Reconciling the UN’s Mandate-Doctrine Gap:  
Towards a Global Peace and Security Partnership

by Kaitlin R. K. Kaskela

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Paul D. Williams 
Associate Professor of International Affairs
Dedication

The author wishes to dedicate this thesis to her father, James Dale Kitchen, who showed her how to take pride in her academic and professional pursuits, and to both of her parents for their never-ending love and support throughout her education.
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Abstract

Reconciling the UN’s Mandate-Doctrine Gap: Towards a Global Peace and Security Partnership

United Nations efforts to address some of the 21st century’s most complex, intrastate armed conflicts have led it to increasingly mandate operations that stretch the bounds of the peacekeeping principles outlined in its doctrinal guidance: consent of the main conflict parties, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defense and defense of the mission’s mandate. This has created a mandate-doctrine gap that challenges the ability of UN missions to deliver peace and risks the legitimacy of the UN as an institution. Moreover, the ambiguity over the UN’s role and purpose strains its relationship with its own member states and other actors who play a critical role in delivering peace.

This thesis develops a framework for thinking about UN operations that distinguishes between peacekeeping, stabilization, and peace enforcement operations. This provides greater clarity for identifying where the UN’s policies and guidance have failed than the vague concept of “robust peacekeeping.” It then proposes a division of labor among peace providers based on their respective doctrines, focusing on actors that conduct peace operations in Africa, specifically the UN, the African Union and other regional organizations, and "coalitions of the willing." Finally, it evaluates their performance in the case of Mali since 2012 to test the applicability of this theoretical framework in practice. The thesis concludes that the UN should focus on conducting traditional peacekeeping; regional organizations should engage in sustained capacity building efforts to enable them to perform stabilization missions, and coalitions of the willing should be the primary actor performing peace enforcement.
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<tr>
<td>AAD</td>
<td>Ansar al-Dine</td>
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<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission to Mali</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Stand-by Force</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CDSP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>EU Training Mission</td>
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<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade</td>
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<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUJAO</td>
<td>Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization for African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>RM</td>
<td>Regional Mechanism</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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Introduction

United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved dramatically over the last 70 years, particularly because the UN Security Council increasingly seeks to address intrastate over interstate armed conflict, and in response to “lessons learned” from successful and unsuccessful peacekeeping ventures.  

The UN’s fundamental peacekeeping principles – consent, neutrality, and use of force only in self-defense – were developed to guide traditional peacekeeping, where peacekeepers typically deployed to areas of interstate conflict “to monitor borders and establish buffer zones after the agreement of ceasefires.”  

Critically, peacekeepers only deployed after a peace agreement had been reached; in this context, the UN’s peacekeeping principles reinforce one another, protect the peacekeepers, and enhance an operation’s chances for success.

Over the last 30 years, however, the UN has stretched its peacekeeping principles as it conducts more statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts needed to address intrastate conflict. This has resulted in the rise of ‘robust peacekeeping’ that is “multilateral, multidimensional, and multinational/multicultural.” UN missions deployed to areas with a fragile peace as governments and societies seek to rebuild after conflict are now guided by a concept of consent that is rarely achieved in intrastate conflicts, impartiality rather than neutrality, and use of force in defense of the mandate in addition to self-defense.

This has resulted in a situation where “what were originally the clear principles that defined UN peacekeeping have become blurred to the point where it is possible to use the

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3 Ibid, 149.
terms ‘peacekeeping operations’ and ‘peace operations’ interchangeably.” The UNSC has even gone beyond its doctrinal principles, mandating some missions to conduct offensive operations to target identified spoilers. This ambiguity over purpose and doctrinal guidance has defined peacekeeping in the 21st century, despite three UN reviews attempting to clarify and codify these issues. Key debates over doctrine, mandates, and what types of missions or tasks the UN should undertake continue.

In short, UN efforts to expand resources, mandates, and doctrine has created a gap between the peacekeeping principles the UN espouses and both the environments in which the UNSC calls on its missions to operate and the tasks it asks them to perform. This thesis defines this as a ‘mandate-doctrine gap’ within the UN and asks how it can be reconciled. It argues that the UN’s peacekeeping principles are insufficient to guide the stabilization and peace enforcement missions the UNSC is increasingly mandating, and that other peace providers, including regional organizations and coalitions of willing, have a doctrinal advantage over the UN in addressing most intrastate conflict. Therefore, regional organizations and coalitions of the willing must play an increasing role in stabilization and peace enforcement, respectively; however, significant investment in regional organizations’ capacity building is still needed for them to do so effectively. It addresses these questions in the context of sub-Saharan African conflicts, as this is where the majority of UN missions have been deployed in the last 15 years and where regional organizations, such as the African Union, have demonstrated a willingness and capability to serve as alternate providers of peace and security.

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4 Ibid, 156.
This thesis proposes a division of labor for peace operations in which the UN largely reverts back to traditional peacekeeping, regional organizations conduct stabilization, and coalitions of the willing perform peace enforcement in order to reconcile the UN’s mandate-doctrine gap. The division of labor is derived from textual analysis of UN, African Union, and European doctrine found in field manuals, mission mandates, and operational guidance for their respective peace operations. Chapter One serves as a literature review addressing the question of how to address the UN’s mandate-doctrine gap. It identifies three schools of thought, including authors who argue the UN’s flexible doctrine is sufficient for contemporary peace operations, those that believe the UN must revert back to its original principles, and those that assert the UN must create a new doctrine for stabilization and peace enforcement. Chapter Two analyses UN doctrine in the context of contemporary conflict management to propose an original framework to define peace operations based on conflict environment and level of use of force. Under this model, this thesis adapts definitions for peace operations as follows:

**Peacekeeping:** “An interim measure to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which the negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed.... [Tasks are] essentially military in character and may involve... observation, monitoring, and reporting... supervision of a cease-fire and support to verification mechanisms; [and] interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measure.”

**Stabilization:** “The process that supports states which are entering, enduring, or emerging from conflict in order to: prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures which lead to a political settlement that institutionalizes non-violent

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contest for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development.”

**Peace Enforcement:** “The application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force… to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”

Chapter Three provides a textual analysis of African and European doctrines, as these countries comprise the regional organizations and coalitions of the willing that conduct peace operations in Africa. This thesis uses the term “regional organization” to refer to any geographically-based multilateral organization that provides security functions besides the UN, including the African Union, Regional Economic Communities, and the European Union. This thesis uses the term “ad-hoc coalitions of the willing” to refer to any militarized conflict response that occurs outside of already established multilateral regional organizations, regardless of the number of countries that participate in the “coalition.” These are generally conducted in response to perceived threats to national security of the TCCs, and this thesis assumed they are conducted in accordance with international law. Chapter Three concludes by proposing a division of labor for these actors using the framework identified in the preceding chapter, arguing that the UN should conduct peacekeeping; regional organizations should provide stabilization, and coalitions of the willing should perform peace enforcement. It argues that the UN’s doctrinal principles were designed for interstate conflict and rarely can be upheld in intrastate conflicts where commitment to a peace process is hard to come by.

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In contrast, the doctrine of regional organizations and coalitions of the willing allow for greater use of force necessary for stabilization and peace enforcement.

Chapter Four tests the applicability of this division of labor using peace operations in Mali from 2012 – 2014 as a case study. It evaluates the performance of the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUMSA), the AU’s African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), and the French-led Operation Serval in conducting key stabilization and peace enforcement tasks, identifying where their respective doctrines supported or constrained their efforts. Using the preceding analyses, this thesis concludes that UN principles are inappropriate to guide peace operations addressing most intrastate conflicts where combatants are too fragmented to obtain the consent of the parties and provide a credible commitment to a peace process. It also concludes that, in contrast to the UN, doctrinal guidance for African and European militaries allows for the greater use of force and is more flexible in implementation, which is necessary to effectively address changing security conditions of intrastate conflict. Finally, it acknowledges that African regional organizations must undergo significant capacity building efforts for the division of labor outlined in this framework to be implemented, but recognizes that these African TCCs have already begun to demonstrated the role they can play as providers of peace and security through various peace operations over the last 10 years. Further research is still needed to determine how the “global” peace and security architecture can conduct peace operations that require use of force against the host government and how this framework can be adapted for conflicts outside Africa to regions that do not have as robust multilateral security organizations.
Chapter 1: How Can The UN Reconcile Its Mandate-Doctrine Gap?

Since UN peace operations began addressing more complex armed conflicts and taking on more robust tasks in the early 1990s, most academic and practical literature has focused on the mandate-resources gap within UN peacekeeping. It has largely addressed mandates that have expanded to meet the changing character of armed conflict, criticizing troop-contributing countries (TCCs) for failing to meet their mandates and UNSC members for issuing mandates without ensuring TCCs could meet the subsequent force generation requirements. Alternatively, literature has focused on issues of reform – either within the UN, the AU, or mechanisms for how these institutions interact with one another.

In contrast to the well-documented mandate-resources gap, fewer sources have examined the emerging mandate-doctrine gap, exploring how the UN continues to issue mandates that in some way contravene the three basic principles of peacekeeping and what these expanded mandates mean for the effectiveness of these missions from a doctrinal perspective. Positions in the current debate on whether or not the UN should participate in missions beyond traditional peacekeeping –whether these operations are termed ‘robust peacekeeping,’ ‘peace enforcement,’ ‘stabilization,’ or something else – can generally be organized into three camps. Practitioners tend to argue that existing UN doctrine can be stretched to accommodate ‘robust peacekeeping,’ and that the UN should

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continue conducting peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and everything in between.\textsuperscript{11} Most academic literature, however, recognizes that this creates a doctrinal ambiguity that endangers the UN and its peacekeepers and call for the UN to clarify its doctrinal principles as it applies to complex conflicts.\textsuperscript{12} This body of literature comprises the remaining two camps, as critics of a flexible interpretation of UN principles diverge on how the UN should reconcile the mandate-doctrine gap it has created. Some argue that the UN simply cannot conduct stabilization missions without jeopardizing its peacekeepers and itself as an institution.\textsuperscript{13} Others, however, believe the UN should continue conducting peace enforcement missions – it simply must develop a new doctrine suited for these robust missions.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{What Mandate-Doctrine Gap? Flexible Principles Allow Flexibility in the Field}

The UN is the strongest proponent of a flexible interpretation of its basic peacekeeping principles. These principles work with various policies to provide doctrinal guidance to UN peace operations, even if this doctrine for multilateral institutions is not as formal or binding as that of a single state, such as US military doctrine, which is defined as “fundamental principles that guide the employment of United States military forces in coordinated action toward common objective and may include terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures.”\textsuperscript{15} The UN’s flexibility is demonstrated through numerous reports and reviews, such as the Brahimi and HIPPO reports, that have stretched the bounds of impartiality, consent, and parameters for use of force as the UN seeks to

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{11} Brahimi Report, 9-10.  \\
\textsuperscript{12} de Coning et al, eds. \textit{UN Peacekeeping Doctrine}.  \\
\textsuperscript{14} de Coning et al, eds. \textit{UN Peacekeeping Doctrine}.  \\
\textsuperscript{15} DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (US DOD, February 2019), 125.
\end{flushleft}
manage evolving threats to international peace and security. The UN perceives most acutely the responsibility to balance calls for international crisis response with the realities of being able to do so. Three documents in particular have defined UN peacekeeping doctrine and documented its evolution, even if not all recommendations were accepted or implemented by member states. These documents include two independent reviews - the Brahimi Report, issued in 2000, and the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in 2015 – as well as one 2008 document that outlined official “Principles and Guidelines” for UN peace operations.

Following the peacekeeping failures in the early 1990s, the Brahimi report recognized that UN missions were no longer entering zones where there was a peace to keep, but rather entering conflict zones in an attempt to create peace. This fundamental change in the requirements of peacekeepers meant that either existing mandates, resources, or both were insufficient for UN peacekeepers to conduct activities necessary to defend UN values. Therefore, it was also the first document to begin to stretch the principles of peacekeeping by redefining impartiality. Previously, impartiality was understood to be synonymous with neutrality, in that peacekeeping forces must refrain from taking sides in a conflict, lest the mission lose the consent of any party. This was an appropriate concept for the UN’s traditional ceasefire monitoring missions. Now, however, impartiality was understood to refer to mandate implementation, and a UN operation did not have to serve a neutral role in a conflict as long as it implemented its mandate with equal regard to all conflict parties.

The Brahimi Report also inverted the relationship between impartiality and consent, recognizing that the principle of consent was tenuous from the outset in many of
the conflicts the UN deployed to during the 1990s. If “in the context of modern peace operations dealing with intrastate/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in many ways by the local parties,” then neutrality was no longer critical to maintain a concept that was already absent. This change held true even if the host government still must provide legal consent, and it was largely driven by UN’s experience in Rwanda and Srebrenica, where the UN’s adherence to neutrality rendered them ineffective in a situation where there were clearly victims and aggressors. The Brahimi Report thus redefined impartiality to mean “adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles.”

In other words, UN peacekeeping operations could conduct limited military actions against particular groups, if the group was preventing the UN peacekeeping mission from implementing its mandate and as long as the UN would do the same against any other group obstructing the mission.

With the Brahimi Report having cracked the door to expanding the UN’s peacekeeping principles, the 2008 document “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” better known as the “Capstone Document,” edged it further open by redefining parameters for the use of force. At peacekeeping’s origin, peacekeepers were permitted to use force only in cases of self-defense, which should be rare occurrences if peacekeepers had the consent of local parties and acted with impartiality. Principles and Guidelines asserted, however, that “the notion of self-defense has subsequently come to include resistance to attempts by forceful means to

16 Brahimi Report, 9.
17 Ibid, 9.
prevent the peacekeeping operation from discharging its duties under the mandate of the
Security Council.”19 This document therefore codified what was already being practiced
in the field, which included an expanded authorization for peacekeepers to use force both
in self-defense and in defense of their mandate – a dramatic expansion when there are no
formal constraints on the types of tasks the UNSC can include in mandates. It also
clarified that use of force should be kept at the tactical vice strategic level, differentiating
robust peacekeeping from peace enforcement. Along with the Brahimi Report, it
represented “an attempt by the UN to draw a red line between what it is prepared to do in
peace operations and what it cannot do – and what it should not be asked to do,” thus
reinforcing distinctions and limitations in UN’s role in managing conflict.20

Since the Capstone Document’s publication, literature began calling on the UN to
provide greater clarity on its doctrinal guidance, but many authors still believe the UN’s
principles can be stretched to accommodate stabilization missions. The UN’s second
review of peace operations this century, the HIPPO Report, recognized the debate that
had been created over the UN’s role in stabilization missions, calling for both clarity and
“a flexible and progressive interpretation” of UN principles of peacekeeping. 21
Proponents of UN involvement in stabilization often cite the dynamic nature of conflict,
arguing that as “the boundaries between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding
have become increasingly blurred,” it is impractical to believe the UN can draw a hard
and fast line that its peace operations will not cross.22 Peter Rudolf offers a more cynical

for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People (UN doc. S/2015/446, Jun. 17, 2015), 32
[hereafter, “HIPPO Report.”]
explanation for why the UN has been resistant to clarifying stabilization: while many look to the UN to maintain international peace and security, per its charter, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) faces real constraints in finding TCCs willing to send their soldiers into high-risk situations of ongoing conflict, particularly when their countries do not face a direct threat. Aditi Gorur terms this approach “constructive ambiguity,” which allows the UN to claim or appear to be responding to contemporary conflicts, while still addressing concerns of TCCs who would be more reluctant to contribute to higher risk stabilization missions than lower risk peacekeeping ones.

While Gorur rejects the UN’s resistance to better defining stabilization, she still believes that its peacekeeping principles can apply to these more robust missions. She proposes a clarifying definition herself, arguing that “the term stabilization in the context of UN peacekeeping should be defined as: supporting the transfer of territorial control from spoilers to legitimate authorities.” She then explains how each of the UN’s three peacekeeping principles are still suited to the types of missions the UN conducts today, but she does this by examining the four contemporary missions that are explicitly named as stabilization missions, thus presuming that the UN can and should be conducting the robust missions it is already engaged in. She calls for clarity, but a clarity that is in line with the Capstone Document and an expanded interpretation of UN peacekeeping principles, rather than questioning whether the UN has already gone too far.

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26 Ibid, 21.
How Can Peacekeeping Stray So Far? The UN Must Go “Back to the Basics”

In contrast to the UN’s position, most academic literature not only recognizes that a gap exists between the UN’s doctrine and its mandates, but also criticizes the UN’s broadening of peacekeeping principles over the last twenty years. Among the earlier authors who believe the UN should reconcile its doctrine-mandate gap by reining in robust mandates, Durch & England argue for a greater, though not total, adherence by the UN to traditional peacekeeping doctrine. 27 They recognize the limitations of peacekeeping, claiming that UN peacekeepers are ill-suited to conduct low-intensity warfighting, and that in practice, dynamic conflicts can result in situations where it is necessary for peacekeepers to engage in combat. However, they assert that “should combat become a routine preoccupation, then the operation has transitioned to something else, regardless of who mandated it or what that initial mandate said,” and that warfighting should be kept distinct from peace operations. 28 This distinction is a notable contrast to the blurring of these functions in the national doctrine of major powers.

Durch & England argue that UN operations should have clear international and local legitimacy, because “legitimacy and consent are, to a peace operation, what body armor is to an infantry soldier: something to reduce the probability of catastrophic system failure.” 29 Notably, they argue against the notion that consent is something that can be created and managed, though they acknowledge that consent in practice is not absolute and that peacekeepers should be prepared to manage situations of eroding consent. Overall, these authors take a measured position in supporting the UN’s robust peace

28 Ibid, 17.
29 Ibid, 17.
operations, though their examination is cursory and largely limited to simply identifying existing areas of tension.

Peter Rudolf takes a similar stance against the UN’s continued role in stabilization.\textsuperscript{30} He argues that the UN is ‘muddling through’ opaque mandates and missions that realistically should be considered much closer to peace enforcement or stabilization. Most concerning, he makes the claim several times that ambiguity over key terms like stabilization work to the UNSC’s advantage, allowing it to address TCC concerns about risk to their forces, while still attempting, or at least appearing to attempt, to address contemporary conflicts. If UNSC members were to clarify such terms, much less create an associated doctrine, this would give TCCs and member states the opportunity to oppose such ‘robust’ missions.

Nevertheless, Rudolf offers three potential solutions: reverting to original principles, developing a distinct stabilization or peace enforcement doctrine, or continuing to muddle through. Despite citing challenges with the former course of action, including that it is potentially unrealistic as asymmetric conflict may necessitate offensive action, he appears to support a return to the UN’s original principles by arguing that, from a normative perspective, the UN cannot and should not conduct stabilization. In addition to typical claims that peace enforcement requires the designation of spoilers, which will inherently reveal a state-centric bias and preclude any veneer of impartiality, Rudolf cites the hypocrisy of UN efforts to support the extension of state authority when states are predatory themselves. Fundamentally, he believes that:

Peacekeeping [is] a practice that is worth saving from a loss of legitimacy through widening gaps between over-ambition and underachievement on the one hand, and unyielding principles and operational change on the

other. The way in which the use of military force is conceived of in the context of peacekeeping usefully sets it apart from war fighting, and should continue to do so.\textsuperscript{31}

Perhaps the sharpest and most thorough rebuke of the UN’s current doctrinal gap comes from John Karlsrud. He cites a significant drawback to the trend towards more robust mandates in UN peacekeeping, claiming that the “embrace of multidimensionality in peacekeeping has come at the cost of deploying in the framework of a longer-term political strategy.”\textsuperscript{32} Rather, the UN should “withstand the move towards Chapter 7 1/2 solutions which entail a marriage of regional enforcement forces under the banner of UN missions, and instead strengthen its partnerships with regional organizations.”\textsuperscript{33} In short, these authors believe that the UN cannot continue to effectively conduct stabilization or peace enforcement missions, and that if it continues to do so, it will place the safety of its peacekeepers and the legitimacy of the entire organization at risk.

\textbf{With A New Doctrine, the UN is Ready for Robustness}

In contrast to the preceding authors, others believe that the UN can continue conducting robust peacekeeping and stabilization; it simply must create a new doctrine to be able to do so effectively. These arguments often justify their position by referencing the lack of other capable peacekeeping providers, specifically regional organizations. Europe and Africa are the only regions to have a functioning intergovernmental organization that conducts regional peace operations, via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the African Union (AU) respectively. While the AU has gained notable experience over the last decade in Somalia, Mali, and CAR, its operations

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, 162.
\textsuperscript{32} John Karlsrud, \textit{The UN at War: Peace Operations in a New Era} (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 5.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 8.
are beset by organizational shortfalls, including funding and logistics that result in the UN shouldering the burden for robust operations regardless of existing doctrine.\textsuperscript{34} Authors such as Jane Boulden who believe the UN not only can but \textit{should} conduct stabilization often cite the UN Charter that establishes its leading role in maintaining international peace and security. They argue that the credibility and legitimacy of the UN itself is at stake if it cedes this responsibility to regional organizations or other actors.\textsuperscript{35}

De Coning, Aoi, and Karlsrud are among the leading authors who believe the UN can continue to engage in stabilization, albeit with a more clarified doctrine. Theirs is “the first book-length comprehensive attempt to identify and analyze [the] growing gap between emerging practice and the existing official UN doctrine,” illustrating the nascent research that has gone into this topic.\textsuperscript{36} These authors recognize the need for a reevaluation of the UN’s existing peacekeeping doctrine and argue that the gap in UN doctrine and its mandates demands the development of a distinct stabilization doctrine for the UN. In this context, they propose a new typology of peacekeeping, distinguishing among four types of peace operations. This typology identifies many of the key tasks contemporary peace operations are asked to address and includes those that 1) support ceasefire or peace agreement implementation; 2) support the formation of the states or transitional administrations; 3) provide protection of civilians in the absence of peace agreements; and 4) protect governments or peace processes from insurgencies.\textsuperscript{37} However, their argument overlooks the potential role of alternative peace providers to

\textsuperscript{34} Cedric de Coning and Chiyuki Aoi, “Conclusion,” in de Coning et al, eds. \textit{UN Peacekeeping Doctrine}, 301-302.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 20.
address the various forms of contemporary peace operations, containing the implicit assumption that the UN has a comparative advantage that will be unchallenged into the future.

Finally, de Coning & Peter strike somewhat of a compromise view among these positions in the most recent significant publication on the UN’s evolving doctrine.38 *UN Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order* largely looks at how the current shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world order is affecting UN peace operations—specifically how the countries from the global south are exercising greater influence on the processes for mission creation and mandate generation. They conclude that we are entering a more “pragmatic” era of UN peace operations, defined by a “more robust interpretations of UN peacekeeping and an increasing reliance on regional actors as providers of peace.”39 This recognition for how regional organizations can play a critical role in filling the UN’s mandate-doctrine gap does not fit neatly into the three preceding schools of thought, but rather provides a more nuanced outlook that recognizes the factors driving increasingly robust mandates and those that limit the UN’s ability to effectively address these factors on its own. However, they fall short of providing a normative assessment of whether this is a positive development for the effectiveness of global peace operations.

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Overall, existing literature has largely criticized the UN’s gradual stretching and reinterpretation of its doctrinal principles, and there have been near unanimous calls by academics and practitioners alike for greater clarity from the UN in how it defines its

38 de Coning and Peter, eds. United Nations Peace Operations.
various peace operations. Where these authors differ, however, is on whether the UN should continue its involvement in contemporary, complex conflict resolution, albeit with a new and better-defined doctrine, or whether the UN should revert to its traditional conflict management role lest it undermine the legitimacy and safety of its members and the organization itself.

Like these authors, this thesis recognizes the ways in which the UN has stretched its doctrine, as well as the enormous gap that still exists between UN published doctrine and UNSC-issued mandates. However, it challenges assumptions from authors who call for a new doctrine that the UN should continue to conduct operations across the range of conflict resolution. It endorses the view of authors such as Karlsrud and Peter, asserting that, rather than expanding doctrine to meet mandates, mandates for UN missions should revert back to ones that meet more traditional UN doctrine. This thesis will strengthen their arguments about the incompatibility of the UN’s peacekeeping principles with current armed conflicts by arguing that the UN’s principles are inherently in conflict with most intrastate conflicts, unless there is a genuine commitment to peace by all combatants. Finally, this thesis endorses de Coning & Peter’s assessment that we are entering a more pragmatic era of peace operations where regional organizations and countries from the global South play an increasingly significant role in providing international peace and security. Overall, this thesis agrees with those who believe the UN should rein in its robust mandates.

Where most of these authors have failed to identify alternative ways to fill the gap in conflict management that will result from the UN reining in its operations, this thesis proposes that the UN must look to and support other actors – namely regional
organizations and coalitions of the willing – to address contemporary armed conflicts. It builds on de Coning & Peter’s assessments by arguing that the growing role of regional organizations is not simply occurring – it is a trend that must be encouraged for more effective peace operations. Where few authors have argued this position – such as John Karlsrud – this paper will analyze peace operations in Mali following the 2012 northern rebellion and coup to provide an empirical basis to support this argument. Mali was selected as a case study because it is representative of many of the conflicts the UN seeks to manage today: it is an intrastate conflict where international missions look to support a weak state’s ability to govern and provide security without a comprehensive peace agreement. It is also one of the few conflicts where each of the peace providers included in this thesis – the UN, the AU and regional organizations, and coalitions of the willing – have deployed a mission seeking to stabilize a conflict zone, enabling a cross-comparison of who is doctrinally suited for stabilization tasks. While this thesis comes to the same conclusion as other authors who have argued that the UN should look to other peacekeeping actors to fill the UN’s mandate-resources gap, it reinforces their position by claiming this solution will help address the UN’s mandate-doctrine gap as well.
Chapter 2: Reconciling the UN’s Mandate-Doctrine Gap

The existence of a mandate-doctrine gap within the UN is evidenced by both previous authors’ claims and those in UN published documents. Mateja Peter argues that the UN’s willingness to enforce political solutions, support military victories, and lead state-building constitutes “enforcement peacekeeping, which further unsettles the basic principles of UN peacekeeping…resulting in a schism between the doctrine and practice.”[^40] She claims that since the 1990s, the UN has moved from traditional peacekeeping, to multidimensional peacekeeping, to enforcement peacekeeping – operations that have fundamentally different purposes and requirements, all while claiming to be various forms of “peacekeeping.” Furthermore, she criticizes the UNSC for failing to recognize the ways in which these types of mandates contravene existing doctrine, or that its gradual foray into enforcement peacekeeping “preclude[s] a proper debate on the problematic externalities, in particular on political processes and peacebuilding.”[^41] Like most academics, she argues against the blurring of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, which risks undermining the fundamental principles that have protected UN peacekeepers for more than 60 years.

A comparison of UNSC-issued mandates against the DPKO’s stated peacekeeping doctrine further illustrates her arguments. Lacking a formal doctrinal foundation, the most authoritative existing document on UN operational principles is the 2008 Capstone Document, which makes several claims regarding the conditions under which UN PKOs deploy, the tasks they conduct, and the rules of engagement that guide

[^41]: Ibid, 353.
their operations; however, these claims are often not reflected in the reality of UN peace operations. From the outset, the Capstone asserts that “United Nations peacekeeping operations are normally deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or a more comprehensive peace agreement” but acknowledges later that multidimensional missions have been deployed absent a formal peace agreement, at host nation request, to support the transition to a legitimate government.42 This point is underscored by the fact that half of the UN’s six new missions43 created since the Capstone’s publication have deployed with no comprehensive peace agreement in place.44 Indeed, it has become so commonplace for the UN to deploy in these situations it is “now cliché to say ‘there is no peace to keep.’”45

The Capstone Document also draws a clear line between the tactical use of force employed in robust peacekeeping and the strategic use of force necessary for peace enforcement.46 According to UN DPKO in 2008, UN peacekeeping only engages in the former, but in 2013 and 2016, the UNSC issued two mandates that authorize at least the operational use of force by naming armed groups to be countered. The clearest example for this contradiction is the UN’s Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), which is the UN’s first offensive combat force that was intended and mandated to neutralize and

43 Missions deployed absent a comprehensive peace agreement include MONUSCO in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, MINUSMA in Mali, and MINUSCA in Central African Republic; the UN also deployed two missions, UNMISS and UNISFA, to South Sudan at its inception and MINUSTH to Haiti.
44 Cedric de Coning and Chiyuki Aoi, “Conclusion,” in de Coning et al, eds. UN Peacekeeping Doctrine, 299.
disarm rebels and foreign armed groups.\footnote{Peter, "Between Doctrine and Practice," 354.} Naming specific groups and authorizing their proactive removal from the battlefield constitutes a strategic use of force at the highest levels.\footnote{De Coning and Aoi, "Conclusion," 300.} Three years later, the UNSC mandated MINUSMA to “anticipate, deter, and counter threats, including asymmetric threats, and to take robust and active steps to protect civilians”, and specifically named Ansar al-Dine (AAD), Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as spoilers.\footnote{S/RES/2295, ¶42.} While not as aggressive in the use of force as the FIB’s mandate, this language goes beyond simply calling on MINUSMA to respond to immediate threats and employing a tactical use of force. It requires an identification of armed groups posing a threat and the use of pre-emptive measures to counter those groups. At a minimum, this suggests an operational use of force, if not strategic, and one could argue that mandating a mission to conduct such aggressive actions as one of its priority tasks is an inherently strategic use of force.

The Capstone also claims that “UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict, [which] requires a commitment by the parties to a political process and their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation mandated to support that process.”\footnote{United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 31.} However, UN deployments that must hold the host state accountable to implement their mandates demonstrate the practical limitations of consent. This is evidenced most clearly by South Sudan, where Juba’s original consent for UNMISS’s deployment in July 2011 eroded on multiple levels since the outbreak of civil war in 2013. Juba sees UNMISS’s efforts to protect civilians as a threat, regularly

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Peter, "Between Doctrine and Practice," 354.}
\footnote{De Coning and Aoi, "Conclusion," 300.}
\footnote{S/RES/2295, ¶42.}
\footnote{United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 31.}
\end{footnotes}
criticized the UN for infringing on its sovereignty, and obstructed the work of peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{51} While President Kiir has provided the legal consent necessary for UNMISS to continue its deployment, the government has still obstructed UNMISS from carrying out various elements of its mandate. Furthermore, President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar have signed numerous peace agreements but failed to implement them, and after the most recent deal in August 2018, the UN’s Special Envoy publicly questioned their commitment to ending conflict.\textsuperscript{52} Despite receiving a minimal legal consent for its presence, UNMISS has an insufficient level of consent for practical cooperation to effectively implement its mandate and neither party is genuinely committed to a political process. Yet, UNSC’s preferred course of action has been to authorize the deployment of 4,000 additional peacekeepers as part of UNMISS, despite the absence of consent on both levels asserted in Capstone.\textsuperscript{53}

Finally, the Capstone asserts that UN peacekeeping operations must implement missions impartially, “without favor or prejudice to any party,” while clarifying that this does not equate to neutrality.\textsuperscript{54} However, the UNSC has authorized several missions “in support of” host nation authorities, including MONUSCO, MINUSCA, and MINUSMA. In each of these contexts, the host nation is actively trying to combat armed rebel groups. In this context, the UN cannot claim that missions supporting the extension of government authority are doing so impartially.

\textsuperscript{53} UN Security Council, Resolution 2304 and Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan, ¶ 14 (June 29, 2016), \url{http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2304}.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines}, 33.
In sum, these examples show a gap between the peacekeeping principles the UN espouses and both the environments in which the UNSC calls on its missions to operate and the tasks it asks them to perform. Moreover, the diversity of examples across missions and time over the last ten years suggests that UN missions contravening the basic principles are not ‘exceptions,’ as some Security Council members insist. At best, this divergence between doctrine and practice reflects a lack of coordination between the UNSC and DPKO regarding the purpose of UN peace operations; at worst, it signals a conscious disregard for, and therefore irrelevance of, existing UN peacekeeping doctrine.

**Characterizing Peace Operations**

The UN’s mandate-doctrine gap reveals ambiguity over what the UN means when it says it is deploying a “peacekeeping” mission, necessitating a clarification of key terms. This section will characterize various types of peace operations, a broad term comprising missions that “involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military) whose mission is to help secure international peace and security.”

**The UN Model**

The UN defines three types of missions that fall under the peace operations umbrella, distinct from the diplomatically-focused tools of conflict prevention and peacemaking applied towards the beginning of the conflict spectrum. These operations include peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Like most authors, the UN envisions these missions as corresponding to various parts of the conflict lifecycle, with some intended to deploy before a conflict breaks out, others during conflict, and still

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others after a ceasefire has been signed. DPKO illustrates the distinction among these as follows:

![Diagram showing the distinction among peace prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding](image)

**Fig. 1 UN DPKO’s Framework for Defining Peace Operations**

Under this model, peace enforcement is the primary tool used once a conflict has begun but usually before a ceasefire has been reached. This military- and security-focused tool seeks to coerce parties into a restoration of international peace and security, with the authorization of the Security Council. Peace enforcement overlaps with peacebuilding, which includes a range of measures to strengthen national capacities to reduce a relapse into armed conflict. While peacebuilding is more often used after a ceasefire has been agreed to consolidate peace gains, both it and peace enforcement can be applied either before or after a ceasefire. In contrast, peacekeeping only begins after a ceasefire has been reached, because it by definition ‘is designed to preserve the

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57 Ibid, 19.
peace…and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. While DPKO recognizes that the boundaries among these types of missions are blurred and calls for peace operations to be conceptualized and deployed along a spectrum, it maintains that the defining factor is the presence of a ceasefire. This results in the UN – as well as academic authors and other practitioners - using many terms to describe vastly different mandates, objectives, and operating environments for “peacekeeping,” including traditional peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping.

An Alternate Framework

While the presence or absence of a ceasefire is a sufficient theoretical distinction, the realities of conflict – especially intrastate conflict - render this almost meaningless in practice. As Durch & England note, conflict is much more fluid than existing doctrine would like, and signatures on a piece of paper do not necessarily translate to even a willingness by armed groups to disarm and canton in practice. Moreover, the actors in many of the armed conflicts that the UN now seeks to manage are fractured, making it increasingly difficult to secure a truly ‘comprehensive’ peace agreement with signatures by all relevant armed groups. Rather than the presence or absence of a peace agreement or ceasefire, which is a fluid concept outside of UN control, this thesis proposes a two-factor model to more specifically define various types of peace operations and reduce the ambiguity under which they operate.

58 Ibid, 18.
60 de Coning and Aoi, “Conclusion,” 292.
Factor 1: Inter- or Intrastate Armed Conflict

The first factor is environmental: whether the mission is addressing an inter- or an intrastate armed conflict, defined by whether or not conflict parties are contesting internationally-recognized state borders. The key factor is whether warring sides have the ability to withdraw to geographically distinct areas, which greatly reduces the types of tasks necessary for effective conflict resolution. When belligerents must integrate into a unified social and political structure, as in intrastate armed conflict, conflict resolution becomes infinitely more complex. Armed conflicts that have a mix of intra- and interstate conflict, such as proxy wars, would be considered intrastate under the assumption that the overriding conflict is for control of a single national governance structure by primary belligerents. In situations of contested statehood, such as Morocco and Western Sahara, the overriding factor would be whether conditions exist for the possible withdrawal to geographically and legally distinct areas. Inter- versus intrastate conflict is a much more definable condition than an armed conflict’s place along the conflict spectrum because it is largely static, requiring less flexibility in the field.

Factor 2: Non-Strategic or Strategic Use of Force

The second factor is operational and defined by the level of use of military force. This thesis uses Aoi’s and de Coning’s definition for ‘strategic’ use of force: “the use of force against pre-identified aggressors, [including] the offensive use of force.”61 This is a broader usage than the UN’s definition of ‘strategic’, which the Capstone specifies as being specifically against the host state. In contrast, non-strategic use of force would be situation-dependent, reactive, and limit to use of force against armed groups that threaten

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61 Ibid, 300.
the physical safety of peace operators. This includes defensive or tactical use of force to defend peacekeepers or UN sites or equipment, as well as operational use of force, such as during active patrols to conduct POC missions that encounter hostile armed groups. The threshold for strategic use of force is thus higher than that which is needed for ‘active’ operations, as almost all peace operations addressing intrastate conflict have a POC component, which is considered an ‘active’ task.62

This definition provides a clearer foundation than the UN’s current justification for use of force ‘in self-defense or defense of the mandate’ by pre-determining what mandate language is considered strategic or non-strategic. In basing the determination for the level of use of force on the language authorized in UNSC-issued mandates, this definition also clarifies potential ambiguity stemming from divergent chains of command for deployed forces. The UNSC will determine whether a mission will have strategic or non-strategic use of force during the mandate development, regardless of whether risk-averse TCCs choose to implement the mandate in the field. If mandate renewals result in the addition or removal of an authorization to target or counter named armed groups, this will shift the mission’s place along the use of force spectrum.

Taken together, these two factors provide an alternate framework to conceptualize peace operations that provides more clarity than the UN’s framework, because the factors are static and clearly defined by the UN itself. Following this framework, this thesis will define peacekeeping, stabilization, and peace enforcement as follows:

Fig. 2 A New Framework for Defining Peace Operations

Peacekeeping

When a peace operation is deployed to manage an interstate armed conflict, it is conducting peacekeeping. In this context, a mission will perform the traditional functions defined by Capstone, such as observing for the demobilization and withdrawal of forces
and supervising a ceasefire.\textsuperscript{63} It is only in this context, where forces follow an established command and control structure and have a defined area to which they can withdraw, that peacekeepers can credibly provide a military observer function. These are sufficient conditions to allow the principles of peacekeeping to protect the peacekeepers and the organization they represent. Thus, use of force does not need to exceed that of self-defense, which is a non-strategic function.

\textit{Stabilization}

Stabilization is conducted in intrastate armed conflict by missions that are authorized to use non-strategic military force. A peace operation will have to perform radically different functions compared to interstate armed conflict, even if a peace agreement has been signed, because there are no distinct areas to which armed groups can withdraw. Disarmament and demobilization necessitate reintegration, as previously warring parties are expected to live and work among each other, or at least under the same national institutions. When warring parties are expected to integrate with one another, confidence building must entail more than simply observation; a peace operation is often expected to actively support DDR or SSR, either through civilian programs, armed action, or both. Any mission deployed to address intrastate armed conflict that performs these functions without discriminating against combatants, such as UNMISS’s efforts to protect civilians from either government or anti-government forces, is conducting stabilization.

Generally, this is where most of the tasks the UN considers ‘robust peacekeeping’ would fall, as stabilization often can employ the tactical use of force. This definition is

\textsuperscript{63} United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 21.
also broad enough to encompass the UN’s definition for peacebuilding, with a key function of both being “to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions;” thus, this thesis considers peacebuilding to be a form of stabilization.64

_Peace Enforcement_

Finally, in intrastate armed conflict where a mission is authorized to use a strategic level of force, a mission will be conducting peace enforcement. Peace enforcement can comprise many of the same tasks as stabilization as they are both addressing intrastate conflict, but it goes further to include active operations that target specific armed groups. Targeted groups can be explicitly named in the mission’s mandate, such as the Force Intervention Brigade’s naming of the M23 or MINUSMA’s naming of AQIM, AAD, and MUJAO. Alternatively, they can be designated by commanders in the field as a mission implements its mandate, such as when MINUSCA targeted criminal groups in Bangui’s PK5 neighborhood for disarmament and arrest. While the UN is only beginning to venture into counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, the distinction between these two is irrelevant for the purposes of this thesis; as long as one of these groups is identified to be targeted, the mission will be considered peace enforcement. Although this thesis uses the UN’s definition for peace enforcement as defined in Capstone, it does not require the use of force against the host state to constitute peace enforcement.

Overall, this framework provides greater clarity for what the UN currently terms “peacekeeping,” enabling these missions to be more specifically conceptualized as

64 Ibid, 18.
depicted in table 1. While it does not fully resolve the practical challenge of using the conflict spectrum to distinguish among some peace operations, it absolves peacekeeping and peacekeepers from the burden of operating in such a fluid environment, and preserves the principles of peacekeeping to contexts and conflicts in which they retain their credibility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission, Duration</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Key Security Tasks</th>
<th>Type of Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, 44 years</td>
<td>Ceasefire maintenance</td>
<td>Monitoring ceasefire…supervising disengagement</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in Sudan/South Sudan, 7 years</td>
<td>Ceasefire maintenance</td>
<td>Monitoring ceasefire …supervising disengagement…facilitating humanitarian relief</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), 59 years</td>
<td>Ceasefire maintenance</td>
<td>Monitoring ceasefire</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 17 years</td>
<td>Ceasefire maintenance</td>
<td>Monitoring ceasefire…supporting political referendum</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 54 years</td>
<td>Ceasefire maintenance</td>
<td>Monitoring ceasefire …supervising disengagement</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 40 years</td>
<td>Ceasefire maintenance</td>
<td>Monitoring ceasefire …supervising disengagement…facilitating humanitarian relief</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 70 years</td>
<td>Ceasefire maintenance</td>
<td>Monitoring ceasefire</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), 19 years</td>
<td>Strengthen rule of law</td>
<td>Policing…monitoring human rights</td>
<td>Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), 1 year</td>
<td>Strengthen rule of law</td>
<td>Policing…monitoring human rights</td>
<td>Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), 11 years</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
<td>Patrolling high risk areas…protecting IDP camps….facilitating humanitarian relief</td>
<td>Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), 7 years</td>
<td>Implement peace agreement;</td>
<td>Patrolling high risk areas…protecting IDP camps….monitoring ceasefire…facilitating humanitarian relief</td>
<td>Stabilization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1: Current UN Peace Operations By Type of Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Type of Mission</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>Stabilization, Peace Enforcement</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>Strengthen state functions; Protection of civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Stabilization, Peace Enforcement</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>Implement peace agreement; Strengthen state functions; Protection of civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>Stabilization, Peace Enforcement</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>Strengthen state functions; Protection of civilians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implications for Doctrine

Under this framework, current UN doctrine is only applicable to peacekeeping, and it will remain so largely because of the UN’s state-centric bias. The principles of impartiality, consent, and limited use of force reinforce one another in situations of interstate conflict. However, they begin to break down when applied to intrastate armed conflict, for two primary reasons. First, the UN comprises states, enabling it to serve as a credibly impartial mediator or conflict manager in interstate conflict. However, when a conflict is between a recognized state and non-state actors, the UN’s actions will often inevitably reveal a bias towards statehood. This bias is reinforced by international law, which requires host state consent for a foreign mission’s deployment, in addition to consent’s role in UN doctrine. When the host state is a party to the armed conflict, as it almost always is in intrastate examples, the peace operation will necessarily favor the

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65 This table excludes Special Political Missions because they lack uniformed contingents.  
66 Karlsrud, The UN at War.  
state against non-state actors. This bias can be overcome in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement, where multiple combatants are committed to integration into the same state; however, the moral imperative to stem conflict is making this an increasingly rare context for UN deployments.

Second, the types of tasks a stabilization or peace enforcement mission are mandated to perform are contradictory to the UN’s doctrinal principles of peacekeeping. While the UN lacks a definition for stabilization, the missions it terms as such to address intrastate armed conflict often include the restoration or extension of state authority and the protection of civilians.\(^{68}\) Again, in theory, restoration of state authority can be done impartially if a comprehensive peace agreement is in place. However, the stabilization and peace enforcement missions the UN has deployed in the last decade have lacked a comprehensive peace agreement, which often results in the UN becoming a party to the conflict itself. Missions mandated to restore state authority often are tasked to support local security forces through capacity building and training. This “create[s] a very close link between the UN and the government of the day, [which] creates tensions between the actual realities of these missions and the impartiality, neutrality, and use of force principles as outlined in the existing doctrine.”\(^{69}\) These challenges become even more acute when the state is predatory; at the same time, it is unrealistic to expect a peacekeeping operation to use force against a predatory state given the legal necessity for host state consent, further precluding any legitimate UN claim to impartiality.\(^{70}\)

Similarly, many peace operations are mandated to conduct POC in intrastate armed conflicts, often requiring robust use of force at the operational level that challenges

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\(^{68}\) Gorur, *Defining the Boundaries*, 16.


a mission’s ability to maintain both impartiality and consent. POC’s primary pillar is protecting civilians “from physical violence, with an emphasis on military capabilities and willingness to use them,” which is fundamentally incompatible with non-use of force except in self defense or defense of the mandate.\textsuperscript{71} Some authors will argue that limited use of force can be upheld if the mission is mandated to conduct POC, yet this often will bring the mission into conflict with a range of armed actors. This can include government forces, though it is unrealistic to expect the peace operation to consistently challenge the state whose consent it legally requires to deploy.\textsuperscript{72} If the mission does not come into conflict with the state, its impartiality will still be called into question, as a robust use of force often results in either an implicit or explicit designation of spoilers, “which will almost certainly reveal a state-centric bias if questioned.”\textsuperscript{73}

These examples show that rarely can impartiality, consent, and limited use of force be upheld in intrastate armed conflicts because of the tasks a peace operation is mandated to perform and because of the UN’s state-centric bias. These principles can be maintained if there is a genuine and comprehensive commitment to the peace process; however, this is difficult to measure and frequent to change in intrastate conflict, and thus increasingly absent from UN missions. This logic preserves the UN’s peacekeeping doctrine to apply only to situations of traditional peacekeeping. With this conclusion, the UN must reconcile its mandate-doctrine gap by either creating a new doctrine for stabilization and peace enforcement or looking to other actors to fill this role.

\textsuperscript{71} Karlrud, \textit{The UN at War}, 150.  
\textsuperscript{73} Rudolf, “UN Peace Operations,” 173.
Why the UN Can’t Create a New Doctrine

Theoretically, the UN can attempt to fill the mandate-doctrine gap created by preserving its current doctrine for peacekeeping and developing a new doctrine for stabilization and peace enforcement missions to meet its expanded practices. Some authors have argued that the UN must do this, even if it maintains its stated preference not to conduct stabilization missions, given the unreliability of other peace providers’ ability and willingness to respond to emerging crises.74 However, tensions among UN member states on the role and purpose of peacekeeping result in caveats on the UN’s more robust missions and assertions that these missions are exceptions rather than precedent.75 For example, HIPPO affirms the exceptionality of peace enforcement; while recognizing that it is the UNSC’s prerogative to authorize peace enforcement tasks, “any such mandate task should be a time-limited, exceptional measure, conducted in support of a clear and achievable political end state and in full respect of international humanitarian law.”76 These caveats suggest there is insufficient consensus of political will to develop a new stabilization or peace enforcement doctrine, which would signal a permanent shift for the UN towards conducting these types of missions and very likely be opposed by key UNSC members.

Resistance to the UN embracing more robust mandates comes from both within the P5 and key powerbases within the General Assembly.77 Moscow and Beijing view UN missions that go beyond traditional peacekeeping most often as tools that great

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75 Peter, “Between Doctrine and Practice,” 316.
76 HIPPO Report, 32.
77 Gorur, Defining the Boundaries, 18.
powers of the West use to promote their own national interests. As a result, Moscow caveats the UN’s more robust mandates to preclude them from becoming a trend or a new normal. When the FIB was created, Moscow ensured language was included that determined it was a one-off mission in an attempt to avoid creating a precedent; Moscow also insisted on caveating that MINUSMA could engage in direct operations against “only” serious and credible threats. Following MINUSMA’s robust mandate creation, the Russian representative stated “what was once the exception now threatens to become unacknowledged standard practice.”

Resistance to more robust mandates also comes from outside the P5, particularly from south Asian and South American countries, which wield significant influence as key TCCs and PCCs. The global South contributes forces that implement largely P5-created mandates, and they are expected to take the biggest risk when deploying missions with a POC, stabilization, or peace enforcement mandate. As a result, many parts of the global South have “serious concerns about the effectiveness and viability of peacekeeping in a rapidly changing and volatile environment,” particularly if they are deploying to confront a threat that does not affect their own national security. African TCCs are the exception that prove the rule, as most current UN peacekeeping mission are in Africa, addressing threats to African states, and therefore key African TCCs such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Africa can be among the strongest advocates for robust mandates.

78 Maxim Bratersky and Alexander Luskin, “The Russian Perspective on Peacekeeping” in de Coning et al, eds. UN Peacekeeping Doctrine, 133.
79 Karlsrud, The UN at War, 38.
80 Seun Abiola, Cedric de Coning, Eduarda Hamann, and Chander Prakash, “The Large Contributors and UN Peacekeeping Doctrine” in de Coning et al, eds. UN Peacekeeping Doctrine, 153.
81 Ibid, 169.
82 Ibid, 161.
Like Russia and China, reservations from non-African parts of the global South can influence mandate creation if these countries are on the Security Council. For example, pressure from Argentina, Guatemala, Pakistan, and Russia resulted in a specific reaffirmation of the UN’s peacekeeping principles in MINUSMA’s mandate, and Argentina and Guatemala expressed deep reservation at both MINUSMA and MONUSCO’s peace enforcement components. Reservations from TCCs and PCCs also manifest in the field, however, when they employ national caveats or orders that prevent their troops from actually taking part in robust military operations. Key TCCs from the global South like Bangladesh, India, and Nepal – which comprise three out of the top five UN TCCs – almost certainly would resist UN efforts to develop a distinct stabilization or peace enforcement doctrine that would signal a permanent shift for the UN, placing a disproportionate risk on their troops.

UNSC efforts to balance TCC concerns about contributing to robust and risky missions while still addressing emerging conflicts are the driving factor behind the UN’s mandate-doctrine gap. This tension over the UN’s role in stabilization has resulted in ambiguity in what this term means, and "in the absence of a consensual definition of stabilization within the UN, an official stabilization doctrine is unlikely to emerge...[because] work to develop a stabilization doctrine could present an opportunity for those skeptical of or opposed to this form of peacekeeping, notably the troop-contributing countries, to undermine it." Rather, “a number of member states, particularly the emerging powers, are showing resistance to the direction that

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83 Peter, "Between Doctrine and Practice," 316.
86 Ibid, 170.
peacekeeping is moving in to.”87 With this resistance, particularly from Russia as a UNSC member, it is unrealistic to expect the UN to develop a new doctrine for stabilization, much less peace enforcement, that would not only recognize but also enable an active and permanent role for the UN’s in conducting these robust missions.

*Why the UN Can’t Simply Go “Back to the Basics”*

At the same time the UN cannot embrace a permanent shift towards stabilization and peace enforcement, neither can it wholly revert to only using traditional peacekeeping for conflict management. At its inception, the UN Charter gave the UNSC “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” The trend towards robust responses to conflict has been driven by the evolution of mass media and the post-Cold War push to promote and protect human rights, and it has been amplified by those who believe UN peace operations must evolve to remain relevant as a primary provider of peace and security.88 These voices come from many levels at the UN, both from within DPKO and from UNSC member states, such as the UK as a leading proponent for POC efforts.89 As a result, protection of civilians has become a key component of UN mandates since the deployment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone in 1999, and in 2014 HIPPO identified POC as a core obligation of the UN.90 From a moral perspective and from the perspectives of key UN members who champion its global leadership role, the UN cannot retrench to traditional peacekeeping if it leaves a gap in conflict management and populations that are vulnerable to violence and warfare.

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87 Peter, “Between Doctrine and Practice,” 316.
88 Karlsrud, *The UN at War*, 96.
89 David Curran and Paul Williams, “The United Kingdom and UN Peacekeeping” in de Coning et al, eds. *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine*, 79.
90 HIPPO Report, 36.
Therefore, the UN must look to other actors with a demonstrated capacity and willingness to conduct peace operations to perform the stabilization and peace enforcement missions that have become critical to the maintenance of international peace and security.
Chapter 3: Filling the UN’s Mandate-Doctrine Gap

If the UN cannot conduct stabilization and peace enforcement with either its current doctrine or a new one, nor can it abdicate its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, then it must look to other actors to conduct peace operations if it wants to fill its mandate-doctrine gap. Despite the UN’s primacy for conducting peace operations, it is not the only actor with the mandate and capability to do so, and capacity limitations are increasing awareness within the UN of the need to share the burden of peace operations. The HIPPO report and the AU’s response to it demonstrate high-level, universal calls for increased partnership, a greater role for regional organizations, and a “mutually agreed division of labor to foster coherence and limit competition”.91 The next chapter of this thesis will build upon these calls for greater burden-sharing and cooperation by first analyzing the doctrines of relevant actors that conduct peace operations in Africa and then proposing a specific model for strategic partnership using the framework for peace operations identified in the preceding chapter.

African-led missions can be grouped into two distinct categories: those conducted by regional organizations, including the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and various Regional Mechanisms (RMs); and those conducted by ad-hoc coalitions.92 European actors have also bolstered international responses to violent conflict along similar lines. The EU has supplemented robust peacekeeping operations with narrowly scoped stabilization missions of its own, while the UK has conducted stabilization

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missions in Sierra Leone and France has led aggressive unilateral counterterrorism operations in Mali and the Sahel.

This thesis acknowledges organizational differences among the AU and its subordinate organizations, including RECs, and RMs, as well as the challenges that areas of divergence and overlap can create. However, this thesis only distinguishes between regional organizations and ad-hoc coalitions of the willing as distinct actors who can conduct peace operations. This is in recognition of the differences in force generation and willingness to use force, despite having similar doctrine given often overlapping membership. In Africa, regional organizations and ad-hoc coalitions of the willing are conducted by both European actors and by African countries and organizations, each of which bring their own doctrines and operational guidance shaping the types of missions they can be postured to conduct.

**African Doctrine**

A number of African organizations and institutions conduct Peace Support Operations (PSO) across the continent. The doctrinal guidance for the ASF alone is scattered over 80 documents and decisions, and efforts are underway to consolidate and update this doctrine for AU PSOs.  

Over the last 20 years, PSOs have been conducted at the highest level by the AU and various RECs, though the more recent trend has seen what “are better understood as coalitions of the willing, rather than as multinational-led and -deployed operations as foreseen in the African Standby Force”.

These various

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organizations overlap, creating a complex network of strategic policies, operational guidance, and practical norms. While recognizing that these various multilateral institutions often do not act as coherent actors, and that African doctrine “emphasize[s] situational factors and downplay[s] general models and universal prescriptions,” this section nevertheless discerns from both published documents and established practice several principles that guide African PSOs.95

**Doctrinal Foundation**

The Constitutive Act of the African Union, created in 2000, sets out several objectives and principles to guide the way the Union functions and the purpose it serves. Two articles in particular set it apart from other multilateral institutions. Article 4(h) establishes, with UNSC authorization, the right to intervene in “grave circumstances,” specifically war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, and was intended to address conflicts in collapsed states with no institutional structures to protect civilians.96 Additionally, article 4(j) was intended to support weak states’ inability to protect its own citizens by affirming Member States’ right to request intervention from the African Union to restore peace and security. The AU was the first organization to give itself such a broad writ, which was a radical departure from its predecessor organization, the Organization for African Unity (OAU).97

In addition to the AU’s founding documents, the Policy Document that established the ASF provided six mission scenarios that the document sought to address.

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97 Ibid, 38.
These range from low-intensity military advisor missions and military observer missions - scenarios 1 and 2 respectively - to complex multidimensional missions with low-level spoilers and high-intensity, kinetic military interventions - scenarios 5 and 6 respectively. In 2006, the AU released a specific PSO doctrine recognizing the range multidimensional PSOs the organization had conducted and reinforcing the operating environments and types of missions outline above. This doctrine provided yet another framework for PSO missions including four types of activities - prevention, intervention, regeneration, and sustainment – that PSOs can conduct while in one of four ‘stances’: prevention, enforcement, stabilization, and transitional.\(^98\)

Despite the existence of the AU’s published PSO doctrine, authors have critiqued both its formation and its utility. Its creation in the early 2000s was based on little-to-no experience conducting peace operations, and thus “largely reflect the doctrinal and policy assumptions of NATO, EU, and the UN at the time.”\(^99\) Fitz-Gerald concludes that “while a capstone ASF PSO doctrine exists, it remains little-known, unused, and outdated.”\(^100\)

This is due in part to its reliance on the UN’s principles and practices, which limited its utility for guiding conflicts specific to the African context. In 2007, the AU reviewed the doctrinal guidance it published four years earlier, but this review’s findings failed to sufficiently reflect the strategic policy and security challenges across the continent. It was never formally approved, “leaving an aging and outdated 2003 ASF PSO doctrine

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\(^100\) Fitz-Gerald, “Towards a Common Doctrine,” 617.
which conformed to UN practice and which failed to capture the organization’s more recent experience in peace operations.\textsuperscript{101}

Therefore, like the UN, the AU has conducted peace operations that go beyond its claimed and published doctrine, and the AU’s established practice offers a further doctrinal foundation than published documents alone. De Coning et al recognize the emergence of an “African model of peace operations” under which the AU primarily conducts stabilization missions.\textsuperscript{102} This includes enforcing law and order and comprehensive protection of civilian measures, as well as multidimensional missions. These authors term the majority of the AU’s operations as stabilization, but acknowledge that this is driven more by practical realities and UN constraints than a strategic choice, and they call on the AU to better define this term.

The authors’ broad use of the term stabilization precludes explicit reference to the AU’s role in conducting peace enforcement, but the tasks they describe demonstrate the AU’s practice in conducting missions that use strategic force as well. These tasks include “protect[ing] governments and their civilians against aggressors… using force and other means to help local authorities to contain aggressors…and helping states in crisis to restore order and stability,” including extending state authority throughout their territory.\textsuperscript{103} This often necessitates operating in support of and alongside host nation security forces and include offensive operations that require intelligence capabilities and stealth. They also acknowledge that many AU missions are “high-intensity”, which characterizes peace enforcement missions more so than multidimensional stabilization missions.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, 623.
\textsuperscript{102} de Coning et al eds., The Future of African Peace Operations.
\textsuperscript{103} de Coning et al eds., The Future of African Peace Operations, 10.
The AU’s old and outdated doctrine leaves it with a mandate-doctrine gap similar to the UN. Many authors have acknowledged that AU doctrine is “out of sync with the challenges faced by African peace operations on the ground,” and there is a similar push for to the AU to update its doctrine to match practice.\textsuperscript{104} In contrast to the theoretical and practical debates surrounding UN doctrine, however, calls for the AU to “boldly articulate its own doctrine and strategy” are largely unanimous amid widespread recognition that a doctrine based on dated assumptions from other multilateral institutions is insufficiently tailored for the African context.\textsuperscript{105} Similarly, the UN’s principles, while evolving, have guided its operations through at least three distinct generations of peacekeeping. The AU lacks any other independent, established practice for conducting peace operations it can fall back to. Finally, the AU should not simply rely on the same doctrine as the UN, as overlapping doctrine removes the comparative advantage that is the foundation for effective burden-sharing and strategic partnership. Rather, the AU should have a broader doctrine that enables it to conduct the full range of peace operations envisioned in its founding scenarios.

\textit{Key Principles & Comparison to UN}

While this doctrinal foundation fails to provide a succinct list of principles to guide AU PSOs, several key themes can be identified that provide for more aggressive forms of peace operations than the UN’s principles of peacekeeping. First among these is the principle of “non-indifference” for the protection of civilians. The peacekeeping failures of the early 1990s- namely, Somalia and Rwanda – prompted great reflection at

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, 3.
the OAU as well as the UN. The OAU’s primary principle of state sovereignty resulted in inaction in response to these crises, and it was a key driver for the formation of a more responsive, less ‘indifferent,’ and ultimately more interventionist AU.  

Non-indifference rests on the principle of collective responsibility, which “make[s] every member of the AU responsible for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.” This notion reframes the OAU’s emphasis on sovereignty that protected governments committing atrocities against their own people, mirroring the theoretical developments that led to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. It also asserts that only the AU as a collective is able to authorize an intervention, serving as a bulwark against interventions by individual states – particularly from outside the African region. Notably, however, “Africa’s collective responsibility is not confined to preventing and stopping mass atrocities, but also extends to peace, security, and other principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act such as democracy.” Similarly, this collective responsibility allows for African states to “interfere with or without the consent of the target country…set[ting] the thresholds for military intervention lower than those outlined in the legal code of any continental organization.” This AU’s lower threshold for consent enables it to use the level of force often required to conduct stabilization and peace enforcement missions.

Additionally, the AU uses the term ‘peace support operations,’ which recognizes a “spectrum of operations that is not defined by the level of force, impartiality, or

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108 Berhe and de Waal, ”Peace Missions in Africa,” 2.
109 Tieku, ”The African Union,” 36.
consent, but rather by function and purpose.”110 This is rooted in the AU’s willingness to undertake higher-risk peace enforcement tasks compared to the UN’s more cautious approach.111 While the HIPPO report made similar calls to conduct peace operations along a spectrum, there is a bureaucratic resistance to this type of change, and stark distinctions remain in the UN’s conceptualization of peace operations.112 In contrast, the removal of the stark distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement gives the AU and its subordinate organizations greater flexibility to respond to changing circumstances in the field. The AU visualized its conception of peace operations with the following framework in its PSO doctrine. Notably, it uses consent and level of required capability as the variables that define peace operations, rather than the UN’s concept of the environment’s place along the conflict lifecycle.

The above graphic also depicts the AU’s understanding of the concepts of proportionality and minimum use of force. It recognizes these are fluid concepts, “understood as principles of planning, rather than as principles that define AU peace support operations.” Consent and impartiality are similarly recognized as important values, but ultimately not defining. Rather, these are variable concepts that are determined by judgments on what the mission needs to achieve its mandate and the degree of risk it will face.

These flexible applications of consent, impartiality, and use of force result in the significant differences for the environment in which the AU and the UN are comfortable

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114 de Coning, “Peace Enforcement in Africa,” 149.
operating. While the UN has increasingly deployed amidst ongoing conflict to halt violence and protect civilians, these are seen as exceptions, rather than the rule. In contrast, most “AU operations to date have been deployed amidst ongoing conflict, and have aimed at halting the conflict and stabilizing the security situation.” Furthermore, despite claiming to use UN operational and policy guidance as the foundation for AU doctrine “whenever possible,” key features distinguish the AU from the UN and make the AU doctrinally suited to conduct stabilization operations and peace enforcement. Scenario 6 and the principle of collective security enable the AU to conduct more robust offensive operations. The sum total of these policies, guidance, and doctrine is an organization with “a mandate to help resolve interstate and intrastate conflicts, deal with terrorist threats and engage in peacebuilding activities.”

**Key European Doctrines**

European actors have also conducted peace operations in Africa, though considerably more limited in number and scope than the African Union and RECs. The UN has asked the EU to deploy its battlegroups as a quick reaction force, but the EU has been reluctant to set a precedent for this type of conflict management response. Instead, the EU has conducted stabilization activities to build the capacity of weak states. These missions tend to be missions with a discrete purpose to train the military or security services, such as EUTAM in both Mali and the Central African Republic. In contrast to the UN, capacity-building tasks are consistent with EU doctrine as outlined in

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117 Karlsrud, *The UN at War*, 127.
the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which provides for CSDP operations to support third countries when combatting terrorism in their territories.\(^{118}\) As a result, almost all CDSP operations support existing state authorities often necessitating operations addressing intrastate conflict.

Among major global powers, France has played a leading role in conducting peace operations and stabilization across Africa, with notable doctrinal divergences from the UN. Like the AU, Paris views peace operations along a spectrum, and it uses this framework to justify more robust operations. Use of force is at the center of French doctrine, and France’s leadership prefers for all tools to be available to the French ‘warrior’.\(^ {119}\) As a result, French stabilization doctrine is defined by the level of coercion used during deployments. The beginning of an operation, the intervention phase, is the most coercive, which decreases as it moves into stabilization and then normalization phases.\(^ {120}\) Coercion has a negative relationship to the intended length of a deployment; intervention is intended to be a short-term endeavor in comparison to the longer-term ‘normalization’ operations. Paris prefers to operate on the former end of this spectrum, looking to other actors, in particular the UN, to fill the gap on the latter end.

As a result of the above factors, with few exceptions, France has tended to deploy alongside UN peace operations in Africa, rather than as part of them. From Paris’ perspective, UN peacekeeping is an ineffective tool for crisis management but can be a useful “exit strategy” after French or regional forces conduct the short-term, high-


\(^{119}\) Karlsrud, *The UN at War*, 43.

\(^{120}\) Alexandra Novosseloff and Thierry Tardy, “France and the Evolution of the UN Peacekeeping Doctrine,” in de Coning et al, eds. *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine*, 98.
coercion operations for they are doctrinally more suited.\textsuperscript{121} At the Security Council, Paris’s desire to make the UN a relevant partner for addressing contemporary security challenges like terrorist threats in its former colonies had lead it to be a leading voice in more robust UN operations.\textsuperscript{122} However, some authors have questioned the extent to which this approach of offensive military operations that contribute to a larger peacebuilding endeavor has been militarily tested.\textsuperscript{123}

\textbf{Proposed Partnership Framework}

The preceding doctrinal analysis suggests the following general division of labor among peace operators on the African continent, using the framework identified in Chapter 2 of this thesis: The UN undertakes traditional peacekeeping missions in situations of interstate armed conflict; regional organizations, including the AU, RECs, and the EU undertake stabilization missions; and ad-hoc coalitions of the willing, including either African-led missions, such as the G5, or single-nation ad-hoc ‘coalitions,’ such as France, undertake peace enforcement. In some cases, the UN may still conduct stabilization missions, particularly in the near-term as regional organizations’ capabilities are improved to meet their doctrine. However, it can only do so effectively if combatants have a genuine commitment to the peace process and integration into the host state when it is not a party the conflict, which is an increasingly infrequent condition of intrastate conflicts during peace operations’ rapid deployment timelines.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, 99-100.
\textsuperscript{122} Karlsrud, \textit{The UN at War}, 44.
\textsuperscript{123} Novosseloff and Tardy, “France,” 99-100.
Karlsrud’s arguments support this division of labor. He claims that it ‘may be advisable’ to mandate stabilization and peace enforcement, which pose security, reputation, and legitimacy risks for the UN, to regional organizations and coalitions “to decide on a range of issues that may be more constrained in a UN setting”. While the strategic doctrine of the latter two actors within a particular region remains largely the same given the overlap among member states of both, two key factors distinguish their ability to effectively conduct stabilization and peace enforcement. First, the existing bureaucracies that accompany regional organizations give them a greater capacity to conduct longer-duration and more complex multidimensional stabilization operations. Second, the national interest that drives TCCs’ contribution to coalitions results in their willingness to accept the risk that accompanies strategic use of force. As Behre & de Waal explain, the basic principle for regional organizations is consensus among participating members, while coalitions depend on voluntary participation. Even if not all members of a regional organization contribute to a PSO, this distinction in force generation has implications for the use of force each actor can effectively wield.\(^\text{125}\)

\(^{124}\) Karlsrud, *The UN at War*, 103-104.

\(^{125}\) Berhe and de Waal, ”Peace Missions in Africa,” 20.
Regional organizations are doctrinally best suited to conduct stabilization missions in most contemporary intrastate armed conflicts, and should orient their peace operations towards filling this gap. AU doctrine enables it to use greater force than the UN’s doctrine allows, which is necessary to manage any of the more complicated situations associated with intrastate conflict. This function is also consistent with scenario 5 in the ASF’s Policy Framework, which provides for “complex multidimensional...
peacekeeping missions with low-level spoilers.”

For African conflicts, the AU and its subordinate organizations should conduct more comprehensive and multidimensional stabilization operations, supplemented by the EU performing discrete stabilization and capacity building tasks.

In contrast, peace enforcement – or interventions in AU parlance – should be conducted by ad hoc coalitions of the willing. They have the same flexible doctrinal principles as regional organizations that enable them to address intrastate conflicts. However, many authors have noted the reality that national interest is a driving factor for contributions to the most robust peace enforcement operations. TCCs will only have sufficient political will to assume the high-risk associated with high-intensity counterterrorism, counter-insurgency, and interventions missions when their national security is at stake. This trend is reflected among UN TCCs, as increasingly robust mandates have coincided with increasing contributions from neighboring states. In these circumstances, they will want to operate with the greatest efficacy, which includes retaining command and control of their own forces. As Karlsrud acknowledges, “there is an inverse relationship between the level of force a mission is expected to apply and the willingness of TCCs to cede command and control to an international organization.” This is also consistent with the AU’s recognition of the need for coherence that accompanies intervention or scenario 6 missions. The ASF’s Policy Framework, recognizing its own capacity limitations, advises that “intervention missions, particularly

128 Karlsrud, *The UN at War*, 115.
those involving an opposed early deployment...are best conducted by a coalition under a lead nation.”

Finally, this leaves the UN to conduct the types of traditional peacekeeping missions it has done for over 70 years. Its doctrine was originally developed for interstate conflict management, and thus the UN is best positioned for these types of operations. Critics may argue that if the UN is relegated to conducting only peacekeeping, it will cede its primacy for maintaining international peace and security. However, the UN and the AU, via the HIPPO report and the Protocol document that established the Peace and Security Council respectively, both recognize the UN’s primacy. Furthermore, by abdicating its role in providing or restoring security – particularly security that favors one side of a conflict – the UN can increase its ability to act as a credible mediator. This can free up its capacity to focus on political resolutions to conflict – in coordination with regional- and coalition-led operations on the ground – to better meet calls to give primacy to politics to find lasting solutions to conflicts. Indeed, the UN already plays a leading role in ensuring that African-led PSOs are nested in a political strategy and coordinating the comprehensive international conflict management response. The inverse scenario risks the UN losing its legitimacy as an impartial arbiter and ability to perform political, humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development functions.

This framework is in line with the AU’s conceptualization of peace operations, which enables it to fill the role of performing more robust operations, albeit with logistical support until organic capacity is developed. The level of force a peace operation

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132 Karlsrud, The UN at War, 160.
is expected to use is outlined in its mandate as a direct result of the mission environment and the level of capability required. These are the two factors the AU uses to define its PSOs, and they are more practical than an operating environment’s place along the conflict lifecycle. It is also largely fits with the scenarios the AU identified in its ASF Policy Framework, with scenario 5 missions conducted by regional organizations and scenario 6 by coalitions of the willing. Stabilization in particular often requires engagement with sub-state actors, which is can be difficult to do without undercutting the host government and risking its consent to the peace operation’s presence. This is an even greater challenge when the host nation is a perpetrator of violence and implementing a protection of civilians mandate might require contravening the host nation’s security forces. Overall, the AU’s more flexible interpretation of consent and increased willingness to use force makes it doctrinally more suited that the UN to conducted stabilization tasks that often risk the mission’s impartiality.

Furthermore, the overlapping doctrine between regional organizations and coalitions gives them yet another comparative advantage over the UN that enables them to operate amid interstate conflict. The distinction between these two actors is ultimately organizational rather than doctrinal. The more flexible application of key doctrinal principles results in fewer restrictions on the use of forces, enabling more flexible responses to changing circumstances on the ground. This allows them to operationalize the spectrum of peace operations parts of the UN aspire to, and it removes a key constraint to effective UN responses when security conditions deteriorated around deployed operations, resulting in many of the UN’s most infamous peacekeeping failures.

133 Youssef Mahmoud, “People-Centered Approaches to Peace: At Cross Roads Between Geopolitics, Norms, and Practice” in de Coning and Peter, eds. UN Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order, 95.
Some may say that this division of labor already exists via various forms of partnership peacekeeping. Many such proposals are based on sequencing, which involve African organizations acting as the “tip of the spear,” for conflict response. This is in part due to the UN’s force generation challenges and doctrinal limitations that have driven it to rely on regional organizations to “act as first responders to emerging crises.” However, this time-based conception results in mission success being defined by transferring authority to the UN, regardless of the conditions on the ground. For a sustainable peace, “a transfer of authority to the UN must not become the overriding objective of the operation: the case-specific political objectives in themselves should be primary, and the AU mission must itself include the components and capabilities necessary for achieving them.” Furthermore, rarely is any peace provider willing to commit forces to what is expected to be a long-duration mission, which often results in the UN filling the gap for sustained stabilization missions because it has a greater capacity, despite not having the doctrinal foundation to do so effectively. The model proposed in this thesis disaggregates partnership from time or place along a conflict lifecycle, placing the focus for partnership on the mission objective.

Other partnership models are based on the principle of subsidiarity, where threats to international peace and security are dealt with at the most local level. This has a similar outcome to models recognizing a “de facto division of labor” that has emerged between the AU and the UN, where the AU addresses conflicts earlier in the conflict lifecycle, and the UN deploys when chances are higher for a sustainable peace. This is a similar model to the one proposed in this thesis. However, the proposed model has a

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136 Karlsrud, The UN at War, 128-129.
broader understanding of what are considered ‘complicated’ conflicts, which include any that are intrastate. It shifts the responsibility for some stabilization missions in Africa to regional organizations rather than the UN. To be sure, great efforts towards capacity building and funding will be necessary for implementation to ensure sufficient force generation and sustainment. Additionally, the AU in particular will need to expand its doctrine to include deployments “in high-intensity, non-permissive situations that the UN peace operation model was not originally designed for,” yet the AU has greater flexibility to develop a new doctrine than the UN.\(^{137}\)

Finally, this thesis responds to widespread calls for “institutionalizing a new African peace operation model to better reflect the kind of short-duration, high-intensity, multi-actor stabilization operations that have become the norm.”\(^{138}\) It goes beyond previous proposals by further defining the type of regional actor that will respond to interstate armed conflicts, based on the use of force that is expected to be used. This framework relieves the burden on the UN to conduct stabilization for which its doctrine is not equipped by recognizing the comparative doctrinal advantage regional organizations have by calling on regional organizations to conduct longer-duration and lower-intensity stabilization operations in addition to peace enforcement. Most strategically, the HIPPO report recommends that the UN and AU “should define evolving and complementary roles, which bring the combined capacities, influence and experience of each organization to bear in ensuring a coherent response in each context.”\(^{139}\) The proposal outlined above seeks to do just that.

\(^{138}\) Ibid, 1.
\(^{139}\) HIPPO Report, 63.
Chapter 4: Peace Operations in Mali - The Effects of Doctrine in Action

This section evaluates the effectiveness of peace operations conducted by five different actors in Mali over the last seven years to determine which actors, from a doctrinal perspective, are best able to the stabilization and peace enforcement tasks required for contemporary conflict management. Mali was selected as a case study because it is emblematic of the types of contemporary intrastate conflicts that the UN’s peacekeeping principles prevent it from adequately addressing. These characteristics include intra-state reconciliation via a partial or non-comprehensive peace process; deteriorating security conditions marked by a rise in violence after the UN mission has deployed; counterterrorism or counterinsurgency threats, including defining combatants as such; and the absence of state authority, the restoration of which includes supporting an often predatory host government. Additionally, every type of peace actor outlined in chapter III has conducted a peace operation since the outbreak of violence in 2012, allowing for a comprehensive comparative analysis within the framework outlined in the preceding chapters. These actors will be assessed in the doctrinal order they were described in previous chapters, and consideration will be given to different real world conditions such as differing deployment timelines and varying mandate, which will be noted as relevant throughout the analysis.

Conflict Context

Mali from 2012-2013 saw a rapid deterioration of security and a tumultuous series of political events, including a coup and the collapse of central government in the northern part of the country. The crisis was sparked by the fourth rebellion of ethnic Tuareg groups in the north in the more than 50 years since Mali’s independence from
France. Driven by the return of fighters with weapons from Libya after its own revolution 2011, Mali’s rebellion was rooted in years of failed peace agreements and reconciliation efforts between the Tuaregs in the north and the central government in the south. In contrast to the previous three rounds of conflict, the 2012 rebellion had the addition of terrorist and transnational criminal groups to the domestic armed groups calling for independence.\footnote{Pierre Buyoya, "The Recurrent Security Crisis in Mali and the Role of the African Union," \textit{Prism} 5, no. 2. (2015), 64.} For the first few months of 2012, this coalition, comprising four main armed groups\footnote{These groups include the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) and the UN-designated terrorist groups Ansar al-Dine (AAD), Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).}, took significant territory and key towns as the Malian military presence steadily ceded their presence in the north.

The poorly equipped and poorly trained Malian military turned on the government in Bamako, which it accused of providing insufficient support to address the Tuareg rebellion. In March 2012, military officers deposed the president a month prior to scheduled elections before handing over power to a civilian transitional government. Over the following nine months, northern armed groups capitalized on the withdrawal of state security services to declare independence and consolidate their control of the north, while struggling to address infighting emerging within their coalition. By the end of 2012, international conflict management efforts centered on regional mediation, while ECOWAS gradually prepared to deploy its own peace operation if diplomatic efforts failed.\footnote{Buyoya, "The Recurrent Security Crisis," 67.}

In January 2013, however, the trajectory of conflict changed, catalyzing a greater sense of urgency from Mali’s international partners. That month, the loss of Konna – the
last government-controlled town north of centrally-located Mopti – drove fears that the rebellion had ambitions southward and would threaten Bamako.\textsuperscript{143} The offensive on Konna would prove to be a strategic miscalculation for the north;\textsuperscript{144} the transitional government requested French military assistance, whose rapid response restored state control in most northern towns within weeks and led to the eventual deployment of no fewer than five different international military responses to the conflict over the following five years.

The international response to the above events has been wide and varied. Since 2013, at least four different actors have deployed distinct peace operations to assist in the restoration of security to the Mali’s north and stability to the country overall. The French Operation Serval, supplemented by Chadian troops and limited force multipliers from Western allies, would be considered a peace enforcement mission conducted by a coalition of the willing as it used strategic force against Islamist insurgents in order to preserve Mali’s territorial integrity. The African Union subsequently deployed AFISMA, a peace enforcement mission conducted by a regional organization. The UN then quickly took over for MINUSMA to deploy the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to conduct stabilization and some peace enforcement tasks. The contemporaneously-deployed EU Training Mission (EUTM) would be considered a limited-scope stabilization mission conducted by another regional organization due to its specific capacity-building tasks to support the Government of Mali’s security services. These actors have conducted a range of stabilization and peace enforcement tasks; the

\footnote{\textsuperscript{143} UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, S/2013/189, ¶ 3 (25 April 2013), \url{https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1326964_eng.pdf}}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{144} Buyoya, “The Recurrent Security Crisis,” 65.}
following analysis will evaluate their mandates against each organizations’ respective doctrine, determining impact on the missions’ performance.

**United Nations Peace Operation: MINUSMA**

In April 2013, UNSCR 2100 mandated that a UN force would assume responsibility for stabilizing Mali.\(^{145}\) Three months later, and less than one month after a partial peace agreement was signed among Malian combatants in Ouagadougou, the UN created MINUSMA to conduct key stabilization tasks on 1 July. MINUSMA’s key tasks included supporting the restoration of state authority to the north, implementing the terms of the peace agreement or transitional road map, and protecting civilians.\(^{146}\) Over the course of the next three years, however, security conditions deteriorated as the parallel French deployment withdrew, and in 2016, the UNSC mandated MINUSMA for the first time to “counter asymmetric attacks” using all necessary means, including against named combatants.\(^{147}\) This shift in MINUSMA’s use of force from non-strategic to strategic moved the peace operation beyond a stabilization mission into peace enforcement, though the key tasks it performed did not change. The following analysis will illustrate the constraints UN’s doctrine places on its ability to perform MINUSMA’s key three tasks, which are essential components of addressing intrastate conflict and core tasks of most current UN operations, particularly amid a deteriorating security situation.

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146 Ibid, ¶ 17.
147 S/RES/2295, ¶ 19(d).
Re-establishment of State Authority and Impartiality

In the state-centric UN, stabilization is “too often confused with the reestablishment of state authority part of the mandate, when the weak and contested state authority is often part of the problem rather than the solution.”¹⁴⁸ At the same time, re-establishing state authority inherently conflicts with the UN’s principle of impartiality when there remain combatants or armed groups that continue to contest state authority. MINUSMA demonstrates the challenges UN peace operations face when conducting stabilization and peace enforcement; its efforts to re-establish the government of Mali’s presence in the north has created key operational and security challenges for its peacekeepers and risked the legitimacy of the mission overall.

Mandating UN missions to support the re-establishment of state authority is based on the assumption that there is a comprehensive peace agreement in place and that there is minimal opposition or question about the state’s legitimacy. When the state’s legitimacy is contested, a peace operation cannot support the re-establishment of state authority without backing the state against those that oppose it. If a peace operation continues to conduct efforts to re-establish state authority against the state’s perceived opponents, it risks becoming an arm of the state, which the state uses to clear away armed groups without engaging in meaningful dialogue.¹⁴⁹ This was a risk for MINUSMA and created tensions with Bamako who wanted the UN to be more aggressive in fighting terrorists, while the UN claimed to want to remain impartial.¹⁵⁰ The partial peace agreement in June 2013, which excluded two of the four northern rebel groups as well as

¹⁴⁹ Stian Kjeksrud and Lotte Vermeij, “Protecting Governments From Insurgencies” in de Coning et al, eds. UN Peacekeeping Doctrine, 237.
¹⁵⁰ Karlsrud, The UN at War, 71-72.
terrorist groups, and subsequent breakdown in security prohibited MINUSMA from implementing its mandate to provide “support for the reestablishment of State authority throughout the country” and compromised any UN claims to impartiality.151

The challenge of extending state authority with impartiality and legitimacy is exacerbated when the state in question corrupt or predatory, which many elements of the Malian armed forces were perceived as in the north. MINUMSA’s human rights observers documented 608 cases of human rights violations and abuses Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Mopti, Séguéla and Timbuktu regions and in Bamako between January 2016 and June 2017. Of these, 288 were attributable to state actors – more than were attributable to either signatory armed groups or terrorist groups.152 MINUSMA officials cited building of police stations as an example of their stabilization efforts; yet, one of the primary factors contributing to state-perpetrated human rights abuses was Malian security forces’ counterterrorism operations and illegal detainments.153 In short, MINUSMA’s mandate to support a predatory state created a paradox, where “the support for the extension of the sovereign space and sovereign agency of the Malian state clashes with the ability of the mission to protect civilians,” another one of MINUSMA’s core tasks and a key element of stabilization missions.154

Finally, MINUSMA’s challenges in extending state authority also worsened following the withdrawal of Malian security forces from the north in 2014. Local Tuareg groups began setting up parallel administrations, leaving MINUSMA with the challenge

151 S/RES/2100, ¶ 16.
153 Gorur, Defining the Boundaries, 16.
of how to engage them – necessary to meet the humanitarian assistance and local governance elements of its mandate – without legitimizing them.\textsuperscript{155} The government in Bamako, trying to prevent MINUSMA from legitimizing its opponents and capitalizing on the state-centric UN’s requirement for host nation consent, effectively limited MINUSMA from any meaningful activity beyond facilitating humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{156} This led to allegations of impartiality from all sides and MINUSMA being “often caught between communities criticizing the UN for doing too little, armed groups suspecting the mission to be partial to the government, and a government wary of the UN indeed legitimizing these groups if it started implementing stabilization projects focused on reestablishing basic services.”\textsuperscript{157}

MINUSMA, as a UN mission, cannot conceptualize stabilization without including the re-establishment of state authority as a key component. Yet this task contravenes the UN’s principle of impartiality, counteracts peace efforts when conducted in support of a corrupt or predatory state, and creates fundamental challenges to the mission’s legitimacy and effectiveness. At best this can result in criticism from all relevant actors and allegations of impotence for the mission; at worst, it places the security of peacekeepers at risk and furthers the conflict the mission deployed to stabilize.

\textit{Peace Agreement Implementation and Consent}

The absence of effective state authority has challenged MINUSMA’s ability to implement other parts of its mandate, including addressing structural drivers of conflict, supporting the political process, and implementing the peace agreement. Implementing

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid, 245.
\textsuperscript{156} Boutellis, “Can the UN Stabilize Mali?” 6.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid, 6.
the June 2014 Ouagadougou Agreement met a UN prerequisite for deployment, established the political basis under which MINUSMA could operate, and provided the peace agreement the UN mission could support. However, this is predicated on the UN’s faulty assumption that the signing of a peace agreement equates to commitment to a peace process. Many interstate conflicts include either a non-comprehensive peace agreement, in which only some of the numerous combatants to a conflict have agreed to the terms of a ceasefire, or weak political commitment to the peace agreement; in MINUSMA’s case, both of these conditions applied.

The Ouagadougou Agreement gained acceptance from the government in Bamako and half of the primary northern armed groups. Algiers led efforts to capitalize on the nascent peace found in this agreement by focusing on bringing armed groups together to form a coherent platform for negotiations. It found partial success with what would become known as the Algiers Accord in 2015 with the signing of a tripartite peace agreement between the government and two coalitions of northern armed groups, while excluding extremist groups. Despite the initial success in bringing six major armed groups together to form two negotiating bodies, the combatants shifted their positions as relative military capabilities evolved and to best position themselves to maximize political gains both during the eight-month negotiating period. Moreover, this complexity among combatants is not limited to non-government forces, as one of the primary armed groups openly supports the government and many consider it to be a proxy force.

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159 Boutellis, “Can the UN Stabilize Mali?” 10-11.
MINUSMA also has been unable to provide the security assurances necessary for combatants’ continued commitment to the peace process, despite this being a core theory of change for UN peacekeeping. After political dialogue broke down in 2014, armed groups resisted cantonment in the absence of negotiations, while Bamako has resisted moving forward on the security arrangements it committed to, even though both parties’ have stated their commitment to inclusive dialogue.\textsuperscript{160} There has been minimal progress towards reconciliation between the north and the south, and as recently as December 2018, the UN Special Representative noted the “limited progress achieved in the implementation of the peace agreement” and no progress standing up and turning over security responsibilities to interim authorities.\textsuperscript{161,162}

The existence of a peace agreement is a sufficient pre-requisite for peacekeeping in interstate conflict, which typically comprises two combatants who can make credible promise to abide by a ceasefire or peace agreement. They can also provide “formal consent [which] is supposed to provide the UN with a minimum of political will and support for the operation. Now, however, some UN peacekeeping operations are being authorized in the absence of clearly identifiable parties to the conflict or a viable peace process.”\textsuperscript{163} The Mali case demonstrates how challenging it can be to obtain consent of the main conflict parties, given fragmentation of armed groups. It shows conditions typical of interstate conflict, where multiple and often splintering armed groups preclude ceasefires from finding an agreement among all combatants, and political commitment to

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid, 5.
\textsuperscript{162} Lotze, ”MINUSMA,” 864.
\textsuperscript{163} Kjeksrud and Vermeij, “Protecting Governments” in de Coning et al, eds. UN Peacekeeping Doctrine, 238.
the peace agreement can wax and wane. In most extreme cases, such as South Sudan, combatants may agree to the terms of a ceasefire only to garner international support for their negotiating positions while allowing their armed forces time to rest and refit for the next round of conflict. As a UN peace operation, MINUSMA lacks the doctrinal basis for robust use of force necessary to overcome these conditions, challenging its efforts to implement its mandate, as well as the peace agreement itself.

Protection of Civilians and Use of Force

In the absence of a political settlement, MINUSMA has struggled to effectively implement the protection of civilians component of its mandate – the aim of the mission at its creation and a core task of almost all UN missions currently deployed – without stretching the UN principle on use of force. This is the UN principle that has been stretched the furthest with the reinterpretation to allow use of force “in defense of the mandate” – essentially, to accomplish any task the UNSC deems appropriate. Despite this wide doctrinal writ, as a UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA is ill-equipped to provide widespread protection of civilians against insurgent and extremist groups in a high-threat area. Insurgents have exploited MINUSMA’s ineffectiveness to turn the population against the mission, using violence to create the perception that being close to MINUSMA increased the risk of being attacked. This led to protests against the mission’s presence in key population centers such as Kidal, degrading local consent amid MINUSMA’s inability to effectively protect civilians, even though MINUSMA’s actions were in line with its mandate.

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165 Ibid, 237.
MINUSMA’s challenge in providing protection of civilians began in the months following its deployment, when it was unable to provide security outside of major population centers. The following year, in 2014, French forces drew down to 1,000 personnel following presidential elections, leading to an uptick in violence against civilians due to the weak Malian government and international presence. This left MINUSMA “overstretched and under attack from the armed Islamist movements,” and resulted in the UN being forced use increasingly robust use of force, including counterterrorism operations, in a way that contradicts with the intention behind its doctrinal principles in order to implement its mandate.\footnote{Lotze, “MINUSMA,” 864.} This deterioration of security exacerbated local communities’ distrust of MINUSMA and perceptions of its inability to improve the situation on the ground.\footnote{Daniel, “Building Sovereigns?” 244.}

Part of this uptick in violence was due to increasing violent extremist activity, and forced the UN to conduct its first foray into counterterrorism operations in order to try to implement the three core components of its mandate. In 2016, amid the worsening security situation and faltering peace process, MINUSMA’s mandate was broadened and it “explicitly authorized to ensure the protections of civilians by assuming a robust and proactive posture, including direct coercive operations. According to a MINUSMA senior official, this means potential pre-emptive strikes against terrorist and extremis groups.”\footnote{Ibid, 242-243.} Furthermore, MINUSMA’s mandates have also explicitly named AQIM, Ansar al-Din, MUJAO, and al-Mourabitoune as terrorist groups threatening peace and security in the region and beyond, contravening any perception or claim to impartiality.\footnote{S/RES/2295, ¶ 42.} This shift
from non-strategic use of force to strategic use of force targeting specific groups moved the mission from stabilization to peace enforcement and moved ‘UN peace operations across the line drawn by the HIPPO report.’170

MINUSMA’s inability to provide adequate protection of civilians, or even its own personnel, and reliance on increasingly robust use of force has negatively impacted its efforts to implement the other parts of its mandate. The response of many contingents to this high-threat operating area has resulted in “bunkerized” troops and civilian staff, often isolated, surviving on minimum rations, poorly protected against IEDs.171 The continued insecurity has “fuelled local discontent and supported the resistance of the Tuareg rebel movements to disarmament and cantonment,” hindering key components of the peace process.172 Similarly, given its support for the extension of state authority, “the de facto partiality of MINUSMA has resulted in a range of retaliatory attacks by various insurgent groups directly targeting the UN mission.”173 The UN’s efforts to implement a restoration of state authority mandate in these conditions has placed its own personnel at great risk, ultimately leading it to become the UN’s most deadly mission.

Finally, of greatest concern for an assessment of the UN’s ability to conduct stabilization and peace enforcement is how the preceding factors relate to one another, as the UN’s principles can only serve as a peacekeeper’s armor when they reinforce one another. In Mali, however, MINUSMA is attempting to extend state authority without a comprehensive peace agreement in place, meaning that its support for state structures

170 Karlsrud, *The UN at War*, 96.
171 Ibid, 102.
supports a party to the conflict and inherently conflicts with MINUSMA’s impartiality. As de Coning explains, MINUSMA’s support to extending state authority catches it in a ‘counterinsurgency logic’ where it cannot simply conduct protection of civilians, but also has to win their support and trust alongside and in support of the Malian government. Similarly, “the essence of MINUSMA’s stabilization efforts remain in the realm of politics and developmental support, coupled with armed protection of civilians and support for the expansion of the sovereign state. However, as MINUSMA’s record has repeatedly shown, it is extremely difficult to achieve coherence in all these tasks.

**Peace Operations by Regional Organizations**

In addition to the UN, the AU and the EU deployed peace operations to support the restoration of peace and security in Mali in the years following the coup. In contrast to the UN, however, operations conducted by these regional organizations were much more limited than MINUSMA. AU’s AFISMA had many of the same tasks as MINUSMA, with the additional, explicit mandate to counter named extremist groups. However, it was more limited in time given the rapid rehatting from AFISMA to MINUSMA within a year of the former’s creation. EUTM has had a longer deployment, but with a stabilization mandate much more limited in scope.

**AU: AFISMA**

ECOWAS and the AU were the first to respond to Mali’s state collapse following the rebellion in the north and the coup in the south. ECOWAS initially began military preparations for its own mission, MICEMA, as the AU lobbied the UNSC to endorse an

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175 Kjeksrud and Vermeij, “Protecting Governments,” 237.
“African military force” to help the Malian government protect its population from Islamists armed groups. Despite disagreement and delays caused by different political strategies between ECOWAS and the AU, the concept for a regional mission was proposed to the UNSC in November 2012. The mission that was finally approved by the UNSC on December 20, 2012 “reflected the statements made by ECOWAS and the AU that AFISMA should be given a strong mandate to respond to the atrocities unfolding on the ground” and defend Mali’s territorial integrity.177 Consistent with their doctrinal principle of non-indifference, African countries were a driving force behind the robust, multilateral mandates to restore stability to Mali, demonstrating that

“The AU is willing to conduct peace operations in tough environments, whereas UN blue helmets and troop-contributing countries are often reluctant to accept the consequences of entering on such commitments...Similarly, the AU’s request that counterterrorism activities be included in MINUSMA’s mandate, something the UN had rejected, demonstrates the extent to which African states have displayed a willingness to engage in peace enforcement activities on the continent and criticized UN operations for being risk averse and lacking consistency regarding the use of force against ‘spoilers’.”178

AFISMA was given both stabilization and peace enforcement tasks, including aiding the restoration of state authority in the north and protecting the civilian population. In contrast to MINUSMA, it was not mandated to support the political process or implementation of a peace agreement, as this was not yet in existence when AFISMA was created. Notably, paragraph 9(b) authorized AFISMA “to support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups and in reducing the threat posed by terrorist

177 Karlsrud, The UN at War, 118.
organizations, including AQIM, MUJWA, and associated extremist groups.” 179 This authorization to counter specific armed groups enabled AFISMA to employ strategic use of force, making it a decidedly peace enforcement mission.

In AFISMA’s case, supporting the restoration of state authority involved offensive operations to recover “northern territory under the control of extremist elements before transitioning to support for the Malian authorities in maintaining security and consolidating state authority.”180 Contrasted with MINUSMA’s role in supporting the extension of state authority, AFISMA was to be involved in the preceding step of retaking the territory. AFISMA struggled to rapidly generate forces, however, which left the burden of combat operations to French and Chadian forces who gradually transitioned to AFISMA. While the mandate to use “all necessary means” to help the Malian authorities recover territory is in line with the AU’s principle of non-indifference, AFISMA’s capacity gaps demonstrate regional organizations’ often limited capability to conduct peace enforcement, which is better left to coalitions of the willing as will be discussed later. 181

The AU’s non-indifference principle similarly drove requests for robust protection of civilian mandates for both AFISMA and MINUSMA, when it was clear the latter would be taking over for AFISMA. This reflects the trend of many African member states supporting “robust mandates authorizing the use of force for the protection of

civilians under the imminent threat of physical harm and other humanitarian concerns.”  

AFISMA was able to make greater gains in a short time frame than MINSUMA, because “AU observers were able to deploy to areas not accessible to UN observers owing to the organization’s more rigid requirement for deployment.”  

At the same time, insufficient investment in staffing, funding, equipment, and other resources limited AFISMA’s ability to support the mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat. Ultimately, AFISMA’s deployment of less than a year was too short to assess its effectiveness at providing protection of civilians, though its more robust mandate is consistent with the AU’s principle of non-indifference.

Many of AFISMA’s shortfalls were due to capability and capacity gaps, many of which were driven by the UN’s failure to provide sufficient logistic and financial support. In addition, “some countries were not willing to make pledged capabilities available for AFISMA, as they were waiting for the operation to transition into a UN peacekeeping mission in anticipation of receiving higher compensation and better support for their personnel.”  

Further analysis on regional organizations’ force generation and capabilities, as well as the transition processes to UN missions, are outside the scope of this thesis, but these claims show that AFISMA’s shortcomings in implementing its mandate was driven by incompatible capabilities rather than inconsistent doctrine. The limited UN support and rapid transition to MINSUMA meant that “AFISMA was never given a chance to prove its worth on the ground;” rather, instead of replacing AFISMA,

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182 Abiola, et al, “The Large Contributors and UN Peacekeeping Doctrine,” 167-168
183 Akpasom, "What Roles,” 114.
184 HIPPO Report, 64.
the UN should have strengthened it via logistics and funding to enable it to provide the stabilization tasks that are consistent with AU doctrine.\(^{186}\)

**EU: EUTM**

UNSCR 2071 that authorized ECOWAS and the AU to begin planning for military intervention in Mali in October 2012 also called on others to respond to the emerging crisis. Almost immediately, the EU began planning for a mission to train and advise the Malian armed forces, and in December, the EU council approved the crisis management concept for a Common Security and Defense Policy military mission to Mali. The EU council also confirmed that the mission would not engage in combat actions, restricting soldiers to non-strategic use of force.\(^{187}\) This limitation, combined with the deployment in an intrastate conflict, make EUTM a stabilization mission. This section will evaluate the ability of this regional organization to support the extension of state authority, based on the tasks included its mandate, and its ability to respond to changing security conditions. It will not consider EUTM’s ability to support peace agreement implementation or protection of civilians as it was not requested to perform these duties.

Since 2013, the EUTM in Mali has been mandated to “respond to the operational needs of the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF) through the provision of training support for the benefit of the MaAF; training and advice on command and control, logistical chain and human resources, as well as training on International Humanitarian Law, protection

\(^{186}\) Karlsrud, *The UN at War*, 119-129.

of civilians, and Human Rights."\(^{188}\) This mandate is consistent with EU doctrine to support existing state authorities, and by October 2018, almost 13,000 members of the Malian military had benefited from some form of EUTM training.\(^{189}\) To be sure, EUTM has struggled to overcome key hurdles, such as corruption within and resistance from the Malian state, paternalism that undercuts its relationship with local security services, and even difficulties as simple as language barriers.\(^{190}\) However, these challenges are derived from the environment in which it operates, and ubiquitous to almost all multilateral operations, rather than derived from inconsistencies between EU doctrine and mandate.

Finally, the EU demonstrated inflexibility when security conditions deteriorated in Mali. The EU responded quickly and willingly to deploy during the less aggressive stage of the conflict, but was unable and unwilling to respond when security deteriorated. Despite pledging to accelerate preparations for deployment, the EU relied on France to intervene leading a coalition of the willing when conflict shifted from addressing internal security following a coup threat to one addressing a terrorist or insurgent threat to Bamako. Under these conditions, the EUTM “cannot substitute for a task of combat forces in crisis management,” despite having a training role that is “necessary for the early stage of a conflict or as a post-conflict project.”\(^{191}\) The EUTM’s response is consistent with its doctrine, illustrating their effectiveness in supporting stabilization


missions while demonstrating the limitations of regional organizations in using strategic force to conduct peace enforcement missions.

**Peace Operations by Coalitions of the Willing: Operation Serval**

The French-led Operation Serval employed strategic use of force to address intrastate conflict, making it a peace enforcement missions. In January 2013, when the northern rebellion threatened to topple the government in Bamako, Mali’s transitional authorities requested French military assistance to stop the offensive. Within days, Paris deployed an operation to achieve four objectives: “(1) stop the jihadist advance, (2) prevent these groups from further endangering Mali’s stability, (3) protect European and especially French nationals present in Mali…and (4) [restore] Mali’s territorial integrity.”

Even though the operation was conducted by host government invitation and thus did not require UN authorization, UNSCR 2100 essentially authorized a parallel French deployment to support MINUSMA, calling on:

> “French troops, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means, from the commencement of the activities of MINUSMA until the end of MINUSMA’s mandate as authorized in this resolution, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General.”

This was not a peace operation in a traditional sense, in that it did not seek to support a broader peace process, yet France did not receive a single protest on the legality of the operation. This demonstrated the unanimous perception that the transnational groups posed a real threat to international peace and security, which is indicative of the types of

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194 Ibid, 857.
transnational threats multilateral organizations are increasingly seeking to address.\textsuperscript{195} Rather, the tasks identified by the French government essentially give Operation Serval a mandate to restore state authority by supporting and defending a weak state against internal aggressors, and UNSCR 2100 authorizes it to use strategic force. This mandate is consistent with French doctrine, at the center of which is use of force.\textsuperscript{196}

French efforts to stop the southward advance began with airstrikes on 11 January 2013, which were soon followed by the deployment of 4,500 French troops, including marines, paratroopers, legionnaires, and 2,000 Chadian troops to support Malian security forces. In less than three months, “the jihadists’ advance southwards had been halted, Mali’s further destabilization had been prevented and territorial control had been largely restored to the provisional government in Bamako….Operation ‘Serval’ appears to have been successful in halting Mali’s collapse.”\textsuperscript{197} The combination of combat airpower, elite ground forces, and robust use of force resulted operational success, demonstrating the effective role coalitions of the willing can have in supporting a weak government against insurgent forces and international threats.

Even though Operation Serval was not mandated or intended to support a peace process, it is important to consider its impact on broader stabilization efforts as it reveals limitations of coalitions of the willing. The military operation prevented another overthrow of the central government and created room to hold elections for a more permanent government, but arguably at the expense of Paris’s relationship with Bamako and broader reconciliation. Part of Serval’s military success in countering the jihadist threat depended on partnerships with the MNLA Tuareg rebels, whom the central

\textsuperscript{195} de Coning and Peter, eds. \textit{UN Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order}.
\textsuperscript{196} Karlsrud, \textit{The UN at War}, 43.
\textsuperscript{197} Boeke and Schuurman, “Operation Serval,” 818-819.
government regarded as perpetrators of the rebellion, and the close cooperation between the MNLA and France further complicated already fraught peace negotiations. Ultimately, “despite ‘Serval’s military success and Mali’s elections, the issue of reconciliation between the Tuareg peoples and the regime and population in the south is far from resolved.”

Furthermore, the military success created a window of opportunity to address governance issues and initiate reconciliation between Bamako and rebel factions, but France lacked the willingness to stay beyond and consolidate peace once the immediate threat had been addressed. Paris was a driving force behind the transition to MINUSMA and MINUSMA’s robust mandate as it looked for an exit strategy for its deployed forces. This reflects the tenuous nature of coalition members’ political will: national interest can drive a rapid response to emerging conflict when immediate intervention is needed, but rarely will these countries be willing to independently sustain the long-term operations needed for stabilization. This is where the organizational support mechanisms of regional organizations, who still have the doctrine to use robust use of force during the peace consolidation process, can play a role.

Conclusions

In sum, several actors have conducted peace operations in an attempt to support the weak Malian state, foster a broader peace process, and provide protection for civilians, illustrating the range of peace actors who can address threats to international peace and security. Each of these missions attempted to address at least one of these three goals, which demonstrates the relatively clear vision among international actors for what

\[198\] Ibid, 819.

\[199\] Boutellis, “Can the UN Stabilize Mali?” 3.
is needed to stabilize a conflict, regardless of whether the response is termed ‘stabilization’ or not. However, each actors’ effectiveness at meeting these tasks varies, in part based on the doctrinal differences among the UN, regional organizations, and coalitions of the willing. From the preceding case study, a few key conclusions can be drawn:

Key Finding 1: The UN Is Unable to Effectively Respond to A Deterioration in Security

UN doctrine is predicated on the assumption that a comprehensive peace agreement is in place and that combatants are committed to a political process, yet the UN is increasingly deploying into situations where these conditions are not in place. When MINUSMA deployed, a peace agreement had only just been signed, and by only half of the major combatants. The push for rapid elections created the appearance of progress early in MINUSMA’s tenure, even though no meaningful reconciliation had been achieved.

Ultimately, MINUSMA might have been able to support the peace agreement’s implementation and protect civilians if the security conditions the UN’s doctrine assumes are in place had not deteriorated. The UN’s principles are meant to be reinforcing, and if the signing of a peace agreement reflects a genuine and comprehensive commitment to the peace process and consent to a UN peace operation, then MINUSMA could have impartially supported the national reconciliation and the restoration of state authority with limited use of force. However, these reinforcing principles begin to crumble in the absence of this genuine commitment, and on MINUSMA’s case, it was faced with an almost existential question when talks for a comprehensive peace agreement broken down within months of its deployment. As Boutellis summarizes:
“This made the implementation of MINUSMA’s mandate to provide ‘support for the reestablishment of State authority throughout the country’ and ‘take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas’ while also supporting ‘the implementation of the transitional road map, including the national political dialogue’ very difficult – some would argue, paradoxical.”

Even if the UN had adopted a more conservative mandate in response to the deteriorating security, relied on parallel French forces to conduct combat operations as was the intention at its creation, and authorized the use of force only in response to direct threats to UN personnel, then MINUSMA would have faced similar doctrinal challenges simply because of the environment in which it was deployed. This is because violent extremist groups posed a threat to the UN as well as civilians, making it “difficult to draw the line as to when the pursuit of armed groups that are behind the attacks turns into a counter-terrorism operations.” This illustrates that the UN’s inability to reconcile its peacekeeping principles with the operational needs is driven by the conditions into which it deploys, rather than decisions made either in New York or in the field. As Karlsrud summarizes, “if the UN continues to deploy UN peacekeeping missions to countries like Mali, the UN must be equipped to prevent attacks against itself and the local population, if necessary by preventative action. In practice, that means confronting violent extremists and terrorists,” and moving it firmly into the peace enforcement realm. However, the UN’s doctrine makes it ill-equipped to deploy into these situations, as this analysis has shown.

Most critically, these factors are not unique to Mali’s conflict. The risk of security degrading is more likely in intrastate conflict, which requires a robust political reconciliation process and systemic, institutional changes to security forces and state-

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200 Ibid, 4.
201 Karlsrud, The UN at War, 93.
202 Ibid, 96.
society relations. By definition, intrastate conflict will almost always include the state as a party to the conflict. This creates a trade-off between impartiality and consent, and UN forces will be forced to choose consent from the host government in order to maintain access and freedom to continue operations. At the same time, fragmented armed groups will prevent the operation from obtaining full consent and a comprehensive commitment to a peace process, resulting in conditions that necessitate robust use of force to protect civilians and provide for peace. These factors put peace operations that address intrastate conflict inherently at odds with the UN’s peacekeeping principles.

Key Finding 2: Willingness to Use Force Increases from the UN, to Regional Organizations, to Coalitions of the Willing

The UN prefers to use distant or third-party TCCs to maintain impartiality, limiting their willingness to use strategic, or even non-strategic, use of force except in cases of immediate self-defense – regardless of what their mandate states. AU missions generally comprise TCCs from neighboring countries, reflected in AFISMA’s TCC composition, which are less impartial than the UN but better suited to conduct more aggressive missions.\textsuperscript{203} France and Chad’s 48-hour deployment when the northern rebellion began to threaten Bamako demonstrates the willingness that coalitions of the willing have to use force because they are responding to a perceived national security threat. In these situations, “the only countries that are willing to contribute troops to such missions are those with regimes that have a strategic interest in securing the stability of the country in question, its neighbours and the subregion.”\textsuperscript{204} Therefore, despite the lofty

\textsuperscript{203} de Coning, et al, \textit{Strategic Options}, 11.
ideals of multilateral institutions, only TCCs who have a national interest in the conflict’s resolution have the willingness to employ strategic use of force.

Furthermore, the frequent overlap among TCCs between coalitions of the willing and AU missions, evidenced by Chad’s integration into AFISMA, provides for greater doctrinal flexibility than the UN, who must accommodate the greatest variance in doctrines and willingness to use force given its greater diversity in TCCs. This flexibility enables regional organizations and coalitions of the willing to be doctrinally better able to respond to a deteriorating security situation that is more likely to accompany intrastate conflict. Fundamentally, “coalitions of the willing, and in some instances regional organizations, will remain the only options with the requisite political will, capabilities, rapid deployment, doctrines, and staying power to conduct counterterrorism operations.”

Key Finding 3: Capacity Building for Regional Organizations is Still Needed

AFISMA’s shortfalls reflect capability limitations, such as logistics and funding gaps, rather than doctrinal ones. Efforts should go towards building the capabilities and capacities of AU and regional organizations to conduct the stabilization and occasional peace enforcement missions that align with their doctrine, rather than relying on the UN to stretch its doctrine to conduct robust stabilization. Reflected in their doctrine, African TCCs are more willing to use force, and “when national interests and mission objectives align, African TCCs are generally less beholden to classic peacekeeping principles and more willing to use force and be partial actors than some other major TCCs.”

205 Karlsrud, The UN at War, 104.
207 Karlsrud, The UN at War, 120.
Some may argue that doctrine must reflect or be rooted in capability, but efforts to stretch the UN’s doctrine go beyond its own capabilities too. Additionally, key African countries have demonstrated through their own operations and contributions to UN missions that they are increasingly critical providers of security rather than recipients. Through sustained training, professionalization, and improved governance, “conflict is no longer at the core of Africa’s identity, but associated merely with a few countries on the continent that are not able to stabilize, develop and consolidate at the same pace as the rest.”\textsuperscript{208} Calls to build the capacity and capabilities of AU members states or regional organizations are not new, but this thesis seeks to reinforce those calls.

Overall, the accelerated transition from MINUSMA to AFISMA was largely driven by a lack of trust in the AU’s capability to stabilize the security situation after territory had been cleared. Paris sought what it perceived as a reliable exit strategy and deployed Operation Serval on the condition that the UN would deploy a follow-up mission, despite the AU and ECOWAS’s ongoing efforts for its own deployment, even while the UN dawdled.\textsuperscript{209} At the same time, the UN delayed its own support for AFISMA which prevented it from receiving the necessary support package, resulting in a situation where “AFISMA was never given a chance to prove its worth on the ground.”\textsuperscript{210} Once African countries realized AFISMA would be overtaken by a UN mission, however, they became among the strongest advocates for a robust mandate for MINUSMA to address the growing counterterrorism threat facing the region. These developments reflect two overall trends in which the AU and other regional organizations are increasingly willing to engage in robust peace enforcement or stabilization in tough environments, and yet the

\textsuperscript{208} de Coning, et al, \textit{Strategic Options}, 137.
\textsuperscript{209} Karlsrud, \textit{The UN at War}, 44; Weiss and Welz, “The UN and the African Union,” 901-902.
\textsuperscript{210} Karlsrud, \textit{The UN at War}, 128.
UN is being pushed to fill this gap and away from the principle of impartiality to support the government of the day.  

In conclusion, peace operations in Mali demonstrate what has become a frequent practice, in which UN forces are deployed because missions conducted by other actors are not sustainable, rather than a strategic choice based on doctrine. Missions conducted by AU or regional organizations are typically handed over to the UN in 6-18 months, with AFISMA transitioning to MINUSMA in even less time. This often makes regional organizations too short-lived to stabilize a conflict zone and establish the conditions necessary for UN missions to abide by their peacekeeping principles, even if a peace agreement has technically been signed. Over the last fifteen years, stabilization missions have developed as a result of various “push and pull factors, [including] the violent nature of confronting facing the AU, the UN peacekeeping model, which prevents the UN from deploying peace operations until a ceasefire or peace agreement is in place, [and] the support models available for financing AU operations.” Rather that continuing this ad-hoc response to conflict management, strategic vision is needed to determine a partnership model among the UN, regional organizations, and coalitions of the willing. Doctrine suggests the former should conduct traditional peacekeeping, the latter should conduct peace enforcement, and stabilization should be conducted by regional organizations – who receive sufficient capacity building efforts to ensure they can sustain longer-term missions necessary for stabilization.

212 Aoi and de Coning, "Conclusion" in de Coning et al, eds. UN Peacekeeping Doctrine, 302.
213 Karlsrud, The UN at War, 128.
Conclusion

This thesis has sought to answer the question of whether the UN’s doctrine makes it the most appropriate actor to conduct contemporary stabilization missions, and if it is not, then to determine who is better suited to do so. To do this, this thesis began by developing a framework to better define various peace operations along two dimensions: whether the mission addresses an inter- or an intrastate armed conflict and whether it employs strategic or non-strategic use of force. The framework divided the UN’s ‘robust peacekeeping’ missions into traditional peacekeeping, stabilization, and peace enforcement, providing clarity where the UN’s policies and guidance have failed to do so. The thesis then identified doctrinal guidance of three major peace operators in Africa – the UN, African countries, and European powers – that conduct peace operations via three mechanisms – the UN, the AU and other regional organizations, and coalitions of the willing. Assessing their respectively abilities to conduct peacekeeping, stabilization, and peace enforcement from a doctrinal perspective, it was determined that these types of peace operations should largely be conducted by the UN, regional organizations, and coalitions of the willing, respectively. Finally, this thesis tested the applicability of this division of labor using post-2012 Mali as a case study.

Through this analysis, this thesis came to a few key conclusions. First, peace operations cannot maintain impartiality in the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, which jeopardizes the UN’s ability to maintain consent and limited use of force. In this context, most of the tasks required to stabilize an intra-state conflict zone – including supporting the extension of state authority, a partial peace process, and protection of civilians from active combatants – are inherently at odds with UN doctrine.
Thus, the UN’s doctrine, and therefore its ability to resolve intrastate armed conflicts, is increasingly limited. While the UN can and has conducted stabilization effectively in the context of a comprehensive peace process that conflict parties are committed to, this is a fragile criterion for intrastate armed conflict, and the UN is ill-positioned to respond to degrading security conditions.

Second, and in contrast to the UN, doctrinal guidance for African and European militaries allows for the greater use of force and is more flexible in implementation, which is necessary to effectively address changing security conditions of intrastate conflict. Given the nature of regional organizations and coalitions’ force generation and the resulting implications for the willingness to use force, the former is more suited for stabilization and the latter for peace enforcement. Furthermore, the overlap in membership between coalitions of the willing and regional organizations enables them to better respond to the deteriorating security that also frequently accompanies intrastate conflict. Finally, the performance of AFISMA and other African regional organizations have demonstrated significant capacity limitations, and thus significant capacity building is still needed for the division of labor outlined in this framework to be implemented.

This framework offers a better model than others previously proposed. Namely, it disaggregates mission transitions from time and an operation’s place along the conflict lifecycle, which the UN and other proposals to ‘sequence’ peace operations have done. Those frameworks present a challenge for intrastate conflicts, because the presence of multiple, shifting combatants and fluctuating commitment to a peace process result in a ‘peace agreement’ being difficult to define and a conflict that is not linear or one-directional. Additionally, the AU and UN have differing ideas on the preconditions for
deployment and transitions, which creates tensions between the two organizations and challenges the practical deployment and transitions of missions between these two organizations, as the Mali case study showed. In contrast, a division of labor based on tasks requires key stakeholders to reconcile a mission’s intention and purpose at the time of mandate creation and force generation, and the actors that are involved enable the mission to be more flexible in the field. It also allows for the trend of contemporaneous deployments to continue, recognizing the emerging “global peace and security architecture, where the UN, together with regional organizations, where they exist and are capable, are co-managing international peace and security.”

The findings in this thesis are in accordance with those of other authors, such as de Coning & Peter, who conclude that the AU and African bodies are better suited to address the types of mission that the UN is not well-suited for, including enforcement, counterterrorism, and transnational threats. While acknowledging that significant capacity building and better funding is still necessary for the AU to fill this role reliably, this thesis recognizes that African bodies have proven they can be providers of security. The UN-AU relationship has moved beyond that of a one-way donor-recipient relationship to one that resembles a strategic partnership, and this is a direction that should be encouraged. Additionally, this thesis seeks to strengthen calls by other authors for a greater role for regional organizations and coalitions of the willing by

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218 Ibid, 223.
making this argument from a doctrinal perspective and by providing an empirical example of conflict management without it.

Ultimately, this thesis joins the debate on the role of the UN in conducting stabilization and that of regional organizations and coalitions as partners in the global peace and security architecture. It attempts to meet UNSC calls for “more effective partnership…based on a clear division of labor that reflects the comparative advantage of each organization,” doing so from a doctrinal perspective.\(^ {219} \) In doing so, it reflects the African vision for conflict management in Mali, where the AU and ECOWAS preferred “a strengthened UN presence that would focus primarily on political and developmental activities, with AFISMA continuing to engage in the stability-oriented tasks until agreed security benchmarks had been achieved,” rather than a division of labor in which “the AU would enforce the peace, and the UN would keep it once established.”\(^ {220} \)

Naturally, there are some limitations to this analysis, and areas remain for further research. First and foremost, the findings in this thesis are only applicable to African conflicts, as those of other regions do not have comparably developed regional organizations to conduct their own peace operations. Additionally, ad-hoc African security coalitions—such as the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel Force— are increasingly demonstrating their ability to provide a regional solution to stabilize certain conflict zones, in particularly addressing transnational extremist and criminal threats. They were excluded from this analysis because they are largely a way for neighboring countries to better organize and obtain external funding to counter a common, transnational threat. In


\(^ {220} \) Karlsrud, The UN at War, 119.
practice, this entails “national soldiers operating on their national territory,” rather than “foreign troops on foreign soil,” as most peace operations entail. Nonetheless, the rise of these types of missions merits additional consideration for the role they can play in the African and global peace and security architecture.

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