by some biased person.” Hughes letter was obviously referring to Kay and his motivation in writing it may have been to protect Eisenhower. Yet it may also reflect uncertainty about judging a relationship when he had no direct knowledge.

For the next few months after the death of Arnold, Hughes’ diary contains only general references to Kay. Nevertheless, Irving distorted these remarks by claiming, that “Hughes threw a birthday party for Eisenhower and gave him a bottle of Benedictine, meaning it, as he noted, to sweeten Kay.” However, this is a misquote of Hughes’ original diary entry, which only said, “Gave him [Eisenhower] a bottle of Benedictine for

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278 Diary, July 3, 1943, box I 2, ESHP.
279 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 8, 1943, letter, folder 13 March 1943, boxII 1, ESHP.
Kay.” 281 There is no evidence that this was more than a harmless gift, especially since Hughes was the go-to man for any officer wanting liquor in North Africa.

From Hughes’ diary it is clear that Eisenhower was ready to leave Kay in North Africa if he was recalled to the U.S. On October 8, Hughes noted in his diary, after discussing the possibility of Eisenhower returning to the States, “Ike wants me to take Kay with car thrown in.” 282 A month later Hughes wrote “Sat next to Kay at Ike’s invitation. Guess Ike is about to turn over.” 283 Hughes later made a note by this entry to see the October 8 statement. From this, Hughes apparently deduced that Eisenhower would be going home and leaving Kay as his driver, rather than as evidence of an affair.

As before, Hughes’ diary contradicts Kay’s later claims in Past Forgetting that she was desperate not to leave Eisenhower. She wrote that in the fall of 1943 “rumors had been flying that struck panic into my heart—rumors to the effect that Ike would be recalled to Washington to serve as Chief of Staff.” 284 The “panic” was due, she claimed, to the fact that she and Eisenhower had already expressed their love for each other. When Kay confided her concern to Eisenhower he said, she claimed, “If it has to be Washington, I’ll find a way. I’m never going to let you go.” 285 This statement was hardly in keeping with Eisenhower’s offer that Kay become Hughes driver. When Eisenhower was ordered to England to command Overlord and happily asked Kay to continue as his driver, Hughes recorded her far from joyful response. “Visited with Kay,” Hughes wrote

281 Diary, October 14, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
282 “Notes on a much discussed subject,” box 2, folder diary notes 1942-1956, ESHP. This entry is from a summary Hughes made after the war. The original diary page is missing from the diary.
283 “Notes on a much discussed subject,” box 2, folder diary notes 1942-1956, ESHP. “Turn over” is Army slang for a change in command.
284 Morgan, Past Forgetting, 179.
285 Morgan, Past Forgetting, 180.
on January 9, 1944, “She doesn’t want to return to London.” This was hardly the reaction of someone in love, or the emotions Kay recorded in her book.

As will be shown, Hughes continued observing Eisenhower’s interaction with Kay when he went to England and afterward. His diary however, provides only weak evidence for an affair in North Africa. The few incidents that made their way into his diary often contradict those later claimed by Kay in Past Forgetting. It, of course, must be remembered that Hughes’ observations were only those of a friend. Yet, as historian Jean Edward Smith noted, Hughes’ “assessment was that of someone who had known Ike and Mamie for over twenty years.” Once again, it was Hughes’ personal relationship with the Supreme Commander that has caused him to be taken seriously by historians.

Hughes himself was not exempt from charges of having an affair during the war, with Irving claiming that Hughes had obtained a girlfriend in North Africa. Irving never discovered her name, but made note of repeated references to a “J.P.” in Hughes’ diary. The evidence of an affair, according to Irving, between the Deputy Theater Commander and the mysterious “J.P.” was a dream in Hughes’ diary where ‘his wife had come in unexpectedly and that J.P. had had to “run like hell down the back stairs.”’ Yet, again, an examination of the diary shows that Irving took considerable liberty with this passage. The February 14, 1944, diary entry states “Dream Kate, J.P. Teddy – Kate home while J.P. – races home back stairs ran like hell.” Along with rearranging the quote Irving also ignores the context of the dream. A few days before, Hughes had visited the ancient

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286 Diary, January 9, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
287 Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace, 234n.
288 Irving, The War Between the Generals, 87.
289 Diary, February 14, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
Roman city of Pompeii and concluded that it was “no place for a man who has been away from his wife as long as I have.” The day after his dream, Hughes wrote Kate longingly “You are so far away and news is non existent [sic].” It should be remembered also that dreams hardly provide evidence of adultery.

J.P. was Hughes’ shorthand for Elizabeth Prismall one of two British women he had met in London in 1942 and asked to join his staff in North Africa. Kate, however, had full knowledge of Mrs. Prismall’s presence in her husband’s headquarters. Hughes explained to Kate, “I have taken Mrs. Prismall to the mess several times and during the past few days….So you’ll soon here [sic] that Hughes has a girl friend [sic] along with the rest. But don’t put the wrong interpretation on anything you hear or on what I have said unless you want to make yourself unhappy.”

However, as Hughes admitted to Kate, Mrs. Prismall was much more than an office worker and the two soon became very close. She helped Hughes organize his villa and made sure he was taken care of when, as often happened during the war, he fell ill. In return he took roses to her when she was sick with malaria.

Hughes described both Mrs. Prismall and Mrs. Marie “Toppy” Black, the other British woman on his staff, to Kate as “attractive…and both have made a hit with Ike’s crowd.” This was certainly true. Mrs. Black eventually became close to Eisenhower.

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290 Diary, February 11, 1944, boxI 2, ESHP.
291 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, February 15, 1944, letter, folder 7 Feb 1944, boxII 2, ESHP.
292 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 8, 1943, letter, folder 13 March 1943, boxII 1, ESHP. Jean Edward Smith, has incorrectly claimed that Hughes “girlfriend” was named Rosalind Prismal. Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace, 235.
293 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 8, 1943, letter, folder 13 March 1943, boxII 1, ESHP.
294 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 23, 1943, letter, folder 13 March 1943, boxII 1, ESHP.
295 Diary, April 18, 1943, boxI 2, ESHP.
296 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 8, 1943, letter, folder 13 March 1943, boxII 1, ESHP.
writing her mother “I like Ike so much and he has been simply charming to me. In fact, he has been just like a father to me since I came out here.” Mrs. Prismall was also popular especially with Patton, who began sending his regards to her in his letters to Hughes. Eisenhower’s aide Ernest “Tex” Lee likewise enjoyed spending time with her. Hughes noted in November 1943 that Lee “is getting fonder of J.P. each day. Quite an affair.”

Mrs. Black was in the middle of divorcing her husband, Captain Ian Black, when in April, 1943, she met Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder of the Royal Air Force. The two were introduced at a party in Algiers and instantly hit it off by discussing the creation of a service club for airmen. Tedder’s wife had recently died and he and Mrs. Black were soon spending a lot of time together. Tedder began trying to create a job for his new friend, who thought the Air Marshal “a darling and is so sweet and kind. Apart from that, he is a very grand man and one can admire him a lot.” On June 12, 1943, Black informed Hughes that she intended to marry Tedder. “What the Hell!?” Hughes confided to his diary.

There is room, of course, for speculation in regard to the friendship between Hughes and Mrs. Prismall. In the Deputy Theater Commander’s case the problem is made harder because there is no evidence except what Hughes left. That evidence is, at

298 Diary, June 23, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
299 Diary, November 10, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
300 Orange, *Tedder*, 220-221. What became known as “Malcolm Clubs,” after the posthumous winner of the Victoria Cross Commander Hugh Gordon Malcolm, would eventually number over a hundred clubs with Mrs. Black active in their founding. Ibid.
301 Orange, *Tedder*, 222.
302 Diary, June 12, 1943, box 2, ESHP.
best, inconclusive and points more to friendship than to an affair. Mrs. Prismall’s papers have not been found and apart from a few letters she wrote to Patton she remains silent to history. Hughes remained devoted to Kate throughout the war sending her many long letters multiple times a week. Almost all were filled with expressions of love for her. He missed her greatly, and was dreadfully disappointed when he was unable to accompany Eisenhower home for leave at the end of 1943. However, when it came time for Hughes to go to England himself he asked Mrs. Prismall to accompany him, to which she agreed.303

Summing up the evidence provided by Hughes’ papers for his relationship with Mrs. Prismall as well as that with Kay and Eisenhower the result is at best inconclusive. For both “couples,” at least in 1943, there is little evidence of any inappropriate relationship. One thing is clear, Hughes’ diary, while seeming to supply evidence of an affair between Eisenhower and Kay, nevertheless contradicts Kay’s own claims multiple times. Likewise, despite what Irving and others have claimed Hughes’ diary contains only a few references to Kay which lends credibility to an affair, with a number of other innocent remarks being completely taken out of context. Yet the war was not over and neither was Hughes finished writing about Kay, or becoming close to Prismall.

303 Diary, February 16, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
Chapter IV
The “Eyes and Ears” of SHAEF
Hughes arrived in England at 1:00 AM on February 21, 1944, and received a royal welcome from his many friends stationed in Britain. Hughes immediately met with Eisenhower who said he had two jobs in mind for him. The first was to be Chief of Staff for Patton, slated to take over the Third Army. Eisenhower and others in his inner circle did not care for Patton’s current Chief of Staff, General Hobart Gay. Patton who was happy with Gay’s performance in Sicily reluctantly consented when Gay said he did not mind serving under Hughes. The day before Hughes’ arrival in England, Patton wrote his wife that “I will have to take Everett in some capacity…It will be all right for me but will I fear imbarass [sic] him.” Yet when the Supreme Commander told Hughes about the job he ruled it out before he could even respond. Hughes gratefully told Kate, “You don’t have to be told how difficult would be an assignment to keep Geo in order.”

The second choice Eisenhower suggested was to become a roaming inspector of Allied forces around England. Hughes accepted the latter post, and for the remainder of 1944 he would have a ringside seat to Operation Overlord and the battles across Europe.

Eisenhower gave Hughes the official title of Special Assistant to the Commander in Chief, ETO. Informally, however, Hughes was simply known as Eisenhower’s “eyes and ears.” Hughes was “authorized to consult and confer with the officers and enlisted men of all units, organizations and Headquarters” in the ETO. As Eisenhower explained,

304 Diary, February 21, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
308 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, February 28, 1944, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
Hughes’ authority would allow “you to place your experience at the disposal of the persons consulted. It will also enable you to advise me as to any measures to be taken to ensure the greater success of the coming operations, whether manpower and supplies are being energetically utilized, whether responsibilities are clear and fixed and whether everything practicable is being done to support and maintain the prospective combat troops.”

Eisenhower noted that Hughes should focus on consultation rather than inspections. If he found problems that only Eisenhower could fix, he was to bring them to the Supreme Commander’s attention.

As he had been with his past assignments during the war, Hughes was initially overwhelmed by the new job. Added to this, his position was even less clear and more dependent on Eisenhower than it had been in North Africa. Hughes noted, “I have no authority and the only reasonability to tell Ike when I see something radically wrong which I can’t get responsible officers to correct.” Though holding only the power to persuade, Hughes’ job had the advantage of being outside the formal command structure, which meant he reported directly to Eisenhower and not, as everyone else did, to General Walter Bedell Smith. As Buel F. Weare, an officer in the SHAEF quartermasters office, recalled “nobody knew quite what he [Hughes] did but he did a lot. He was one of the inner circle boys.” Yet because so much of his job rested on giving advice, Hughes was careful how much communication he had with the Supreme Commander. “I would like to

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311 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, February 24, 1944, letter, boxII 2, ESHP.
see Ike frequently,” he wrote his wife, “but I do not want to tell tales or appear to be telling tales. So probably won’t see him often.”

Not all were happy with Hughes’ new job for exactly that reason. General John C.H. Lee, who was still in charge of the Service of Supply worried, correctly, that his former subordinate would be snooping on his job. A more damning complaint came from George Marshall in a private letter to Eisenhower. Hughes’ name had been brought up by Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell while he, Marshall, General Henry H. Arnold, and Brigadier General Thomas T. Handy were driving to lunch. Somervell blamed Hughes for trouble with the Special Service activities in North Africa, and expressed disappointment that Hughes was going to England rather than becoming the governor of, still unconquered, Rome. Somervell claimed Hughes had been rigidly outspoken against the Special Services, and had met each visiting officer trying to fix the problems with sarcasm. Arnold added that “Hughes had been his particular difficulty throughout the period of the Mediterranean campaign and he could second all Somervell was saying.” Handy quickly stated that Hughes had been hated by all his students while he was an instructor at Leavenworth. Marshall relayed the conversation to Eisenhower and added “I have never seen the man to my knowledge, therefore my viewpoint is purely abstract, but the unanimity of opinion leads me to believe that you are reacquiring one of the cast iron types in a job that requires other characteristics.”

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313 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, February 24, 1944, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
314 Diary, February 21, 1944, box I 2, ESHP; Diary, February 22, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
“You know him and worked with him so it is entirely your affair.” The Army Chief of Staff required no reply, and Eisenhower ignored his advice and sent for Hughes.

Much of the drama that had been present in the Mediterranean was also transferred to England. Stopping by Eisenhower’s place for supper on February 23, Hughes found Eisenhower out at a British stag dinner and Kay waiting for his return. When the Supreme Commander finally came back the three were joined at the table by Captain Harry Butcher, and to Eisenhower’s annoyance, his Red Cross girlfriend. The Eisenhowers had been friends with Harry and his wife, Ruth, long before the war, and Mamie currently lived across the hall from Ruth. Mrs. Butcher knew of her husband’s infidelities and had turned to drinking heavily during the war. The Supreme Commander disgustedly told Hughes, who also knew Ruth, “not to talk” in front of Butcher’s new love interest. Later in March Hughes would write enquiringly of Kate about Ruth, is “that split final? Butch never speaks on the subject.”

Hardly had Hughes arrived in England then the cold he had in 1942 returned with a vengeance. However, he ignored it. On March 1 he, Mrs. Prismall, and Patton had gone to lunch at Claridges, and then went shopping for a bull dog, for the new Third Army Commander. To Patton’s delight they found a fifteen month old bull terrier which at once took to its new owner, who christened the dog William, quickly amended to Willie. Yet Hughes was becoming sicker throughout the day and on the way back, Patton

316 Diary, February 23, 1944, box 2, ESHP; D’Este, Eisenhower, 313. Butcher would devoice Ruth after the war and marry his Red Cross sweetheart. Virgil Pinkley, Eisenhower Declassified, 362.
317 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 24, 1944, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
318 Diary, February 23, 1944, box II 2, ESHP.
dropped him off at a hospital. He would remain there till March 13 after which he emerged with shaky knees and a running temperature making it impossible for him to travel.

By March 26 Hughes felt fully recovered and began traveling around England to inspect the preparations for Overlord. When he had first arrived in Britain, Hughes had visited Bradley’s First Army which was preparing to spearhead the invasion. “They are where we were two months before Torch,” Hughes wrote in his diary, “milling around trying to make an estimate of troop requirements.” Unsurprisingly, Hughes’ first trip was a drive to the town of Peover, where Patton’s new Third Army Headquarters was located. Hughes stayed there until April 13 touring divisions and talking to commanders with Patton.

As he had done in North Africa Hughes believed the command structure was flawed and hoped to improve it. D-Day and the operations to follow were commanded directly by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). Supplies, however, were still, as in North Africa, handled separately for the American and British forces. Thus, General John C.H. Lee, and the SOS, was under the European Theater of Operations (ETO) and not SHAEF. However, Eisenhower commanded both the ETO and SHAEF. “Ike as [Commander] in [Chief] vs. Ike as Theater Commander” Hughes wrote in his diary with an accompanying doodle of a man with two faces. What made the

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319 Diary, March 1, 1944, box 3, GSPP; Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 421
320 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 10, 1944, letter, box II 2, ESHP; Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 18, 1944, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
321 Diary, February 28, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
322 Diary, April 13, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
323 Crosswell, Beetle, 574; Diary, April 4, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
command structure different than the dual headquarter system that had existed in North
Africa was that Walter Bedell Smith was chief of staff for both SHAEF and ETO.
However, there was still a Deputy Commander for the European Theater of Operations in
the form of General Lee. This left the ultimate responsibility in the ETO blurred between
Smith and Lee. “Beadle [sic] wanted to know why Bradley called him about a bulldozer,”
Hughes bemusedly noted in his diary, “I said that probably B. didn’t want to talk to
Lee.”

The “cockeyed” command structure was bad enough for Hughes to write a
memorandum to Eisenhower recommending a return to the system used in North Africa,
“which did not require General Smith to act as Chief of Staff of the Theater” and hold the
same post at AFHQ. Smith and Lee were both lieutenant generals, but Smith was
technically senior to Lee, which under normal circumstances meant Smith would be in
charge. However, in the Theater command, the chief of staff was subordinate to the
deputy theater commander, making Lee Smith’s boss, despite his rank. Hughes believed
this “arrangement makes for division of responsibilities, it results in appeals to General
Smith over General Lee’s head and in decisions being made without proper
representations from the Deputy.” Hughes concluded, that “I do not believe that you can
apply any real criteria as to the performance of duty of the Deputy Theater Commander
unless his responsibilities are fixed and he is held accountable for the supply and

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324 Diary, April 6, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
administrative functions of the Theater.”325 It is unknown whether Eisenhower ever saw Hughes recommendations.326

Other suggestions Hughes made around the same time had better outcomes. In a flurry of memos dated April 5 Hughes stated that security for the coming invasion was preventing commanders, in particular the XV Corps and Third Army, from having the information necessary to prepare for their tasks.327 Hughes also voiced concerns of a number of combat officers who felt they were missing out on promotions to rear echelon and SOS officers.328 Another memo suggested that Eisenhower reassure his division and corps commanders that their jobs were secure. Hughes had found that there was “an apparent disinclination of commanders to discuss fully and frankly with either you or General Lee matters about which there is some doubt or question. Feeling insecure in their jobs, they are either being “Yes” men or are disobeying orders rather than take the chance of being relieved for questioning orders.”329 Hughes reiterated this last point again in a meeting with Eisenhower the next morning. Describing the meeting to Kate, Hughes wrote, “We had a good talk with Beadle [sic]…I left several memos with him [Eisenhower] on which he was already acting before I left. I caught him at a good time and had enough material to really discuss such problems as promotions, his relationship

325 Everett S. Hughes to Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 8, 1944, memorandum, box 5, ESHP.
326 Though Hughes kept a copy of his memorandum, it does not appear in Eisenhower’s papers.
327 Everett S. Hughes to Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 5, 1944, memorandum, box 58, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principal File, DDEL.
328 Everett S. Hughes to Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 5, 1944, memorandum, box 58, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principal File, DDEL.
329 Everett S. Hughes to Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 5, 1944, memorandum, box 5, ESHP.
to American combat organizations, [and his] issuing of too detailed orders. He agreed with me on most subjects.\footnote{Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, April 6, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.}

Meanwhile, Patton’s presence in England and command of Third Army was more or less a secret. On April 17, Hughes wrote a memorandum to Eisenhower suggesting that Patton’s command of his new army be announced to the war correspondents. Eisenhower ignored the memorandum.\footnote{Memorandum for General Eisenhower, April 17, 1944, box 33, folder 18, GSPP.} When Hughes brought up the matter in person a few days later, the Supreme Commander made it clear that he was afraid Patton would say something that would get him in trouble and make it impossible to retain him in Europe.\footnote{Diary, April 21, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.}

Eisenhower had good reason to worry. The case of the two POW shootings in North Africa had finally been brought to trial in early 1944. In their defense the two soldiers, a captain and sergeant, claimed that Patton had implied killing prisoners was desirable in a speech to his soldiers before the Sicily invasion. During Hughes’ visit with Patton in April, word reached the Third Army that Lieutenant Colonel Curtis L. Williams, an Inspector General for the War Department, was in London investigating these allegations.\footnote{Hirshson, General Patton, 453-454.} “Hughes came in at 8 o’clock to see if I was in any trouble,” Patton wrote in his diary on April 6, “I assured him I was not. However, we decided to write Surles an accurate account of the incident so that if any unscrupulous correspondent got wind of it, Surles could immediately state the facts.” Hughes had graduated with Virgil L. Peterson, who was the Army’s Inspector General, and quickly sent him Patton’s side of
the story. “I am firmly convinced that Patton never at any moment advocated the
destruction of prisoners of war under any circumstances … Patton is a fighter for he
looks at war realistically and does what few men in our army have yet dared to do—talk
openly about killing.”\textsuperscript{334} Peterson waited almost two months before replying that “the
case in question appears to be resting quietly at the moment, and I doubt if it will be
brought up again.”\textsuperscript{335}

Eisenhower knew that Patton was continuing to make fiery speeches to his troops,
writing after the war, “A speech he made to an American division shortly after his arrival
in the United Kingdom caused more than a ripple of astonishment and press comment,
and I well knew that it would be far easier to keep him for a significant role in the war if
he could shut off his public utterances.”\textsuperscript{336} Eisenhower met with Patton on April 7 and
disgustedly told the Third Army Commander that he talked too much. Patton replied that
“If you order me not to I will stop. Otherwise I will continue to influence troops the only
way I know, a way thich [sic] so far has produced results.” “Go ahead,” replied
Eisenhower, “but watch yourself.”\textsuperscript{337} Nevertheless, the Third Army Commander
promised Eisenhower that he would not make any explosive public statements. “I shall
certainly attempt to say nothing which can be quoted.” Patton wrote in his diary.\textsuperscript{338}

By the end of April however, Patton’s mouth had managed to get him into just the
kind of trouble Eisenhower had feared. The incident began innocently enough when a

\textsuperscript{334} Hughes to Peterson, APO 887 New York, April 7, 1944, File 333.9, Box 67, Records of the Office of
the Inspector General, quoted in Hirshson, General Patton, 455.
\textsuperscript{335} Virgil L. Peterson, to Everett S. Hughes, May 22, 1944, letter, box11 3, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{336} Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 224.
\textsuperscript{337} Diary, April 7, 1944, box 3, GSPP.
\textsuperscript{338} Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 224; Diary, April 7, 1944, box 3, GSPP.
group of British ladies asked Patton to attend the opening of a welcome club for
American soldiers. Patton agreed but stressed that he was not there in an official capacity.
The group was small, approximately sixty people, and when the chairman, without
warning, asked the General to say a few words Patton agreed. Before he said anything the
chairman reminded the group that “General Patton is not here officially and is speaking in
a purely friendly way.”339 Rising to his feet Patton adlibbed, in part, the following
remarks,

I feel that such clubs as this are a very real value, because I believe with Mr.
Bernard Shaw, I think it was he, that the British and Americans are two people
separated by a common language, and since it is the evident destiny of the British
and Americans, and, of course, the Russians, to rule the world, the better we know
each other, the better job we will do.340

Two days after Patton’s speech Hughes returned to London, tired, from an
unimpressive winged bomb demonstration to find Eisenhower’s Headquarters in a ruckus
over Patton’s remarks. Unknown to Patton, a reporter was present at the gathering and his
speech had been distorted in subsequent newspaper articles. Most provocatively a number
of newspapers had quoted the General saying Britain and the U.S. would rule the post-
war world, but did not mention Russia. Coming so close after the slapping incident, most
news coverage was bitterly critical of Patton. The Washington Post stated that Patton had
“progressed from simply assault on individuals to collective assault on entire
nationalities….All thought of promotion should now be abandoned.”341 Congressmen
from both parties also condemned Patton’s remarks.342 Though a correction of the story

339 Diary, April 25, 1944, box 3, GSPP.
340 George S. Patton Jr. to Everett Hughes, April 26, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
341 Washington Post, April 29, 1944, quoted in Hirshon, General Patton, 460-461.
with Russia among the world’s rulers was quickly published, many reporters were still unconvinced.\textsuperscript{343}

In his mailbox however, Hughes also found a letter from Patton explaining his remarks. The Third Army Commander stated that he was speaking off the cuff and had not known that there was a reporter present. Further, Patton provided two statements from eye witnesses that he had included the Russians among the world’s rulers. The letter was addressed to Hughes, but Patton clearly meant it for Eisenhower, writing that these were the facts “which you may in your discretion present to the Commander-in-Chief.”\textsuperscript{344} Though he was irritated with Patton—“Why can’t he shut up?”—Hughes decided once again to intervene between his two friends.\textsuperscript{345}

When Hughes walked into Eisenhower’s office the next day he found a furious Supreme Commander busily writing out a message to Marshall stating that he had no need to continue protecting Patton and that he should be recalled to the United States. Eisenhower wrote after the war that the incident caused him for the first time to seriously “doubt my ability to hang onto my old friend, in whose fighting capacity I had implicit faith and confidence. However, my concern was not so much for his particular statements, which were the object of criticism at home, as it was for his broken promise with the resultant implication that he would never improve.”\textsuperscript{346} Later, Hughes recalled telling Eisenhower to “regard Patton as a nervous, fidgety and temperamental race horse, which would kick his trainer, get his front feet into the manger and bolt his

\textsuperscript{343} “Army & Navy-Morale: There He Goes Again,” \textit{Time}, May, 8, 1944, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,933374,00html
\textsuperscript{344} George S. Patton Jr. to Everett Hughes, April 26, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{345} Diary, April 28, 1944, boxI 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{346} Eisenhower, \textit{Crusade in Europe}, 224.
food...regardless of all these defects he wins races and consequently the trainer has to avoid being kicked; the stall has to be padded and a device has to be constructed to keep the animal from bolting his oats. The idea apparently was put across, but it is an idea that requires considerable salesmanship.”

Hughes also showed Eisenhower Patton’s letter and a copy of his speech, along with the witness testimony. Eisenhower perused the letter and finally said “Oh hell” and tore up the cable to Marshall. Yet the Supreme Commander was still angry and Hughes left to write in his diary, that I don’t “know what action Ike will take!”

However, it is certain that Patton’s letter and Hughes’ timely action saved the Third Army Commander from returning to the U.S. in disgrace. Writing after the war Eisenhower remembered that two points had quickly been brought to his attention. “The first of these,” he noted, “was that in advance of the meeting Patton had refused to make any speech and had merely, under the insistence of his host, risen to his feet to say a word or two…The second point was that he had been assured that the meeting was a private one, with no reporters present, and that no information concerning its details would be given to anyone.”

In short, this was the exact information contained in the letter Hughes passed along to his boss. The Supreme Commander would let Patton sweat for a few days before calling him to London to receive his tearful apology. He informed Patton, that “You owe us some victories; pay off and the world will deem me a wise

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347 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, March 28, 1945, letter, box II 4, ESHP.
348 George S. Patton Jr. to Everett Hughes, April 26, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP; Diary, April 30, 1944, box 3, GSPP.
349 Diary, April 29, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
350 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 224.
man.”\footnote{Eisenhower, \textit{Crusade in Europe}, 224.} Surely some of the stunning victories that Patton would redeem himself with in the coming months were due not only to Eisenhower’s wisdom but to Hughes loyalty and timely action.

Meanwhile, Hughes continued to busy himself with inspection trips to oversee the preparations for Overlord. On April 29 he traveled to the English coast and inspected troop camps and ships. Hughes observed small crafts drilling for D-Day, and was thrilled when he got to ride in an amphibious tank, known as a Duplex Drive Tank.\footnote{Diary, April 30, May 1, 2, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.} Though he was evidently impressed, Hughes was far from being an uncritical observer of the operations, noting ‘Men not fed as well as circumstances permit. Excuse: “This is war.”’\footnote{Diary, May 4, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.} It was not an excuse Hughes was willing to accept since he observed that the problem was caused not by insufficient rations but by the fact that nobody had any orders to feed troops whose schedules were delayed. As he wrote to Lee, regulations “do not cover the period during which schedules are not being met and troops must wait in a place where food is not being regularly provided under the plan.” Because of Hughes’ memorandum on May 17, the SOS dictated that it was the responsibility of the base commanders to provide hot meals and beverages to troops traveling through their camp who were experiencing delays.\footnote{Everett S. Hughes to John C.H. Lee, May 9, 1944, Memorandum for Lt. General Lee, box I 5, ESHP; Richard P. Fisk, to Base Section Commanders, May 17, 1944, “Feeding of Troops”, ESHP.}

As the invasion neared Hughes confronted other problems, which had little to do with the war. On a visit to the Supreme Headquarters on May 6, Hughes found Eisenhower and Smith discussing the price of office rugs and billets. Hughes tried to
bring up the “feeding of soldiers, staff work, etc. but got no where [sic].” Hughes, who was generally careful how the taxpay-er’s money was spent, or at least good at criticizing others excesses, had already begun conducting a quiet investigation into the expenses incurred by American generals. Lee, who still lived in luxury, was his favorite target, but other high ranking officers were living in far from Spartan conditions. “Aides have the answer to Ike’s expenditures,” Hughes noted in his diary, “Lee and Butch ask for the world. Beadle [sic] looked at his bills, knew the price, took it and is now scared.” Butcher, who had bought four pillows at a price of ten dollars apiece for Eisenhower’s getaway, Telegraph Cottage, resented Hughes meddling. “I was responsible for authorizing this intended improvement to the cold and hard davenport and two overstuffed chairs in our plain living room,” Butcher noted angrily in his diary, “If words had been a paddle, I could have used one pillow very handily. The pillows were returned.” When Eisenhower’s “eyes and ears” informed him how much was being spent on him personally, the Supreme Commander was dumfounded.

A few days later Hughes stumbled into an even more scandalous situation involving Walter Bedell Smith. Patton and Hughes were visiting shops along Oxford Street in London on May 12 when they happened into the exclusive James Purdey and Sons gun shop. A conversation with the owner revealed that the shop was in the process of crafting a shotgun for Smith. Patton estimated the shotgun’s value at $2,000, which was made all the more interesting when it was discovered that it was a gift from the store’s owner. In exchange, Smith made his own gift in the form of two U.S. Army

355 Diary, May 6, 1944, box 1, ESHP.
356 Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 537.
357 Diary, May 12, 1944, box 1, ESHP.
carbines, a cheap electric train set, and a lot of hard to get army food. Neither Patton nor Hughes liked Smith and the experience was summed up by Patton as “the cheapest swindle either of us had ever seen.”

Hughes was not prepared to let Smith enjoy his ill-gotten shotgun in peace. A few days after the discovery, Hughes confronted Smith who flew into a rage and illogically blamed Patton for the whole affair. It had not been a good day for Hughes, who felt depressed and hoped “the war hasn’t passed me by.” His mood and Smith’s angry reaction may have triggered him to investigate the incident further. The next day Hughes spoke to General Henry Sayler, the Ordnance Service Chief in the ETO. “I take it he thinks I should keep mum on subject,” he noted, “Maybe I’d better.” However, Sayler did discover that Smith “was issued two army carbines which he lost and then paid for.”

This incident did nothing to improve Smith and Hughes relationship and triggered an investigation by the Army Inspector General. On June 6 Smith told Hughes he would fire the Inspector General if he delves “too much into his affairs.” As Smith’s biographer, D.K.R. Crosswell, has observed “Smith’s attention should have been elsewhere” on D-Day. The Chief of Staff escaped any consequence for the “gift”, apart from having his picture displayed in James Purdey and Sons to this day. Nevertheless, the Inspector General told Hughes that Smith did not like being investigated. “I can see that” observed Hughes.

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358 Diary, May 12, 1944, box 3, GSPP; Diary, May 14, 1944, box12, ESHP.
359 Diary, May 16, 1944, box12, ESHP.
360 Diary, May 17, 1944, box12, ESHP.
361 Diary, June 6, 1944, box12, ESHP.
362 Crosswell, Beetle, 606.
363 Crosswell, Beetle, 606n; Diary, June 28, 1944, box12, ESHP.
Though not as gratifying as investigating Smith, Hughes was also busy through the month of May pushing his old idea of supplies being requested from the front instead of being blindly offered up from the rear. The issue had reemerged when, during one of Hughes’ inspection trips, he found that a unit of MPs had arrived at the Plymouth staging area before the port commander knew they were coming. Noting that supplies arriving without warning had been one of the greatest difficulties in both New York and North Africa, Hughes understood that the problem could not be entirely solved. “In my opinion,” Hughes wrote Lee, “it is going to be absolutely essential for any cross channel movement that the men at the receiving end be told by the men at the shipping end that men and supplies are on their way. Of course, in my opinion, nothing should be shipped until the man at the receiving end has called the men or supplies forward or unless he has been notified by the shipper that the men and supplies are on the way.”

Lee raised the issue of informing commanders of what supplies were coming before it was shipped at a meeting with his supply colleagues, but no further action was taken. Undeterred, Hughes tried to sell the idea of supplies from the rear to Omar Bradley, who apparently remained uncommitted.

Like so many others in southern England Hughes was awakened early on June 6, 1944, by the thunder of thousands of planes flying overhead toward Normandy, signaling that D-Day had begun. Hughes arrived at his office in time to hear Eisenhower’s address on the radio. At 11:30 A.M. he noted again that the invasion was going as planned, German gun emplacements had been knocked out and the battleship *U.S.S. Texas* was

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364 Everett S. Hughes to John C.H. Lee, May 6, 1944, Memorandum, ESHP.
365 Meeting transcript, May 16, 1944, ESHP; Diary, May 26, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
pounding a shore battery. Hughes added, somewhat troublingly, “Weather not so
good.” Yet despite the weather and stiff German resistance the Allies made it ashore on
D-Day. Their advance inwards in the coming days, however, was quickly slowed by
heavy German resistance. The invasion’s success hinged on the Allies ability to build up
men and supplies for a breakout faster than the Germans could reinforce Normandy to the
point where they could force the Allies back into the sea. This was the basic dilemma that
would face Hughes and the rest of Eisenhower’s lieutenants in the coming weeks.

On Tuesday, June 13, Hughes flew with General Lee to Normandy for an eleven
hour visit. Omaha Beach, which had been a scene of carnage on D-Day, and the rest of
Hitler’s Atlantic Wall left Hughes stunned.

The fields were covered with poppies and with huge sticks which the Nazis had
put in most of the fields to prevent glider landings. However, just as American
forces were able to cross the beaches, which were covered with obstacles of every
known form, our gliders were able to land and our paratroopers succeeded in
getting to the places which they were told to hold. After seeing what our men did,
I am convinced that there is no such thing as the impossible.\m

The Generals were in France to inspect the supply situation and, despite his
admiration for the battle over Omaha, Hughes believed there was room for improvement.
The weather over the channel had been imperfect during D-Day and was showing signs
of worsening. With so much of Overlord’s success resting on which side could build up
forces faster in the beachhead, Hughes thought that supplies were coming in much too
slow. Furthermore the supply lines were being run by the Engineer Corps, not the SOS.\m

Though the number of troops coming over Omaha had vastly exceeded expectations, the

\m366 Diary, June 6, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
367 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, June 14, 1944, letter, box 16, ESHP; Diary, June 13, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
368 Memorandum, June 14, 1944, box 5, ESHP.
tonnage of other supplies was hardly compatible. On the day of Hughes’ visit a little over half of the planned supplies were delivered to the Beach.\textsuperscript{369} The situation on Omaha was in fact slowly improving by the time Hughes and Lee arrived. It had taken more time to clear the German obstacles than it did on the other four less defended beaches. The Army had also insisted that ships be unloaded in order of priority as dictated by the Overlord plan, even if other ships arrived before their allotted time. Finally on June 10, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, Naval Commander in Chief of the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, ordered ships to be unloaded as they arrived.\textsuperscript{370}

Back safe in England the next morning Hughes received a call from Eisenhower to come to his headquarters at eleven-thirty that morning on personal business. Not sure whose personal business was on the agenda, Hughes spent the morning trying to discover if he had done anything wrong. Ushered into the Supreme Commanders office Hughes found Eisenhower’s son, John, who had just arrived in Europe after graduating from West Point. “Uncle Everett” John said, raising and throwing his arms around Hughes shoulder, “I certainly am glad to see you again.”\textsuperscript{371}

After chatting with John for a few minutes the Supreme Commander enquired about Hughes, who began giving his recommendations from his trip to Normandy. He believed that too much attention was being put on meeting the schedule dictated by the D-Day plan, and pointed out the only thing that mattered was building up forces faster than the Germans. Complacency on the part of the Engineer Corps running the supply

\textsuperscript{369} Ruppenthal, \textit{Logistical Support of the Armies}, 416, 420.
\textsuperscript{370} Christopher D. Yung, \textit{Gators of Neptune: Naval Amphibious Planning for the Normandy Invasion} (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 200-201.
\textsuperscript{371} Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, June 14, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.
lines was part of the problem, he believed, and “simply because supplies are being handled by barges and because of necessity for constructing roads, clearing beaches, clearing away demolitions and doing other work which is properly that of the Engineer Corps it is unwise to assume that the principal job is also one for the Engineer Corps.” Hughes also stated he did not think General Hoag, who commanded the Shore Battalion, was pushing his men hard enough. Bradley, argued Hughes, was not driving the supply people and seemed happy to rely on what Lee and other generals told him. After some more heated discussion that clearly made John uncomfortable, General Smith sent a cable to Bradley to speed up the unloading of supplies, and later called Hughes and relayed Eisenhower’s order for him to go back at once to France to take over supervising the landing of supplies.

Arriving at Bradley’s Headquarters in Normandy Hughes was happy to discover that Smith’s cable had produced excellent results. The First Army Commander had put pressure on his staff to start speeding up the unloading of the ships. However, there was no mention of Eisenhower’s orders for Hughes to take over the beach situation, thus shortening his visit.

The next day, however, convinced Hughes that much more could be done to speed the unloading of supplies and the problem lay with the Navy. The General was shuttled out to the U.S.S. Augusta and met with Admiral Alan Kirk, Senior U.S. Naval Commander for Overlord, and tactfully explained that the only way to “clear up all the Army alibis based upon Navy failures or alleged failures” was to do everything possible

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372 Memorandum, June 14, 1944, box I 5, ESHP.
373 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, June 14, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP; Diary, June 14, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
to land supplies faster. Though Kirk believed that some of the delays were caused by the slowness of request cables to cross the Channel, he did not think that he could do anything about it. He suggested Hughes ask Eisenhower to intervene with his boss, Admiral Ramsay. Hughes refused to involve Eisenhower and eventually convinced the Admiral to solve the problem himself. For Hughes, the incident boiled down to three problems. First commanders were often unwilling to direct problems to the attention of their superiors. Second the Army and Navy were unwilling to face the problems of working together. This was compounded, thirdly, by the British and American unwillingness to work together to find better solutions. Nevertheless, Hughes considered the trip a success. “My method of operating is to let the men who are on the job do the job and if I think they are not doing the job then I find some way of applying sufficient pressure to make them do it” he explained to Kate.

“Back to London,” Hughes wrote the next day, “to find that Hitler has made London more unsafe than France.” The cause of this exaggeration was the German assault of the V-1 pilotless aircraft. Hitler’s secret weapons were not unexpected for Hughes and the Allied High Command since “we have known so much for so long.” The V-1s also conjured images of future conflicts. “The next war should be a holiday,” Hughes wrote his wife, “We can sit in Kansas City and shoot at Moscow, London, Berlin or what not . . . . You better get started on a house to be built underground.” The V-1s

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374 Diary, June 15, and 16 1944, boxI 2, ESHP; Everett S. Hughes to Dwight D. Eisenhower, June 19, 1944, Memorandum, ESHP.
375 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, June 18, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.
376 Diary, June 16, and 16 1944, boxI 2, ESHP.
377 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, June 18, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.
378 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, July 12, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.
were far from being an effective military weapon, yet their sheer randomness and lack of an affective defense put the residence of London on edge. Some days after Hughes returned from France a V-1 landed close to where Patton and Hughes were having lunch, throwing great clouds of smoke into the sky, and encouraging the departure of the Third Army Commander who worried that he might be killed before returning to battle.379

A few days later an even greater problem emerged, which the Allies were even less well prepared to meet than the V-1 attacks. On June 18 the landing beaches were hit with the worst summer storm in almost fifty years. By noon the next day all unloading operations had been halted. When the storm finally abated on June 22, the Allied supply lines were in shambles. The American artificial harbor, code named Mulberry B, had been destroyed, along with approximately 800 craft of all types, which were either beached or destroyed. The Army estimated that the storm cost them 20,000 vehicles and vast tons of other stores.380 For Hughes the disaster was vindication, if any were needed, for his advocacy of speeding up the unloading of supplies. The Allied advance toward Cherbourg was slowed since now there was only a three day supply of ammunition in Normandy.381 Viewing the clogged harbors of Portsmouth with John S.D. Eisenhower, Hughes said with great emotion “See that! That’s what’s licking your Dad right now.”382 Yet, despite the devastation the Allied operations were not seriously curtailed because of the storm. This was partly due to the fact that Hughes had managed to get the unloading speeded up before the gale struck.

379 Diary, June 19, and 16 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
380 Yung, Gators of Neptune, 202-203.
381 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 303.
382 Eisenhower, Strictly Personal, 66.
On June 24 Hughes joined John, his father, and other Allied brass to board a destroyer headed for Omaha Beach. As they slipped out of the harbor their destroyer passed a long line of landing ship tanks (LST) returning from France, which John took as “visible evidence that traffic was moving” again after the storm.\textsuperscript{383} Omaha Beach gave the group the first evidence of the violence of the storm, and left Hughes impressed with how the operation was still continuing. “The storm had,” he wrote Kate, “its evil effects but nobody was downhearted and all were actively engaged in clearing up the debris and resorting to other solutions in order to keep the fighting forces fed and armed. I know now how the Egyptians constructed the pyramids. They just made up their minds to do it.”\textsuperscript{384}

The Supreme Commander’s party was met at the beach by Bradley, and after a day of inspections Hughes invited himself to stay at First Army Headquarters. The U.S. forces were advancing toward Cherbourg and the next day Bradley and Hughes drove within four miles of the embattled city. At that point, the two generals “decided that there was no particular object in trying to take the town with a .45 pistol so after listening to the fight for a while we turned around and went back to headquarters.” Neither he nor Bradley “felt that there was any particular necessity for getting killed while touring around doing things that were none of our business. Neither of us is overly valourant [sic], although I think that both of us would do what we had to do if that were our job.”\textsuperscript{385} The next day, Hughes was in Bradley’s command truck sheltering from the rain when a call came that the German commander of Cherbourg had been captured. Bradley turned

\textsuperscript{383} Eisenhower, \textit{Strictly Personal}, 69.  
\textsuperscript{384} Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, June 28, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.  
\textsuperscript{385} Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, June 28, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.
to Hughes and said “We’ve got the big boy up in Cherbourg, but he won’t surrender the rest of his troops.” Scowling Hughes wondered aloud if Bradley would ask the German to dinner. “Do you think I ought to have him in for dinner?” Bradley responded with an intense stare. “Hell, no” replied Hughes. The German commander, Bradley later discovered, was very hurt by the Americans lack of chivalry.\textsuperscript{386} Despite his visit with the First Army, Hughes was worried about the slow progress in Normandy. On his return to England he mentioned this to Eisenhower who growled, that “sometimes I wish I had George Patton over there.”\textsuperscript{387}

Patton was preparing to depart for Normandy and full of plans to improve the situation. Hughes visited before the Third Army Commander left, and was lectured on how the current situation resembled the German Schlieffen Plan during World War I. Patton had written his thoughts down in a paper for Eisenhower, which Hughes promised to pass along to the Supreme Commander. If that plan did not work, Patton mused, “the same thing could be affected [sic] by placing one or two armored divisions abreast and going straight down the road, covering the lead elements with air bursts.”\textsuperscript{388} Bradley’s Operation Cobra, a few weeks later, would not be far from Patton’s suggestion. Despite Patton’s lobbying, Hughes was still concerned about his friend’s mouth. “He has learned to keep quiet in several languages,” Hughes told his wife, “I only hope that the enforced silence has not gotten him into bad habits. I hope he will speak up on matters of tactics. He may not. People form habits and play safe.”\textsuperscript{389} This was a telling observation.

\textsuperscript{386} Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 313.
\textsuperscript{387} Diary, June 27, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{388} Diary, July 2, 1944, box 3, GSPP.
\textsuperscript{389} Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, July 3, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
coming battles of Brittany and the Falaise Pocket, Patton would meekly accept orders from Bradley and Eisenhower with which he disagreed. A number of his biographers have agreed with Hughes that Patton’s silence was caused by the slapping incident and probably lengthen the war by letting the Germans escape. That, combined with his unfortunate remarks before D-Day, made him unwilling to object too strongly when vigorous advances would have proven beneficial. Yet this recalcitrance, in Patton’s case, was not habit forming.

Hughes also had ideas for improving the Normandy situation, though they dealt more with command structure and supply responsibilities than with matters on the battlefield. Originally he had worried about creating a Communication Zone to deal with supplies and rear area problems before the beachhead was large enough. However, this did not stop Lee who relocated to France even before the Communication Zone was established. Changing his mind by July 4, Hughes recommended to Eisenhower that a Communication Zone be established though he also stated that some way should be organized to keep unneeded organizations and officers out of Normandy. Eisenhower asked the opinion of Bradley, who disliked Lee and did not want to share a small beachhead with him. When Hughes brought the subject up again in a July 7 meeting with the Supreme Commander, arguing that the SOS personnel in the beachhead “are under the control of an army commander and staff who are not trained to handle the big business now existing across the Channel.” Hughes realized that the planned territory had not yet been gained to activate the Communication Zone, yet “the functions are there and

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391 Diary, June 28, 1944, box 2, ESHP; Crosswell, Beetle, 653.
the work has reached a tremendous volume.” He also argued that Eisenhower should make Bradley the commander of the First U.S. Army Group and activate another U.S. Army, i.e. Patton’s Third Army. Eisenhower said Bradley was still opposed to the Communication Zone, but had stated, “I would have turned … it over long ago if Everett Hughes had been in command of CZ.” Eisenhower concluded, that “I know it should be done, but I won’t issue an order as it would hurt Brad’s feelings.” However, he ordered Hughes back to France to work out the problem.

The next day Hughes arrived at First Army Headquarters by courier plane. After spending the night at Patton’s still inactive Third Army, Hughes finally tracked Bradley down and got him to agree to the Communication Zone. Hughes returned happily to England only to find that Bradley had changed his mind. “I went over on a special mission for Ike,” Hughes explained to his wife, “and returned smiling and happy thinking that I had performed a job which Ike himself had failed to do the last time that he was over there. Yesterday afternoon I went out to report my success and was greeted with a statement that the understanding had fallen down.” Eisenhower had no details on why the agreement had not worked except that Bradley and Lee had found something to disagree with in the plan. However, a few days later Bradley and Hughes’ original agreement was finally accepted by all concerned.

During his trip to Normandy Hughes inspected Cherbourg which had been finally liberated by the Allies. As the first port to fall into Allied hands, the city was vital for

392 Diary, July 7, 1944, box 1, ESHP; Everett S. Hughes to Dwight D. Eisenhower, July 4, 1944, Memorandum, ESHP; Everett S. Hughes to Dwight D. Eisenhower, July 7, 1944, Memorandum, ESHP.
393 Diary, July 8, 1944, box 3, GSPP.
394 Diary, July 14, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
future operations. However, the Germans had left the city and dock facilities mostly destroyed.\textsuperscript{395} On his way into inspect the damage Hughes was enraged to see U.S. troops raking leaves and branches off the road. Comparing the sight to a New Deal W.P.A. project, the General believed that the soldiers would have been better employed repairing the port and complained vigorously to the First Army Commander.\textsuperscript{396} On returning, Hughes informed Eisenhower that if the port of Cherbourg was not cleared up quickly he risked further supply delays. Hughes did not believe supplying the armies through the beaches could survive another storm.\textsuperscript{397} In this case his lobbying paid off. “I raised so much hell about the port that I have not been popular with a lot of people,” Hughes wrote Kate, “Just the same the hell raising was successful, for Ike backed me up.” For months after its liberation, however, the Allies would continue to bring in much more supplies over the D-Day beaches than at Cherbourg.\textsuperscript{398}

Meanwhile, in the middle of July Kate began filling her letters with reports of Kay Summersby’s visit to the United States. Since the death of her fiancé Richard Arnold in 1943, Hughes’ diary references to Kay were fairly generic, with no evidence of any impropriety between her and Eisenhower. However, Hughes was most eager to read Kate’s description of the event. Kay, herself, gave two different versions of her reception by Mamie. The first was in 1948 where she claimed to be well received by Mamie, who’s “cordiality helped me to meet the wives of various friends around headquarters … In the beginning, I felt strange … But their natural friendliness soon thawed my embarrassment.

\textsuperscript{396} Diary, July 9, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{397} Diary, July 9 and 11, 1944, box 2, ESHP; Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, July 12, 1944, letter, box 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{398} Beevor, \textit{D-Day}, 217n.
Moreover, we had mutual interests, mutual friends: their husbands.” Yet Kay’s second book, *Past Forgetting*, gave a different version of the meeting: “It was not much fun. I felt very stiff and foreign and military among these women in their fluttery light dresses….certainly no other woman was being scrutinized as sharply as I was.”

Hughes’ diary and papers support both versions of Summersby’s reception. Kate wrote her husband that she did not think Kay was enjoying herself. Yet when Kay returned and Hughes greeted her with questions about Kate, whom she had met, probably at the meeting at Mamie’s, he heard a different story. “She seems to have had a good time and is most enthusiastic over you,” Hughes wrote to Kate, “She is really sorry that she did not have the chance to dine with you.” Most likely both versions of the story contain truth. The many rumors surrounding Eisenhower and his driver could not have made the experience very pleasant for either woman. Butcher and Hughes, both interested spectators, doubted whether the whole trip “was such a good idea.” When Eisenhower had visited Washington in January, 1944, the trip had been marred by Mamie’s fury when her husband mistakenly called her Kay. Nevertheless, both women were reasonably cordial in an awkward situation. Yet if Hughes still believed that Kay and Eisenhower were lovers he did not say so, despite his eagerness for news. As he reminded Kate, “Don’t write too much. We still have censors.”

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400 Morgan, *Past Forgetting*, 229.  
401 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, July 14, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.  
402 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, July 19, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.  
403 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, July 14, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.  
405 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, July 14, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.
At the end of July, Bradley launched Operation Cobra which knocked a hole in the German lines. Patton’s Third Army became operational and began what was to be a stunning advance through France to the German border. As historian Russell F. Weigley notes, “COBRA had achieved the breakout, and the most mobile army in the world for the first time since D-Day could capitalize on its mobility, the issues confronting the army became for the first time in Europe strategic rather than tactical. The soldier’s battle of Normandy was about to become the generals’ battle of France.”

Reflecting on Patton’s advance, Hughes felt, “that I have done more than any one [sic] except Stalin to win this war….I have kept Geo Patton in this war. I have fought him and the powers that be, I have kept up his morale, and that of his staff. I have succeeded in getting into this war the only American field commander who knows that the job is to kill Germans, and kill them fast.” Yet much of this story, he wrote Kate, “must await my first evening with you.”

That evening was not far off. On August 7 Hughes wrote again to Kate that “God willing, fly bombs and weather permitting, I’ll be home about the end of this week.” Six days later he arrived on a hot and moist Sunday, and at once reported to the Adjutant General’s office in the newly constructed Pentagon. It was not until then he was able to meet Kate. “Burst into tears when I saw Kate,” Hughes wrote in his diary, “She looked like Hell.” The war had not been easy on Kate, and the other military wives. Missing Everett and worrying about his safety had taken a toll on Kate’s health. She had spent a

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407 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, August 2, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
408 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, August 7, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
409 Diary, August 13, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
lot of time in the hospital suffering from a host of maladies. Hughes wrote often, but letters habitually took weeks to arrive.

Hughes’ service as Eisenhower’s “eyes and ears” in the months leading up to D-Day more than repaid the Supreme Commander’s confidence in him. In his inspection trips around England and Normandy, Hughes had made suggestions and observations which vastly helped the Allied war effort. These ranged from making sure soldiers moving to their transports were fed to pressing Eisenhower on the importance of quickly liberating and rebuilding Cherbourg’s ports. His lobbying to increase the supplies being brought over the beach helped speed up deliveries which became extremely important when the summer storm cut the supply lines to England. Likewise, his advocacy of establishing a Communication Zone to handle the rear of the American armies further alleviated supply difficulties. Despite Bradley and Lee’s bickering, it was Hughes’ agreement that was finally accepted. Undoubtedly his greatest accomplishment during the planning for Overlord was Hughes help in keeping Patton in command of his Army. Without his intervention Eisenhower would have sent Patton home, and the Allies would have been deprived of the stunning advances the Third Army made at the end of August.
Hughes returned to France on September 3, 1944, after a two-week stay in the United States. The visit had been pleasantly divided between meetings at the War Department and time spent with Kate. By the time he returned to Europe most of France had been liberated, yet the war was far from over. Hughes found a muddy headquarters, Eisenhower limping from a small plane accident, and General Lee, to everyone’s annoyance, having orchestrated the takeover of Paris for the Service of Supply. Hughes requested to be assigned to Paris to which Eisenhower quickly agreed. He traveled to the French capital the next day and was soon luxuriously ensconced in the King George V Hotel. For the remaining nine months of the war Hughes continued to advise Eisenhower and perform other important duties for the Supreme Commander.

By September, what has been called the “great supply crisis” had struck the advancing Allied armies. As historian Stephen Ambrose notes the “crisis was inevitable. It had been foreseen. It could not have been avoided.” This is somewhat of an overstatement. If Cherbourg had been captured intact and the advance had been slower, the Allies could have had time to build up their supply bases. Nevertheless, the supply problems were enormous. The minimum amount of supplies at the front for maintenance was 13,000 tons a day, added to supplies needed in the forward operating area which numbered between 150,000 to 180,000 tons. By mid September only 11,000 tons of supplies were reaching the battle zone, while only 7,000 tons of this was going to support the two American Armies. To maintain one U.S. division alone required 840 tons of

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410 Diary, September 4, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
411 Diary, September 5 and 6, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
412 Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 112-113.
supplies per day, all of which had to be carried from the beachhead in Normandy across France.\textsuperscript{413} Transportation of this equipment was the responsibility of the U.S. Communication Zone (CZ). By the beginning of September the Allied armies were grinding to a halt with empty gas tanks in front of renewed German resistance entrenched in the Siegfried Line.\textsuperscript{414}

However, those who were supposed to relieve the supply crisis were adding to it. General Lee, acting against Eisenhower’s wishes not to locate a major headquarters near a large city, moved into the best hotels in Paris with 29,000 SOS personnel. This not only wasted time as the crisis in supplies was building, but also used scarce resources maintaining the SOS headquarters. A month before the war ended there were 160,000 SOS soldiers based in Paris. An angry Eisenhower sharply criticized Lee and ordered him to get most of his SOS people out of Paris. Yet the deed was done, and the Supreme Commander did not wish to waste more time and gas and rescinded his order.\textsuperscript{415}

Hughes had a number of suggestions to improve the supply situation. The first was to advertise the exploits of the SOS and the Army’s truck organization, known as the Red Ball express.\textsuperscript{416} Next he suggested that worthy SOS soldiers be decorated on the spot like the combat troops.\textsuperscript{417} Eisenhower quickly acted on this recommendation and

\textsuperscript{413} Ruppenthal, \textit{Logistical Support of the Armies}, vol. II, 169, 173.
\textsuperscript{414} Ambrose, \textit{Citizen Soldiers}, 112.
\textsuperscript{415} Ambrose, \textit{Citizen Soldiers}, 338; Kay Summersby Diary, September 16, 1944, box 140, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, DDEL.
\textsuperscript{416} Diary, September 6, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
\textsuperscript{417} Diary, September 10, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
decorated a number of black SOS drivers. Hughes hoped that *Stars and Stripes* “gets the idea across that Ike is recognizing rear area efficiency.”

Accompanied by Mrs. Prismall, Hughes journeyed to see Patton on September 12. The General arrived to find the Third Army in the middle of struggling with the supply crisis. Patton had just returned from trying to persuade Bradley to keep his advance moving by giving him more fuel. Hughes had brought gifts for his host and presented Patton with a new pearl handled pistol, liquor, cigars, and a heavy coat. The two generals visited the XII and XV Corps and then forded the Moselle River, which the Third Army had just crossed, to watch the 35th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions battle the Germans. That morning the Germans had launched a harsh counterattack against the 80th Division, which had been forced back to the bridge. However, the U.S. 4th Armored Division had than appeared and drove the Germans off. Hughes noted that Patton “seems dissatisfied no matter how hard his commanders seem to be pushing. Maybe it works.” In any case, Patton was far from being in a good mood since the First Army had just managed to get through the Siegfried Line before him. “Geo jealous” Hughes noted. Patton was also upset with Eisenhower who had approved Field Marshal Montgomery’s drive to cross the Rhine River by liberating Holland, code named Operation Market Garden, instead of supporting the Third Army’s drive into southern Germany.

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418 Diary, September 22, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
419 Diary, September 12, 1944, box 3, GSPP.
420 Diary, September 12, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
421 Diary, September 13, 1944, Box 2, Hobart R. Gay Papers, MHI.
422 Diary, September 13, 1944, box 3, GSPP.
423 Diary, September 13, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
On September 16, Hughes flew to SHAEF and reported his observations to Eisenhower. He found the Supreme Commander busy and still walking with a limp, but nevertheless cheerful. Operation Market Garden was scheduled for the next day and many believed it would be the last push for the Allies to end the war. The German armies were still seen as being too disorganized to mount much resistance. Hughes suggested that the railroads should be operated closer to the front so as to relieve supply problems. Currently, Hughes observed, there was no build up of supplies behind the front, and the armies were surviving hand to mouth on whatever supplies they could obtain. Another suggestion Hughes made was to utilize German prisoners near the front to work on unloading supplies, thus also easing the problems of feeding them. Though there is no record that Hughes told Eisenhower of the stiff German resistance the Third Army met at the Moselle, his recent experience with Patton did not support the notion that Germany was nearing collapse. The discussion of supplies continued over lunch, where the two generals were joined by Admiral Harold Stark and Admiral Bertram Ramsey. However, the conversation quickly degenerated into a debate between the admirals of how captured German ports would be controlled. This did nothing to impress Hughes who recorded that Eisenhower had to explain “three times to Stark (dumbest admiral I know except Kirk) that each port was to be controlled by one nation.”

Ports, and the supplies they admitted in, were an abiding point of interest for Hughes and the rest of the Allied leadership. Though there were a number of ports in the Allied advance, such as Calais and Dunkirk, these had limited facilities compared to

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supply needs. Antwerp however, offered a solution. The Port was large—historian Russell Weigley compared it in size to New York City—and could unload vast numbers of ocean going craft. Antwerp also was connected to rail and waterways that extended through Belgium and France. Hughes wrote Kate on September 23 that the Allies needed Antwerp “more than we need FDR.” Though this conclusion was as evident to the Germans as to Hughes, Montgomery’s forces liberated Antwerp with the port facilities intact on September 4.

Unfortunately, Antwerp is an inland port separated from the English Channel by the ninety-kilometer Scheldt Estuary, whose banks the British had neglected to clear. Montgomery’s Operation Market Garden distracted Eisenhower and Allied forces from clearing the Estuary of German troops thus making the Port useless. Eisenhower, Hughes recorded, “wants Antwerp but has to depend on Monty” Hughes suggested that Montgomery be offered a promotion for clearing the Estuary. “To what?” snapped Eisenhower, and then recalled that King George VI of Great Britain had told Eisenhower in North Africa that “he was delighted to discover that Monty wasn’t after his job.” It was not until October 2 that the Canadian First Army began trying to clear the approach to the port only to meet entrenched German resistance. Montgomery, however, did not give the operation his full attention until October 16, and Allied ships did not begin unloading at Antwerp until November 28.

425 Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 260.
426 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, September 23, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.
427 Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 277.
428 Diary, September 22, 1944, boxI 2, ESHP.
429 Diary, September 22, 1944, boxI 2, ESHP; Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 351 and 354.
In a meeting with Eisenhower on September 30, Hughes brought more evidence, if any were needed, of the deteriorating supply situation. Added to the lack of ports and the long supply lines was the new trouble of trucks beginning to wear out. Yet Lee was still fretting over small things such as what type of uniform SOS men should wear in Paris. “Gens Lee and Hughes don’t get on” Kay Summersby noted in her diary. Lee undoubtedly was even less inclined to “get on” when he heard that Hughes was advocating removing the control of trucks and supply trains from the SOS and giving them to Bradley to control the transportation of material. Hughes made his case to Eisenhower who vetoed the suggestions.

Despite their disagreements Hughes and Lee set out on an inspection trip together on October 3. Lee was on a schedule which, to Hughes irritation, only allotted thirty minutes for the inspection of the First U.S. Army. However, Lee made the mistake at the end of the short inspection of asking Hughes if he had any questions for the First Army Commander, Courtney Hodges. Seeing the opportunity to start a fight and destroy the inspection schedule, Hughes attempted to get Hodges to demand more transportation. Hodges, however, was passive on the topic leaving Hughes to note disgustedly that “We don’t command, we collaborate and cooperate and compromise.”

The next stop on Lee’s now-destroyed itinerary was the Advance Section, Communications Zone (ADSEC). After inspecting supply depots, hospitals, and railheads, the day ended with each section giving a briefing. Hughes, who was coming

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430 Kay Summersby Diary, September 30, 1944, box 140, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principal File, DDEL; Diary, September 29, 1944, box 2, ESHP
431 Diary, September 27, 29, and 30, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
432 Diary, October 3, 1944, box 2, ESHP; Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, October 6, 1944, letter, boxll 3, ESHP.
down with a cold and had been standing with Lee in the rain for hours, was by this time in a bad mood, which was only increased when the Assistant Chief of Staff for supplies implied during the briefing that the service sections belonged to him personally.

Grumpily, Hughes stood up and said that the service sections answered to the commanding general and not his staff. Falling back on his favorite gripe, Hughes pointed out that with limited transportation he “hated to see men in the rear who thought they knew more about what the man at the front needed than the man at the front did.” Lee jumped up and tried to laugh off Hughes’ remarks by joking that the General was an old Leavenworth instructor who was not acquainted with the Army Service Force’s new methods. Hughes was not amused.

Hughes spent most of the rest of October in bed with a cold, fever, and somber reflections of the state of the world. One of his legs had also begun to give him trouble. “The war is passing me by” he wrote angrily, “just because I didn’t have sense enough to know that the high boots were hurting me seriously in June.” Meanwhile, Market Garden had been a disaster and the Allied armies had been slowed all along the front. Likewise the political situation seemed to be growing ever darker. “I wonder why we are here and what we are going to do” Hughes mused to Kate. He predicted a protracted guerrilla war if the Allies ever got into Germany. He also believed the Allies were making a mistake in allotting sphere of influence and governing through a United Nations Control Council. “I

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433 Diary, October 3, 1944, boxI 2, ESHP; Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, October 6, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.
went all through that in [North Africa],” Hughes wrote his wife, “It didn’t work, and
won’t. No nation will willingly admit another is stronger.”

Because of his extended stay in the hospital Hughes next meeting with
Eisenhower did not occur until October 30. He found the Supreme Commander disgusted
at Lee and his subordinates. In an attempt to increase the amount of supplies coming in
through Cherbourg, Eisenhower had just appointed General Lucius Clay as the city’s
commander without asking Lee. Hughes wondered to his diary why Eisenhower did not
simply fire Lee if he did not have faith in the General’s ability to appoint his
subordinates. The two old friends had a much longer and more social visit the next
Saturday. Eisenhower showed Hughes the first chapter of a book he was writing and
discussed his plans for when the war was over. “He has a lot of ideas mostly cockeyed”
Hughes told Kate, “I’ll tell you if they come true.” Thus Hughes did not leave any
records of what Eisenhower’s plans were except by ending his letter to Kate suggesting
retiring after the war to “go fishing with Ike.”

The next day Hughes left for Lorraine and the Third Army’s Headquarters. He
found Patton in a state of tension so great that he was, for once, not saying anything. The
Third Army’s stunning advance across France had ended in September in front of the
fortress city of Metz. The most formidable of the numerous strong points throughout the
city was Fort Driant which had resisted, to Patton’s fury, every attempt by the Third
Army to storm it. The Fortress was built to house a garrison of 2,000 soldiers and covered

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434 Diary, October 6, 13, and 18, 1944, box I 2, ESHP; Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, October 6,
1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
435 Diary, October 30, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
436 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, November 3, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
355 areas of concrete, machine gun nests and heavy artillery. Added to this, most of Driant was underground.\(^{437}\) No other obstacle, constructed by man or god, ever slowed Patton’s advance as Fort Driant did.

Hughes had arrived on the eve of the attack that would blast Driant out of Third Army’s way to the Rhine. Patton told Hughes he planned to cover the 132 miles to the Rhine in ten days. Yet, as had been the case throughout the fall of 1944, heavy rain was blanketing the front creating a sea of mud. Patton was nervous, but decided the attack would go forward regardless of the weather. After talking with a number of his commanders Hughes found that not all of them shared their leader’s determination.\(^ {438}\)

Patton woke at 3 A.M. on November 8, the morning of the attack, to hear rain pouring down outside his headquarters. Too nervous to sleep he read Erwin Rommel’s *Infantry Attacks*, felt better, and drifted off to sleep again. Hughes was not awakened until a few hours later by the opening artillery salvo.\(^ {439}\) The rain had gone, temporarily, and the skies were clear. The offensive began well but was slowed a few days later by poor weather and German opposition. Nevertheless, by November 19 the Third Army had surrounded Metz, but the large cache of prisoners and the break through to the Rhine Patton had lusted for was still elusive. Driant did not fall until December 6.\(^ {440}\) Hughes however, had returned to Paris on November 8.\(^ {441}\)

\(^{437}\) Ambrose, *Citizen Soldiers*, 136; Diary, November 5, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
\(^{438}\) Diary, November 7, 1944, box 2, ESHP; Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, November 9, 1944, letter, box 3, ESHP.
\(^{439}\) Diary, November 8, 1944, box 3, GSPP; Diary, November 8, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
\(^{441}\) Diary, November 8, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
Leaving the front Hughes traveled back to the French capital where another, more personal, confrontation awaited him. In an attempt to improve the Communication Zone Eisenhower had sent for his West Point classmate, Major General Henry Aurand, to be the assistant to the ordnance section commander, Major General Henry B. Sayler. Aurand had been stateside for much of the war and had performed well, and did not mind telling people about it.\footnote{Crosswell, \textit{Beetle}, 757.} At their first meeting in Europe, Aurand entertained Hughes with the gossip that Eisenhower had been forced to take Walter Beetle Smith as his Chief of Staff.\footnote{Diary, October 31, 1944, box 2, ESHP.} Hughes, who probably would have loved the story to be true, soon found that it was not, which did not increase his respect for Aurand.\footnote{Diary, November 4, 1944, box 2, ESHP.} Though Aurand had served under Hughes years before, the older general quickly became irritated with the new arrival. “Dinner with Aurand, Maxey, Sayler, who with me spent the evening listening to words of wisdom from Maxey and Aurand,” Hughes angrily scribbled in his diary, “They told of things so lofty that Sayler and I were not supposed to understand—nor did we.”\footnote{Diary, November 12, 1944, box 2, ESHP.}

Neither Aurand nor Maxey had been in Europe long, but went on at length criticizing the command structure and among others General Smith, who “loved power” but was not a logistician, “He hates them.”\footnote{Crosswell, \textit{Beetle}, 762.} Aurand “started finding a lot of things wrong” Hughes told Kate,

He asked Maxey to ask Handy to get him home. Then he announced that the moguls here had discovered that while many combat commanders had been relieved no service man had lost his head. So the moguls had made up their minds to do something about it. They had made up a slate of men to be relieved headed
Hughes had had enough of the troubling new expert and decided to help Aurand get home via Beetle Smith.

Apart from the shot gun investigation, Smith and Hughes had more or less remained at peace with each other. Since Hughes only had the power to report and persuade he was not a direct threat to Smith’s power. Yet this did not make Smith like Hughes anymore than he liked Aurand, which was very little. On November 19, a week after Aurand’s chat on personnel assignments, Hughes met with Smith and suggested Aurand be sent home for his comments about Sayler and Littlejohn. Hughes then treated an unknowing Aurand and Mrs. Prismall to champagne. An angry Smith however, saw a chance to make trouble for both officers.

Two days later Aurand, who was busily working on an ammunition report for Smith, was suddenly summoned to the Chief of Staff’s office. Smith told Aurand that he was to be reduced to Colonel and sent home, a remarkable statement for someone who had no power to issue such an order. He then handed the stunned Aurand Hughes’ memo suggesting his relief. Knowing that with Aurand in the War Department it might be a bad idea to be too hard on him, Smith suddenly relented, and said he thought that a position might be found in SHAEF so Aurand could remain in Europe. Aurand went to visit his old boss, Hughes. “A[urand] told me that what I said was true and that what I did was right,” Hughes wrote Kate, “(doesn’t mean a thing).”

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447 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, November 21, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.
448 Diary, November 19, 1944, boxI 2, ESHP.
449 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, November 21, 1944, letter, boxII 3, ESHP.
Historian D.K.R. Crosswell concludes from this incident that Hughes and Smith collaborated to protect Eisenhower and other generals from Aurand’s criticism of the command structure. However, Hughes was probably more motivated by dislike and annoyance at the new arrival, than in defense of the command structure which he knew had problems. Nor, in his long career, had Hughes ever been one to engage in a cover-up when he thought a solution could be found. “Poor Henry,” Hughes wrote his wife, “How did a man who causes as much trouble as A[urand] ever get to be a commander.” Smith’s motivations may well have been more complicated as well. The Chief of Staff was engaged in trying to clean up the supply situation and was lobbying for General Lee’s dismissal. Hughes believed that “Beetle had probably a slate of one name (Henry [Aurand] probably added the other two) Sayler and was sore at A for squealing and may be [sic] it was all Henry A’s idea.” A few weeks later Hughes heard that Smith wanted to be an Inspector General at SHAEF. “I suppose B. wants me to report to him instead of Ike,” Hughes noted in his diary, “He has always wanted that.” At any rate Hughes concluded, “I’ll not get anything but knife from A now.” Contrary to Hughes’ expectation, his relationship with Aurand, who remained in Europe, improved markedly.

Around this time Hughes began to make headway at SHAEF with his ideas of reducing the rations of German prisoners of war. On November 4 Hughes had raised the

450 Crosswell, Beetle, 764.
451 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, November 21, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
452 Diary, November 21, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
453 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, November 21, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
454 Diary, December 6, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
455 Diary, November 20, 1944, box 2, ESHP.
456 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, December 9, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
issue with Eisenhower and suggested that he not issue any orders on the subject. A few weeks later he told Lee that he should not put his thoughts of POW rations on paper.\textsuperscript{457} Hughes’ idea was not to starve German prisoners. Yet he did not see why POWs should be fed better than what U.S. troops could obtain at the front. The French were complaining that their interned former masters were given food they could not obtain. Hughes was frustrated with Lee’s indifference on the subject yet finally got Littlejohn—the Chief Quartermaster for the ETO, and the one responsible for feeding POWs—to talk about the problem. On December 1, Hughes told Littlejohn that the POWs should be fed less than what was given to the French population, and the Allies should also avoid issuing food not available in their country. Littlejohn seemed receptive and Hughes left with the feeling that he was making progress on the issue.\textsuperscript{458}

In a December 4 meeting with Eisenhower, Hughes brought up the issue of POW rations but did not record Eisenhower’s response. On November 6 the Supreme Commander had sent out a memorandum, against Hughes advice, concerning living conditions of frontline soldiers. In it Eisenhower had listed complaints of enlisted men including one that said “Prisoners of war receive better food than anyone else.”\textsuperscript{459} Yet Eisenhower’s subsequent recommendations made no reference to POWs. Eisenhower apparently took no action. After inspecting a POW camp ten days later Hughes recorded angrily to his diary

\textsuperscript{457} Diary, November 4 and 24, 1944, box 2, ESHP.  
\textsuperscript{458} Diary, November 29, December 1, 1944, box 2, ESHP.  
\textsuperscript{459} Dwight D. Eisenhower to General Bradley et al, November 6, 1944, memorandum, diary notes 1942-1956, box 2, ESHP.
Prisoners … get 5 packs of cigarettes per week. [Enlisted men] same. Paris get 2. Replacements 7, 4000 men not working. POW still getting good chow as per 1 Nov memo—Dec memo not received.460

It is also clear that, despite Hughes best efforts, German POWs remained well fed. A month later, Hughes was being driven back to Paris by Patton’s Aide-de-camp, Colonel Charles R. Codman, when they passed a POW camp. “I ought to turn in a report on something” Hughes said after asking Codman to stop to inspect the camp. The general added that it was “lunchtime, and it has been my experience that if you are looking for a good meal, the best bet the Army has to offer is a P.O.W. camp. That is all they do, eat, and eat well.” The two officers were greeted by the camp commandant, “a plump lieutenant colonel,” and promptly invited to lunch. As Hughes had predicted the meal was excellent, and Codman noted that the general had two helpings of everything. Both officers also noted that the German prison waiters were anything but going hungry.

Hughes asked the Commandant if the POWs got enough to eat, to which the Colonel replied proudly that, the prisoners “fare is exactly the same as ours right here.” After a tour of the camp, which included the prisoner’s well stocked larder, Hughes and Codman ended up in the Commandant’s office. Hughes asked if the Commandant “happened to have handy a copy of the rules of the Geneva Convention governing the feeding of prisoners of war?” The suddenly apprehensive commandant produced the Convention and Hughes asked him to read aloud section eight, six A. Codman described what happened next:

With the reading of the second or third paragraph the natural pink of the Colonel’s cheeks began to fade and with the fourth a sickly green infusion indicated the

460 Diary, November 29, December 14, 1944, box1 2, ESHP. The “Dec memo” has not been found and it probably was never issued.
dawn of full realization …. The precise, albeit generous, specifications laid down for the feeding of prisoners would have approximated perhaps a quarter, or at most a third, of their present gargantuan menus.

Hughes thanked the Commandant for lunch and told him to see to it that the “eleven paragraphs you have just been reading are put into effect—to the letter.”

Years later historian James Bacque would claim that Eisenhower had purposely starved thousands of German POWs and allege that Hughes was the one of his principle conspirators. “Hughes took an extraordinary interest in the rations of POWs,” Bacque charged, “which he was constantly reducing below the levels set by the subordinate supply officers who based their requisitions for supply on the Geneva Convention.”

Putting Bacque’s wider accusation aside he fundamentally misinterpreted Hughes’ opinion. On December 3, Eisenhower had informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the U.S. First, Third, and Ninth Armies alone had captured over 40,000 POWs. The Geneva Convention stipulated that prisoners be fed to the equivalent of their captors’ armed forces. If each POW camp gave the inmates three times that what U.S. combat troops received, as was happening in the camp Hughes visited with Codman, there was no way the Allies could continue to supply the rations. Hughes, ever the realist, understood this. He also knew that the number of people to feed would only rise when the Allies began handling more displaced persons. As victory neared, Hughes noted, “we take over more and more responsibility for feeding displaced persons ….”

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461 Charles R. Codman to Mrs. Codman, January 22, 1945, Drive, 243-245.
462 Bacque, Other Losses, 20.
463 Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, December 3, 1944, Cable S 69334, EP, 2328.
464 Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 359-360.
feed the displaced persons our reputation will suffer. If we feed them we may not beat the German [sic].” “This,” he added to Kate, “is somethimes [sic] called a dilemma.”

There was also a moral question. Why should German prisoners be fed better, by American tax dollars, than those U.S. soldiers who had captured them? Hughes was not a vindictive person, nor was he starving POWs or disregarding the Geneva Convention. The general was however, totally committed to seeing that the captives were not fed more than was legally required. It should also be noted that nowhere in Hughes’ diary does he mention Eisenhower agreeing with his policy. On March 21, 1945, Hughes visited with Littlejohn who said he was “under pressure from US & ETO because he has cut POW rations. I advised him to take it up with Ike without delay. Ike may not support him.”

Like so many other things in the general’s diary, this does not mean the Supreme Commander did not agree to cut the rations, only that Hughes does not provide evidence of it. Eventually Littlejohn solved the problem by cutting both U.S. troop and POW rations.

December 16 was a festive day at SHAEF. The occasion was the wedding of Eisenhower’s orderly, Mickey McKeogh, to a WAC driver named Pearlie Hargreaves. Hughes shivered with the other members of SHAEF in an ancient chapel and then warmed up with “[l]ots of Champagne” afterwards. For the Supreme Commander it was a day of triumph since word had just come that he had been awarded his fifth star. Hughes saw this as a reason to continue celebrating. As for the war all seemed to be going well, though it was clear that Eisenhower was going to lose his five pound bet with

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465 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, December 1, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
466 Diary, March 21, 1945, box I 2, ESHP.
467 Diary, April 23, 1945, box I 2, ESHP.
Montgomery that the war would be over by Christmas. Montgomery had written that day to remind Eisenhower of the wager to which the Supreme Commander replied that he would pay at Christmas since “he still has nine days.” Bradley arrived at the headquarters later that day. “Brad says Germans have started a big counter attack toward Hodges,” Hughes noted in his diary, “Very calm about it. Seemed routine from his lack of emphasis.”

The German offensive, what history has called the Battle of the Bulge, had begun early that morning in the wooded region known as the Ardennes. Hitler had managed to scrape together some 250,000 troops—some excellent in quality, most not—2,168 tanks and assault guns. Added to this was the 150th Panzer Brigade led by Major Otto Skorzeny and equipped for a special mission. Armed with twenty Sherman tanks and American uniforms the 150th was made up of 500 English speaking Germans. Their mission was to roam around the rear of the U.S. lines attempting to take the Meuse bridges and spreading confusion along their way.

Hughes’ participation in the biggest battle the U.S. Army has ever fought was almost nonexistent. He spent the first few days having a minor operation performed on his eye and suffering from a cold. At worst, the battle was an irritant, mostly because of the increased security. Rumors spread that there were Germans fighting in American uniforms with the mission of assassinating General Eisenhower. “Security so tight I can’t get into Geo V..” Hughes wrote angrily in his diary while being locked outside his billet.

468 Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 722; Diary, December 16, 1944, boxl 2, ESHP.
470 Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 189, and 218-219.
471 Diary, December 17, 18, and 19, 1944, boxl 2, ESHP.
“Had it out with Lord who agreed to put an officer there who knew us.”

The next day when an MP asked to see his pass Hughes refused and asked to see his commanding officer. When the officer appeared, Hughes asked to see his pass before showing his own under the logic that the MP was as likely to be a German as he. After that, the MPs stopped asking to see Hughes’ papers, at least temporarily.

For Hughes, 1944 ended on a pessimistic note. The year had not been without accomplishments which he listed in his diary as “succeeded in selling Patton to Ike, I persuaded Brad to turn over [Command Zone] to Lee, [t]old Ike he had too many complacent generals, kept the question of POW rations stirred up, followed replacements and reclassifications, etc.” Yet Hughes also worried about the future after the war. “Are we going to win the war and then lose the war,” he wondered, “What are we fighting for[?]”

He wrote Kate on New Year’s Eve that “I still think that the Russians are thinking more about the next war than about this one.”

On January 16 Hughes ran into General Bradley at Eisenhower’s office who suggested he visit Patton. Needing no further urging Hughes rushed lunch and boarded a plane heading for Luxembourg. He found the Third Army Commander in good form, and the two stayed up till 1:30 in the morning “discussing Brad, Ike, Courtney et al and as usual agreed on their IQs.” The next day the two generals inspected the front and visited the Third Army’s corps commanders.

472 Diary, December 21, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
473 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, December 22, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
474 Diary, December 31, 1944, memoranda pages, box I 2, ESHP.
475 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, December 31, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
476 Diary, January 16, 17, 1945, folder Diary notes 1942-1956, box I 2, ESHP; Diary, January 18, 1945, box 3, GSPP.
As he prepared to leave the Third Army Headquarters the following morning, Hughes received a call from General Ben Lear, the new Deputy Commander of the ETO, to come to his office as soon as possible, implying that Hughes was to be the new Chief of Staff for the ETO. As Hughes headed by car to Paris, Patton hoped that Hughes would be made the chief of staff, he “has had a very raw deal and is a very able officer. In my opinion he should have Lee’s job.” When Hughes walked into Lear’s office the next day however, he heard the unwelcome news that instead of reporting to Eisenhower he was now to answer to General Lear. Because the new Deputy Theater Commander was new to Europe, Eisenhower wanted Hughes to help Lear with his command, while also continuing as an inspector. Angrily, Hughes headed to Eisenhower’s office the next day to try and keep his old job. When the Supreme Commander said no, Hughes stated he did not want to serve under Lear and asked for another post. Eisenhower said that was impossible and added he wanted “his best man to help Lear.” “Hughes is a very difficult man to work with,” Kay Summersby wrote in her diary, Eisenhower “is leaving the office early this afternoon to try to get away from staff problems.”

Conceding defeat Hughes met Lear the next day for lunch and reminded his new superior that as Deputy Theater Commander his “word was law.” He suggested that when Lear sent out inspectors their main focus should be trying to get the responsible commanders to correct mistakes themselves. “The job must never deteriorate into one of attempting to correct something that has gone wrong,” Hughes argued, planning was

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477 Diary, January 18, 1945, box 3, GSPP.
478 Diary, January 20, 1945, folder Diary notes 1942-1956, box 2, ESHP; Diary, Kay Summersby, January 20, 1945, box 140, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52, Principal File, DDEP.
essential as well as having all SHAEF directives related to the mission. Finally, Hughes offered to act as Lear’s Administrative Officer since “I know the ropes.”

Lear however, believed Hughes was more valuable as a roving inspector and left him at his old job. As Hughes explained to Kate, “I am doing exactly what I have been doing except that I do not see Ike. I report to Lear who was told by Ike to let me continue as I was.” As for the other recommendations in his memorandum the Deputy Theater Commander agreed with Hughes. For his part Hughes was still apathetic about the change. “Lear’s job just a mop up,” Hughes scribbled in his diary, “To clean up after mistakes are made.” He also grumbled to his old friend, Major General Virgil Peterson, that Lear “has several youthful assistants who prowl around searching for errors without knowing the background and without knowing the organization. B. gets all excited when some man in the Communication Zone is cold. I suggested to him that he should go up to the front lines and find out how many men were dead that should not be.”

Likewise, the shift in command did nothing to improve Hughes’ opinion of Eisenhower, who, he confided to his diary, ‘is all too prone to accept loyal service and unwilling to say “thank you.”’

Unbeknownst to Hughes, Eisenhower still considered his job vital to the war effort and near the end of February fended off an attempt to replace his inspector. General

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479 Diary, January 21, 1945, Diary notes 1942-1956, box 2, ESHP; Everett S. Hughes to Ben Lear, January 22, 1945, memorandum, box 5, ESHP.
480 Ben Lear to Everett S. Hughes, January 25, 1945, letter, box 5, ESHP.
481 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, February 17, 1945, letter, box II 4, folder 12, ESHP.
482 Ben Lear to Everett S. Hughes, January 25, 1945, letter, box 5, ESHP.
483 Diary, January 23, 1945, Diary notes 1942-1956, box 2, ESHP.
484 Everett S. Hughes to Virgil L. Peterson, February 2, 1945, letter, box 5, ESHP.
485 Diary, March 3, 1945, box 2, ESHP.
Brehon B. Somervell, who a year before had criticized Hughes actions in North Africa to Marshall, wrote Eisenhower asking that Hughes be sent to London to replace Major General James K. Crain on the Munitions Board. The Supreme Commander’s response, however, was a short and emphatic no. “It would be embarrassing to me to lose him at this juncture,” Eisenhower replied to Somervell on February 25.486 Despite Hughes considerable annoyance about working with Lear, Eisenhower did not believe he could get along without his old friend.

It was around this time that the love life of Kay Summersby returned to the pages of Hughes’ diary after a lengthy absence. When Hughes had returned from his August visit in Washington he had lunch with Eisenhower, Kay, and others at SHAEF and noticed the Supreme Commander “Blinked at Kay when I discussed Mamie.”487 Later in November Kay told Hughes that she was almost a WAC but was waiting for Eisenhower to finish the paper work. Hughes wrote Kate that he saw George C. Marshall’s hand, and “I’ll bet Ovate, [Director of the WACs], is sore.”488 On March 3, 1945, he talked to Colonel Ernest “Tex” Lee, Eisenhower’s aide about the subject and agreed that Eisenhower “doesn’t sleep with Kay (Tex idea not mine). That there is nothing we can do about it.”489 Yet this statement is odd for a number of reasons. First, Tex was in much closer contact with Eisenhower than Hughes, who could go for weeks without seeing his boss. Second, the fact that Hughes felt the need to debate the relationship suggests that he had no direct knowledge on the subject.

487 Diary, September 4, 1944, box I 2, ESHP.
488 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, November 21, 1944, letter, box II 3, ESHP.
489 Diary, March 3, 1945, box I 2, ESHP.
By this point, the Allied armies had forced back the “bulge” created by the German winter offensive and were penetrating the Siegfried Line. On March 14 Hughes noted in his diary that “All bridges across Rhine down except at Remagan. How do the Germans expect to be fed.” However, five days later he wrote again that First Army managed to capture the bridge at Remagan. Patton crossed the Rhine a few days later. Despite these gains Hughes was far from being in an ebullient mood. He did not believe the war in Europe would end soon, betting Lear that V-E day would be August 15. His health was also troubling him. When asked if he would accept the new job of orienting returning soldiers, which Smith had recommended him for, Hughes agreed. However, he knew the job would not start at once and felt depressed at the uncertainty of his future.

However, the end of the war was near. Berlin was being attacked by the Red Army, while Mrs. Prismall received word that her husband, captured by the Japanese, had been liberated. On April 28 Hughes left to visit Bradley’s Headquarters. He explained to Kate that the “end is so close that I want to be in on the finish as I was in at the landing, and the planning and all the rest.” That same day Hughes heard that the First Army had met Russian soldiers at the Elbe River. Hughes was introduced to his first Soviet general, commanding the XXVII Corps, at Wittenberg on May 2. The two generals traded pistols and got drunk on vodka.

490 Diary, March 14, 19, and 24, 1945, box 2, ESHP.
491 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, April 2, 1945, letter, box II 4, ESHP.
492 Diary, March 28, 1945, box 2, ESHP.
493 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, April 23, 1945, letter, box II 4, ESHP.
494 Everett S. Hughes to Kate Hughes, April 27, 1945, letter, box II 4, ESHP.
495 Diary, April 28, 1945, box 2, ESHP.
496 Diary, May 2, 1945, box 2, ESHP.
At breakfast on May 7 General Lee told Hughes that Germany had surrendered the night before, and though the fighting was to stop at once, the surrender had not yet been announced. Hughes had a prearranged appointment to see Eisenhower and drove by car to his headquarters at Reims. Kay ushered him into the Supreme Commander’s office at 11:15 A.M. and Eisenhower rose to shake hands. Hughes joked that the hand shake had been the only reason he had come down. Eisenhower was tired having been up all night signing the surrender documents and was now fielding questions from Winston Churchill about when the announcement of the surrender was to be made. The next day General Lear awarded Hughes the Bronze Star for his work as SHAEFs “eyes and ears.” “Glad somebody is doing something” said Mrs. Prismall. The citation read in part: “Major General Hughes demonstrated superior initiative in the planning, direction and coordination in matters relating to Communications Zone and...[his] distinguished work reflect great credit upon himself and the armed forces of the United States.” For Major General Everett S. Hughes, the war was over.

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497 Diary, May 5, 7, and 8, 1945, boxl 2, ESHP; Citation for the Bronze Star, boxl, 8, ESHP.
Conclusion

On June 13, 1969, Kate Hughes wrote her old friend Mamie Eisenhower near the time of the Eisenhowers wedding anniversary. Everett had been dead for twelve years, Dwight two months. Kate wrote that she had been recently thinking of the former First Lady.

Mostly I think I have been remembering – things and times that we have shared and that brought so much happiness …. You and Ike had such a wonderful life – everything wonderful that could come to you – love, happiness and glory. You have so much to remember. And I am glad that in our small way Everett and I could share those memories with you. 498

Both women would survive their husbands by many years. Mamie died on November 1, 1979. Kate would pass away almost exactly one year later. 499

After Germany’s surrendered Hughes had remained in Europe and been appointed the Inspector General for the ETO. 500 On June 1, 1946, Hughes moved back to the states and was made the Chief of the Ordnance Department. 501 He served in that position until 1949 when he retired after forty-five years in the Army. After retirement the General was made the Director of the Office of Energy and Utilities for the National Security Resources Board. Kate and Everett remained in Washington D.C. and supported Eisenhower in his run for the presidency. On Tuesday, September 5, 1957, the General passed away at Walter Reed Hospital and was interned at Arlington National Cemetery. A post-war letter to Hughes from Eisenhower was quoted in his Washington Post

499 “Kate Hughes, D.C. Resident Since ’30s, Member of DAR,” Washington Post, October 29, 1980.
500 Order, August 28, 1945, boxl 8, ESHP.
501 Order, June 1, 1946, boxl 8, ESHP.
obituary saying “I can never thank you enough for the load you took from my shoulders during those trying [war] years.”\textsuperscript{502}

That load, which constituted Hughes contribution to victory, had indeed been substantial. In 1942 Hughes had helped make the invasion of North Africa possible by working out many of the difficult supply problems. As the Deputy Theater Commander for the Mediterranean he untangled numerous supply and organizational problems throughout 1943. Perhaps the greatest of these was making the confusing command structure between the NATOUSA and AFHQ function. Hughes also used his influence to have Patton appointed to the command of II Corps and then, again, intervened to save his career after the slapping incidents. When he followed Eisenhower to England in 1944, Hughes’ influence with the Supreme Commander was all the power he had as SHAEF’s chief trouble shooter. This was enough to save Patton’s career again, and remove numerous small and large problems from the D-Day operations. These included working out the many troubles with the Communication Zone in France when Bradley and Lee did not want to cooperate.

These accomplishments point to Hughes being accorded a larger portion of the credit in the Allied victory than he has previously received from historians. If not for him it is almost certain Patton would have been sent home in disgrace, if not for the slapping incidents, then for his remarks before D-Day. This would have deprived the Allies of the Third Army’s dash across France and the swift counter-attack during the Battle of the Bulge. Likewise, by working on numerous smaller difficulties Hughes made sure that they did not become bigger problems. One of his most important projects was taking an

inventory of American supplies before the Torch landings and rushing an order to the states. Hughes was criticized for his methods by the War Department, but when the troops landed in North Africa they had enough supplies to achieve victory. His work to speed the arrival of supplies after D-Day enabled the American Army to continue fighting even after the supply lines were destroyed by the June Storm. Unfortunately many of Hughes’ accomplishments have been overshadowed by the few notes he made about Kay Summersby.

After the war Hughes reflected on Eisenhower’s relationship with Kay transcribing a few of his diary entries on the subject. Yet he left no record of his final conclusion. It is clear that at times during World War II Hughes fully believed Eisenhower was having an affair with Kay. Yet Hughes contradicts Kay’s later claims as much as the diary suggested the possibility of an inappropriate relationship. In North Africa when Kay claimed she was not yet interested in Eisenhower, Hughes believed otherwise. When Kay stated she desperately wanted to follow the Supreme Commander to England, Hughes wrote that Kay did not wish to leave North Africa. For all the attention his remarks about Kay got him, she appeared very infrequently in Hughes’ diary and most references were totally innocuous.

It has also been claimed that Hughes wanted to starve German POWs. This is, at best, an exaggeration. Hughes, ever concerned of supply problems, simply did not want them increased by the captured enemy. He did advocate a breach of the Geneva Convention yet if enacted, no German POWs would have been starved.

The typical comprehensive history of the Allied high command usually numbers approximately 900 pages. Because of space and time this paper has only examined a
select portion of Hughes’ experiences during the war. Many topics such as his role of rearming the French in North Africa or the reorganization of SHAEF near D-Day have been passed over. Of the topics covered, space has necessitated showing them in a manner which could be described as a mile long and an inch deep. Nevertheless, for the first time, this essay gives a detailed account of Hughes and his role in the war. So integrated was his activities and influences in Eisenhower’s Headquarters that Hughes can no longer be ignored by those seeking to understand how the U.S. Army operated in Europe during World War II.
Major General Everett S. Hughes, George S. Patton Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
Walter Bedell “Beetle” Smith, George S. Patton Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
Everett and Kate Hughes with Brigadier General Ray M. Hare, June 2, 1950. Courtesy National Archives, GR 319-AP, box 216.
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Appendix

An example of Hughes’ handwriting in his diary on a good day. It says,

“Tonight there is a party in Oran. I wonder if Jake gets his share (John
Bought underwear, shirts went to ___ and saw ___ who doesn’t want Rome job any
more than I do. And thinks that the British will oust any Americans who gets it[.]

On to 5th Army to see Al Gruenther who is optimistically hoping that bridgehead
will role.

Visited Ord. M.M. Lt says depot won’t take his surplus because it is also their
surplus.

Visited evac hospital and say the patients live on wounds. Now is the time to
sever.”