Japan’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century

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Abstract of Thesis

“Japan’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century”

International debates about Japan’s peacekeeping efforts tend to focus on the country’s limited military contributions to United Nations operations. But a more constructive debate requires a comprehensive analysis of Japan’s financial, military, observer, civilian, and material contributions in both UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations in the last decade. This thesis provides such an analysis.

Overall, Japan’s military and civilian personnel contributions are low in relation to its high financial contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget. Japan has participated in missions that suit its top priorities in Asian security, economic security, and the US-Japan alliance. Japan’s efforts are highly concentrated in Asia, specifically South Asia and the Middle East. Outside of the UN, Japan’s efforts aligned closely with US operations in anti-terrorism. Even though Africa currently hosts most peacekeeping operations, Japan’s personnel contributions to Africa remained relatively small. Japan’s willingness to operate beyond Asia is limited to safer missions such as relief operations in Haiti.

Instead of focusing on military issues, the Japanese government should reflect on what it wants to get out of peacekeeping and for which activities it is most suited. Military participation is not the only answer. In addition to sending more troops abroad, Japan could take a leading role in efforts to review peacekeeping operations, create an efficient database, and train peacekeepers from other countries. Japan’s strengths lie in developing civilian contributions to peacekeeping because it has the population and resources to train and support them.
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<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Center on International Cooperation</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>UN Department of Field Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>UN Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRF</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>International Peace Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCATU</td>
<td>International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCHQ</td>
<td>International Peace Cooperation Headquarter</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIO</td>
<td>Maritime Interdiction Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defense Forces</td>
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SG  Secretary-General
SIPRI  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UN  United Nations
UNDP  UN Development Programme
UNHCR  UN High Commissioner for Refugees
## List of Mission Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERFRET</td>
<td>International Force in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>UN Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multinational Force – Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMIK</td>
<td>OSCE Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>UN Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>UN Mission in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>UN Mission in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>UN Disengagement Observer Force</td>
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<td>UNIOSL</td>
<td>UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIN</td>
<td>UN Mission in Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMSET</td>
<td>UN Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOTIL</td>
<td>UN Office in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOWA</td>
<td>UN Office for West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>UN Political Office for Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>UN Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSMA</td>
<td>UN Special Mission for Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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Introduction

In the first Gulf War, Japan was accused of resorting to “checkbook diplomacy” – contributing money but no military personnel to the UN-authorized coalition force against Iraq.\(^1\) In response, Japan revised its domestic law in 1992 to allow its Self-Defense Forces to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations, international humanitarian relief initiatives, and disaster relief efforts abroad. Since then, Japan has become a more active player in international security, participating in numerous missions and undergoing additional legal changes. In response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States, Japan enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2001 that allowed for its participation in the Multinational Force in Iraq in 2004. It marked Japan’s first ever Self-Defense-Forces deployment abroad to a non-UN military mission and to a war zone since World War II. Furthermore, in January 2007, the Japanese law elevated international operations from “supplementary” activities into the category of “primary tasks” for the Japanese SDF.

Despite its increased commitment to peacekeeping efforts, other UN member states have criticized Japan for not contributing enough or as much as it can. Such accusations often point out that Japan does not actively participate in Chapter VII operations that require the use of force. Under the law, Japanese personnel cannot use force except for self-defense and usually cannot deploy to countries without a ceasefire agreement, consent from all conflict parties, and impartiality. Therefore, Japan’s participation has been limited to traditional peacekeeping activities. While it is true that Japan has been unable to send many

\(^1\) Go Ito, “Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” in *Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State*, ed. Thomas U. Berger et al. (Boulder Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 75.
troops abroad, the current criticisms fail to look at Japan’s non-military contributions. To develop a more constructive assessment, there is a need for a comprehensive and objective analysis of Japan’s military and non-military contributions in UN and non-UN peacekeeping efforts.

In this context, this thesis addresses two main questions: (1) How has Japan contributed to peacekeeping in the 21st century? (2) How can Japan’s efforts be improved? The first task is to give an overview of Japan’s participation in both UN and non-UN peacekeeping, including not only troops but also civilian staff, election observer, financial, and in-kind contributions. The second task for this study is to analyze the significant trends in these contributions. In doing so, I will construct frameworks that could be used in the future to continue evaluating Japan’s participation. Finally, the thesis answers the second question by assessing Japan’s contributions in light of its government’s stated objectives and policies. I then make recommendations on how to overcome the challenges and identify issues that will influence Japan’s future contributions to peacekeeping.

**Literature Review**

While there was significant interest in Japan’s first peacekeeping experiences of the 1990s, there has been no strong interest in studying the issue in the 21st century. The most recent and comprehensive book in English was published in 2003 and focused on peacekeeping efforts in the 1990s.² Most reports criticized the inflexibility of the Japanese law in terms of military personnel deployment and gave options for Japan in taking a more active role either in troop or non-troop contributions. Writings did not focus on concrete problems.

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numbers and trends – most likely because Japan had very little experience in peacekeeping and there was not enough data to conduct an in-depth analysis of the 1990s. However, it is surprising that no study has evaluated the issue more deeply in recent years, especially in light of Japan’s ambitions to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and the stated support of this ambition by recent US Presidents. This means that most assessments and criticisms expressed today on Japan’s contributions are incomplete. Nevertheless, although most writings are outdated for an analysis of the 21st century, many of the recommendations continue to apply today.

In 1996, Alan James wrote that Japan was making valuable contributions to the UN’s peacekeeping assessments and through voluntary contributions. At the same time, he expressed that Japan could do more. In particular, if Japan could manage to send more SDF personnel to operations, this would enhance its case for a permanent seat on the Security Council. In addition, James suggested that Japan could make more policy input in determining the appropriateness of traditional peacekeeping operations or peace enforcement actions in a given situation. As an unlikely possibility, James also pointed out that Japan could host a UN peacekeeping body as a means of moving towards or implementing settlement of the Northern Territories dispute between Japan and Russia over four islands. Such an undertaking would show that peacekeeping operations are not only valuable but also honorable.

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4 The Russians call the islands the Southern Kurils and Japan calls the Northern territories. In 1855, Russia and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimoda, giving Japan ownership of the four southern islands and Russia ownership of everything to the north. However, Russia took control of the islands at the end of the World War II and deported all residents to Japan. Japan has claimed its “right, title, and claim” to the islands but Russia has not recognized so. To this day, the dispute continues. Source: “Kuril Islands Dispute between Russia and
Hans W. Maull wrote in 1996 that Japan along with Germany could actually use its skepticism toward militarism in developing a more sophisticated understanding about the limitations of military means and suggesting possible alternatives. Specifically, Japan could assist in launching a thorough review of the future of UN peacekeeping operations. It could also participate in the maintenance of economic sanctions. Moreover, Maull advocated that Japan increase its financial and in-kind contributions and use its financial resources and technical expertise to train and equip UN peacekeepers.

According to Alex Morrison, domestic public opinion carries substantial weight in determining any future involvement of Japan in peacekeeping. He particularly pointed out that the role of media in peacekeeping is crucial in creating public support. He also identified the importance of educating the youth about peacekeeping and Japan’s involvement in it. Morrison predicted in 1996 that Japan’s participation would increase gradually both in the variety of tasks undertaken and the number of military personnel involved.

In 1999, Shannon-Marie Soni explained that in the post-World War II “collective security” system, countries like Canada, Sweden, Norway, Australia, and Japan have a role of “middle power diplomacy” and “niche diplomacy.” These countries lack sufficient military strength to make them great powers but have enough resources to place them

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*Note: Page numbers are unavailable for this article.*
above minor powers. Middle powers tend to pursue multilateral and compromising solutions to international problems and to embrace notions of “good international citizenship” to guide their diplomacy. Soni argued that Japan’s pacifist approach to the collective security argument was no longer acceptable and that financial contributions no longer projected enough leadership power. “In an age of media revolution in which the picture is mightier at swaying public opinion than is the pen, the pursuit of Japan’s foreign policy goals requires that it wear blue (i.e. partake in [UN] PKOs),” wrote Soni.\(^8\) She added, however, that Japan should also take role in “supplemental” tasks such as election monitoring, civilian policing, infrastructure construction, goods transportation, and medical relief. Such roles are permitted under the law and are supported by the public.

In 2004, Kazumi Ishizuka pointed out that the Japanese government and its citizens had not held serious debates to identify the national interests behind Japan’s commitment to UN peacekeeping operations.\(^9\) Instead, the content of their discussions tend to focus on the constitutionality of peacekeeping and its relevance to collective defense. Ishizuka encouraged Japan to develop a distinctive international policy with a stronger voice in the US, to take an initiative in Asia as a regional leader, and to activate the SDF.

Harold Green in 2006 wrote that Japan’s foreign policymakers are “trapped in self-made myths of pacifism,” an idea rooted in Article 9 of the nation’s constitution which renounces war and prohibits the maintenance of military forces.\(^10\) Green argued that while Japan’s image as a peace-loving nation may make the nation liked abroad, this myth

\(^8\) Ibid.
“hinders the formation of a realistic counter-threat to those who may threaten Japan, such as North Korea and China.”\textsuperscript{11}

Chiyuki Aoi and Yoshinobu Yamamoto claimed that Japan pursued “activism-lite,” meaning that it tends “to pursue its security goals on the cheap, without paying the full costs in legal, political, an institutional transformation.”\textsuperscript{12} Aoi asserted that this approach is increasingly unattainable if Japan is to remain a credible ally or to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. At the same time, she agreed with Ishizuka that there is a lack of consensus in the Japanese political debate on what constitutes the strategic priorities of Japanese political security.\textsuperscript{13}

Relevance of This Study

The first purpose of the paper is to give an overview of Japan’s participation in peacekeeping since the turn of the millennium. While the literature review provided a summary of some of the central debates about Japan’s participation in peacekeeping, the data mentioned were outdated for this analysis of Japan’s efforts in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Therefore, I provide detailed data on Japan’s contributions to peacekeeping in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. The data covers not only the number of personnel contributed to the United Nations but also contributions in civilian staffs, election observers, money, and material resources. I also examine Japan’s efforts in non-UN missions.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, 1.
Even today, there is no clear consensus on data categorizations or easy access to comprehensive data. In fact, there is not even a universally endorsed definition of peacekeeping, which Paul D. Williams writes is unlikely to emerge in the future as well because after all, “one person’s peace operation may always be another person’s invasion force.”

According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), peacekeeping is “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.” Specifically, UN peacekeeping refers to

> A field operation established by the Security Council, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under UN command and control, at the collective expense of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by the member nations, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.

On the other hand, non-UN peace operations are those with or without a United Nations mandate that are conducted by regional organizations or ad hoc coalition of states. Examples of the regional organizations include African Union (AU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Information on Japan’s efforts are provided by the UNDPKO, the Japan International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (IPCHQ), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

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Japan (MOFA), the Ministry of Defense of Japan, United Nations official documents, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) databases, and elsewhere. Overall, the data available was scattered, limited, and sometimes inconsistent. Overlapped data did not always match between sources, and some information was incomplete, listing only overall numbers or only missions with no concrete number on how many Japanese staffs there were or what they did.

Generally, data is available only for the recent decade or less. For example, the UNDPKO data on missions with detail on each country’s contributions to different types of personnel is only available starting in 2000. Publications like the *Annual Review on Global Peace Operations*\(^\text{17}\) started in 2005 and the *Review of Political Missions*\(^\text{18}\) came out only in 2010. Without a consensus on data and a baseline for understanding Japan’s efforts, there cannot be an objective and comprehensive debate on how well Japan contributes to peacekeeping today or what more Japan could do.

The second purpose of the thesis is to analyze the gathered data and identify trends in Japan’s contributions. The categorization of trends will help construct frameworks on which constructive debates can be based in the future.

The final purpose of the thesis is to assess Japan’s efforts, challenges, capacities, and outlook while giving some recommendations.

**Overview of Thesis**


In order to give context to why Japan acts the way it does, chapter 1, “Japan and Peacekeeping: A Historical Overview,” describes the policies, challenges, participation, and changes Japan has undergone in terms of peacekeeping. It includes discussions on Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution that renounced Japan’s military; the creation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces; criticisms Japan received during the Gulf War; the 1992 Peace Cooperation Law; overview of Japan’s participation in peacekeeping in the 1990s; and Japan’s political developments and interests in the 21st century peacekeeping.

In chapter 2, “United Nations Missions 2000-2010,” I describe Japan’s financial contributions to the UN general and peacekeeping budgets. Next, I highlight Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Then, I identify election observations run by the UN in which Japan participated. Finally, I list Japan’s record of contributions in kind, followed by UN political mission civilian staff and UNDPKO and UN Department of Field Support headquarters staff numbers.

Chapter 3, “Non-UN Missions 2000-2010,” discusses Japan’s participation in non-UN Missions, some of which were mandated by the UN. Overall, Japan has sent its Self-Defense Forces to UN-authorized missions focused on fighting terrorism and piracy in Iraq, the Indian Ocean, the Coast of Somalia, and the Gulf of Aden. Japan also supports missions in Eastern Europe run by OSCE with election observers and civilian staffs.

The following chapter 4, “Numbers and Trends 2000–2010,” identifies trends in the first decade of the millennium utilizing the data of Japan’s contributions in finances, troops, election observers, civilian staff, money, and in-kind described in chapter 2 and 3. I first analyze the financial contributions to the UN compared to other top donors. Next, I evaluate the implications of the overall number of troop contributions and regional focuses,
compared to UN’s global statistics. Then, I assess Japanese civilian participation by missions, headquarters, election observations, and training centers. Finally, I look at Japan’s in-kind contributions. The chapter’s purpose is to develop frameworks that can be used to assess Japan’s future contributions to international peacekeeping more objectively and comprehensively.

Finally, the Conclusion, “Assessment and Future Directions,” uses the historical background, data, and trends described in the previous chapters to assess Japan’s current contributions to peacekeeping. To do so, I compare Japan’s recent interests and promises toward peacekeeping to its actual contributions. Overall, Japan in the 21st century has expressed its commitment to a) deploy more personnel to UN peacekeeping operations; b) make efforts in strengthening peacekeeping capabilities; c) develop human resources for peacekeeping and peacebuilding; and d) contribute actively and intellectually to the review of peacekeeping operations. Then, I discuss possible future directions for Japan’s contributions to peacekeeping looking particularly at US-Japan relations, Security Council reform, and public opinion that may affect the outcome. At the same time, I identify the challenges Japan faces and make recommendations on how to overcome them.

Conclusion

Overall, Japan’s military and civilian personnel contributions are very low relative to its high financial contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget. Moreover, Japan generally participated in missions that suited its high priorities of Asian security, economic security, and US-Japan alliance. Japan’s efforts are highly concentrated in Asia, specifically South Asia and the Middle East. Outside of the UN, Japan’s efforts aligned
closely with the US operations in anti-terrorism. Even though Africa hosts most peacekeeping operations, Japan’s personnel contributions to Africa remained low. Japan’s willingness to go beyond Asia exists but is limited to safer missions such as the relief operations in Haiti.

The biggest debate in terms of Japanese participation in peacekeeping revolves around the use of force. If Japan opts for vigorous international security efforts, constitutional changes will be necessary, and public support for peacekeeping operations will be necessary. An increase in the military budget would also be needed to provide further training and equipment. At the same time, Japan can participate in non-military aspects of peacekeeping including planning and reviewing of missions, research, transportation, logistics, electoral observation, policing, training of local officers, medical assistance, and reconstruction of infrastructure.
Chapter 1. Japan and Peacekeeping: A Historical Overview

After the end of World War II, Japan underwent a significant transformation from an offensive imperial country to a peaceful country that constitutionally could no longer possess an army or initiate war. During the following decades, Japan focused its efforts on economic development and did so successfully while relying on the United Nations and the United States for its foreign and security policies. Japan was ranked the world’s top overseas development assistance provider from 1991 to 2000 (nearly one-fifth of the world total), and for more than two decades, Japan has been the second largest financial contributor to the UN general and peacekeeping budgets. As international interventions in conflicts around the world increased, Japan was accused of using “checkbook diplomacy” in the Gulf War (1991) because it contributed only money and no forces to the UN-authorized coalition force against Iraq. Since then, Japan has brought about numerous legal changes and has participated in peacekeeping more actively. This chapter describes the policies, challenges, and changes Japan has undergone in terms of peacekeeping. This historical overview will give context as to why Japan might act the way it does.

Article 9

The most significant law that has constrained Japan’s participation to international peacekeeping is Article 9 of the so-called “Peace Constitution,” drafted in 1947 during the US occupation of 1945-52:

20 Ito, “Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” 75.
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.\textsuperscript{21}

Article 9’s renouncement of war and means to prosecute war, including possession of military reassured East Asian countries that in the past suffered from Japanese aggression that Japan would never start a war again.\textsuperscript{22}

This provision, together with the Japanese dependency on the United States as a guarantor of security, is the foundation for Japan’s remarkable economic transformation after the World War II. Former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru said that the constitution allowed Japan to devote all its resources and energy “to pursuing economic recovery and maintaining political stability… [while deferring] indefinitely the task of preparing the Japanese people themselves for a return to the harsh realities of international politics.”\textsuperscript{23}

Article 9 has been a politically controversial issue in Japan in terms of peacekeeping. Depending on its interpretation, Japan could have a more active Self-Defense Force or even use force given that there is no intention to initiate or participate in a war. Debates on peacekeeping usually center on whether Japanese force deployments are allowed by the Constitution and to what extent and under what conditions they may be allowed.

\textsuperscript{21} Constitution of Japan, Chapter II, Art. 9.
Self-Defense Forces

Japan established the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954 after heated political debates. Stressing its right to self-defense and no intention for offensive measures, sending the SDF abroad was prohibited for any reason. Progressive political groups, especially the Japan Social Party and the Japan Communist Party, favored this pacifist approach to foreign policy while conservative forces like the Liberal Democratic Party generally agreed to the terms because they were primarily concerned with rebuilding the economy. At the same time, the devastation of war had developed suspicion among the Japanese toward military activities and fear of Japan’s remilitarization. On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) hoped to contribute to collective security and argued against prohibiting sending armed SDF officers, especially to military observer groups or non-combat duties.

Japan Joins the United Nations

Japan joined the UN in December 1956. According to Sadako Ogata, Japan’s primary interest was “to bolster its national security by relying on the capacity of the world organization to maintain international peace and security.” At the same time, the Foreign Ministry tried to play an active role in the UN in order to demonstrate Japan’s desire to be a constructive force in world affairs.

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24 Dobson, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, 50.
In 1958, when Japan held a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council, UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld requested Japan to send 10 SDF officers to Lebanon to assist in monitoring the flow of weapons. Japan rejected the request saying that the missions outlined in the SDF law did not include UN duties. In 1960, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld again requested Japan to send personnel to the newly independent Congo. This time, Japan refused because the situation on the ground was not safe.  

During this time, Japan’s main foreign policy goal was to integrate further with the global economy. By the mid 1960s, Japan was achieving a high level of economic prosperity and had become the world’s second largest economy.

In the late 1970s, MOFA initiated a new effort to raise its profile in the UN by creating an advisory group to discuss and report on peacekeeping and other forms of assistance. By the mid-1980s, Japan was already providing more money than any other country except the United States to the UN.

When Noboru Takeshita became the Japanese Prime Minister in 1987, he took concrete steps to expand Japan’s involvement in international affairs. He proposed the International Cooperation Initiative in 1988 and identified five areas in which Japan had to play a larger role: 1) active pursuit of diplomatic efforts aimed at strengthening political dialogue and international cooperation; 2) stepped-up contributions for UN-sponsored activities seeking to prevent outbreak of conflicts; 3) active involvement in international efforts to resolve disputes peacefully; 4) strengthening assistance to refugees through both

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28 Ibid., 17.
bilateral and multilateral efforts; and 5) vigorous contributions to international cooperative efforts aimed at reconstruction once a conflict is peacefully resolved.²⁹

In 1989, Japan sent 39 government personnel to the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to monitor elections in Namibia. In 1990, six officials were sent to the UN Observation Mission for Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN).³⁰ These efforts were possible because dispatch of officials was permissible under the Japanese law.

The “Checkbook Diplomacy”

The turning point in Japan’s participation in peace operations was the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991. During the war, Japan contributed $13 billion to the activities of the UN coalition forces in the Gulf.³¹ In April 1991, in the aftermath of the war, Japan sent minesweeping ships to the Persian Gulf, marking the first time that Maritime SDF were deployed on a foreign mission. There, Japan spent US$11 million for a three-month effort that successfully cleared 34 mines from shipping lanes. Nonetheless, the general international reaction was that Japan sent too little too late. In particular, Japan was shocked when Kuwait purposefully excluded Japan from a full-page advertisement in the New York Times thanking those countries that had provided assistance.³² At the same time, Japan was accused by the United States and some European countries of resorting to

²⁹ Ibid., 18.
³⁰ Ibid., 18.
³¹ Ito, “Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” 75.

* According to Zisk, this add was mentioned to her in virtually every interview she conducted in Tokyo in summer 2000. The exact article or the date of the article is unknown.
“checkbook diplomacy” – paying money instead of sending personnel, thus avoiding “sweating with the coalition forces.”\textsuperscript{33}

According to the Foreign Ministry’s 1991 \textit{Bluebook}, then Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiaki said that the crisis was “a major time of testing for Japan as a nation of peace and the most severe trial we have face since the end of the war.”\textsuperscript{34} Japan suffered from a sense of powerlessness and embarrassment that led to a reconsideration of its role in global security.

\textbf{The Peace Cooperation Law}

In 1991, the Japanese government began working on a new bill to allow the Self-Defense Forces to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. In addition to responding to the embarrassment during the Persian Gulf, Japan wanted to play a substantial role in Cambodia where Japan had been increasingly involved in its international negotiations. Japan also wished to be considered for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

The Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (also known as the Peace Cooperation Law or the Peacekeeping Law) was passed on 10 August 1992. It created the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (IPCHQ) in the Prime Minister’s Office and enabled SDF participation in UN-administered peacekeeping operations, election monitoring organized, and international humanitarian relief efforts. The law specifically stipulated that Japan’s peacekeeping operations must be carried out according to five principles:

\textsuperscript{33} Ito, “Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” 75.
\textsuperscript{34} MOFA, \textit{Diplomatic Bluebook 1991}, 360, quoted in Ito, “Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” 75.
1) Agreement on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts.

2) Consent for the undertaking of UN peacekeeping operations as well as Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts.

3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts.

4) Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the international Peace Cooperation Corps may suspend international Peace Cooperation Assignments. Unless the requirements be satisfied again in a short term, the Government of Japan may terminate the dispatch of the personnel engaged in international Peace Cooperation Assignments.

5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel, etc.\(^\text{35}\)

Accordingly, Japan can send personnel to International Peace Cooperation (IPC) efforts only if a ceasefire agreement, invitation from all conflict parties, and impartiality exist. Personnel were to be withdrawn immediately should conditions in the host country deteriorate.

Moreover, the Peace Cooperation Law listed 16 specific tasks as IPC (International Peace Cooperation) assignments. This so-called “positive list” determined what the SDF and IPC corps may carry out, and the personnel may not perform tasks not listed there. The first six tasks are to be carried out by SDF personnel: monitoring ceasefire or implementation of relocation programs, withdrawal or demobilization of armed forces; patrol of buffer zones; inspection or identification of the carrying in or out of weapons and/or their parts by vehicles, other means of transportation, or passersby; collection, storage or disposal of abandoned weapons and/or their parts; assistance in the designation of ceasefire lines and other assimilated boundaries by the parties to armed conflicts; and assistance for the exchange of prisoners-of-war among the parties to the

\(^{35}\) IPCHQ, *Paths to Peace*, 5.
Further, the list includes election monitoring; medical care; assistance and advice to police administration; distribution of food; repair of facilities; and so on. This list can be problematic because it does not cover many focus areas of UN Peace Operations today such as protecting UN facilities and personnel, civilians, and freedom of movement, or the wider range of security-related tasks such as re-seizing key facilities, assisting the national police, riot control, enforced investigations, disarmament, arrest, and detention.37

In 1998, the Peace Cooperation Law was reviewed and allowed election monitoring sponsored by regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of Security and Co-operation of Europe (OSCE). Moreover, to allow for more flexibility, the newly modified law let Japanese personnel participate in humanitarian missions involving the UNHCR even if there was no agreement on ceasefires among parties to the conflicts. Furthermore, the SDF was allowed to use weapons if senior officers ordered them to do so.38

Decision-Making Process for UN Deployments

The first step in the decision-making process involves private negotiations between the United Nations and the IPCHQ. Next, the IPCHQ must make sure the potential operation obeys the Japanese law and abide by the conditions described above – ceasefire, invitation by the belligerent parties, and impartiality. Then, IPCHQ forwards the proposal to the chief cabinet secretary who must assess whether the proposal will garner enough political support to overcome domestic opposition. If a proposal is approved politically, a

36 International Peace Cooperation Law, Article 3(3) a-f (1992).
fact-finding team mission would be dispatched to the host country to determine whether the conditions set forth in the Peacekeeping Law have been truly met and to report to the Diet.\textsuperscript{39}

Granted the fact-finding mission has no major objections, the chief cabinet secretary requests cooperation from ministries and agencies. At the same time, the IPCHQ would develop an Implementation Plan for the cabinet consideration, describing details such as duties SDF personnel would perform, the time length of their stay overseas, and the types of weapon they would be permitted to carry. Once the plan is drafted, the IPCHQ asks the UN to issue a formal request for Japanese participation. Finally, after Japan receives the formal request, the cabinet votes to approve the Implementation Plan and the SDF begin preparations for the mission abroad.\textsuperscript{40}

To this day, the decision-making process has been long and stressful. For example, the government took about 4 weeks to agree on sending the SDF to Cambodia and Zaire, three months for Mozambique, and a year and a half for Golan Heights. By the time the cabinet approved the deployment of SDF to eastern Zaire in 1994, major duties had already been assigned to other countries or NGOs, thus lessening the value of Japan’s contribution.\textsuperscript{41}

**First Applications of the Peace Cooperation Law**

On 8 September 1992, just weeks after the Peacekeeping Law had gone into effect, the cabinet approved the dispatch of 600 SDF engineers to Cambodia’s Takeo Province,

\textsuperscript{39} Heinrich, *UN Peace-keeping Operations*, 34.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 34.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 34.
eight military observers to sites throughout the country, and 75 policemen to UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia’s (UNTAC) Civilian Police Unit.\footnote{Ibid., 24.} This was the first and the largest deployment of military personnel since the end of World War II. The personnel conducted efforts such as repairing roads and bridges in areas where the use of force would be unlikely. Despite these precautions, hostilities did continue in Cambodia and Japan experienced its first casualties when Nakata Atsuhiito, a Japanese UN volunteer, was killed in April 1993 and Takata Haruyuki, a Japanese civilian police officer, was shot and killed one month later.\footnote{Hugo Dobson, Julie Gilson, Glenn D. Hook, and Christopher W. Hughes, \textit{Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security} (London: Routledge, 2005), 384.} In response, Japanese citizens made calls embedded in the norm of anti-militarism to bring back all Japanese personnel in the face of an evidently ineffective ceasefire. Nonetheless, the government was able to continue with the mission by emphasizing the importance of contributing to regional stability and the existence of a cease-fire agreement that legitimated Japan’s presence in Cambodia.\footnote{Dobson et al, \textit{Japan’s International Relations}, 384.}

One weakness of the SDF was its inability to perform duties that were even slightly different from those listed in the Implementation Plan without government approval.\footnote{Heinrich, \textit{UN Peace-keeping Operations}, 25.} For example, Japanese civilian police could not accept a newly added mandate to arrest those who violated the election process.\footnote{Kazumi Ishizuka, “Japan and UN Peace Operations,” 147.} This inflexibility irritated Cambodians and other UN personnel who needed assistance. Despite this weakness, however, the SDF engineering battalion received some praise for the personnel’s expertise and accomplishments in road
and infrastructure reconstruction.\textsuperscript{47} UNTAC was an important first step for Japan in setting a precedent for Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping.

In 1992, Somalia was on the verge of complete political and economic collapse, and the UN Security Council approved the formation of a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) under US leadership to use force to ensure that aid reached those who needed it. MOFA was keen on making contributions, but the deteriorating circumstances in Somalia and the lack of a formal cease-fire agreement did not permit the SDF to be deployed under the Peacekeeping Law.\textsuperscript{48}

On the other hand, Japan was able to partake in the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in 1993 because a peace accord had been reached, a cease-fire was in effect, and both the domestic factions had agreed to a UN presence. Japan sent a 53-person contingent from May 1993 to December 1995. Japan’s participation in ONUMOZ did not attract much attention because not many Japanese had interest in or knowledge of affairs in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{49}

MOFA also considered taking part in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia when the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the newly appointed Japanese head of UNPROFOR Yasushi Akashi approached the Japanese government in 1993. According to Heinrich, Japanese domestic political factors worked against participation because in the previous summer, the long-governing Liberal

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 148.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 26-27.
Democrats had been replaced by a loose coalition of eight political groups, including the Japan Socialist Party, which had opposed SDF participation.\textsuperscript{50}

In the fall of 1994, however, Japan sent a 283-person SDF contingent to Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, to assist the UNHCR in helping the thousands of Rwandan refugees suffering from insufficient food, water, and sanitation.\textsuperscript{51} The Socialist Party was starting to adopt a more moderate position on military matters and had decided that dispatching the SDF to humanitarian relief operation was a beneficial contribution to global welfare.\textsuperscript{52}

In the rest of the 1990s, Japan also supported peacekeeping in El Salvador, Rwanda, Golan Heights, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and East Timor through UN Peacekeeping support, election observation, humanitarian relief support, and in-kind contributions, increasing its commitment to peacekeeping (see Table 1.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/Purpose</th>
<th>Type of Personnel</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)</td>
<td>Electoral observers</td>
<td>Sep - Oct 1992</td>
<td>3 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
<td>Sep 1992 - Sep 1993</td>
<td>8 persons x 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian police</td>
<td>Oct 1992 - Jul 1993</td>
<td>75 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineering units</td>
<td>Sep 1992 - Sep 1993</td>
<td>600 persons x 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral observers</td>
<td>May - Jun 1993</td>
<td>41 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)</td>
<td>Staff Officers</td>
<td>May 1993 - Jan 1995</td>
<td>5 persons x 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement control units</td>
<td>May 1993 - Jan 1995</td>
<td>48 persons x 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral observers</td>
<td>Oct - Nov 1994</td>
<td>15 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)</td>
<td>Electoral observers</td>
<td>Mar/Apr 1994</td>
<td>15 persons x 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 27.


\textsuperscript{52} Heinrich, UN Peace-keeping Operations, 27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/Force</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)</td>
<td>Civilian police</td>
<td>Jul - Sep 1999</td>
<td>3 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rel. of Rwandan refugees in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo)</td>
<td>Refugee relief units</td>
<td>Sep-Dec 1994</td>
<td>283 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Airlifting units</td>
<td>Sep-Dec 1994</td>
<td>118 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)</td>
<td>Staff officers</td>
<td>Feb 1996 - Present</td>
<td>2 persons x 9 (as of Mar 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport units</td>
<td>Feb 1996 - Present</td>
<td>43 persons x 18 (as of Mar 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina general and regional elections</td>
<td>Elections supervisors and observers</td>
<td>Sep-1998</td>
<td>30 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief of East Timorese dispatched persons</td>
<td>Airlifting units</td>
<td>Nov 1999-Feb 2000</td>
<td>113 persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Japan’s Interests and Promises in the 21st Century**

In response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001, Japan enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in October 2001, succeeded later by the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law in January 2008. According to the 2010 Defense White Paper, “international terrorism is a global threat, and it is important for Japan to cooperate with international community in making appropriate efforts for its prevention and eradication.” The Special Measures Law allowed the Ground SDF to provide medical care, water supply, and assistance for the recovery and improvement of public infrastructure such as schools and roads in Samawah, Iraq. The Law also allowed the Air SDF to transport supplies for humanitarian reconstruction assistance from its base in Kuwait. The Ministry of Defense claims that such SDF participation in international peace cooperation contributes to the maintenance of peace and security of the international community. Conversely, such participation benefits Japan as it demonstrates the capabilities of the SDF and enhances Japan’s credibility with other nations.

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55 Ibid., 323.
The 2005 National Defense Program Guideline lists one of the objectives of Japan’s security policy as improving the international security environment in order to reduce the changes that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. In addition to Japan’s duty as a responsible member of the UN to help others, Japan wants to make good use of its post-war experiences and accomplishments as a “nation of peace” thereby further enhancing its national standing. The Guideline called for development of necessary mechanisms for Japan to participate actively in activities that the nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment.\(^{56}\)

In a policy speech delivered in November 2006 entitled “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,” Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso stated that striving to create affluent, stable regions grounded in such universal values as freedom and democracy is a new pillar of Japanese diplomacy.\(^{57}\)

In January 2007, the Japanese law elevated international operations from “supplementary” activities into the category of “primary tasks” for the SDF.\(^{58}\) Consequently, Japan upgraded the Japan Defense Agency was upgraded to ministry status and created the Ministry of Defense. In addition, the Central Readiness Force (CRF), Japan’s first standby system ever, was created to prepare for quicker and larger deployment of Ground SDF contingents. The CRF organizes and commands ongoing international missions. Japan’s five regional armies now take turns preparing 1,300-person stand-by units, from which suitable personnel with proper skill sets are selected and prepared for


\(^{57}\) Ibid., 2.

deployment on missions within 90 days of the preparation order. The CRF also has a unit called the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit (IPCATU) devoted to education and training of personnel to serve in international operations. In addition to training, the IPCATU performs research aimed at enhancing education and equipment based on lessons learned.59

Also in January 2007, Prime Minister Abe announced his resolve to contribute more personnel, stating, “While adhering to the principles of the Constitution, Japanese will no longer shy away from carrying out overseas activities involving the SDF, if it is for the sake of international peace and stability.”60 In March, Japan promised future efforts in human resource development for peacebuilding; intellectual contributions; and bolstering ODA for peacebuilding and promoting international peace cooperation.61

At the 19 October 2009 Opening Ceremony of the US-Japan Global Peace Operations Initiatives, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Koichi Takemasa stated, “Given the fact that more than 110,000 people are currently working as peacekeepers, we think that there is much room for Japan to make further efforts.”62 Takemasa promised that Japan will 1) make efforts to develop civilian experts specializing in peacebuilding; 2) make efforts in strengthening overall peacekeeping capabilities; 3) consider positively the possibility of deploying more personnel to UN peacekeeping operations; and 4) contribute actively to the discussion on the review of the UN peacekeeping operations.

59 Aoi, “Beyond “Activism-Lite”?” 89.
60 MOFA, Japan’s Efforts on Peacebuilding, 15.
61 Ibid., 14-15.
In recent years, there has been debate in the Diet and at other venues over the “general law” that governs international peace cooperation activities. No specific actions have been taken so far by the Government toward enacting such a law, but issues including what specific activities Japan should engage in as it actively assists in ensuring global peace and stability need to be examined.\(^{63}\)

**Summary**

This chapter gave a historical overview of the context in which Japan’s participation has taken place. In particular, the challenges, accomplishments, and future commitment statements mentioned in this chapter will help in the later assessment of whether Japan has kept up to its promises or not, what challenges remain today, and how Japan can improve its efforts in the future.

After World War II, Japan’s new constitution renounced the right of belligerency of the state. The Self-Defense Forces were established in 1954 for defense purposes only. After Japan joined the United Nations in 1956, Japan was requested at various times by the organization’s officials to participate in peacekeeping efforts. Japan had to turn down some of them saying that the SDF missions did not include UN duties. Japan did contribute several government officials, election observers but not SDF personnel at first. During the Gulf War (1990-1991), Japan was accused of resorting to “checkbook diplomacy” because it contributed money but no personnel to the UN coalition forces. Since then, Japan has passed laws such as the 1992 Peace Cooperation Law and the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and categorized international operations as one of SDF’s primary tasks.

\[^{63}\text{Ministry of Defense of Japan, }\textit{Defense of Japan 2010, 325.}\]
Such efforts have allowed Japan to send the SDF abroad under certain conditions and to participate in numerous operations over the last two decades. Whether and how Japan’s actual contributions reflect its expressed commitments is assessed later in the Conclusion chapter.

The following two chapters describe Japan’s contributions to UN and non-UN Missions in the 21st century. The gathered data on Japan’s contributions in troops, civilian personnel, and materials will set objective standards in assessing Japan’s contributions.
Chapter 2. UN-Commanded Peacekeeping 2000-2010

Since 2000, Japan has contributed money, troops, observers, civilian staff, trainers, and materials to peacekeeping operations. Dispatched personnel include those from the Self-Defense Forces, the government, NGOs, as well as private individuals such as engineers and doctors. Troops help in efforts such as transportation and reconstruction of infrastructure. Election observers help prepare for elections, monitor elections, and report on how well the elections were done. Civilian officers often have special expertise like engineering and medical care. Contributions in kind include tents, clothing, and food.

Specifically, this chapter examines Japan’s contributions to UN peacekeeping operations which are “established by the Security Council, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under UN command and control, at the collective expense of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by the member nations, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.”

I distinguish UN from non-UN commanded missions discussed in chapter 3 because Japan clearly distinguishes UN and non-UN missions. In fact, until 1998, Japanese personnel could only be deployed to UN missions and elections abroad. Reports like the Center on International Cooperation’s Annual Review of Global Peace Operations and the Review of Political Missions also make this distinction. Moreover, data for each sector comes from different sources, and the distinction will facilitate the data analysis later on.

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The chapter looks at 1) financial contributions to UN general and peacekeeping budget; 2) UN peacekeeping operation troop deployments; 3) electoral observation; 4) in-kind contributions; 5) UN political mission staffs; and 6) UNDPKO and DFS headquarters staffs. The DPKO and DFS headquarters staff do not physically work where the missions take place. Instead, they support the peacekeeping operations from the headquarters located abroad. The United Nations, not the Japanese government, hires them. The same usually applies to civilian staffs at political missions. The number of headquarters and political mission civilian staff reflect Japan’s human resource capacity and help assess how involved Japanese citizens are in peacekeeping.

While DPKO focuses on military peacekeeping, DPA’s political missions focus on political engagement with governments, parties, and civil society with the purpose of averting, mitigating or stopping conflict. For this reason, DPA missions tend to be safer for the peacekeepers than are DPKO operations that focus on local security issues. Troop participation for Japan is a very big commitment that comes from constitutional debates on whether Japan can send forces and from a long decision-making process.

Financial Contributions

Japan has been the second largest contributor to both UN general and peacekeeping budget, after the United States (Figure 2.1). In 2005, Japan’s assessed contribution was 19% in both budgets, and in 2010, assessed contribution for Japan’s UN regular budget was 16.6% and UN peacekeeping budget was 12.53%.

Figure 2.1: Japan’s Assessed Contributions to UN General Budget
For the peacekeeping budget in particular, Japan paid US$792 million in 2005 and $1.2 billion in 2010. Between 2005 and 2010, Japan’s payments exceeded its assessed amount except in 2008. Therefore, the exact percentage of the actual contributions out of the total payments is unknown (Figure 2.2).

According to calculations done by the Norway Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Japan contributed about US$1.084 billion to the overall UN system in 2008. Of the $1.04 billion, $364 million were in core contributions and $720 million in non-core contributions. Overall, Japan paid about 0.02% of its GNI to core and non-core contributions to the UN system. Their source is the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, but the exact method and what they consider “core” and “non-core” contributions are not clarified.

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67 Data from CIC, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* 2006 to 2011
*Note: Their source is the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, but the exact method and what they consider “core” and “non-core” are not clarified.
UN-Commanded Peacekeeping Operations Involving SDF Participation

**UN Disengagement Force (Feb. 1996 – Present):** Since the Six-day War in 1967, friction has continued in Golan Heights, located in the borders of Israel and Syria. The UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) plays a key role in supporting ongoing peace negotiations. Beginning February 1996, Japan has been dispatching SDF units to UNDOF. Japan saw participation in a Middle East peacekeeping operation as a chance to raise its political visibility by increasing the already substantial financial aid it provided to countries in the region. Moreover, because UNDOF had strong support from both Israel and Syria, the

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69 Ibid.
mission seemed to provide relative safety for the Japanese personnel. This time, Japan asked to participate in a peacekeeping operation before the UN issued a request.\(^{70}\)

There are three SDF staff officers assigned to UNDOF headquarters located in Camp Fouar. They rotate about once a year and actively cooperate with those from other countries to engage in public relations and logistic operations such as planning and coordinating transportation of water, food, and other supplies. The SDF transport unit consists of 43 personnel, switching every six months. Headquartered at Camp Ziuani on the Israeli side of the Golan Heights, they provide logistic support for UNDOF activities, including road repair, transportation, and storage of food and other supplies.\(^{71}\)

According to Munemori Fujita, an Ex-Major who served in UNDOF 26\(^{th}\) Transport Unit in 2008, his unit had an entire year of training before leaving Japan. Fujita’s unit studied English for three months and trained for “necessary disciplines” to fulfill their tasks abroad. For example, those assigned to transport duty trained to drive large, left-handed vehicles and to load supplies with forklift trucks kept by the SDF.\(^{72}\)

To ensure smooth and effective performance of duties, the Japanese Cabinet Office forwards liaison and coordination personnel dispatched to Israel and Syria. They provide liaison and coordination between Japanese staff officers and units and relevant organization in both countries.\(^{73}\) Additionally, the Air Self-Defense Force has since May 1996 provided

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\(^{73}\) IPCHQ, “International Peace Cooperation Assignment in the Golan Heights.”
a U-4 or a C-130H transport plane approximately every six months to airlift food and other supplies from Japan to support transport units and staff officers in the Golan Heights.74

**East Timor (1999–Present):** In 1974, Portugal abandoned its sovereignty over Timor-Leste, which had been its colony since the 16th century. This was followed by the annexation by Indonesia in 1976 and an armed conflict between pro-independence and pro-Indonesia militias. A peace agreement was concluded in 1999 and referendum took place in August under the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). When violence broke out upon the announcement of the result for East Timorese independence, violence broke out killing over 1,000 people. In response, the International Force in East Timor (INTERFRET) undertook a peace enforcement operation to restore security. A month later, in October 1999, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was put in place.75

After East Timor gained independence on 20 May 2002, UNTAET was replaced by UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) that supported core administrative structures until May 2005. Today, the UN continues to support East Timor under the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). Japan has been involved in East Timor since June 1999. Below are the details of Japan’s personnel contribution to the peacekeeping operations in East Timor in the 21st century. Japan also made election observer and in-kind contributions to East Timor, which are discussed below.

74 Ibid.
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor and UN Mission of Support in East Timor (Feb. 2002–June 2004): Beginning 25 October 1999, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) governed East Timor and exercised all legislative, executive, and judicial functions. It came to an end with the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on 20 May 2002. Then, UNTAET was replaced by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) to support core administrative structures critical to its viability and political stability. Japan sent a group of ten staff officers to the headquarters of UNTAET and UNMISET from February 2002 to May 2003 in Dili. It sent a second group of seven staff officers from April 2003 to June 2004. The personnel were involved in planning and coordination for the maintenance and repair of roads and bridges and other logistic support. From March 2002 to June 2004, four engineer units with a maximum of 680 personnel at one time were successively sent to East Timor. At five locations, they engaged in logistic support for UNMISET, including maintaining and repairing roads and bridges and maintaining and overseeing water supply points. They also took part in civilian support projects, such as landscaping the grounds of elementary schools.76

Additionally, a liaison and coordination office was set up in Dili to provide liaison and coordination between Japanese staff officers and units and relevant organizations. The Maritime Self-Defense Force transport ship Osumi and escort ship Mineyuki and six Air Self-Defense Force C-130H transport planes transported engineer units and some of their

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76 IPCHQ, “International Peace Cooperation Assignment in East Timor.”
equipment. About twice a year, C-130H transport planes flew in food supplies for the engineers and staff officers.  

UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (Jan. 2006 – Present): In response to the deteriorating security situation in East Timor since the wake of protest activities by former East Timorese Armed Forces soldiers in April 2006, the UN Security Council established UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). The mission supports presidential and parliamentary electoral processes. Consisting primarily of civilian police officers, UNMIT assists in strengthening stability and nation building in Timor-Leste. Japan has dispatched two civilian police officers and three liaison and coordination personnel to UNMIT. Additionally, Japan sent two military liaison officers in September 2010 to carry out tasks necessary in observing the ceasefire and disengagement.


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77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
Japan has sent four groups of six-member teams of SDF personnel beginning March 2007 to serve as military observers of UNMIN. Japanese personnel also participate in a mixed team consisting of a number of personnel from various countries. They conduct monitoring of the management of arms and armed personnel at Maoist Cantonment Sites in seven locations in Nepal and at the Nepal Army’s camp. A group of six GSDF members were put into different international teams and carried out tasks while staying at the seven Maoist camps or at the UN area within the Nepal army around in Katmandu. Additionally, four coordination and liaison personnel are currently assigned in Katmandu. They facilitate communications and coordination between the dispatched military Observers and the concerned agencies to ensure smooth and effective execution of their duties.  

**UN Mission in Sudan (Oct. 2008–Present):** In 1983, Sudan suffered from an armed conflict between the Sudanese government in the north that sought a nation based on Arab nationalism and anti-government forces led by Christians in the south. The conflict continued for over two decades until the conflict parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005. In March 2005 the United Nations established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), mandated to support the implementation of the agreement and to facilitate and coordinate the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Since 2008, Japan has had two officers in the UNMIS headquarters. One officer in the Force Headquarters’ Logistic Planning Office is in charge of liaison within the UNMIS concerning logistic needs for military components. The other officer serves as a database

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manager in the Joint Mission Analysis Cell under the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General.83

**UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Feb. 2010–Present):** In order to support urgent restoration, reconstruction, and stabilization in Haiti after the devastating earthquake in January 2010, the Security Council adopted resolution 1908 authorizing to increase the number of UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) personnel. Japan established “the International Peace Cooperation Assignments Plan for Haiti” and “the Cabinet Order Concerning International Peace Cooperation Corps for Haiti” to dispatch a SDF Engineering Unit to MINUSTAH. The 225 personnel unit completes various tasks such as removing rubble, repairing roads, and constructing simple facilities. Additionally, the liaison and coordination personnel forwarded from the Cabinet Office provide liaison and coordination between Japanese staff officers and units and relevant organizations in Haiti for smooth and effective performance of duties.84

**Election Observations**

**East Timor (Aug.–Sept. 2001):** Elections took place under the auspices of the UNTAET for representatives to the Constituent Assembly on 30 August 2001. At the UN’s request, Japan dispatched 19 election observers out of which 13 were national government officials and six from the private sector. Starting 22 and 26 August, they collected information from UNTAET, UNDP, as well as local surveys, and monitored campaign

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83 Ibid.
activities and election preparations in Dili, Manatuto, and Liquica Districts. On election day, the observers observed voting at 16 polling stations. They noted that the election was generally conducted freely and fairly. All election observers completed their duties by 5 September and returned to Japan.\(^\text{85}\)

**Kosovo (Nov. 2001):** On 17 November 2001, elections for members of the Kosovo assembly took place under the auspices of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Upon the request of the UN, Japan sent six election observers (three national government officials and three individuals from the private sector). They paired with observers from other countries and observed the polling preparations, voting, and counting process to check if the election rules were being followed. They covered stations in Pristina, Zvecan, Mitrovica, Istok, Klina, Malisevo, and Dakovica. The observers arrived in Kosovo on 12 November 2001 and left the country by 19 November. Japan also sent five liaison coordination personnel who coordinated between the Council of Europe, other relevant organizations, and Japanese observers in Kosovo. They began work in Kosovo from 9 November and returned to Japan on 19 November.\(^\text{86}\)

**East Timor (Apr. 2002):** For the 14 April 2002 presidential election under the UNTAET, Japan dispatched 8 election observers (four national government officials and four individuals from the private sectors) from 8 to 17 April, They checked the campaigning and election preparations in Dili, Liquica and Manatuto District while

\(^{85}\) IPCHQ, “International Peace Cooperation Assignment in East Timor.”


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conducting local surveys and collecting information from UNTAET, UNDP, and other relevant organizations. On Election Day, the observers monitored voting at 14 polling stations and the following day they observed ballot counting. In general, the turnout was high and voting and ballots went smoothly and peacefully. On 20 May, Xanana Gusmao became the president of Timor-Leste.87

**Democratic Republic of Congo (Jul.–Aug. 2006):** To assist the 30 July 2006 presidential legislative elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Japan sent 8 election observers at the UN’s request (five national government officials and three individuals from the private sector). Two arrived in Kinshasa on 22 July 2006 and the remaining six arrived on 26 July. They monitored electoral campaigns, voting preparations, voting, and ballot counting to ensure free and fair elections. Japanese observers covered a total of 59 polling and counting stations. They completed their duties and returned to Japan by 5 August 2006.88

**Democratic Republic of the Congo (Oct.–Nov. 2006):** Because none of the presidential candidates won a majority of votes in July, there was a run-off election on 29 October between the two finalists. Japan sent five election observers (two national government officials and three individuals from the private sector) carrying out similar

duties. On polling day, they monitored 43 polling and counting stations and returned to Japan by 2 November.⁸⁹

**East Timor (April 2007):** Japan dispatched 14 election observers (five national government officials and nine individuals from the private sector) to assist with the 9 April 2007 presidential election. Four that arrived in late March collected information and prepared for election monitoring operations and were joined by ten more on 4 April. Observers monitored electoral campaigns, voting preparations, voting, and ballot counting. On 9 April polling day, the Japanese observers monitored 59 polling centers. They completed their mission and returned to Japan by 14 April 2007.⁹⁰

**East Timor (May 2007):** Japan sent 8 election observers (4 national government officials and 4 individuals from the private sector) starting 4 May to assist the 9 May presidential run-off election. They observed electoral campaigns, voting preparation, voting, and ballot counting. On polling day, they monitored 54 centers. They completed duties by 14 May.⁹¹

**East Timor (June 2007):** Japan sent 14 election observers (five national government officials and nine individuals from the private sector) for the 30 June 2007 parliamentary election. Some arrived on 20 June and others joined the team on 27 June.

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⁸⁹ IPCHQ, “International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
⁹⁰ IPCHQ, “International Peace Cooperation Assignment for East Timorese Election Observation.”
⁹¹ Ibid.
On polling day, Japanese observers monitored 55 polling centers. They completed duties and departed the country by 7 July.\textsuperscript{92}

**Nepal (May–April 2008):** To support the 10 April 2008 Nepalese election for Constituent Assembly, Japan sent an election observation mission consisting of 24 election observers (six national government officials and 18 individuals from the private sector). They were deployed in various parts of Nepal, including remote regions. Ten were dispatched from 28 March and the remaining 14 joined on 4 April. The observers established headquarters, arranged logistics, and investigated the regional situation. On polling day, they covered stations in Kathmanu, Dhulikhe, Pokhara, Biratnagar, and Nepalganj and monitored some 300 polling stations.\textsuperscript{93}

**Sudan (Dec.–Jan. 2011):** To assist the 9 to 15 January 2011 South Sudan Referendum, Japan dispatched a Referendum Observation Mission in December 2010 to Sudan comprised of 15 members including private individuals such as experts and NGO workers and national governmental officials. Twelve carried out observation in Juba, the capital city of Southern Sudan, and three in the north. At each polling center, the mission, members observe the preparation, free and fair voting, and the legacy of the result.\textsuperscript{94}

**In-Kind Contributions**

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
Table 2.1 compiles Japan’s in-kind contributions in the 21st century under the International Peace Cooperation Law. Most of the recipients listed are not peacekeeping operations. I listed them, however, because UN agencies that work for conflict victims, especially refugees, and contribute significantly to the peacekeeping efforts on the ground.

Table 2.1: Japan’s Record of Contributions in Kind 2000-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient / Purpose</th>
<th>Cabinet Decision</th>
<th>Item and Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Afghanistan</td>
<td>23 Mar. 2001</td>
<td>Tents (160 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Blankets (1,200 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plastic sheets (1,600 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Pakistan for Afghan refugees</td>
<td>4 Oct. 2001</td>
<td>Tents (315 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Blankets (200 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sleeping mats (20 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jelly cans (400 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 Oct. 2001</td>
<td>Plastic sheets (75 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Jordan and Syria for Iraqi refugees</td>
<td>28 Mar. 2003</td>
<td>Tents (160 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Chad for Sudanese refugees</td>
<td>5 Oct. 2004</td>
<td>Tents (700 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
<td>29 Jul. 2005</td>
<td>Landmine detectors (60 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All wheel drive vehicles (27 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Large tents (20 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Sri Lanka</td>
<td>31 Oct. 2006</td>
<td>Sleeping mats (10,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jelly cans (10,000 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plastic sheets (4,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Darfur, Sudan</td>
<td>6 Nov. 2007</td>
<td>Blankets (10,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sleeping mats (10,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jelly cans (10,000 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plastic sheets (4,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Iraq</td>
<td>28 Dec. 2007</td>
<td>Tents (1,000 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Sudan</td>
<td>28 Oct. 2008</td>
<td>Water purifiers (60 sets, including spare filters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA in Gaza for Palestinian affected people</td>
<td>23 Jan. 2009</td>
<td>Blankets (29,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sleeping mats (20,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plastic sheets (8,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM in Sri Lanka</td>
<td>15 May 2009</td>
<td>Tents (560 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jelly cans (30,000 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plastic sheets (4,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sleeping mats (10,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mosquito nets (1000 sets)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

95 IPCHQ, *Paths to Peace, Paths to Peace: Japan’s Contributions to World Peace*, Tokyo, 2009, 10.
It should be noted that with regard to UN efforts in Iraq, Japan did not directly contribute to the peacekeeping activities on the ground but did help transport relief goods for various programs run by the United Nations, as shown in table 2.1. In March 2003, Japan sent 50 Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) personnel in a refugees relief unit to Jordan. They supplied 160 tents to the UNHCR, which was undertaking relief operation for Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria.\footnote{IPCHQ, “International Peace Cooperation Assignment for Iraqi Refugees,” accessed March 1, 2011, http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/result/iraq/iraq02.html.} In July 2003, Japan sent 98 ASDF personnel to transport supplies between Brindisi, Italy, and Amman, Jordan for around one month, transporting a total of about 140 metric tons of humanitarian relief supplies. In addition, six transport support personnel handled procedures for the acceptance of the unit in Jordan and other airports along the route. In addition, one liaison and coordination personnel was sent to Jordan to facilitate relations between the unit and the Jordanian government, the WFP, UNHCR, and other relevant organizations.\footnote{Ibid.} Moreover, in December 2007, Japan provided UNHCR supplied 1000 tents for afflicted people in the northern region of Iraq.\footnote{IPCHQ, “Contribution in kind to UNHCR for the Relief of Iraqi Afflicted People, “ accessed March 1, 2011, http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/result/iraq/iraq05.html.}

**UN Political Mission Civilian Staffs**

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Japan has contributed civilian staffs in various additional multilateral peace operations. However, the data is limited. In some operations, at least one Japanese civilian staff was involved, but the exact number is unknown (indicated with“?” in the table below). What kind of work
they do is not specified either.\textsuperscript{99} According to the first Annual Review of Political Missions 2010 published this year ranks Japan has 13 staffs throughout UN political missions, ranking 23rd among all contributing countries.\textsuperscript{100}

Table 2.2: Japanese Civilian Staff in UN Political Missions 2000-2009 \textsuperscript{101}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>‘00</th>
<th>‘01</th>
<th>‘02</th>
<th>‘03</th>
<th>‘04</th>
<th>‘05</th>
<th>‘06</th>
<th>‘07</th>
<th>‘08</th>
<th>‘09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Integrate Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSL)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Civilian Staffs at DPKO and DFS Headquarters (2005-2009)**

In addition to deployments by the government of Japan, there are Japanese citizens who work for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) headquarters. Although each staff’s specific assignments are unknown, according to the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2011, there are currently 15 Japanese citizens working in the headquarters, an increase from 11 staffs in 2005.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{99} I contacted several missions to ask about the specific number of Japanese staff and their contact information in March 2011, but I received no reply.
\textsuperscript{100} CIS, Review of Political Missions 2010, 129.
\textsuperscript{101} Data from SIPRI, Multilateral Peace Operations Database, http://conflict.sipri.org/SIPRI_Internet/.
\textsuperscript{102} CIC, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2011.
Summary

Between 2000 and 2010, Japan contributed money, troops, observers, civilian staff, trainers, and materials to peacekeeping operations. The financial contribution steadily increased in dollars and comprised similar levels of around 16% of the UN general and peacekeeping budgets during the 2005–2010 period. Between 2000 and 2010, Japan participated in seven peacekeeping operations, nine election observations, in-kind contributions in 13 different occasions, and eight political missions. Although data was limited in some aspects, the chapter was able to identify major numbers in several fields on UN missions and efforts. Next chapter focuses on non-UN Missions, often authorized by the United Nations.
Chapter 3. Non-UN Commanded Peacekeeping 2000-2010

While most of Japan’s peacekeeping contributions assist UN operations and efforts, it is critical that we also look at non-UN missions in order to get a more complete view and assess Japan’s contributions to peacekeeping comprehensively. By non-UN peacekeeping operations, I mean those with or without a United Nations mandate that are conducted by regional organizations or ad hoc coalition of states with the stated intention to preserve the peace, however fragile, usually where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.

Japan has sent its Self-Defense Forces to UN-authorized missions focused on fighting terrorism and piracy in the Indian Ocean, Iraq, the coast of Somalia, and the Gulf of Aden. The Ministry of Defense explained that because Japan depends on the Middle East for 90% of its oil imports, participating in the eradication of terrorism is crucial.\[^{103}\]

Japan also supports missions in Eastern Europe run by the Organization of Security and Co-operation of Europe with electoral observers and civilian staff. This chapter covers Japan’s participation in UN-mandated missions, election observation; OSCE missions; and training of peacekeepers.

In terms of financial contributions to non-UN peacekeeping, the numbers are unknown. From the data I gathered, I could determine that Japan has contributed $20 million to peacekeeping training centers in Africa. Similarly, I was unable to compile a list of in-kind contributions. It is quite possible that Japan did make several of them, including Japan’s contributions in fuel and water to ships in the Indian Ocean, as discussed below.

\[^{103}\text{Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2010}\]
UN-Mandated Missions

Anti-Terrorism Oil Replenishment (Oct. 2001–Jan. 2010): In response to the 9/11 terror in the United States, the Japanese government expressed shock and sympathy for those killed and injured in the incident. The US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage reportedly asked the Japanese ambassador to the United States, Yanai Shunji, that Japan “show the flag” on the upcoming US operations in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{104} On 19 September, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi issued a Seven Point Plan that was used to mobilize Japanese SDF to escort a US aircraft carrier scheduled to sail from Yokosuka to the war zone.\textsuperscript{105} A legislation that incorporated an active engagement in Afghanistan was drafted by the Foreign Ministry and passed in both houses of the Diet in October 2001. However, in the process, the Japanese government found it difficult to dispatch SDF units under the established framework and under peacekeeping operations because Secretary-General Kofi Annan made no further statements than the right of “self-defense” regarding US bombing. Moreover, it was questionable whether Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean could be included within the “areas surrounding Japan” indicated in the US-Japan guidelines to the Enduring Freedom operations.\textsuperscript{106}

In the end, Japan could not directly participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, a NATO-led security mission in Afghanistan established by the United Nations Security Council on 20 December 2001. Instead, Japan has supported the fight against terrorism by conducting replenishment support activities in the Indian Ocean from 2001 to January 2010, with a short interval from November 2007 to

\textsuperscript{104} Ito, “Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” 84.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 84.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 84.
January 2008. The Maritime Self-Defense Force supported the multilateral Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) to deter terrorism by replenishing fuel and water to ships of various participating countries such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan. The MIO deters international terrorism by blocking movements of weapons; blocking the flow of funds earned through drug transactions; and blocking movements of terrorists, to Afghan and other countries. From December 2001 to January 2010, Japan supplied fuel for military vessels around 1,100 times amounting to about 537,000KL of fuel and fuel for helicopters on ships over 100 times amounting to 1,400KL.

Multi-National Force – Iraq (Jan. 2004–Dec. 2008): After the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001, Japan enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law on 29 October 2001, later replaced by the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law on 11 January 2008. On 18 December 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro approved the plan drafted by the Defense Agency for deployment of units from the SDF to Iraq. The direct basis for the dispatch was the cabinet approval on 9 May of a “basic plan” as stipulated under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, which was passed by the National Diet in July 2003. Prime Minister Koizumi stated, “I believe that, as a responsible member of the international community, Japan must also fulfill its responsibility in the creation of an environment that will allow the people of Iraq to work to rebuild their own country with optimism. For that purpose, I have

108 Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2010
decided that there is a need for Japan to provide not only financial assistance, but also material assistance and personnel assistance, including the dispatch of the SDF.”

In January 2004, “the Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group,” consisting of 600 Japanese soldiers were deployed to Samawah, Iraq. According to the basic plan, the Ground SDF undertook humanitarian and reconstruction assistance involving medical services, water supply, and rehabilitation and maintenance of schools and other public facilities in southeastern Iraq. The ASDF transported members of the GSDF and supplies and materials for them using airports in Kuwait and southeastern Iraq. In addition, the Maritime Self-Defense Force transported and supplied the GSDF through operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

Japan’s SDF participation in Iraq received much criticism and marked a significant turning point in Japan’s history. It was the first deployment of SDF forces to a non-UN mission and to a war zone since the end of World War II. Before the forces left for Iraq, domestic opposition to the deployment was strong. However, public opinion changed over time. According to Asahi Shimbun, on 10-11 December 2003, immediately following Koizumi’s decision to dispatch the SDF, only 34% of Japanese agreed with the decision and 55% opposed it. After the SDF was actually dispatched, by 23 February 2004, the percentage of those in agreement had risen to 44%, with 48% still opposed. By 20 June

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110 Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2010, 323
111 Watanabe, “Japan Dispatches the SDF to Iraq.”

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2006, 49% of respondents agreed that sending the SDF to Iraq had been good for Japan while 25% disagreed.\textsuperscript{112} Opinion on the issue had been reversed.

As expected, the deployment had a positive effect on Japan-US relations. The close relationship between Japanese PM Koizumi and US President Bush is well known internationally. On 16 November 2005, Bush remarked at a press conference in Kyoto, “We’ve got a friend in Japan when it comes to spreading democracy and freedom. I appreciate the contributions of Japanese people in both Iraq and Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{113}

According to Ishiba et al, Japan might have had no other choice but to dispatch the SDF because Japan’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil is overwhelmingly high compared to other countries. Shipments of oil from the Middle East account for 86% of Japan’s supply, while the figures for other nations, including France (28%), the United States (24%), Germany (11%), and Britain (6%), are much lower. Japan would be the most adversely affected if the situation in Iraq were to worsen and instability in the Middle East as a region were to grow. Ishiba et al explained that “should the world plunge into widespread fear of terrorism, the global economy should probably shrink. This would deal a direct blow to the Japanese economy, which relies on international markets.”\textsuperscript{114}

The Ishiba et al further noted that although Japan’s contribution to reconstruction in Iraq is not explicitly for the sake of Japan-US alliance, it does reflect the Japan-US relationship and impacts Japan’s own security. They said, “finding a solution to the worsening North Korean crisis is impossible without solidarity among Japan, the United

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
States, and South Korea.”\textsuperscript{115} Even South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, who was elected while flying a banner of anti-Americanism, quickly dispatched 700 noncombat troops to Iraq in the spring of 2003 despite the lack of domestic support for this move.

According to Colonel Atushi Hikita who served in Iraq, the Japanese Air Self Defense Force’s airlift operations in Iraq were a “breakthrough operation.” He said that before Iraq, Japan was hesitant in participating in peacekeeping operations. However, Japan’s successful contributions, as well as lessons from mistakes in Iraq have given Japan the experience and confidence it can use to “step up” an increase Japan’s international peace efforts in the future.\textsuperscript{116}

\textbf{Anti-Piracy Efforts (Jan. 2009–Present):} Beginning with UN Security Council Resolution 1816 which was adopted in June 2008, each country has been requested to take action to suppress act of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. In January 2009, Japan announced it would send a naval task force to join international efforts to stop piracy, crime on the high seas, off the coast of Somalia. After some legal debates on how to handle attacks by pirates against ships that have Japanese personnel or cargo or ships under foreign control, it was determined that necessary action can be taken to protect ships connected with Japan from acts of piracy in the region. Since March 2009, 2 Japanese destroyers escort commercial ships connected with Japan. Since then, Japan has also deployed an aircraft to patrol the area. As of July 2009, the destroyers had protected 1,089

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Atsushi Hikita, “The Meaning of the JASDF’s Airlift Operations in Iraq and the JASDF’s Future Challenges,” (lecture, the Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, March 10, 2011).
\end{flushright}
ships. The Japanese forces also share information with forces dispatched by other countries such as the United States to help finding suspicious vessels and provide warnings.\textsuperscript{117}

According to the Ministry of Defense, “To maritime countries such as Japan in particular, which rely upon marine transport for a great deal of the food and resources from the basis of their survival and prosperity, [piracy] is a problem which cannot be ignored.”\textsuperscript{118} In a public opinion poll concerning the SDF and defense issue conducted by the Cabinet Office in January 2009, 63.2\% of people responded that Japan should be engaged in anti-piracy activities, compared to which 29.1\% responded that it was not necessary to do so. SDF efforts in the Gulf have received over 800 high praise and gratitude messages from various countries and ship-owners.\textsuperscript{119}

**Election Observation**

**Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mar. 2000):** On 8 April 2000, Bosnia and Herzegovina held municipal assembly elections in 145 municipalities. At the request of the Organization for Security and Co-operation of Europe (OSCE), Japan sent 11 election observers and polling station supervisors, three of which were national government officials and eight were from the private sector. Six election personnel were stationed in Sarajevo Canton and five in the city of Banja Luka. They monitored whether the election rules were followed by observing balloting and ballot counting.\textsuperscript{120} When they noticed any violations, they requested the head of the polling station committee concerned to rectify the situation. They

\textsuperscript{117} Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2010*, 244

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 243

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 252

also offered advice upon consultation and notified the OSCE of significant events at polling stations. In addition, there were six liaison and coordination personnel who were forwarded from the Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Three were stationed in Sarajevo Canton and the other three in the city of Banja Luka. They cooperated closely with the Japanese election personnel and the OSCE and relevant organizations to ensure smooth and efficient collection of information and monitoring of the public security situation.121

Civilian Staffs in OSCE Missions

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), there are Japanese citizens at several OSCE missions. Unfortunately, the data is very limited. In some operations, at least one Japanese civilian staff was involved but the exact number is unknown (indicated by “?” in the table below). What kind of work they do was not specified either.122

Table 3.1: Japanese Civilian Staffs in OSCE Missions 2000–2009 123

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>’00</th>
<th>’01</th>
<th>’02</th>
<th>’03</th>
<th>’04</th>
<th>’05</th>
<th>’06</th>
<th>’07</th>
<th>’08</th>
<th>’09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Mission to Croatia</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Mission to Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Presence in Albania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Spillover Monitor to Skopje</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

121 Ibid.
122 I emailed several missions to ask about the specific number of Japanese staff and their contact information in March 2011, but I received no reply.
123 Data from SIPRI, Multilateral Peace Operations Database.
Trainers and Financial Contributions to Training Centers in Africa (2008-2010)

In a joint press conference held in June 2008 Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced their intention to enhance the capacity of the Peacekeeping Operations center in Africa. As a result, Japan dispatched GSDF officers as trainers to the PKO center in Egypt, Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCDPA) in order to support the peacekeeping efforts undertaken by the African nations themselves. It was the first time that SDF instructors had been dispatched to a foreign educational and training institution for PKO.124

The Government of Japan provided assistance amounting to approximately US$14.5 million in total in 2009 to five peacekeeping training centers in Africa (Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mali and Rwanda) for the construction and rehabilitation of facilities, provision of equipment such as computers and the conduct of training courses, among other forms of assistance. In the fiscal year of 2009, Japan extended its assistance to three more centers (Benin, Nigeria and South Africa), which amounted to approximately $4 million in total. Japan up to now has sent 15 Japanese lecturers (six Self-Defense-Force personnel and nine civilians) to four centers. More than 1,200 military, police and civilian personnel have been trained through Japan's assistance to date.125

The GSDF also sent two officers to the peacekeeping school in Mamako, Mali from 28 August to 5 September 2010. Additionally, the first female GSDF officer was sent from 11 to 16 April 2010, and another GSDF officer was sent from 14 to 30 August of the same year.

On 16 August 2010, the Government of Japan additionally provided approximately $2.52 million to peacekeeping training centers in Africa. Specifically, $0.6 million were additionally provided to the Peace Keeping School (Ecole de Maintien de la Paix) (EMP) in Mali, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana and the Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) in Egypt, respectively, as well as approximately $0.72 million newly to the Ecole Internationale des Forces de Sécurité (EIFORCES) in Cameroon.

Summary

Overall, Japan has sent its Self-Defense Forces only to UN-authorized missions that focus on fighting terrorism and piracy in Iraq, the Indian Ocean, the Coast of Somalia, and the Gulf of Aden. There were also several election observers and civilian staffs that support non-UN missions Japan, all of which are run by the OSCE by. Due to limited data, the roles of the civilian staffs are unknown. Finally, Japan in the recent years began contributing trainers and money to peacekeeping training centers in Africa. Many of the non-UN mission contributions by Japan go unnoticed. Looking at them should give a good start in assessing Japan’s capacities and possibilities in participating in multilateral peace operations outside the United Nations.

In the following chapter, I analyze the numbers and trends from 2000 to 2010 utilizing the data of Japan’s contributions in troops, election observers, civilian staff, and in-kind described in chapters 2 and 3.

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126 Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2010, 338
127 MOFA, “Additional Assistance to Peacekeeping Centers in Africa, August 16, 2010.”
Chapter 4. Numbers and Trends 2000-2010

Using the comprehensive data gathered in chapters 2 and 3, I now identify trends in Japan’s contributions to peacekeeping. First, I analyze the implications of the overall number of Japan’s financial and troop contributions and regional focus, compared to UN global statistics. Then, I assess Japanese civilian participation by missions, headquarters, election observations, and training centers. Finally, I look at Japan’s in-kind contributions. The chapter aims to create a basis for objective and comprehensive assessment of Japan’s contributions to international peacekeeping. Before diving into the numbers, however, the challenges in gathering and analyzing the numbers is discussed.

Challenges in Data Collection

Overall, available information was limited, scattered, and sometimes inconsistent. Information on Japan’s efforts were found at the UNDPKO website, the Japanese IPCHQ and MOFA websites and reports, UN annual official documents, the SIPRI database, and elsewhere. One reason why I chose 2000-2010 was that detailed data on the 1990s were not available for Japan’s contributions to UNDPKO. As for data on political missions, even in 2011, there is no detailed data available. The most comprehensive report as of now is the Review of Political Missions that came out for the first time only in 2010, though it does not have specific details on Japan’s participation.

There were also some overlapped data that did not match each other. For example, the IPCHQ website said that there were 41 personnel in UNDOF whereas the UNDPKO indicated only 30. The numbers can easily depend on when the data was gathered.
Therefore, although two sources may discuss the same year, say 2007, one could be talking about numbers from March and another from December, thus creating discrepancies. Moreover, there are databases such as SIPRI’s that only cover data on a yearly basis. Generalization of data of one year is too arbitrary. The number of peacekeepers fluctuates all the time, with sudden increases for emergencies, sudden decreases at the end of a mission or retreat of a certain country’s troops. While annual data is better than no data, more detailed data would allow for more comprehensive analysis. Finally, some information only listed overall numbers with no details or lacked concrete numbers of participating Japanese staff in certain missions. Whether public or confidential, I strongly recommend a real-time online database be developed and maintained within UNDPKO where countries and missions can update their information. Japan could provide resources and leadership in taking on such a project.

Because of the inconsistent or limited data, my numbers are accurate only to a certain degree. I had to arbitrarily use numbers from certain sources to analyze the data. Moreover, even the data I gathered is incomplete. For example, I was unable to compile lists for monetary and in-kind contributions to non-UN peacekeeping. In fact, there is not even a universally endorsed definition of peacekeeping. Thus, it is challenging even to begin determining what counts as peacekeeping contributions or not. For example, Japan gave a grant aid in the amount of US$7.14 million to promote disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of children and female fighters. Would it be counted as peacekeeping contributions? What is the line between peacekeeping and peacebuilding? In this aspect, it was easier to look at contributions to UN peacekeeping that were clearly

128 Numerous definitions of peacekeeping are listed in Williams, “Peace Operations,” 5553.
129 MOFA, Japan’s Efforts on Peacebuilding: Towards Consolidation of Peace and Nation-Building, 11.
marked by the Japanese government as part of IPC efforts. Overall, as objective as I tried to be, my data is subjective to the point that I had to interpret data, determine what is relevant, and pick arbitrary numbers when there were different numbers available for the same issue.

Even in 2011, there exists no study, analysis, or database that can give a complete overview and data of Japan’s contributions to peace operations. More consensus on data and a baseline on understanding Japan’s efforts are needed to conduct a more objective and comprehensive debate on how well Japan contributes to peacekeeping today or what else Japan could do. The following analysis must be viewed in light of these methodological caveats.

**Financial Contributions**

In terms of assessed contributions, Japan has been the second largest contributor to both the UN general and peacekeeping budgets. However, upon closer inspection of the actual payments of the peacekeeping budget, Japan actually paid more than was requested of it and in some years superseded the United States (Figure 4.1). Perhaps Japan wants to compensate for its small troop contribution by contributing more money. Whatever the case may be, Japan’s contributions to UN peacekeeping has increased almost 15 times in 5 years, from $792 million in 2005 to $12.1 billion in 2010. Japan’s contribution of ten billion dollars is extremely valuable and critical in running the peacekeeping operations.
According to calculations done by the Norway Permanent Mission to the UN, in 2008, Japan made core and non-core contributions adding up to about $1.084 billion or 0.02% of its Gross National Income (See Table 4.1). Looking at the other top contributors to the UN system, Japan’s percentage of GNI is the smallest, with the United States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands paying 0.03%, 0.04%, and 0.12% of their GNI respectively. Although the difference might be only in one or few hundredths of 1% of the GNI, if Japan increased its commitment by even just 0.01 or 0.05%, the actual difference in dollars could be in tens of billions, considering Japan’s GNI is over $4 billion. Japan might be one of the top contributors in terms of the dollar amount of its contributions, but looking at the percentage of GNI it dedicates to the UN tells a different story in terms of how much Japan

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is willing to commit to the United Nations. Japan should consider paying even more than it
does now to show a stronger commitment toward international efforts.

Table 4.1: Top Contributors to the UN System in 2008
(in million USD)\(^{131}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Core</th>
<th>Non-core</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of GNI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>3,289</td>
<td>3,939</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>1,142</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Troop Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations**

Overall, the number of Japanese personnel participating in UNDPKO increased
from 30 in 2010 to 266 in 2011. However, whereas the total number of troop and personnel
contributions to UNDPKO increased steadily between 2000 and 2011 worldwide, Japan’s
contribution of personnel varied over time and the increase was not steady (see Figures 4.2
and 4.3). The largest contributions were 690 troops to UNMISET in 2002, followed by 436
troops to UNTAET in 2002 and 225 troops to MINUSTAH today. Globally in the same
time period, troop and personnel contributions increased steadily and consistently. Whereas
in January 2000, there were about 20,000 personnel, today there are around 100,000, a five-
fold increase in ten years (Figure 4.2).

The number of peacekeeping operations Japan is involved in has increased from
only one (UNDOF) in 2000 to five (MINUSTAH, UNMIS, UNMIT, UNMIN, UNDOF) in
2010. The proportionate increase was significant, but considering there are 14 missions

\(^{131}\) Norway Mission to the United Nations.
today, five is very low. Japan is not involved in two thirds of UN missions around the
globe. While the increased involvement in terms of number of peacekeeping operations
shows that Japan is trying, there is still plenty of room for more contributions.

Figure 4.2: Japan's Troop and Personnel Contributions
to UNDPKO by Mission 2000-2010

Data from statistics available at UNDPKO website, “Troop and Police Contributors,”

132
Regional Interests

Out of the seven UNDPKO missions Japan participated between 2000 and 2010, five are located in Asia with four in South Asia (UNMISET, UNTAET, UNMIT, and UNMIN) and one in the Middle East (UNDOF). Only MINUSTAH and UNMIS are outside Asia, respectively in the Americas and Africa. The difference between the UN global and Japanese statistics is stark. Over the past decade, 79.5% of Japan deployed personnel to South and Central Asia whereas only 0.2% of all UN personnel were deployed to the same region (Figure 4.4). Conversely, whereas globally 74.3% of peacekeepers were deployed to Africa in 2009, Japan sent only 3.1% of its personnel to Africa over the last decade.

133 Ibid.
Japan has been particularly committed to East Timor. It has been involved for over 11 years in all peace operations since UNAMET with troops up to 690 and numerous in-kind contributions. Moreover, a Japanese citizen, Sukehiro Hasegawa, has been the Special Representative in Timor-Leste and Head of the UNMIT since 2004. These efforts reflect Japan’s second security objective in the 2011 and earlier National Defense Program Guidelines “to prevent threats from emerging by further stabilizing the security in the Asia-Pacific region and by improving the global security environment,” which follows the first objective to “prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan.” In particular, Central and Southern Asia are a concern for Japan, since they are located closest to Japan. The political difficulties of North Korea, Afghanistan, India-Pakistan relations, and China-Taiwan tension means that Asia is potentially one of the most insecure areas in the world. Japan has

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134 Data compiled from statistics available at UNDPKO website “Troop and Police Contributors.”

* I included each of the UN peacekeeping missions Japan was involved in and used their highest number of personnel each had between 2000 and 2010.

135 Data from Annual Review of Global Peace Operation 2011, 121


a strong interest in maintaining peace in the region both for economic and political reasons.\textsuperscript{138}

Japan, however, seems to have reluctance in making a long-term and large commitments to Africa. Whereas 73.4\% of UN personnel go to Africa, only 3.1\% of Japanese personnel went to Africa, including electoral observers. Japan has only two UNMIS officers in Africa as part of a mission. Instead, Japan’s contributions to Africa have been in the form of temporary election observers and materials rather than troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan and relief contributions in five occasions. Such a pattern does not break the image of checkbook diplomacy Japan was blamed for during the Gulf War. At the same time, Japan can hardly be criticized as the only contributing member to put the majority of its resources and troops into areas of highest priority to its national interests.

As for non-UN missions, Japan’s contributions are heavily concentrated in the Middle East (see Figure 4.6). Japan’s emphasis on the Middle East reflects Japan’s commitment to the country’s dependence on oil from the region. In fact, Japan’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil is overwhelmingly high compared to other countries. Shipments of oil from the Middle East account for 86\% of Japan’s supply, while the figures for other nations, including France (28\%), the United States (24\%), Germany (11\%), and Britain (6\%), are much lower. Ishizuka et al explain that Japan would be the most adversely affected if the situation in Iraq or its neighboring countries were to worsen and instability in the Middle East as a region were to grow. Should the world plunge into widespread fear of

\textsuperscript{138} Ishizuka, “Japan and UN Peace Operations,” 153.
terrorism, the global economy would probably shrink. This would give a direct blow to the Japanese economy, which relies on international markets.\textsuperscript{139}

![Figure 4.6 (Left): Deployment of Japanese Civilian Staffs to Non-UN Peacekeeping 2000-2010](image)

![Figure 4.7 (Right): Deployment of Troops, Military Observers, Civilian Police, and Civilian Staff in Non-UN Operations 2009](image)

While its primary focus remains South Asia and the Middle East, Japan since February 2010 has sent over 200 troops and in-kind contributions to Haiti, implying Japan’s desire to go beyond Asia. MINUSTAH worked especially well for Japan post January 2010 earthquake because Japan could assist in the natural disaster relief and reconstruction efforts that are safe and are clearly under the five principles of peace cooperation, with no threat of violence. Japan’s achievements in Haiti – cleaning sites, providing medical aid, and reconstructing infrastructures such as schools – prove that Japan has the capacity to help especially in reconstruction, which does not conflict with the constitution or political debates.

\textsuperscript{139} Ishiba et al, “Sending the Self-Defense Forces Overseas,” Japan Echo, Vol. 33, No. 6, October 2006

\textsuperscript{140} Data from SIPRI, Multilateral Peace Operations Database.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
In analyzing regional interests, a more comprehensive data on whether other countries such as the United States also have regional priorities would be helpful. Most likely, all countries have certain regions they prioritize more than others do and Japan’s focus on South Asia is not out of the ordinary.

**Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Piracy Efforts**

Japan’s participation in Iraq and the Replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean have contributed to the US-led “war on terror.” In Iraq, Japan for the first time deployed up to 600 SDF personnel to a country in war. Between March 2003 and January 2011, Japan transported relief supplies and provided medical care, water supply, and assistance for recovery and improvement of public infrastructure. Colonel Atushi Hikita who served in Iraq described the Japanese Air Self Defense Force’s airlift operations in Iraq as a “breakthrough operation.” He said that Japan’s successful contributions, as well as lessons from mistakes in Iraq have given Japan the experience and confidence it can use to “step up” an increase Japan’s international peace efforts in the future.\(^\text{142}\)

In the Indian Ocean, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces replenished military vessels of all countries engaged in anti-terrorist measure with ship fuel, fuel for helicopters on ships, and water. From December 2001 to January 2010, Japan supplied fuel for military vessels around 1,100 times amounting to about 537,000KL of fuel, fuel for helicopters on ships over 100 times amounting to 1,400KL.\(^\text{143}\) Japan’s anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden have also protected over 1,000 ships from attacks and have increased

\(^{142}\) Hikita, “The Meaning of the JASDF’s Airlift Operations in Iraq and the JASDF’s Future Challenges.”

\(^{143}\) Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2010*
Japan’s cooperation with other countries. Nevertheless, the number of overall piracy attacks in the Gulf has actually increased drastically by a 36-fold jump in five years despite the presence of various multinational ships. These ransoms have raised costs of shippers and the threat to vessels carrying 20 percent of the world trade. Although Japan’s efforts are commendable, there seems to be a need for better, faster, and larger strategies in dealing with piracy. Japan can help brainstorm other ways to deal with piracy to demonstrate its desire for a more serious leadership position and prove its qualifications for permanent UN Security Council membership.

Japan’s efforts in Iraq and the Indian Ocean reflected Japan’s commitment to the international community while it enforced its special security ties with the United States. Japan needs the US support especially in solving the worsening North Korean crisis. As Colonel Hikita said, Japan’s participation in a country in war suggests new possibilities for Japan’s future participation in peace operations. Their success could translate into further law reforms that allow the Japanese forces to participate in more military efforts.

Though the change from zero to three force deployments to non-UN missions in the 21st century was significant, Japan’s future efforts in the field remains to be seen, especially now that its efforts in Iraq and the Indian Ocean have ended. Whether Japan would be willing to participate actively in other non-UN peacekeeping or outside Asia seems not highly likely in the near future considering Japan’s record now with little experience outside the UN and Asia. In addition, Japan is more likely to contribute its personnel and

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144 Ibid., 244
resources to US requests, and Africa is not as strong of a priority to the US as was Iraq and Afghanistan in the first decade of the century.

**Election Observers**

Japan has shown commitment to peacekeeping and democracy also by participating in numerous election observations, not only in Asia but also in Africa and East Europe. The numbers below show Japan’s increasing participation over the years. Out of the ten missions listed in table 4.1, only one (Kosovo) was a non-UN election observation. Japan prefers working with the UN than regional organizations. Regionally, Japan participated in two African elections in the latter part of the decade. This could imply that Japan is trying to expand its efforts into Africa as well. Election observation is a relatively safe way through which Japan could contribute to peacekeeping as well as democracy development. More participation in this sector could help boost Japan’s image without using force. Overall, the upward trend is encouraging and further increased efforts in this category are likely to be seen.

**Table 4.2 Japan's Participation in Election and Referendum Observation 2000-2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2000</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2001</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2001</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2002</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2006</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2007</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2007</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

146 Data from data available at the IPCHQ website, http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/operations/operations.html..
### Civilian Staff

According to the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* 2005 to 2011, there were 15 Japanese citizens working in the UNDPKO and DFS headquarters in 2010, an increase from 11 staffs in 2005.\(^{147}\) Japanese staff represent less than 2% of the overall headquarter staffs (Figures 4.8 and 4.9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Staffs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2008</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2011</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Political Missions, Japan ranks 22nd with 13 staffs in 2010 (See Table 4.3). Unfortunately, there are no further details on their positions or duties. As the second largest financial contributor to the UN and the UNDPKO efforts, Japan should be providing more staffs, closer to the number of staffs the United States and United Kingdom provide, 184 and 47 respectively. International staffs in political missions mainly participate in political planning and do not engage in violent environments. If Japan wants to be a leader in the

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\(^{147}\) Data from CIC, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operation* 2006 to 2011.  
\(^{148}\) Ibid.  
\(^{149}\) Ibid.
international arena, it should develop its public interest and capacity to participate more in
civilian positions. The issue of human resources is discussed more in detail in the
conclusion chapter.

### Table 4.3: National Representation of International Staff
in UN Political Missions - 31 Jan. 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, the list of Japanese civilian participation in multilateral peace missions
compiled in SIPRI has little detail (see Table 4.4). The Japanese government does
courage Japanese employment in international organization but does not seem to keep
track of individual civilian staff deployments. Therefore, the data is incomplete.
Nonetheless, Japan did have at least one civilian staff in the following 13 multilateral
missions (“?” indicates there was at least one person but the exact number is unknown). It
shows that Japan could participate more in peacekeeping not only through the Japanese
government or troops but also through civilian venues.

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150 Data from CIC, *Review of Political Missions* 2010.
Table 4.4: Japanese Civilian Staff in Multilateral Peace Missions 2000–2009\textsuperscript{151}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>'00</th>
<th>'01</th>
<th>'02</th>
<th>'03</th>
<th>'04</th>
<th>'05</th>
<th>'06</th>
<th>'07</th>
<th>'08</th>
<th>'09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNSMA</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Mission to Croatia</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Mission - Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE Spillover Monitor to Skopje</td>
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</table>

Training of Peacekeepers

Japan sent officers to Mali and Egypt as instructors. Japan has also provided assistance amounting to $20 million for training centers in Mali, Egypt, Ghana, Cameroon, Benin, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa. In total, there have been 20 Japanese officers sent to five different centers.\textsuperscript{152} Such contributions are commendable as many peacekeepers lack training and preparation upon departing for missions. Japan can provide trained officers as well as resources to help peacekeepers and address existing issues of conduct as well as lack of skills and resources. One weakness of the Japanese trainers, however, is that they have no experience in combat environments and thus have only limited scope from which to train the peacekeepers – although this may not be especially problematic as UN peacekeepers are engaged rarely in high-intensity conflict. Nonetheless, Japan has a lot of technical and disciplinary expertise that are worth sharing.

\textsuperscript{151} Data from SIPRI, Multilateral Peace Operations Database.
\textsuperscript{152} MOFA, “Additional Assistance to Peacekeeping Centers in Africa, August 16, 2010.”
Two years of efforts do not provide sufficient evidence to analyze in depth, but Japan’s contributions to training centers could be an increasing and long-term commitment for Japan. Japan should expand such training efforts. At the same time, the international community should hold in higher regard such contribution to peacekeeping training.

In-Kind Contributions

Over the years, Japan has made many in-kind contributions. The trend seems to be going upward with more contributions made during the second half of the decade with larger quantities (See table 4.5). Such contributions have significant impact in the lives of refugees and conflict-affected persons. Overall, according to the IPCHQ, Japan made in-kind contributions to only UN peacekeeping missions and UN agencies. Japan also contributed oil in the refueling efforts in the Indian Ocean. Relief materials are constantly in need and can help in conflict areas to which the Japanese SDF cannot deploy. Japan should consider giving more in the future.

Table 4.5: Japan’s Record of Contributions in Kind under the International Peace Cooperation law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient / Purpose</th>
<th>Cabinet Decision</th>
<th>Item and Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Afghanistan</td>
<td>23 Mar. 2001</td>
<td>Tents (160 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Blankets (1,200 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plastic sheets (1,600 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Pakistan for Afghan refugees</td>
<td>4 Oct. 2001</td>
<td>Tents (315 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Blankets (200 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sleeping mats (20 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jelly cans (400 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plastic sheets (75 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 Oct. 2001</td>
<td>Tents (500 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Jordan and Syria for Iraqi refugees</td>
<td>28 Mar. 2003</td>
<td>Tents (160 sets)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Item Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Chad for Sudanese refugees</td>
<td>5 Oct. 2004</td>
<td>Tents (700 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
<td>29 Jul. 2005</td>
<td>Landmine detectors (60 sets), All wheel drive vehicles (27 units), Large tents (20 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Sri Lanka</td>
<td>31 Oct. 2006</td>
<td>Sleeping mats (10,000 sheets), Jelly cans (10,000 sets), Plastic sheets (4,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Darfur, Sudan</td>
<td>6 Nov. 2007</td>
<td>Blankets (10,000 sheets), Sleeping mats (10,000 sheets), Jelly cans (10,000 sets), Plastic sheets (4,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Iraq</td>
<td>28 Dec. 2007</td>
<td>Tents (1,000 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR in Sudan</td>
<td>28 Oct. 2008</td>
<td>Water purifiers (60 sets, including spare filters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA in Gaza for Palestinian affected people</td>
<td>23 Jan. 2009</td>
<td>Blankets (29000 sheets), Sleeping mats (20,000 sheets), Plastic sheets (8,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM in Sri Lanka</td>
<td>15 May 2009</td>
<td>Tents (560 sets), Jelly cans (30,000 sets), Plastic sheets (4,000 sheets), Sleeping mats (10,000 sheets)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary**

Japan’s contributions to peacekeeping in the last decade have increased overall. Japan was involved in more missions and election observations and made more in-kind contributions than in previous decades. In the 21st century, Japan contributed to not only UN peacekeeping operations but also non-UN multilateral missions in Iraq, the Indian Ocean, and Somalia. Japan’s peacekeeping efforts strongly focus in South Asia and the Middle East. The recent deployment of over 200 SDF engineers to Haiti and election observers to Africa imply that Japan is trying to go beyond Asia. Nevertheless, the commitment seems low. In particular, UN peacekeeping missions are mostly located in Africa, yet Japan sends only two officers (to UNMIS) in the entire continent.
In terms of money, Japan’s financial contributions increased over the 2005–2010 period and Japan paid about 16% of both the UN general and peacekeeping budgets every year. In terms of the percentage of GNI, Japan covered about 0.02% of its GNI to UN contributions in 2008. Although Japan was third in absolute dollars in the ranking by the Norway Permanent Mission to the United Nations, it paid the lowest percentage of GNI compared to the 8 other countries listed. If Japan wants to prove its strong commitment to the United Nations, it should increase contributions in order to demonstrate that Japan is using its full capacity to participate in international cooperation. One indicator of a high use of capacity is the percentage of GNI contributed to the United Nations efforts. Japan should look more at how much it can contribute without being caught too much in the fact that it pays more than other countries in terms of absolute value.

Japan ranks 10th in the number of staffs in UN political missions and represents less than 2% in DPKO and DFS headquarters. As the second largest financial contributor to the UN general and peacekeeping budget, Japan should set higher goals in civilian staff participation. Considering its population and resources, Japan should aim to be the second largest contributors of civilian staffs. While increasing troop numbers might be legally challenging, increasing personnel and resources in areas such as electoral observation, logistics, researching, security reform, policing, and training have no legal issues. Japan must make more effort in informing citizens and encouraging them to participate in international efforts.

Finally, one aspect in which Japan started to get actively involved is the training of peacekeeping. Although Japanese personnel do not have experience in combat operations, they have a lot of technical and disciplinary expertise worth sharing. The upward trend in
monetary and trainer contributions to training centers in Africa is very encouraging. Japan should make training a priority for its efforts since it has the resources and personnel to take lead in the issue.
Conclusion: Assessment and Future Directions

Using the historical background, data, and trends described in the previous chapters, I now assess Japan’s current contributions to peacekeeping. To do so, I compare Japan’s recent interests and promises toward peacekeeping to its actual contributions, identifying the strengths and weaknesses. At the same time, I identify the challenges Japan faces and recommendations on how to overcome them. Overall, Japan in the 21st century has expressed its commitment to a) deploy more personnel to UN peacekeeping operations; b) make efforts in strengthening peacekeeping capabilities; c) develop human resources for peacekeeping and peacebuilding; and d) contribute actively and intellectually to the review of peacekeeping operations. Then, I discuss the future directions of Japan’s contributions to peacekeeping looking at factors that hold particular influence on the outlook – US-Japan relations, the Security Council reform, and public opinion – while I make recommendations.

Deployment of More Personnel and Efforts to Strengthen Capabilities

Japan has deployed personnel to more peace operations over the years. The actual number of personnel has not increased steadily. Instead, there have been certain months in which Japan sent a large number of troops to missions that were of strong interest to Japan. Particularly, Japan shows reluctance to make larger commitments of SDF to farther, more dangerous missions in Africa. On the other hand, Japan has increased its capacity and participation in not only transport assistance but also relief efforts, reconstruction, replenishment, medical, election observation, oil replenishment, and anti-piracy efforts.
Toshihisa Takata, General-Director of International Peace Cooperation Headquarters of the Cabinet Office, is confident that Japan’s diligent and earnest work has been highly praised by countries and assures that “Japan will extend as much cooperation as possible” as long as they are needed.\footnote{Japanese Gov’t Internet TV. “In Pursuit of International Peace - PKO Assignment in the Golan Heights.”} Australian Major-General Wolfgang Jilke, the Force Commander of UNDOF, confirms Japan’s strengths in peacekeeping efforts:

> It’s a big pleasure having the Japanese contingent here because they are doing an excellent job. The Japanese contingent is providing highly skilled and loyal soldiers, which is the big advantage for me as the force commander. Every time I give a task to the Japanese, I know exactly that it’s done. The mobility of the force and for being able to implement my policy of prevention, it is key and vital that we are able to be quickly on the spot. To be able to be quickly on the spot, one of the preconditions is to have proper communication. The Japanese contingent is providing this. To summarize…we’d be in a very bad position not having the Japanese.\footnote{Ibid.}

On the other hand, according to scholar Chiyuki Aoi, Japan’s participation in military and strategic term remains “extremely limited, to the frustration of its allies and partners in the United Nations.”\footnote{Ibid., 73.} The SDF cannot perform full range of activities normally asked of military organizations, such as protection of civilians and enforcing area security. Japan’s activities are limited to non-offensive tasks such as logistical support and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. Thus, a gap exists between the Japanese personnel and the military organizations from other nations operating in the same field.\footnote{Ibid., 73.} Aoi and Yoshinobu Yamamoto claim that Japan pursues an “activism-lite,” meaning that Japan tends “to pursue its security goals on the cheap, without paying the full costs in legal, political, an institutional transformation.”\footnote{Yamamoto, “Japan’s Activism Lite: Bandwagoning the United States,” 127-65.}
Clearly, Japan does what it does very well, mostly in logistics and relief efforts. However, it has deficiencies when it comes to military efforts. In increasing deployment of personnel and to strengthening capabilities, the solution need not necessarily be greater military participation. In fact, there are many non-military ways Japan can increase its role in peacekeeping without conflicting with its constitution.

In particular, developing more Japanese civilian staffs must be considered seriously. The need for more and better civilian staffs and the options in doing so are strongly highlighted in the March 2011 “Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of the Conflict: Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group” that reviewed the civilian capacities provided by the international community in the immediate aftermath of conflict. The review analyzed “how the United Nations and the international community can help to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts to support the immediate capacity development needs of countries emerging from conflict,” and made concrete recommendations for improvement.

Specifically, the report states that the UN and the international community must support and enable national capacities; align more closely with national priorities; support core government functions and maximize their economic impact. The report recommends creating faster, effective deployment of UN Member States’ civilian capacities; developing an efficient mechanism for partnerships; and investing in triangular South-South cooperation mechanisms, as well as training and outreach. Moreover, necessary is clarity on who does what, stronger accountability for results, and better

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160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
training leaders. Finally, the report recommends the development of a “cooperative emergency” model and build career paths to retain talented staff.\textsuperscript{162} Japan could contribute in all the aspects mentioned in the report.

**Development of Human Resources**

The challenge in expanding Japan’s peacekeeping efforts further is reflected in the low Japanese civilian staff participation. Although Japan is the second largest financial contributor to the United Nations general and peacekeeping budgets, the number of Japanese UN civilian staff remains low. There is a lack of Japanese personnel who possess the expertise and experience necessary to participate in international peace cooperation. This is attributed to many factors in the human resources sector.

Although many young Japanese people are interested in and enthusiastic about international cooperation, they do not take active part in international peace cooperation. According to MOFA, “they lack the opportunity to gain information about what career path they should choose and what skills they need to acquire in order to prepare themselves to engage in activities of this kind.”\textsuperscript{163} Japan needs to expand its recruitment base and manpower pool in the field.

In the recent years, there have been increased efforts in this field. In fact, MOFA established the Recruitment Center for International Organizations in 1974 to recruit Japanese staff to reach appropriate Japanese representation in international organizations. The Center has increased its visibility in the recent years through its website, email

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.

communication, as well as seminars regarding international organizations and employment in them. I personally found useful their recruitment seminar in which Japanese students could ask questions about working in international organizations and how to go about it. Nowadays, recruiters from MOFA go talk to most major universities and locations, including those abroad.

MOFA also offers training to Japanese citizens. For example, the Program for Human Resource Development in Asia for Peacebuilding, commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trains individuals from Japan and other Asian countries as professional civilian peacebuilders through the Coursework in Japan and Overseas. Upon completion of the six-week main course, Japanese and Asian colleagues are sent abroad to peacebuilding activities around the world, including those in Sudan and Sierra Leone. Additionally, various personnel databases that contain people with interests and skills in participating in international peace cooperation efforts exist in organizations such as International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (IPCHQ) of the Cabinet Office; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT); and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

Such efforts clearly imply Japan’s commitment to develop human resources in peacekeeping. However, there are many challenges that remain. While information is available for those who already have interest, there seems to be not enough proactive education on international organizations or Japan’s efforts toward global peace. Coordination among relevant organizations needs improvement as well. The Government of Japan should strive to make information easily accessible to citizens and study methods for disseminating this information effectively.
Specifically, the Japanese government should forge closer connections among the personnel databases maintained by the offices concerned such as IPCHQ, MOFA, and JICA. It is also important that registered individual information include specific in-depth information such as experience, skills, and desires. These methods should be streamlined across agencies and entered into one large database. Furthermore, there needs to be a study on how to secure a large number of experts and on how to dispatch these individuals for fixed periods of time.164

The biggest constraint is the inflexibility of schools or companies in allowing deployments. People who want to serve abroad should be supported. For example, it is important to establish a system in which public servants can take a secondment for the purpose of participating in international peace cooperation activities. There also needs an adequate positive importance attached to participation in such activities in their career paths. A system to support private company employees who choose to leave their jobs for fixed periods of time and take part in international peace cooperation activities should be considered. Currently, people are afraid of losing their employment status or missing their promotion opportunities if they go abroad on such service. Japan should develop a civilian response corps like the United States and the United Kingdom governments have.165

The Government of Japan should try to increase understanding and support for such activities by explaining these points to a broad spectrum of citizens. A culture that views participation in international cooperation as a positive effort and prestige in career development must be created. In addition to prestige, Japan might have to compensate

165 For more information, see US Civilian Response Corps website at http://www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/ and UK Stabilization Unit website at http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/
some money to experts such as medics. In a seminar in Washington, DC, Col. Akita mentioned that it was hard to recruit even within the Self-Defense Forces medics to go abroad because they could easily quit the SDF and find safer and higher-paying jobs in Japan. If going abroad became prestigious, people would be more inclined to do so.

**Active Contributions in Intellectual Initiatives and Review of Peacekeeping**

Japan served as a chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations in 2009 and 2010 and continues to encourage discussion on enhancement of cooperation with personnel contributing countries and other stakeholders today. In addition, Japan takes intellectual initiatives such as the promotion of the idea of “human security,” a concept that focuses on the safety and dignity of individuals at all times. Under Japanese leadership, the UN Trust Fund for Human Security and the Commission on Human Security were created.

Moreover, since 2009, Japan has sent personnel from the SDF and civilians as instructors to PKO training centers in Egypt, Ghana, and Mali. Additionally, Japan provides assistance to peacekeeping training centers in eight African countries (Ghana, Mali, Kenya, Egypt, Rwanda, Benin, Nigeria and South Africa) and Malaysia.

Japan has intelligent capacities that could be used in various ways. It should take more leadership in the research, analysis, and innovation of peace efforts as well as share its skills and knowledge to future peacekeepers. It could also take lead in developing a live

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166 Hikita, “The Meaning of the JASDF’s Airlift Operations in Iraq and the JASDF’s Future Challenges.”
167 MOFA, “Opening Remarks by Mr. Koichi Takemasa State Secretary for Foreign Affairs.”
online database for peacekeeping data and updates. These propositions tie in closely with the recommendations from the 2011 Civilian Capacity Review mentioned earlier.\footnote{Senior Advisory Group,” Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict.”}

**Future Directions**

The biggest debate in terms of Japanese participation today in peacekeeping revolves around the use of force. The current International Peace Cooperation Law limits to Japan’s participation to traditional peacekeeping operations where a ceasefire, consent of the conflict parties, and impartiality exist. The law contains a rigid list of tasks out of which Japanese personnel are not permitted to act upon. The list does not cover many focus areas of UN peace operations today such as protecting UN facilities and personnel, civilians, and freedom of movement. UN peacekeeping operations today involve a wider range of security-related tasks such as re-seizing key facilities, assisting the national police, riot control, enforced investigations, disarmament, arrest, and detention.\footnote{Aoi, “Beyond “Activism-Lite”,” 92.} If Japan opts for vigorous international security efforts, constitutional changes will be necessary, and public support for PKOs will be necessary. An increase in the military budget would be needed as well to allow for further training and equipment.

While constitutional debates on the use of force is important, Japan has so much to offer without conflicting with the constitution. Japan could take leadership in reviewing past operations as well as determining the appropriateness of future actions in a given situation. Japan could increase its financial and in-kind contributions. Japan may also participate in the maintenance of economic sanctions. Increasing its financial and technical assistance to training and equipment of peacekeepers is a likely possibility as well. In order
to develop regional leadership and confidence, Japan could conduct joint military exercises with its neighbors. Moreover, Japan can take role in tasks such as election monitoring, civilian policing, infrastructure construction, goods transportation, and medical relief. There is no need to center our debates on the military or the constitutional issue. What Japan first needs to determine is what its top priorities are and what Japan can do that significantly contributes to peacekeeping, whether in military or non-military aspects. These questions must be discussed actively in the political as well as public arena before diving straight to the debate on the constitutionality of SDF deployments.

The outlook of Japan’s participation in peacekeeping depends on how well Japan tackles the commitments it expressed. In doing so, three factors that will influence Japanese policy in the future are the US-Japan relations, UN Security Council reform, and public opinion.

**US-Japan Relations:** Because Japan does not have a military, it has been dependent on its close relations with the United States with regard to military security. Recently, both countries have considered efforts to revise the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation in joint participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Working with the US military under the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty has had clear political advantages for Japanese leaders because the public supports the treaty. Additionally, access to US sea and airlift capabilities are especially helpful for the SDF, which has a limited number of large transport aircraft and ships. Looking at Japan’s recent involvement in the Multinational Force operations in Iraq, the oil replenishments for anti-terrorism efforts, and anti-piracy mission, Japan demonstrates its loyalty to the US.
Whether Japan will participate more in peacekeeping and how will be in part dependent on the US relationship with the UN. If the US shows strong interest in one region or country, Japan is likely to support it. Thus, how US responds to UN issues and how much the US pressures Japan to contribute more forces and resources to peacekeeping will shape Japan’s future efforts. A separate study should analyze whether Japan does peacekeeping more because it genuinely wants to or because it wants to share a burden with the US.

**UN Security Council Reform:** In the current effort to reform the UN Security Council, most proposals call for expansion in the number of permanent members from the present five. As the second largest financial contributor to the United Nations, Japan naturally believes it has a claim to one of the new permanent seats. If Japan increases its military contributions to peacekeeping, Japan likely would have a higher chance in getting the permanent seat. Conversely, if a proposal is eventually passed and Japan does join the Security Council, MOFA may argue that Japan must cut back on the restrictions on the SDF in order to expand its general participation in UN collective security actions.\(^{172}\) If Japan gains a permanent membership, Japan’s increase international prestige may garner the support of political leaders and general public toward such expansion.

**Public Opinion:** According to Maull, the political culture of Japan is less permissive towards the use of military force, than is the case in other countries. Although continued participation may help to change this attitude, the possibility exists that it will

\(^{172}\) Heinrich, *UN Peace-keeping Operations*, 32
not, and should casualties occur, the Japanese public will react very negatively. Therefore, should the military path be chosen, politicians must find ways to institutionalize public support so that tragedies will not undermine Japan’s continued participation.

Throughout the decade, the Japanese public opinion on Japan’s participation of peacekeeping activities has remained stable, with a slight increase in support. The majority (94.0%) of the population surveyed by the government of Japan in 2010 thought that Japan should continue to participate in peacekeeping (see Figure 5.1). Public approval of peacekeeping activities is clear and there are many who support more involvement, increasing from 22.1% in 2003 to 34.2% in 2010. The upward trend suggests more room for deploying additional troops and getting involved in more peace operations. Another important number in the surveys is the decline in the percentage of people who answered, “do not know.” This downward trend could suggest that more Japanese citizens are informed about peacekeeping and Japan’s efforts toward global peace. Current efforts to disseminate more information about these efforts should be increased further.
Nevertheless, how truly influential public opinion in Japan is remains unclear. In the case of Iraq, domestic opposition to the deployment was strong. According to Asahi Shimbun, on 10-11 December 2003, immediately following Koizumi’s decision to dispatch the SDF, only 34% of Japanese agreed with the decision and 55% opposed it.\textsuperscript{174} Prime Minister Koizumi announced his support for the U.S. military attack on Iraq despite the fact that most Japanese citizens opposed to it. Koizumi stated in the Diet, “If I follow public opinion, I will make a mistake. Even though the majority of citizens do not

understand my decision, I have to carry out the policy which needs to be implemented.”

The coalition government, consisting of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Clean Government Party (Komeito), passed the Iraq support bill in July authorizing dispatch of the SDF to Iraq, which occurred in January 2007.

On the other hand, the SDF’s deployment to Iraq did not topple the LDP-Komeito Coalition in the November 2003 lower house elections. If most Japanese citizens opposed the war as well as the SDF’s dispatch to Iraq, they could have voted the LDP-Komeito government out of office, thereby blocking the deployment. Instead, the coalition won a majority of seats in the Diet. This is very puzzling because according to liberal-democratic theorists, the public is supposed to influence a government’s policy through elections in a democratic country.

Ishibashi explained that at the time of the November 2003 lower-house election, the Japanese public was most concerned with Japan’s long economic recession, unemployment, and the welfare system. With regard to security policies, although a majority opposed Japan’s involvement in Iraq, in light of the North Korean threat and Japan’s growing rivalry with China, there was still widespread support for the US-Japan Security Treaty as the linchpin of Japan’s defense policy. Given the number of issues in play, Ishibashi explained that their relative impact on the vote depended upon the ability of various policy advocates to present them skillfully to the electorate.

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176 Ibid., 766.
177 Ibid., 767.
178 Ibid., 778.
179 Ibid., 788.
Nonetheless, whether public opinion did not matter at all in the government’s overall Iraq policy is not clear. Even though negative public opinion regarding dispatch of the SDF did not affect the election outcome, the government’s policy seemed to stay within certain broad parameters of public opinion. In order to appease the public and the opposition parties, Prime Minister Koizumi emphasized over and over again in the Diet that the SDF would go to Iraq to help with reconstruction, not to participate in any combat operations, although he was unable to guarantee the safety of the SDF personnel.\textsuperscript{180}

More recently, in the aftermath of the 11 March 2011 Tohoku-Pacific earthquake and tsunami tragedy, Japan has seen a large inflow of foreign assistance. More people are now aware and very thankful of relief efforts and international cooperation. Being in the receiving end of assistance for once may be opening people’s eyes to the importance of international cooperation and the benefits of helping others even when Japan might be doing well. The 2011 survey might see significant changes in public opinion toward relief efforts as well as peacekeeping. If so, the case for more campaign and education about international peace efforts would be strong. How much public opinion truly influences Japanese foreign policy and how public opinion can be shifted merits an in-depth study. Such an understanding could help us better predict and shape public opinion and Japan’s future participation in peacekeeping.

**Conclusion**

Since Japan was accused of resorting to “checkbook diplomacy” in the Gulf War and passed the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, it has become a more active

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 789.
player in international security. Japan has participated in numerous peace operations, humanitarian relief, and disaster relief efforts abroad.

Overall, in the 21st century, Japan’s military and civilian personnel contributions have been low in relation to its high financial contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget. Moreover, Japan tends to participate in missions that suit its high priorities of Asian security, economic security, and US-Japan alliance. Japan’s efforts are highly concentrated in Asia, specifically South Asia and the Middle East. Outside of the UN, Japan’s efforts aligned closely with the US operations in anti-terrorism. Even though Africa hosts most UN peacekeeping operations, Japan’s personnel contributions to Africa remained almost non-existent. Japan’s willingness to go beyond Asia exists but is limited to safer missions such as the relief operations in Haiti.

Political debates on peacekeeping tend to focus on the constitutionality of the deployment of the SDF and the use of force. Japan’s contributions to peacekeeping are only in part about the constitutional debate. In fact, how different Japan’s contributions would be without the constitutional constraints is unclear. The result may be not so different, especially considering Japan’s low participation in civilian positions. In reality, the argument on the constitutional debate and the public anti-militarism does not justify Japan’s low participation in peacekeeping. Increasing majority of the population surveyed support Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping, and Japan has the capacity to participate in the efforts in all kinds of ways without interfering with the constitution.

Instead of focusing on the legal aspects of use of force, Japan should spend time determining exactly what Japan wants to get out of peacekeeping and what activities Japan is most suited for. In addition to sending more troops abroad, Japan could take leadership in
efforts such as reviewing peacekeeping operations, creating an efficient database, and training peacekeepers. The biggest mission for Japan should be the development of its human resources. As a large financial contributor and visible leader in the international arena, Japan should also be a top contributor in personnel. Japan is especially fit to do so in the civilian staff positions because it has the population and resource to train many highly skilled civilian personnel. If Japan seriously devotes to the development of its human resources, Japanese personnel could be leading actors in all non-military aspects of peacekeeping including planning and reviewing of missions, research, transportation, logistics, electoral observation, policing, training of local officers, medical assistance, and reconstruction of infrastructure. At the same time, the international community must recognize all aspects, not only military, of peacekeeping contributions as valuable.


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